By Rafis Abazov

Kazakhstan has long sought to establish itself as a "middle power" in Eurasia, though its geographic and political significance has often been overshadowed by rivalries among major powers like Russia, China, and the West. Recent developments—such as the rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), expanded Eurasian transport links, and deeper global economic integration—offer new opportunities to realize this ambition. These themes were explored at the Kazakhstan Economic Freedom Conference held in Astana in September 2024, where experts debated whether Kazakhstan can effectively capitalize on these trends to enhance its global standing.

BACKGROUND:  In international relations, a "middle power" refers to a state that, while not a superpower, exerts significant regional influence and acts as a bridge between larger global powers. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy with a GDP of US$ 261 billion (2023), has pursued this status through a strategy of balancing relations with major neighbors like Russia and China while fostering strong ties with the West. Astana emphasizes principles of non-alignment and multivector diplomacy, enabling the country to mediate regional conflicts, support global non-proliferation, and contribute actively to international organizations.  Kazakhstan’s vision as a middle power is rooted in its economic potential, particularly its vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals, which have attracted substantial foreign investment over the past three decades. This influx of investment has supported infrastructure development and economic diversification, bolstering its regional standing. By leveraging its natural resources, strategic geographic position, and diplomatic engagement, Kazakhstan aspires to shape regional and global dynamics. Nevertheless, as global economic systems and technological innovations transform the international landscape, Kazakhstan’s ability to adapt and capitalize on these changes will be crucial in achieving its middle-power ambitions.

IMPLICATIONS:  Three key developments hold the potential to bolster Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power, with one of the most transformative being the rise of CBDCs. As digital equivalents of national currencies issued by central banks, CBDCs promise to revolutionize global financial systems by improving transactional efficiency, strengthening monetary policy, and significantly reducing the costs of cross-border payments. Kazakhstan is actively examining the potential of CBDCs, drawing lessons from countries like China, which has advanced in developing the digital yuan.  For Kazakhstan, adopting a CBDC could modernize its financial infrastructure, enhancing its integration into global and regional financial networks. A national CBDC would not only streamline domestic payment systems but also facilitate faster, cheaper, and more secure international transactions. This shift could play a pivotal role as Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy beyond oil and gas, attracting foreign direct investment in emerging sectors such as advanced technology, green energy, and financial services.  Additionally, a CBDC would enable Kazakhstan to exercise greater control over its monetary system, reducing reliance on foreign currencies in trade and cross-border finance. Amid increasing geopolitical tensions and the impact of sanctions on global trade flows, such autonomy within a digital financial ecosystem could significantly enhance Kazakhstan’s economic resilience and reinforce its strategic positioning as a middle power. The second key development bolstering Kazakhstan's middle-power aspirations is its role in bridging East and West. Strategically located at the center of Eurasia, Kazakhstan has long been pivotal in regional transportation and logistics. This role is being strengthened by the expansion of Eurasian transportation corridors, particularly the 4,200-km Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). Positioned at the intersection of major trade routes connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Kazakhstan's importance has grown amid disruptions in global supply chains caused by geopolitical tensions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and shifting trade partnerships. Initiatives such as China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project further underscore Kazakhstan’s centrality in facilitating overland trade between China and Europe. Investments in infrastructure—including railways, highways, and ports—enhance Kazakhstan’s potential to capture a larger share of international trade flows, boosting its economy and geopolitical relevance. Discussions at the Astana conference highlighted how these transportation corridors present a critical opportunity for Kazakhstan to redefine its middle-power role. By strengthening economic ties with major global actors such as China, the European Union, and Turkey, Kazakhstan not only solidifies its position as a regional logistics hub but also enhances its capacity as a mediator. This dual role, connecting East and West through both trade and diplomacy, reinforces Kazakhstan’s strategic standing in an increasingly interconnected world. The third development shaping Kazakhstan’s aspirations as a middle power is its integration into the global economy amidst ongoing global shocks. Like many nations, Kazakhstan has faced significant economic disruptions in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, and environmental crises. Mark Uzan, director of the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and co-organizer of the Astana conference, noted that these shocks have disrupted global supply chains, heightened financial market volatility, and altered trade patterns. They have also exposed vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan’s economic model, particularly its reliance on natural resource exports. Kazakhstan’s response to these challenges has been twofold. Domestically, the government has emphasized economic diversification, with investments in renewable energy, agriculture, and digital technologies. Internationally, Kazakhstan has pursued deeper integration into global and regional economic systems, including active participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Astana conference underscored the urgency for Kazakhstan to accelerate its diversification efforts and strengthen resilience to external shocks. Policies promoting advanced technology transfer, improved governance, and enhanced participation in global value chains were identified as critical steps. Successfully navigating these challenges could not only stabilize Kazakhstan’s economy but also enhance its credibility and influence as a middle power on the global stage.

