By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi 

On January 2, 2024, Mullah Baradar, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in the Taliban administration, announced that construction of the Wakhan Corridor, a strategic route connecting Afghanistan to China, remains underway. Baradar highlighted that the new road through Wakhan in Badakhshan Province is expected to establish a direct trade link between Afghanistan and China, thereby greatly enhancing bilateral trade opportunities. Taliban officials have underscored the geopolitical significance of the corridor, as it is positioned at a pivotal intersection of regional interests, potentially influencing broader dynamics in Central and South Asia.

BACKGROUND:  Mawlawi Ayub Khalid, the Taliban-appointed governor of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, reported to Al Jazeera that, following five months of continuous work, they have constructed a road physically connecting Afghanistan and China. This milestone is anticipated to catalyze economic development across the region. The section of the road under construction spans 49 kilometers, with nearly 40 percent of the work completed to date. In the coming years, this road is projected to extend into China’s Xinjiang region, further solidifying the direct trade link between the two nations. The Wakhan Corridor, an ancient segment of the Silk Road connecting Afghanistan and China, first appeared on maps in 1895 as a buffer zone strategically positioned between the Russian Empire and British India, emphasizing its enduring geopolitical significance. Although the Sino-Afghan border was formally delineated in 1963, no border checkpoints were established, despite the two countries sharing a direct border. External factors, including the prolonged presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and concerns over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) affecting China's security, had historically hindered the development of closer ties between Beijing and Kabul. China's strategic engagement with the Taliban underscores its long-term interests in Afghanistan’s remote Badakhshan province, specifically the Wakhan Corridor. This engagement reflects China’s cautious preparation for a regional realignment that began well before the U.S. withdrawal, as China employed diplomacy and development initiatives to strengthen ties with Afghanistan. Since 2012, China’s military and strategic involvement in the Wakhan region has gradually expanded, leveraging its location at the nexus of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. In 2017, China pledged over US$ 90 million to support infrastructure projects in northeastern Afghanistan, including fiber optic connections and a segment of road through Wakhan. However, the presence of U.S. forces, delays in funding, and various political obstacles impeded progress on these initiatives. Despite previous setbacks, China’s vision for regional integration has remained steadfast. In 2021, the Taliban’s Ministry of Public Works announced plans for a road linking Afghanistan's Ishkashim district to China’s Xinjiang province through the Wakhan Corridor, part of a broader regional development strategy. Since the Taliban assumed control, China’s investments in Afghanistan have significantly increased, with substantial funding directed toward regional infrastructure projects. The long-anticipated construction of this critical corridor—expected to serve as a major trade and transit route between Afghanistan and China—has now officially commenced, signaling a renewed commitment to connectivity and economic collaboration between the two nations.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Wakhan Corridor is emerging as a pivotal element in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape, with China and Pakistan actively involved in its development. Former Afghan Information Minister Mohammad Karim Khuram has highlighted that Pakistan had previously sought to utilize the corridor to establish strategic connections with Central Asia and China; however, these efforts were met with resistance under President Karzai’s administration. In early 2022, the situation evolved when the Pakistani military, in coordination with Chinese forces, crossed into the Afghan side of the corridor to adjust border demarcations originally established under the 1895 Russo-British agreements. This move provoked widespread backlash on Afghan social media, prompting the Taliban to deploy forces to reassert the historic boundary. Recently, the Taliban, with significant Chinese support, has committed to advancing the infrastructure within the Wakhan Corridor, underscoring China’s clear interest in integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). High-level visits by Taliban officials and the Chinese ambassador to the corridor in August 2024 further emphasize the project’s strategic importance. Local communities believe that the corridor could play a crucial role in fostering economic stability, facilitating streamlined exports between Afghanistan and China, and promoting the development of surrounding areas. The Wakhan Corridor project illustrates China’s strategic intent to dominate Afghanistan’s economy, positioning itself as a key trade partner while outmaneuvering competitors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, the UAE, and India. By establishing a direct trade route, China seeks to circumvent more expensive, indirect pathways through Pakistan or Uzbekistan, thereby consolidating its economic influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the project aligns with Pakistan’s broader goal of enhancing its trade connections with Central Asia, sidelining India’s influence in the region. From a security perspective, the Wakhan Corridor provides China with a buffer zone to secure its sensitive Xinjiang region. Concerns regarding groups like ETIM and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have driven China to create a “security belt” along the corridor, supported by two dedicated security units and coordinated patrols with the Taliban to reinforce local stability. China’s growing investment in Afghan infrastructure projects, including those in resource-rich areas such as the Amu Darya oil fields, further underscores its strategy of embedding economic initiatives that enhance regional security while serving its broader geopolitical interests. Although China and the Taliban have forged a cooperative relationship, a level of mutual distrust endures, adding complexity to their interactions. The Wakhan Corridor project thus functions as both a diplomatic bridge and a strategic instrument for China, enabling it to manage regional threats while embedding itself economically and geopolitically in Afghanistan’s future. The Wakhan Corridor holds substantial strategic potential, positioning itself as a critical link that could connect China to Iran and onward across Central and South Asia through Afghanistan. This vision aligns with Iran’s aspirations for regional connectivity but faces opposition from India, whose border tensions with Pakistan in the Azad Kashmir region complicate cooperation on such initiatives. Functioning as a contemporary extension of the ancient Silk Road, the corridor is poised to have far-reaching economic and security ramifications, likely reshaping the regional balance of power. Its development could redefine trade routes, potentially offering more efficient access between East and West, while also bolstering China's influence across a corridor that traverses key geopolitical frontiers. As both a trade artery and a security buffer, the Wakhan Corridor embodies the intersection of historic ambitions and modern strategic interests, with the capacity to influence the economic and political landscape of Central and South Asia for years to come.

