By Vali Kaleji

The construction of the first phase of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline (TAPI) gas pipeline constitutes a key component of the Taliban's broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects that were suspended following their return to power. The successful implementation of these initiatives is expected to enhance the internal legitimacy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, unlike the preceding two decades, the leadership of Pakistan and India have not participated in the construction of the first phase of the TAPI gas pipeline. Adopting a pragmatic and incremental approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance this energy transfer project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in a phased manner. It appears that Pakistan and India have cautiously opted to wait and watch regarding their involvement in the TAPI gas pipeline.

BACKGROUND:  The transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas resources to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India has faced numerous challenges over the past three decades and remains unimplemented. This initiative has been referred to by various names over time, including “Trans Afghan” (1995), “Consortium of Central Asia Gas Pipeline, CentGas” (1997), “Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline, TAGP” (2002), and TAPI (2010). These projects proposed the construction of a 1,814 kilometer pipeline to transport natural gas from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gas field, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. The Afghan section of the pipeline, spanning 816 kilometers, will traverse the provinces of Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar. The pipeline will enter from Quetta in Balochistan and pass through Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Fazilka, a city at Indian border 150 kilometers from Multan. From Fazilka, the pipeline will enter India. 

The pipeline was designed with an estimated annual transmission capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm). It will supply 5 percent of the gas to Afghanistan, 47.5 percent to Pakistan, and 47.5 percent to India during its 30-year operational period. Afghanistan will receive 500 million cubic meters of gas for the first decade, 1 bcm in the second decade, and 1.5 bcm in the third decade. 

To implement the TAPI pipeline project, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and India’s Vice President Hamid Ansari convened in 2015, in Turkmenistan’s remote Karakum Desert, to inaugurate the proposed pipeline. However, the construction was hindered by several factors, including financial constraints, insecurity in Afghanistan, and the terrorist activities of groups such as the Taliban, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, persistent tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, further obstructed the project’s progress.

A decade later, on September 10, 2024, the construction of the Serhetabat-Herat section of TAPI was inaugurated on the border of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. The ceremony was attended by Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, as well as the Acting Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammed Hasan Akhund.

Unlike the earlier inauguration, the leaders of Pakistan and India were notably absent from this event. The ceremony marked the commencement of TAPI’s first phase, spanning from Serhetabat (formerly Gushgy) in Turkmenistan to Herat in Afghanistan. The subsequent three phases are planned to extend the pipeline from Herat to Helmand, from Helmand to Kandahar, and finally from Kandahar to the Pakistan border.

Adopting a pragmatic and phased approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance the TAPI project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in four distinct stages. This incremental strategy enables the Taliban regime to demonstrate its political resolve, operational capacity, and ability to ensure the security of the project to Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India.

Over the past two years, the Taliban has achieved significant milestones, including the completion of the first phase of the TAP-500 energy system project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan), the inauguration of the Herat Noor-ul-Jihad Substation and Turkmenistan electricity transmission project, the opening of a 177-meter railway bridge on the Serhetabat–Torghundi railway at the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, the initiation of the Shatlyk-1 gas compressor station construction at the Shatlyk field in Mary Province, the launch of a fiber-optic communication line along the Serhetabat-Herat route, and the commencement of the 22-kilometer Torghundi-Sanabar railway construction, marking the first segment of the Torghundi-Herat railway.

These accomplishments have likely bolstered the Taliban’s confidence as they proceed with the implementation of the first phase of TAPI.

IMPLICATIONS:  The project is a critical element of the Taliban’s broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects, including CASA-1000 (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission line), the Lazorde project (linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), the Chabahar port transit initiative (connecting Afghanistan, Iran, and India), and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan railway route. These projects, which were suspended following the Taliban's return to power, are expected to generate employment and income for various provinces in Afghanistan, thereby bolstering the Taliban’s domestic legitimacy. 

In line with these efforts, the Taliban declared a public holiday in Herat province on September 11, 2024, coinciding with the inauguration of TAPI’s first phase. This move appears to reflect a deliberate effort at public diplomacy or propaganda, aimed at showcasing the Taliban’s commitment to national development and infrastructure revival.