CONCLUSIONS:  At the international conference in Astana, experts emphasized the transformative potential of CBDCs in positioning Kazakhstan as a financial hub in the region and a key player in the emerging digital economy. By adopting CBDCs and advancing digital finance, Kazakhstan could assert itself as a middle power by actively shaping global financial norms and practices. Moreover, integrating regional transportation corridors with technologies like blockchain and digital logistics platforms could improve efficiency and transparency in trade, giving Kazakhstan a competitive edge. With strategic control over vital transportation routes and a commitment to digital innovation, Kazakhstan is well-positioned to influence the reconfiguration of global trade networks in the 21st century. Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power should therefore be reinterpreted beyond its diplomatic and geopolitical role, focusing on its capacity to navigate and shape the regional economic order. The interplay of CBDC adoption, transportation network expansion, and integration into regional and global economic systems creates new pathways for Kazakhstan to enhance its influence on the international stage. However, Kazakhstan’s ability to secure middle-power status will depend on well-calibrated economic policies that address internal challenges while responding to global economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts. The conference underscored the importance of embracing digital finance, expanding its transportation hub role, and building economic resilience. By doing so, Kazakhstan can solidify its position as a pivotal actor in the future of the Eurasian region and the global economy.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is the author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007) and The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013). He was executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan between 2014 and 2019 and organized the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015. He served as a UNDP project manager (joint project UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF) between 2019 and 2022.

By Ghulam Ali

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong recently criticized the repeated attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, calling them “unacceptable” and citing security as the biggest challenge to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). His comments followed two fatal incidents within six months, which claimed seven Chinese lives. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, instead of addressing the concerns, dismissed the remarks as “perplexing,” revealing underlying tensions in the bilateral relationship. Despite China’s role as Pakistan’s key economic partner, security lapses and strained diplomacy are testing the limits of their traditionally strong ties, highlighting deeper challenges to the CPEC and broader cooperation. These tensions point to a more complex dynamic in bilateral relations, revealing that mutual dependency alone may not be sufficient to sustain smooth cooperation amidst mounting challenges.