CONCLUSIONS:  China’s present approach to Afghanistan reveals a meticulously crafted strategy that emerged following the U.S.-led withdrawal in 2021. With the exit of Western forces, Chinese policymakers identified a strategic window to establish direct engagement with the Taliban. This shift allowed China to reinvigorate major projects, including the Amu Darya oil fields, as well as gold mining operations in Takhar and Badakhshan, while reconsidering the long-stalled Mes Aynak copper mine project, originally awarded to China in 2010. However, China’s deepening involvement in the Wakhan Corridor signals a focus that extends beyond economic objectives, highlighting a pronounced interest in regional security and geopolitical stability. The Wakhan Corridor not only represents an opportunity to secure valuable resources but also functions as a strategic zone for monitoring and mitigating regional threats. Through this multifaceted engagement, China is navigating a balance between bolstering Afghanistan’s infrastructure and securing its own influence, underscoring the corridor's importance within a broader vision of Central and South Asian stability and security. China’s presence in the Wakhan Corridor serves as a calculated measure to counter threats from extremist groups, particularly ETIM, which poses potential risks to the stability of its border regions, especially Xinjiang. This approach aligns seamlessly with China’s broader strategy to reinforce stability across Central Asia—a region where China has made substantial investments and is consolidating its role as the dominant economic force. For the U.S., China’s expanding footprint along the Wakhan Corridor is a growing point of concern, as it threatens to reduce U.S. influence within Eurasia, particularly in areas related to counterterrorism and regional diplomatic leverage. Washington remains closely attuned to China’s evolving role in Afghanistan, apprehensive that deepening Beijing-Kabul relations could disrupt U.S. strategic interests in the region. This shifting dynamic underscores the broader geopolitical contest over influence in Central and South Asia, where China’s calculated moves may challenge the United States' longstanding objectives in both regional security and diplomatic outreach. The unique geography of the Wakhan Corridor offers China a strategic opportunity to establish an efficient trade and energy route into Central Asia, potentially shortening pipeline distances and bolstering its energy security. If successfully developed, this initiative would solidify China’s position as both a dominant economic and military power in the region. The corridor serves as a critical junction where China’s economic ambitions converge with its security priorities, creating a dual-purpose pathway that addresses both its energy needs and regional stability concerns. As a result, the Wakhan Corridor could serve as the foundation for a robust Chinese presence that is likely to influence the regional order for the foreseeable future, shaping economic relations and security dynamics across Central and South Asia.

AUTHORS’ BIOS:

Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. She is a 2024 CAMCA Fellow. 

Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Research Fellow on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals. 

By Laura Linderman and Michael Hikari Cecire

In early October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three North Caucasian federal lawmakers, accusing them of plotting his assassination amid a power struggle over the Wildberries e-commerce platform. This incident highlights the escalating tensions and fragility of power within Russian politics, revealing vulnerabilities in the Kremlin's governance amid ongoing conflicts. As regional elites assert their interests, the potential for broader instability increases, particularly against the backdrop of Russia's war in Ukraine. The situation underscores the complex interplay of patronage networks and regional autonomy that could lead to significant shifts in Russia's internal power dynamics.