If TAPI becomes operational, it will create jobs for over 12,000 Afghans, and the project could generate approximately US$ 1 billion annually in revenue for the country. This gas supply will be crucial for meeting the energy needs of urban and rural areas, as well as supporting industrial and production centers in densely populated and strategically important regions such as Herat, Helmand, and Kandahar.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of significant energy transfer and transit projects, such as TAPI, holds the potential to strengthen the Taliban’s diplomatic and economic ties with neighboring countries. Such developments are particularly critical for the Taliban leadership, given its international isolation. 

An important aspect of the TAPI project is the decision to construct its four phases without reliance on international financial aid. Both Turkmenistan and the Taliban recognize that, given the lack of international recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, securing financial assistance or loans from institutions such as the Asian Development Bank is not feasible. This constraint likely influenced the decision to proceed with the phased implementation of TAPI exclusively within Afghanistan, excluding the active participation of India and Pakistan at this stage.

The construction and operation of the pipeline are overseen by TAPI Pipeline Company Limited (TPCL), based in Dubai. TPCL is a joint venture between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with each country holding a stake in the project. The state-owned company Turkmen Gas holds a dominant 85 percent share in TPCL, while the remaining 15 percent is equally distributed among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Consequently, it is anticipated that TPCL will finance the construction of the four phases of the TAPI pipeline within Afghanistan.

Should the pipeline be extended to Pakistan and India, the financing strategy would likely involve not only allocating the respective shares of Pakistan and India from TPCL but also securing additional funding through financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank to support the broader extension.

Another significant implication of TAPI, even if limited to its four phases within Afghanistan, is the increased diversification of Turkmenistan’s gas export destinations and routes. Over the past three decades, Turkmenistan has developed gas export pipelines along three primary routes: northern (Russia), eastern (China), and western (Iran and Turkey). The implementation of TAPI would establish a new southern route, enhancing Turkmenistan’s gas export network. This diversification is expected to strengthen Turkmenistan’s position in the regional gas market, providing the country with greater leverage and bargaining power in negotiations.

Additionally, Turkmenistan remains attentive to the dynamics of its competitors, particularly Iran. International sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the past, along with unilateral sanctions by the U.S. in recent years, have significantly curtailed Iran’s foreign investment, production, and export capacity. These sanctions have also stalled major gas transmission initiatives, most notably the Peace Pipeline (Iran-Pakistan-India). In this context, the successful implementation of TAPI could position Turkmenistan as a more reliable and influential player in the regional energy market, capitalizing on opportunities that competitors like Iran have been unable to pursue.

However, Turkmenistan will need to secure additional foreign investment to expand its gas production capacity to ensure a sustainable supply for its growing base of gas-consuming customers. The country’s ability to meet this challenge will be crucial as it seeks to maintain its role as a reliable energy supplier in an increasingly competitive regional and global market.

This challenge will become even more pronounced if Turkmenistan succeeds in implementing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project in collaboration with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the European Union. Such a project, aimed at supplying gas to European markets, would further strain Turkmenistan’s production capacity. The increased demand would necessitate significant investments in infrastructure and technology to scale production while ensuring the reliability and sustainability of its gas exports across multiple routes and to diverse markets.

CONCLUSIONS:  The full implementation of TAPI will hinge on several critical factors. These include the political will of the leaders of the four participating countries—Turkmenistan, Afghanistan under Taliban leadership, Pakistan, and India—along with the ability to ensure security throughout all stages of construction and operation. Particular attention must be given to mitigating threats from groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, effective operation and distribution of gas through rural and urban areas, as well as the mobilization of the substantial financial resources required for this ambitious project (estimated at US$ 7 to 8 billion), are essential for its success.

Moreover, the project must remain insulated from the complex and often contentious disputes between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The successful completion of the current four phases of TAPI is seen as a critical test for the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate in demonstrating its capability to execute such a significant energy transfer initiative after three decades of delay.

Pakistan and India are seemingly opting to wait and watch to assess the feasibility and progress of the project under the Taliban’s stewardship. Should the Taliban successfully implement these initial phases, Pakistan and India can be anticipated to join efforts to extend the project further.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

By Stephen Blank

As a second Trump Administration takes power it is worth inquiring of its future policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. While neither region is likely to be a priority of U.S. policy, both offer Washington numerous opportunities to advance its interests, vis-à-vis the regional states as well as the larger actors bordering them, most prominently Russia, China, and Iran. If the incoming administration adheres to the framework that Trump’s first team propounded of this being an era framed by great power competition, it may indeed come to see the value of upgrading U.S. policy towards these countries. Across Central Asia and in the Caucasus, particularly among the Georgian population now rising against its government, and in Armenia, a stronger U.S. profile would certainly be welcome.