BACKGROUND:  The diplomatic row between China and Pakistan intensified during a seminar in Islamabad on October 30, when Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong openly rebutted remarks by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Dar claimed that China prioritized security in its overseas investments but made Pakistan an exception due to its friendship. The ambassador firmly countered, stating that President Xi Jinping consistently emphasizes the importance of ensuring the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Pakistan, reiterating that security remains China’s top concern and a major constraint to the CPEC.  This marked the first public expression of such sentiments by China and an equally unprecedented response from Pakistan's Foreign Office, which described the remarks as “perplexing” and “surprising.” Pakistan's English-language media reflected the gravity of the situation, with Dawn describing the exchange as rare and The Nation advising restraint from the Foreign Office. Further complicating matters, Pakistan canceled President Asif Ali Zardari’s planned visit to China on November 2, citing a dubious pretext of a foot injury, signaling deeper strains in the relationship amid growing concerns over security and diplomatic discord. This is not the first time China has urged Pakistan to ensure the security of its nationals. In several meetings with Pakistani leaders, China has consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan. During his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in June 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the need for Pakistan to create a safe and stable environment, stressing the protection of Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions. In line with this, Beijing also sent Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Islamabad, where he echoed similar concerns regarding security during discussions with Pakistan’s political leaders. China has faced numerous attacks on its citizens in Pakistan, with over 21 Chinese nationals killed since 2017. The Balochistan Liberation Army, a separatist group seeking independence for the underdeveloped Balochistan province, which hosts the strategic Gwadar Port, is behind many of these attacks. The Balochi population has long expressed grievances over marginalization and resource extraction without benefiting from the region’s wealth, fueling insurgent movements. Currently, Balochistan is experiencing its fifth wave of insurgency. Another key source of attacks on Chinese nationals is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group primarily based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the TTP has denied responsibility, Pakistani authorities have attributed the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers to the group. Allegations suggest that the TTP may be collaborating with Uyghur separatists, given their shared religious ideology, further complicating the security landscape for Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Chinese ambassador’s public expression of frustration and his direct reprimand of Pakistani officials highlighted China’s increasing impatience with Pakistan’s handling of security for Chinese nationals. By emphasizing the gravity of the situation and warning against future incidents, the ambassador signaled that China would no longer shy away from bluntly addressing its concerns. This shift in tone underscores the growing tension in the bilateral relationship, with the potential for global attention if the situation deteriorates further. The security situation in Pakistan will be pivotal in determining China’s future investment decisions. If the security environment remains unstable, China may choose to complete ongoing projects but refrain from launching new ones. This was evident during Chinese Premier Li Qiang's mid-October visit to Pakistan for the SCO conference, where he did not explicitly endorse the second phase of the CPEC or any new initiatives. This lack of commitment signals that security concerns could heavily influence China’s willingness to deepen its involvement in Pakistan moving forward. China and Pakistan had already planned to review their counterterrorism cooperation, and recent developments are likely to expedite this process through three key trends. First, China may increase its security support by providing bomb-proof vehicles for the safe transport of Chinese engineers, offering specialized security training to Pakistani personnel, and expanding intelligence sharing and consultation between the two countries. Second, the idea of involving Chinese private security companies (PSCs) or establishing joint security arrangements with Pakistani counterparts could gain traction. China has expressed interest in deploying PSCs, especially in conflict zones worldwide, to safeguard its growing investments. However, the deployment of PSCs to Pakistan faces both legal and practical obstacles. Pakistani law prohibits foreign security companies from operating within its borders. Even if this hurdle is overcome, the concept is likely to face challenges due to the country’s security realities. The Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, despite having the necessary resources and capabilities, have struggled to protect Chinese nationals. Given this, private companies, with far fewer resources, may not be effective in improving security. Additionally, bringing in foreign security personnel, whether from China’s armed forces or private firms, could expose them to the same risks from terrorist groups that have targeted Chinese nationals in the past. Third, the worsening security situation in Pakistan could provide the military with a pretext for launching another large-scale military operation, something it has long advocated. In June 2024, the Pakistani government approved the counter-terrorism operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), but its implementation was delayed due to opposition from political parties and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), which advocates for the rights of Pashtuns. However, conducting a military operation during a period of economic difficulties, political polarization, and significant opposition would reduce its likelihood of success. Additionally, such an operation would come with substantial economic costs and the risk of collateral damage, particularly in already unstable regions, further complicating its execution and effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS:  Although a seemingly minor incident, Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong's remarks have exposed long-standing issues between China and Pakistan, revealing underlying challenges in their relationship. These comments have sparked debate, both within Pakistan and internationally, regarding the durability of their "all-weather" friendship. If one factor has most damaged the Sino-Pakistani partnership, it is terrorism. Likewise, if there is one issue that will significantly determine the future of this relationship, it is the ongoing challenge of terrorism and its impact on security for both nations.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Ghulam Ali is the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (www.rcas.top). He received his PhD from Monash University in Australia and completed a postdoc at Peking University in Beijing. He has authored or edited four books and published articles in academic journals and media outlets.