BACKGROUND:  In early October, Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three federal lawmakers—two Dagestani and an Ingush deputy—whom he accused of planning his assassination. The dispute is tied to control over the Russian Wildberries e-commerce website, which had been wrested by forces backed by the Dagestani and Ingush deputies against Kadyrov’s allies, culminating in a deadly shootout at the company’s Moscow headquarters. The company's contentious expansion has also led to intimidation beyond Russia's borders - in October 2024, a JAMnews editor in Georgia received threats of violence from an apparent Chechen supporter after criticizing Wildberries' entry into the Georgian market despite international sanctions. Kadyrov’s rhetoric indicates a profound willingness to use violence and intimidation, highlighting Kadyrov’s belief that he operates beyond Moscow’s control.

More broadly, the Wildberries saga highlights an ongoing scramble among Russian elites for key economic assets, and a deepening sense of growing instability throughout the contest Russian political economy arena. The North Caucasus, is a notable theater for this contestation given its historically restive and fractured contexts. Further, Kadyrov’s willingness to level threats—and the limited reaction it elicited—highlight the privileged position that Kadyrov continues to enjoy in Russia, but also the way other factions are contesting his authority. Kadyrov's comments also mark an escalation in the tensions between regional leaders and the Kremlin, illustrating the fragile balance of power within Russian politics. Kadyrov has long been known for his authoritarian rule, and this incident further showcases his leverage in the ongoing political competition among regional and federal authorities.

The ongoing conflict has drawn attention not only for its immediate violence but also for what it reveals about Russian and North Caucasus patronage networks. The region has long been characterized by real and fictive kinship affiliations that shape local governance and economic relationships. The fallout from the incident may embolden other North Caucasian factions to assert their interests in Moscow, potentially leading to further, and spiraling, destabilization. The Kremlin's haphazard approach to governance in the North Caucasus only further complicates matters. Moscow has historically relied on regional strongmen like Kadyrov to maintain stability, yet this reliance simultaneously breeds conditions for potential conflict.

Against the backdrop of an exhausting military quagmire in Ukraine, institutionally fragile security services and military apparatus made hollower by that war, and elite infighting and uncertainty as Russian President Vladimir Putin ages, the Wildberries incident reveals how Russia’s weak institutions and semi-feudal mode of control may be contributing to feedback loops of internal deterioration and instability. As the situation unfolds, it will be critical to monitor the responses from both the Kremlin and North Caucasian regional power centers, as this may foreshadow larger shifts in Russia's internal power dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: The broader implications extend far beyond a mere violent confrontation between business interests and political factions. This event reveals profound vulnerabilities in the Russian state, which are particularly exacerbated amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.

The dynamics exposed by this recent incident suggest shifting balance between Moscow and the North Caucasus, highlighting the Kremlin’s internal fragility and the growing assertiveness of regional elites. As the war in Ukraine continues to stretch Russian resources and resolve, the Kremlin’s reliance on figures like Kadyrov to maintain control—or at least the simulacrum of control—can backfire and may kindle wider instability that can be expressed as a broader challenge to Moscow's authority.

The instability generated by Kadyrov and his patronage-based power structure, or other such triggers, could spiral into larger conflicts, not only within Chechnya but across the entire region. The interconnected nature of intertwined North Caucasian business and family groupings means that tensions in one republic can quickly spill over into others, potentially igniting violence that could further destabilize Russia's southern flank. This spillover effect extends beyond Russia's borders into the South Caucasus, as evidenced by threats against journalists in Georgia who criticize Wildberries' regional expansion. Such incidents demonstrate how Russian patronage networks attempt to exert influence through both economic penetration and intimidation in neighboring states, particularly as sanctions push Russian businesses to seek new markets

In addition, the situation signals a growing challenge to the Kremlin’s narrative of centralized control. The framented web of factional loyalties and business interests belie the formal appearance of a centralized state. As North Caucasian elites gain more visibility and influence in Moscow, the Kremlin may find itself increasingly unable to exert authority over these networks. Distracted and increasingly incapable state security structures and empowered regional elites where societal alienation from the Russian body politic is strong (or, as in the case in the North Caucasus, arguably endemic) could boost nationalist sentiments and separatist movements—particularly in the North Caucasus, which have their own historical grievances against the central government.