BACKGROUND: For Washington to fully benefit from enhanced relations with the governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it must acknowledge and adapt to the current regional realities. These regions have transformed significantly over the past generation, necessitating a rethinking of U.S. engagement strategies. 

First, it is imperative to recognize that Central Asian states, as well as Russia and China, have come to terms with the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and now consider Afghanistan an integral part of Central Asia. Despite Washington’s current reluctance to adopt a similar stance, advancing economic and political engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus creates a foundation for future dialogues involving Afghanistan. These engagements would prepare the groundwork for meaningful regional discussions and collaborations when conditions become favorable.

Second, Azerbaijan is rapidly emerging as a key player in Central Asia. President Aliyev is frequently invited to and actively participates in regional presidential summits and Azerbaijan takes full part in significant regional economic, trade, and transportation initiatives. These projects, either in progress or under serious consideration, underscore Azerbaijan’s importance in shaping the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Consequently, any effective U.S. policy towards the Caucasus or Central Asia must account for these evolving regional dynamics. Recognizing and leveraging the interconnectedness between these regions will allow the U.S. to engage more effectively and with greater agility in advancing its strategic interests.

U.S. policymakers must also rethink both regions in a broader context. Central Asia and the Caucasus have established lasting inter-regional connections and ties to major global actors, including Turkey, Iran, India, South Korea, and Japan, alongside Russia and China. On economic grounds alone, Washington should increase its presence through trade, investment, environmental initiatives, and security cooperation, especially as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecasts robust growth for these states. Wider U.S. engagement is needed in contrast to its neglect for the region during the Afghanistan war—when U.S. policy was narrowly focused—and subsequent disengagement after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban. 

Continued U.S. and Western inattention gives Moscow and Beijing opportunities to solidify hegemonic influence, despite local governments’ explicit preference for multivector foreign policies. While the Biden Administration accepted Kazakhstan’s 5+1 presidential summit, this event has not become a recurring engagement, nor have there been significant high-level visits. Initiatives like the Economic Resilience in Central Asia (ERICEN) program are underfunded and lack alignment with an overarching strategy. This pattern of inadequate resources and strategic disconnect has long characterized U.S. initiatives in the region.

Similarly, strategy documents, such as the Trump Administration’s Central Asia Strategy to 2025, have achieved little, reflecting a lack of both intellectual and institutional commitment to the strategic importance of these regions. This is further evidenced by the absence of a strong U.S. response to Russian interference in Georgia, minimal involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and the overall lack of a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia. Such bipartisan neglect highlights the critical need for a reformed and proactive approach to U.S. policy in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: To reverse this record of failure, the new administration must rethink its approach to these regions, recognizing their growing linkages and the potential of regional and international cooperation. Such collaboration will strengthen these states’ independence from Beijing and Moscow, aligning with vital U.S. interests. However, this objective requires large-scale institutional reform.

The State Department, Pentagon, and the National Security Council should establish a dedicated structure for Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. At the State Department, this would involve appointing an Assistant Secretary of State to oversee this portfolio, to whom the corresponding country desks report directly. In turn, he or she can report directly to the Under Secretary, Secretary of State, their opposite numbers at the Pentagon, and the White House at the National Security Council. Such a structure would elevate these regions’ importance in policymaking and provide the president with a more transparent and effective process for addressing issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

This reorganization would enable an integrated “whole-of-state” approach, ensuring that that U.S. policies align with its strategic interests and that regional voices are heard. It also allows the U.S. government to conduct policies towards these areas based on its interests rather than on the values of junior bureaucrats as in the State Department’s Bureau of Labor and Democracy. Its members previously boasted that they were going to impose democracy on Central Asian states and achieved merely an ignominious failure. They failed because they refused to take into account that every one of these governments has alternatives to Washington and factions within them who lean towards Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, in the absence of sustained U.S. engagement, all that these lectures achieved was increased anti-American resentment and a turn to other powers who took these states as they are. This outcome is visible in U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, which has many other patrons and several pro-Russian figures in its government. Baku spurned Congressional and Administration demands for democratization and subsequently moved closer to Russian policy. Undoubtedly, they saw these demands as moves initiated by this bureau and the Armenian lobby who influenced Congress in the absence of any coherent U.S. strategy.