By Sergey Sukhankin

In Kazakhstan’s recent referendum, over 71 percent of voters endorsed building the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), marking a significant step toward advancing this major infrastructure project. Strongly supported by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the national political elite, the NPP is expected to address Kazakhstan’s current and projected electricity needs. Additionally, as the world’s leading uranium producer, Kazakhstan stands to benefit from self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment, reducing its reliance on external suppliers. A key issue now centers on which entity will secure the NPP construction contract, with geopolitical considerations expected to weigh heavily alongside technological and economic factors.

BACKGROUND:  Discussions about constructing a new, modern NPP in Kazakhstan date back to the early 2000s. From 1973 to 1999, the country operated an NPP in Shevchenko (now Aktau), which was closed as part of Kazakhstan’s de-nuclearization policy. However, tangible steps toward this goal only began in 2021, following a severe electricity shortage linked to a spike in cryptocurrency mining and pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the European Union’s push for sustainable trade relations led Kazakhstani political leaders to prioritize renewable energy expansion in the national economy. In promoting a public vote for constructing an NPP, the government highlighted four main priorities: averting a potential energy crisis amid rising electricity demand; mitigating environmental risks linked to unsustainable energy sources; reducing Kazakhstan's reliance on electricity imports from Russia; and preserving the competitiveness of Kazakh exports to the EU. Despite compelling arguments supporting the nuclear power plant project, significant concerns have emerged from local experts, civil society, and the public. A primary worry centers on the risk of nuclear accidents, with Chernobyl and Fukushima serving as stark reminders of possible environmental catastrophes. Specific fears include potential harm to the fragile ecosystem of Lake Balkhash, which is already experiencing drying and may face further degradation from plant operations. Moreover, experts emphasize Kazakhstan's current lack of expertise and infrastructure for safely managing nuclear waste, leaving the issue of radioactive waste disposal unresolved. The economic viability of Kazakhstan's nuclear project is also a subject of concern. Critics point to the high construction costs and question the plant’s long-term financial sustainability, especially given the uncertain outlook for future electricity demand. Some experts suggest that the expected surge in demand may not occur as projected. They argue that even if demand does rise, Kazakhstan has alternative options, such as expanding renewable energy sources and improving the efficiency of the current electricity grid, which could address energy needs without relying on nuclear power. Geopolitical concerns further drive opposition to Kazakhstan’s nuclear project. Recent incidents at nuclear facilities, such as Zaporizhzhia and Kursk, illustrate the vulnerability of such infrastructure during conflicts, highlighting risks if similar instability arises in Central Asia. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s limited technical expertise and financial resources mean it would likely depend heavily on foreign partners to build and operate the plant. Critics argue that this reliance could compromise Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, with potential implications for the country’s long-term energy autonomy and geopolitical independence.