Finally, the likely distant but non-zero potential for federal disintegration looms. If the Kremlin's grip continues to weaken, the North Caucasus could witness a resurgence of separatist movements, echoing the conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s. As regional elites compete for power and influence, those efforts could escalate into open conflict with each other and federal authorities—themselves fragmented patronage networks. This suggests not the need for Russia to more adequately fill the regional power vacuum, but perhaps that its tentative dominion over the region has been fundamentally illegitimate and ill-fitting.

CONCLUSION: North Caucasus instability underscores the intricate power dynamics within the region and its fundamentally contingent relationship with the Kremlin. As the Kremlin grapples with material and systemic exhaustion from nearly three years of full-scale war, the North Caucasus could be a leading indicator for generalized instability and regime weakness.

While President Putin has broadly sought to consolidate power and eliminate challenges to federal authority, the reality is Moscow—and Putin himself—have come to rely on regional elites who has operated with semi-independence and in sometimes open defiance of state structures. Kadyrov's brazen threats against federal lawmakers highlight the potential for personal and political rivalries to escalate into violence. This power struggle reveals the dissonance between Moscow's objectives and the realities on the ground, where informal networks and personalistic loyalties can often dictate political outcomes.

Moreover, the ongoing war in Ukraine is exacerbating existing tensions in the North Caucasus, making it increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to maintain stability. The region, with its historical grievances and complex interethnic dynamics, is a potential flashpoint for renewed conflict, especially as federal resources diminish. In a generalized scramble for influence and assets, the North Caucasus may be particularly prone to instability, and under certain circumstances, potentially renewed national movements or separatism. The Wildberries incident thus serves as a harbinger of potential unrest, suggesting that the Kremlin's focus on external conflicts may leave it vulnerable to internal challenges—cultivated by the very system of political economy that it has depended upon to maintain its writ.

More broadly, growing signs of instability in the North Caucasus ask questions of wider regional dynamics, including in the South Caucasus. While separated by certain geographic and especially political features (i.e., borders of the Russian Federation itself), in many respects the North and South Caucasus are a more coherent and permeable cultural space than geopolitical dynamics suggest. Narratives of ethno-linguistic segregation can be politically expedient, but often belie reality. Political controversies aside, Nakh-speaking Chechens and Ingush share a common cultural sphere in many respects with each other and the smaller but prominent Nakh and Georgian-speaking Kist and Bats communities in Georgia’s highlands. Similarly, Ossetians in the Russian Federation have far more regular interaction and exchange with a substantial Ossetian population in Georgia, not to mention with Georgians themselves. Avars and Lezgins, two of the largest ethnic groups in Dagestan, also form substantial minorities in Azerbaijan. And so on.

As such, instability in the Caucasus have dynamic effects on other parts of the Caucasus. Should the situation continue to deteriorate in the North Caucasus, it should be expected to have an effect on the South Caucasus as well, given the inherent and durable (notably, despite broader political conflicts) connectivity and interplay between north and south. Beyond cross-hatched ethnic affinities, comparable patronage dynamics exist in Azerbaijan, increasingly in Georgia, and residually in Armenia—all with business and social interests that have ties to Russia. Just as North Caucasus elites are scrambling for influence in the region and Russia’s power centers, so too are South Caucasus oligarchs and their own networks of allies and clients. Overall—what happens in the North Caucasus cannot be a strictly localized affair, and is likely to trigger instability elsewhere in Russia, and potentially spill over into the South Caucasus as well.

AUTHORS' BIOS: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council. Michael Hikari Cecire is an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a former senior policy advisor at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

By Pauline Le Grand

This Saturday, on October 26th, Georgia, will decide its future trajectory in parliamentary elections. The country stands at a crossroads and must decide whether to continue towards a European future or turn towards authoritarianism. After achieving candidate status for the European Union in 2023, the passing of the “foreign agent” law by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party raised concerns over the country’s democratic progression and stalled its EU ascension. The GD remains a strong contender for this election, especially in Georgia’s more conservative regions, and risks steering Georgia away from the EU for good. This election will not only test the resilience of Georgia’s democratic institutions but will also reveal the country’s broader geopolitical alignment in an increasingly polarized region.