Structural and intellectual reorganization will allow Washington to engage strategically and consistently with regional governments. By connecting democratization efforts with significant economic, political, and defense projects, these governments will find it harder to forgo the benefits of cooperation. Additionally, this structure minimizes the

influence of single-interest Congressional lobbies by emphasizing comprehensive and strategic policies. As Central Asia and the Caucasus gain prominence, increased administrative capability will enable better collaboration with Congress to shape balanced and forward-looking strategies. A proactive, strategic approach will not only enhance U.S. influence but also support the independence and development of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Addressing the importance of these regions in U.S. policymaking is critical to securing long-term stability and countering hegemonic ambitions by other powers.

CONCLUSIONS: The opportunities of the future and lessons from the past are unmistakable. Previous U.S. policies failed for reasons detailed in academic and professional literature. However, the Trump administration has a chance to respond to the region’s desire for enhanced U.S. economic, political, and military cooperation. Possibly excepting the pro-Moscow Georgian government, every state in the region seeks greater U.S. engagement, albeit on their terms.

This desire signifies a positive development that Washington should support by implementing the structural and policy changes outlined here. These adjustments would bolster the independence of Central Asia and the Caucasus and facilitate their cooperation with international institutions to spur regional development. This progress would empower these states to shape their futures independently, and not according to the wishes of Moscow or Beijing.

Failure to seize these opportunities and continuing inaction will leave these regions vulnerable to becoming backward, conflict-ridden dependents of Russia and China. The new generation, more aligned with Western values, may lose its chance for a brighter future. Rather than becoming stable regions fostering global cooperation, Central Asia and the Caucasus risk devolving into conflict zones where international rivalries escalate.

The U.S. must act decisively to prevent such an outcome. By prioritizing these regions and adopting a proactive strategy, Washington can mitigate great power competition and avert prolonged instability across Eurasia. The stakes are too high to ignore the transformative potential of effective engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Laura Linderman

On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze declared the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, rejecting talks until 2028 and refusing EU budget support. Kobakhidze asserted that Georgia would enter the EU in 2030, "with dignity" - a claim rejected by the vast majority of Georgians who view this as a betrayal of the country's pro-European aspirations.

This decision sparked nationwide protests that reflect the broad public consensus in support of European integration. Demonstrators have gathered in Tbilisi, Batumi, and cities across Georgia, condemning GD's decision and the subsequent police brutality against mostly peaceful protesters. Demonstrations have continued since the announcement, with protesters blocking streets, clashing with riot police, and facing dispersal attempts using water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray. President Salome Zourabichvili has pledged to stay on as Georgian President, emphasizing that the illegitimate Parliament cannot elect a legitimate President.

BACKGROUND:  Prior to the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgia's economy was experiencing double-digit economic growth, despite the fact that most ordinary Georgians live near poverty. This growth was fueled, in part, by financial flows from Russia, including tourism, trade, and potentially sanctions-evading investment. Russia is a significant market for Georgian products like wine, and the influx of Russian money had created a wealthy elite dependent on these financial flows. The economic growth figures helped the Georgian Dream (GD) secure support and acquiescence from some segments of the population.

This dependence on Russian money creates a conflict between Georgia's political aspirations of joining Europe and its economic realities. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia did not produce much that Europe wanted to buy, while Russia was a major consumer of Georgian products. This economic reality, coupled with GD's close ties to Russia, likely contributed to the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, further consolidating its grip on power and jeopardizing Georgia's European future.

The protests that followed Georgian Dream's decision to suspend EU accession negotiations were fueled by a strong desire for EU integration among a distinct majority of the Georgian population. While the GD government maintained its rhetoric about commitment to eventual EU membership, its decision to postpone accession talks until 2028 provoked immediate public anger and confirmed long-standing suspicions that the government lacked genuine commitment to EU integration. The government's ratification of a Russian-style "foreign agents" law over the summer, coupled with its strategic courting of older, rural conservative constituencies more vulnerable to fears of cultural upheaval and potential conflict with Russia, further reinforced the perception that GD was prioritizing appeasement and political expediency over meaningful European alignment.

The timing of the announcement coincided with a European Parliament resolution documenting electoral irregularities. This resolution echoed widespread criticism of the elections, which were marred by concerns about the secrecy of the vote, vote-rigging, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, as reported by international observers. GD's decision, perceived by many as a rejection of the popular will in favor of closer ties with Russia, led to a significant portion of the population demanding immediate progress toward EU membership.