IMPLICATIONS:  Four main contenders have emerged to construct Kazakhstan’s NPP: Russia’s Rosatom, China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KEPCO), and France's Électricité de France (EDF). While Kazakhstan has pledged to base its choice on factors such as economic feasibility, technological reliability, and environmental safety, Russia and China realistically lead the race. Although France and South Korea bring significant expertise, high construction costs (potentially exceeding US$ 12 billion) and geopolitical dynamics may limit their competitiveness. Thus, Kazakhstan appears to face three pragmatic options moving forward. One option is for China to assume the role of sole contractor for the project, a scenario with several competitive advantages. China offers relatively lower construction costs compared to French and South Korean alternatives and maintains a robust trade and investment relationship with Kazakhstan, enhancing its influence as an economic partner. However, the feasibility of China proceeding alone is uncertain. Moscow might perceive China’s unilateral role as a diplomatic slight, as Russia has become a key strategic partner and potential Arctic access point for China. Moreover, it remains unclear if China is willing or prepared to undertake this project independently, given its geopolitical sensitivities. A second option is to appoint Russia as the sole contractor, a role Moscow has long pursued. Between 2010 and 2019, President Vladimir Putin personally lobbied Kazakhstan to select Rosatom as its nuclear plant builder. Given Russia’s current geopolitical isolation and diminishing network of allies, Moscow might view any exclusion of Rosatom as a serious diplomatic offense. The recent “grain war” between Russia and Kazakhstan—allegedly sparked by Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS—demonstrates how swiftly Moscow might respond with retaliatory measures if it perceives a breach in loyalty or alignment. An analysis of Russian sources indicates several strategies Russia might use to “encourage” Kazakhstan to prioritize Rosatom’s bid. A primary leverage point is Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian territory for transporting export-bound oil. Approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russia, and oil revenue constitutes about two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s national budget. Any disruption in this transit route could precipitate a fiscal crisis for Kazakhstan, with severe implications for the stability of its national budget. A second leverage point is Russia’s role in alleviating Kazakhstan’s energy deficit through electricity exports. Russian experts warn that any abrupt cessation of this supply could lead to severe energy shortages in Kazakhstan, potentially triggering economic and political instability. These pressure points are further highlighted by recent incidents, such as the explosion at Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev discussed with EU officials increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supplies. These events suggest that- Should Kazakhstan consider alternatives to Russia for its NPP construction, it might face similar pressures or retaliatory actions from Moscow. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia for both oil export infrastructure and electricity supply exposes the country to significant vulnerabilities. Nearly 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, and oil revenues account for approximately two-thirds of the national budget. Any disruption to this transport network could result in severe economic consequences, potentially destabilizing Kazakhstan’s fiscal position. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s electricity deficit is largely covered by imports from Russia. Russian experts caution that if Russia were to cut off this supply, Kazakhstan would face a precarious situation, where both political stability and economic restructuring could become unfeasible. These dependencies highlight Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Russian influence, as demonstrated by the 2022 explosion at the Tengiz oil field, the country’s largest, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev’s discussions with EU officials about increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supply due to the invasion of Ukraine. This incident underscores Russia’s capacity—and potential willingness—to retaliate against Kazakhstan should the country act in ways that conflict with Russian interests. A third option is to form an international consortium to oversee the construction of the NPP. This approach could provide a balanced compromise, allowing Russia to participate without being the sole contractor, thus reducing the risk of secondary economic sanctions. Such an arrangement might appeal to Moscow, as it would obscure Rosatom’s central role while still involving Russian expertise. Notably, President Tokayev has rhetorically supported the idea of an “international consortium,” suggesting that this could be the most feasible solution. However, several uncertainties surround the international consortium option. A significant challenge is that the construction of the nuclear reactor, the core component of the NPP, cannot be easily divided among multiple parties. This raises the critical issue of who would be responsible for sourcing and manufacturing the reactor, as the origin of this essential component remains unclear. Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities within the consortium could lead to complications. Some members would likely take leadership roles, while others would play secondary, supportive functions. The precise allocation of these roles, and how they align with the interests of the participating companies, remains uncertain, potentially creating tensions within the consortium and complicating cooperation and decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS:  The construction of Kazakhstan’s NPP will provide crucial insight into Russia’s influence in Central Asia, a region where assertions of Russia’s diminishing role may underestimate its true significance. The outcome of this project could offer a clearer picture of Russia’s geopolitical and economic standing in the region. If Kazakhstan ultimately selects Rosatom as the sole bidder—an outcome that seems less probable—or if Russia’s state corporation participates within an international consortium, it will symbolize Russia’s continued strategic presence in Central Asia. Such a scenario would highlight Russia’s ability to retain substantial leverage in the region, despite competing global interests. Whether as the lead contractor or a key consortium member, Rosatom’s involvement would likely reinforce its central role in the region’s energy infrastructure and broader geopolitical affairs.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi 

On January 2, 2024, Mullah Baradar, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in the Taliban administration, announced that construction of the Wakhan Corridor, a strategic route connecting Afghanistan to China, remains underway. Baradar highlighted that the new road through Wakhan in Badakhshan Province is expected to establish a direct trade link between Afghanistan and China, thereby greatly enhancing bilateral trade opportunities. Taliban officials have underscored the geopolitical significance of the corridor, as it is positioned at a pivotal intersection of regional interests, potentially influencing broader dynamics in Central and South Asia.