BACKGROUND:  On October 26th, Georgians will head to the polls to decide their future. This election is one of the most significant in Georgia's history as it will determine whether Georgia will remain on its European path or succumb to the Kremlin's sphere of influence. In December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status for the European Union on the understanding that the country would work to make significant changes towards accession. Yet, since then, Georgia appears to have done just the opposite and its accession process has been frozen. In April 2024, the current government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, passed the law on transparency of foreign influence, referred to as a copy-paste of Russia's foreign agent law. Civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20 percent of funds from overseas had to register on the Government's list as they were deemed to be carrying out the interests of a foreign power. The bill was first proposed in 2023 but withdrawn due to popular discontent. This year, despite promising to not revisit the law, despite even fiercer popular opposition gathering thousands of Tbilisi citizens in front of Parliament for weeks, and despite pro-European President Salome Zurabishvili's veto, the government adopted the bill on May 28th. Of an estimated 300,000 CSOs in Georgia, only 476 CSOs registered, with the others ignoring the law in protest. They preferred to wait for the government's investigation and resulting hefty fines with the hope that the upcoming election will lead to a reevaluation of the bill. The government also passed an anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda law in September as part of a legislative package 'On Protection of Family Values and Minors'. The law is a clear violation of freedom of expression and assembly. The Georgian Dream party has promised that if re-elected, it will effectively ban all opposition groups and turn Georgia into a single-party state. The GD, backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in power for the last twelve years and is determined to maintain its hold of the government. Despite the GD's apparent authoritarian turn and seeming unpopularity, it is projected to obtain a significant percentage of the vote. The question is whether it will secure enough votes for a supermajority, which would enable it to amend the constitution freely, distancing Georgia further from democracy and ultimately from the European Union.

IMPLICATIONS: In early October, the Georgian Dream launched an incredibly successful poster campaign across the country. While the capital of Georgia is relatively progressive and anti-GD, 70 percent of voters are registered outside the capital. Regional voters are overall less critical of the current government, focused on issues of employment and wages, stability and peace, and are generally culturally conservative. Regional voters have higher turnout and are therefore key to the outcome of the election and to Georgian Dream's constitutional super-majority (3/4 of Parliament).

The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rise to power was viewed by some as a positive turning point for Georgia. The party successfully ousted former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had come to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Initially, Saakashvili's leadership brought significant improvements, including the removal of a corrupt elite, implementation of free-market reforms, and impressive economic growth. However, towards the end of his tenure, Saakashvili and his United National Movement (UNM) party tightened control over the political system, allowed elite corruption to spread, and expanded law enforcement powers excessively. Many felt that Saakashvili and the UNM had implemented changes too rapidly and aggressively. In contrast, GD's early years saw improvements in human rights and media freedom, along with a reduction in heavy-handed law enforcement. The party continues to benefit from lingering discontent with the Saakashvili era and fear of its potential return. GD has also cultivated support through social welfare programs, particularly pensions. Many voters worry these benefits might disappear if they don't support the ruling party. This fear is particularly pronounced in areas where electronic voting is being introduced, as some voters believe the new system compromises ballot secrecy, leading to pressure to vote for GD.

Fear remains a central and effective theme in Georgian Dream's (GD) election strategy. The mere possibility of losing pensions is often enough to drive voters to support GD. Similarly, the prospect of the United National Movement's (UNM) return motivates some Georgians to cast their ballots this Saturday. The UNM is inextricably linked to memories and fears of war.

Under Saakashvili's leadership in 2008, Russia invaded South Ossetia, a territory beginning just 40 kilometers from the capital. The 1992-1993 war with Abkhazia also lingers in the collective Georgian memory. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine reignited these concerns for Georgians, who strongly support Ukraine. The fear of another conflict weighs heavily on the minds of Georgians, particularly older voters who constitute the majority of the electorate – a fear GD has not hesitated to exploit.

A week after its initial poster campaign, GD launched a new series depicting Ukrainian buildings destroyed by Russian bombs alongside intact Georgian structures. This campaign sparked online outrage, with Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili commenting on Facebook: "How desperate and pitiful must you be to shamelessly and brazenly offer your people a poster crafted in the 'forges of the KGB'! 'With dignity' towards hell!" Nevertheless, GD's message remains potent; they warn that a vote for the opposition is a vote for war. Ivanishvili even suggested apologizing to South Ossetia for the 2008 war, which he blamed on Saakashvili's government. GD also hints at the possibility of reconciliation between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia with Russian assistance.