IMPLICATIONS:  Since the November 28^th announcement, numerous civil servants have resigned in protest, including Georgia's ambassadors to the United States, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Italy, Czechia, and the Netherlands. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia imposed sanctions on GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and several high-ranking Interior Ministry officials, barring them from entering their countries. The Baltic states also condemned the suppression of protests and reaffirmed their support for the Georgian people's European aspirations. In addition to these resignations and sanctions, various sectors of Georgian society mobilized in opposition to the GD's decision. Students from universities organized marches and protests, demanding a reversal of the decision and calling on their universities to suspend classes so students could participate in demonstrations. The Georgian Trade Unions Confederation criticized GD's lack of transparency and condemned police violence against protesters. The International Chamber of Commerce in Georgia warned that halting the EU accession process would negatively impact the country's economy and investor confidence. Both major banks, Bank of Georgia and TBC Bank, and leading internet providers Magti and Silknet condemned the government's actions and reaffirmed their commitment to European integration.

The implications of GD’s decision and the subsequent protests are multifaceted and far-reaching:

• Erosion of Democracy: GD’s actions, including the alleged election rigging and violent suppression of protests, have significantly damaged Georgia’s democratic credentials. International observers have expressed concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the shrinking space for civil society in Georgia, especially the ratification of the Russian-style foreign agents law. The use of excessive force against protesters, including journalists, further highlighted the government's disregard for fundamental freedoms.

• Strained EU Relations: The decision to halt EU accession has severely strained Georgia’s relationship with the EU. European officials have condemned GD's move as a betrayal of the Georgian people’s aspirations and a rejection of the country's European future. The suspension of EU budget support and the potential for sanctions against GD leaders further isolate Georgia from its European partners.

• Strained US Relations: The US decision to suspend its Strategic Partnership with Georgia, in response to GD's halt of EU accession negotiations, signals a deterioration in US-Georgia relations and underscores US concerns about GD government's commitment to democratic values and the rule of law. By suspending the partnership, the US aims to pressure the Georgian government to reconsider its actions and to demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles. The suspension also raises questions about the future of US assistance to Georgia, which has been instrumental in supporting the country's democratic and economic development. This move could weaken Georgia's security and stability, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions with Russia. Additionally, it may embolden anti-Western forces within Georgia and undermine the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people

• Geopolitical Realignment and Russian Influence: The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin's praise for GD's decision, just minutes after the announcement, has raised suspicions about potential Russian influence behind the move. The sources also highlight GD's adoption of policies, such as the "foreign agent" law, that mirror Russian legislation and have been criticized by the EU and the US.

• Implications for Regional Stability: The potential geopolitical realignment of Georgia has significant implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus. A shift towards Russia could embolden the Kremlin to exert more influence in the region and potentially threaten the sovereignty of other neighboring countries, particularly Armenia.

• Economic Fallout: The halting of EU accession has created significant economic uncertainty for Georgia. The potential for reduced foreign investment and trade disruptions could severely impact the country's economic growth. While Georgia's recent economic growth has been partly fueled by Russian money, this raises concerns about economic sustainability and potential dependence on Russia. The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rejection of EU budget support will limit financial assistance and hinder development. GD's actions have damaged Georgia's international reputation and risk international isolation. Widespread protests, including strikes by schools and universities, are disrupting economic activity and further undermining investor confidence. The ongoing political instability threatens to derail Georgia's economic progress and international standing.

CONCLUSION:  GD's decision to halt EU accession has triggered a nationwide crisis, revealing a stark disconnect between the ruling party and the overwhelming pro-European sentiments of Georgian citizens. While GD claims to be pursuing a "European path with dignity," its actions suggest a shift towards Russia's sphere of influence, raising concerns about the country's sovereignty and democratic future. This shift is motivated, in part, by a strategic calculation that aligns with the interests of certain political and economic elites within Georgia, who have benefitted from closer ties with Russia and favor an appeasement strategy with the North. GD has employed a range of tactics to consolidate its power, including manipulating elections, intimidating voters, and suppressing dissent, drawing parallels to the authoritarian playbook seen in countries like Hungary. The opposition's struggle to counter GD's narrative and mobilize sustained public resistance highlights the challenges facing pro-democracy forces in Georgia.

AUTHOR BIO: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow and Director of Programs at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council.