BACKGROUND:  Mawlawi Ayub Khalid, the Taliban-appointed governor of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, reported to Al Jazeera that, following five months of continuous work, they have constructed a road physically connecting Afghanistan and China. This milestone is anticipated to catalyze economic development across the region. The section of the road under construction spans 49 kilometers, with nearly 40 percent of the work completed to date. In the coming years, this road is projected to extend into China’s Xinjiang region, further solidifying the direct trade link between the two nations. The Wakhan Corridor, an ancient segment of the Silk Road connecting Afghanistan and China, first appeared on maps in 1895 as a buffer zone strategically positioned between the Russian Empire and British India, emphasizing its enduring geopolitical significance. Although the Sino-Afghan border was formally delineated in 1963, no border checkpoints were established, despite the two countries sharing a direct border. External factors, including the prolonged presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and concerns over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) affecting China's security, had historically hindered the development of closer ties between Beijing and Kabul. China's strategic engagement with the Taliban underscores its long-term interests in Afghanistan’s remote Badakhshan province, specifically the Wakhan Corridor. This engagement reflects China’s cautious preparation for a regional realignment that began well before the U.S. withdrawal, as China employed diplomacy and development initiatives to strengthen ties with Afghanistan. Since 2012, China’s military and strategic involvement in the Wakhan region has gradually expanded, leveraging its location at the nexus of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. In 2017, China pledged over US$ 90 million to support infrastructure projects in northeastern Afghanistan, including fiber optic connections and a segment of road through Wakhan. However, the presence of U.S. forces, delays in funding, and various political obstacles impeded progress on these initiatives. Despite previous setbacks, China’s vision for regional integration has remained steadfast. In 2021, the Taliban’s Ministry of Public Works announced plans for a road linking Afghanistan's Ishkashim district to China’s Xinjiang province through the Wakhan Corridor, part of a broader regional development strategy. Since the Taliban assumed control, China’s investments in Afghanistan have significantly increased, with substantial funding directed toward regional infrastructure projects. The long-anticipated construction of this critical corridor—expected to serve as a major trade and transit route between Afghanistan and China—has now officially commenced, signaling a renewed commitment to connectivity and economic collaboration between the two nations.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Wakhan Corridor is emerging as a pivotal element in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape, with China and Pakistan actively involved in its development. Former Afghan Information Minister Mohammad Karim Khuram has highlighted that Pakistan had previously sought to utilize the corridor to establish strategic connections with Central Asia and China; however, these efforts were met with resistance under President Karzai’s administration. In early 2022, the situation evolved when the Pakistani military, in coordination with Chinese forces, crossed into the Afghan side of the corridor to adjust border demarcations originally established under the 1895 Russo-British agreements. This move provoked widespread backlash on Afghan social media, prompting the Taliban to deploy forces to reassert the historic boundary. Recently, the Taliban, with significant Chinese support, has committed to advancing the infrastructure within the Wakhan Corridor, underscoring China’s clear interest in integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). High-level visits by Taliban officials and the Chinese ambassador to the corridor in August 2024 further emphasize the project’s strategic importance. Local communities believe that the corridor could play a crucial role in fostering economic stability, facilitating streamlined exports between Afghanistan and China, and promoting the development of surrounding areas. The Wakhan Corridor project illustrates China’s strategic intent to dominate Afghanistan’s economy, positioning itself as a key trade partner while outmaneuvering competitors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, the UAE, and India. By establishing a direct trade route, China seeks to circumvent more expensive, indirect pathways through Pakistan or Uzbekistan, thereby consolidating its economic influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the project aligns with Pakistan’s broader goal of enhancing its trade connections with Central Asia, sidelining India’s influence in the region. From a security perspective, the Wakhan Corridor provides China with a buffer zone to secure its sensitive Xinjiang region. Concerns regarding groups like ETIM and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have driven China to create a “security belt” along the corridor, supported by two dedicated security units and coordinated patrols with the Taliban to reinforce local stability. China’s growing investment in Afghan infrastructure projects, including those in resource-rich areas such as the Amu Darya oil fields, further underscores its strategy of embedding economic initiatives that enhance regional security while serving its broader geopolitical interests. Although China and the Taliban have forged a cooperative relationship, a level of mutual distrust endures, adding complexity to their interactions. The Wakhan Corridor project thus functions as both a diplomatic bridge and a strategic instrument for China, enabling it to manage regional threats while embedding itself economically and geopolitically in Afghanistan’s future. The Wakhan Corridor holds substantial strategic potential, positioning itself as a critical link that could connect China to Iran and onward across Central and South Asia through Afghanistan. This vision aligns with Iran’s aspirations for regional connectivity but faces opposition from India, whose border tensions with Pakistan in the Azad Kashmir region complicate cooperation on such initiatives. Functioning as a contemporary extension of the ancient Silk Road, the corridor is poised to have far-reaching economic and security ramifications, likely reshaping the regional balance of power. Its development could redefine trade routes, potentially offering more efficient access between East and West, while also bolstering China's influence across a corridor that traverses key geopolitical frontiers. As both a trade artery and a security buffer, the Wakhan Corridor embodies the intersection of historic ambitions and modern strategic interests, with the capacity to influence the economic and political landscape of Central and South Asia for years to come.