GD's successful fear campaigns stand in stark contrast to the opposition's apparent weaknesses. No single party emerges as particularly strong. Fragmented across four different coalitions, none offers a promising alternative. The opposition lacks connection with the regions; once outside Tbilisi, the already scarce opposition campaign posters virtually disappear. In some areas, voters have never even heard of certain opposition parties. Even in Tbilisi, those inclined to vote against GD struggle to choose a party, uncertain which might garner more votes.

CONCLUSION: This weekend's election will undoubtedly be a pivotal moment for Georgia's foreign policy orientation and liberal democracy, both within Georgia and more broadly. With a high risk of external interference, particularly from Russia, the stakes are high. Moldova's close call last weekend in the EU referendum serves as a reminder of the fragility of democracy and regional tendencies towards illiberalism. Still, the hope remains that Georgia's path will continue to align with Europe and the West, reflecting the population's overwhelming desire to join the European Union. Georgia is caught between an older population that remembers with great fear these two wars and is willing to back down to Russia and a politically active younger population who dreams of a liberal and European future. October 26th will show the rest of the world which pull is stronger today in Georgia.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Pauline Le Grand is a research intern at the Rondeli Foundation in Tbilisi, Georgia, where she researches Russia's influence in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

By Stephen Blank

On September 18, 2024, Armenian authorities announced the exposure of an attempted coup orchestrated by Russia. Seven individuals were arrested, all of whom had been recruited, trained at a Russian military base, and financially supported by Russian officials. This recent incident sheds important light on Russia’s broader relations with its neighboring countries, extending beyond the Caucasus. Moscow seems to perceive most, if not all, post-Soviet states as susceptible to such destabilization. Although Armenia’s situation is shaped by its specific relationship with Russia, it may not be as exceptional as it initially appears.

BACKGROUND:  Coups have become a central tactic of the Russian state, both within the former Soviet Union and internationally. Through the use of proxies and pro-Moscow elements, Russia has been implicated in coup attempts across the Balkans, including in Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Greece. In Ukraine in 2004, pro-Russian actors poisoned Viktor Yushchenko during his presidential campaign. Additionally, Russia has employed proxies to further its interests in Georgia. Given the presence of Russian proxies, covert operatives, and pro-Russian factions across the states of the former Soviet Union, coupled with the overarching aim of restoring the Russian empire that drives Putin’s foreign policy, it is unsurprising that Moscow frequently resorts to organized strategies of state subversion, including coups. Armenia’s increasingly strained relationship with Russia stems from two key, interconnected events: the rise of the Pashinyan government during the 2018 revolution, which itself was a response to an attempt to manipulate the elections, and Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war against Azerbaijan. The 2018 revolution brought a democratizing agenda to Armenia, creating immediate friction with Russia, as Pashinyan’s government fundamentally contradicted the authoritarian model championed by Putin’s regime.  Despite these tensions, Armenia’s reliance on Russian energy and security, along with the presence of a Russian military base in Gyumri and Armenia’s efforts to maintain control over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowed for a functional, if strained, partnership between the two nations. However, the September 2020 war, which resulted in a decisive Azerbaijani victory, severely disrupted this relationship. During the conflict, Moscow did not offer military support to Armenia, while Turkey actively aided Azerbaijan and solidified an alliance with it. Russia’s primary focus was on securing its strategic interests, positioning its troops as peacekeepers between the warring sides after the fighting concluded, rather than directly assisting Armenia. This outcome has severely undermined the Armenia-Russia partnership, potentially beyond repair. As a result of Russia’s perceived “betrayal” and self-serving policies during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian support for its alliance with Russia has steadily eroded. The Pashinyan government, despite facing nationalist opposition domestically, has largely accepted defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, relinquishing claims to the region, although the issue of a corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave remains unresolved. Armenia’s growing discontent with Russia has manifested in its de facto withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Moscow’s attempt to create a defense alliance with intervention rights across the former Soviet Union. From Putin’s perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Armenia has not only distanced itself from Russia but has also strengthened its ties with the U.S. and the EU, seeking economic assistance and exploring the possibility of acquiring Western (notably French) weapons. These actions jeopardize Armenia’s dependence on Russia and feed into Moscow’s persistent fear of Western influence in the strategically critical Caucasus region. In response, it is predictable that Russia would view Armenia’s pro-Western trajectory as a direct threat and seek to replace the Pashinyan government with a more compliant regime, one that would restore Yerevan’s subservience to Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. Simultaneously Russia has reversed its alliances, positioning itself as a partner of Azerbaijan, a sentiment that Azerbaijan reciprocates. 