CONCLUSIONS:  China’s present approach to Afghanistan reveals a meticulously crafted strategy that emerged following the U.S.-led withdrawal in 2021. With the exit of Western forces, Chinese policymakers identified a strategic window to establish direct engagement with the Taliban. This shift allowed China to reinvigorate major projects, including the Amu Darya oil fields, as well as gold mining operations in Takhar and Badakhshan, while reconsidering the long-stalled Mes Aynak copper mine project, originally awarded to China in 2010. However, China’s deepening involvement in the Wakhan Corridor signals a focus that extends beyond economic objectives, highlighting a pronounced interest in regional security and geopolitical stability. The Wakhan Corridor not only represents an opportunity to secure valuable resources but also functions as a strategic zone for monitoring and mitigating regional threats. Through this multifaceted engagement, China is navigating a balance between bolstering Afghanistan’s infrastructure and securing its own influence, underscoring the corridor's importance within a broader vision of Central and South Asian stability and security. China’s presence in the Wakhan Corridor serves as a calculated measure to counter threats from extremist groups, particularly ETIM, which poses potential risks to the stability of its border regions, especially Xinjiang. This approach aligns seamlessly with China’s broader strategy to reinforce stability across Central Asia—a region where China has made substantial investments and is consolidating its role as the dominant economic force. For the U.S., China’s expanding footprint along the Wakhan Corridor is a growing point of concern, as it threatens to reduce U.S. influence within Eurasia, particularly in areas related to counterterrorism and regional diplomatic leverage. Washington remains closely attuned to China’s evolving role in Afghanistan, apprehensive that deepening Beijing-Kabul relations could disrupt U.S. strategic interests in the region. This shifting dynamic underscores the broader geopolitical contest over influence in Central and South Asia, where China’s calculated moves may challenge the United States' longstanding objectives in both regional security and diplomatic outreach. The unique geography of the Wakhan Corridor offers China a strategic opportunity to establish an efficient trade and energy route into Central Asia, potentially shortening pipeline distances and bolstering its energy security. If successfully developed, this initiative would solidify China’s position as both a dominant economic and military power in the region. The corridor serves as a critical junction where China’s economic ambitions converge with its security priorities, creating a dual-purpose pathway that addresses both its energy needs and regional stability concerns. As a result, the Wakhan Corridor could serve as the foundation for a robust Chinese presence that is likely to influence the regional order for the foreseeable future, shaping economic relations and security dynamics across Central and South Asia.

AUTHORS’ BIOS:

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. She is a 2024 CAMCA Fellow. 

Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Research Fellow on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.