IMPLICATIONS:  Given Russia’s continued military presence at its base in Gyumri and its broader leverage over Armenia, this is likely the most favorable arrangement Russia can achieve in the current geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus. When considered alongside the strong position of the increasingly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, this alignment enhances Russia’s strategic hold in the region. However, these maneuvers leave Armenia in a precarious position. Despite its vulnerability, domestic public and elite opinion in Armenia is unlikely to support a return to dependence on Russia. Yet, the coup attempt reveals that even this seemingly optimal arrangement is insufficient for Moscow, which remains dissatisfied as long as Pashinyan’s government stays in power. Consequently, Russia sought to overthrow Pashinyan’s administration and install a regime more amenable to its interests. Russia’s coup attempt is driven by its desire to reassert itself as the dominant power over the three Transcaucasian states and reclaim its strategic advantage against regional rivals – namely Iran, Turkey, and the West. Moscow’s bid for control continues to shape its foreign policy not only in the Caucasus but also in its actions across the broader former Soviet space, as seen in its involvement in Ukraine and Central Asia. The potential rise of Armenian nationalists, who may be unreconciled to the losses in Nagorno-Karabakh, does not seem to alarm Moscow. On the contrary, Russia likely calculates that by fostering an unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it could restore its influence in the region. Perpetual instability would create a need for an external “security manager” – a role Russia would readily assume. Additionally, such a situation would undermine Western influence and its democratizing efforts in the region, allowing Russia to discredit and push out Western agendas. This would enable Moscow to recover as much of its former dominance in the region as is realistically feasible. The attempted coup in Armenia highlights several implications for both Russia and its neighboring states, as well as for other European states, such as those in the Balkans. It exposes the failure of Russia’s policies toward Armenia, demonstrating that Moscow is unable to provide security to its allies despite formal agreements. Additionally, Russia’s capacity to offer economic support has significantly diminished under the weight of international sanctions and the specter of stagflation.  This decline is not limited to Armenia but is also visible in Central Asia, where Russia, despite holding significant economic sway, is increasingly unable to compete with foreign rivals. Moscow’s self-proclaimed role as the primary security provider in Central Asia has been undermined, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine. Notably, no Central Asian state has endorsed Russia’s actions, and Kazakhstan has publicly distanced itself from Moscow’s goals, recognizing the implications for its own sovereignty, especially given the claims by Russian revisionists that northern Kazakhstan should be considered part of Russia. This broader regional disengagement reflects a weakening of Russia’s influence, as its inability to fulfill its security commitments and its shrinking economic capacity force its neighbors to seek alternatives. The coup attempt in Armenia, therefore, is symptomatic of a larger strategic failure that underscores Russia’s declining power and the increasingly fragile nature of its imperial reach across the former Soviet Union and beyond.

CONCLUSIONS:  Russia’s failure to deliver on its security promises, alongside its visibly declining economy, has paved the way for Central Asian states to pursue both greater regional cooperation and increased foreign engagement. These developments are perceived by Moscow as threatening, as they represent a shift away from Russian influence. The Armenian case exemplifies Russia’s inability to effectively wield its instruments of power in former Soviet republics, leaving it increasingly reliant on force and deceit to maintain control. Coups, such as those attempted in the Balkans and now Armenia, along with heightened espionage and sabotage efforts across Europe, have become the primary mechanisms through which Russia conducts its foreign policy. This dynamic threatens Europe and as seen in Armenia, also places the Caucasus and Central Asia under constant risk of destabilization. Putin’s regime depends on the systematic use of coercion and manipulation to survive. This reliance renders it a persistent threat to every European and post-Soviet government, from London to Dushanbe. The attempted coup in Armenia is a clear illustration of this reality and signals that further crises are inevitable as Putin’s regime struggles to sustain the remnants of an empire. The effort to oust Pashinyan is not an isolated incident but a warning of future instability, a symptom of Russia’s inability to accept that its imperial aspirations are no longer viable. Thus, the Armenian coup is likely the first in a series of crises that will unfold across Eurasia. It serves as a stark reminder that Russia’s weakening grip on its former territories will continue to generate turbulence. We can no longer claim ignorance of these possibilities; the warning signs are clear, and we have been forewarned of what lies ahead.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute at www.fpri.org.