By Sergey Sukhankin

Uzbekistan, the most populous nation in Central Asia, has announced a strategic objective to significantly enhance the proportion of green energy within its energy portfolio and to utilize the surplus as a revenue source by exporting it to energy-demanding countries.This prioritization of green energy stems from ecological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Given Uzbekistan's vast but largely untapped potential in this sector, Tashkent's initiative has been positively received internationally, with investors from China, the Gulf region, and the European Union expressing readiness to provide financial resources and technical expertise. However, despite growing international interest and the political elite's professed commitment, certain domestic challenges have led experts to question Uzbekistan's capacity to fully realize its considerable green energy potential.

Photo by Vladimir Jirnov

BACKGROUND: The end of 2024 witnessed a potentially transformative event for the development of green energy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On November 13, during the World Leaders Climate Action Summit in Baku, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement focused on the production and transmission of green energy. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy, the country plans to commence exporting green electricity, primarily generated from solar and wind power, to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan by 2030.

This agreement reaffirms and solidifies the previously signed protocol in Astana, which outlined the establishment of the Central Asia-Azerbaijan-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. Beyond benefiting Uzbekistan, this initiative aims to strengthen ties between the two most influential Central Asian nations—despite their existing challenges—and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby fostering improved inter-regional trade and cooperation. Uzbekistan is strategically positioned to develop its green energy potential, benefiting from a surplus of inexpensive labor and over 320 sunny days annually. Studies indicate that Uzbekistan possesses the most promising wind and solar energy potential in Central Asia.

By 2027, Uzbekistan plans to construct twelve state-of-the-art thermal power plants across the Bukhara, Tashkent, Khorezm, Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Syrdarya regions. These projects are expected to generate an additional 49.7 billion kWh of electricity annually and, as asserted by Uzbekistan’s political leadership, will be realized through public-private partnerships financed primarily by foreign investments. Moreover, alongside its collaboration with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s green energy initiatives present opportunities to enhance economic and political cooperation with other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose competitive advantage in green energy lies in hydropower generation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan stands to benefit from developing its significant green energy potential in three primary ways. First, by mitigating environmental impacts and reducing natural gas consumption. Given the country’s rapidly growing population and its economic model, the political leadership has recognized the critical role of clean energy in supporting the local economy. By late 2024, Uzbek officials reported that solar and wind power plants had generated 4.5 billion kWh of electricity, conserving 1.36 billion cubic meters of natural gas and preventing 1.89 million tons of harmful emissions. Successes in green energy carry notable diplomatic and political implications. Uzbekistan’s leadership is actively positioning the country as a key regional player in green energy and sustainability, a stance explicitly articulated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the 2024 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Samarkand. This strategy not only enhances the country’s international image but is also expected to generate significant economic benefits.

Second, the development of green energy offers Uzbekistan an opportunity to strengthen economic ties with the European Union (EU). Historically, EU-Uzbekistan relations have been marked by challenges, primarily due to differences in values. However, the geopolitical shifts following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 have underscored the mutual economic benefits of collaboration between the resource-rich Uzbekistan and the economically powerful EU.

In early 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized Uzbekistan’s export potential in green energy, stating that the country plans to produce 13 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity, far exceeding domestic demand by a factor of 10 to 12, with the surplus available for export. According to Uzbek officials, the country is ready to supply between 2 and 5 gigawatts (GW) of green energy to Europe. In support of this initiative, the Italian company CESI is already conducting a feasibility study to facilitate the export of green energy to the EU.

Importantly, collaboration in green energy may serve as a stepping stone toward broader mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU and individual member states, notably France, have shown significant interest in Uzbekistan's natural resources, especially critical metals, whose production Uzbekistan is determined to expand. In the context of China's assertive actions in the critical metals sector, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, holds the potential to significantly enhance its role as a key supplier of essential metals and resources to the EU, addressing the bloc's strategic needs.

Third, Uzbekistan seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These resource-rich nations, equipped with advanced technologies, are particularly attractive to Uzbekistan due to their lack of a geopolitical agenda in Central Asia, unlike Russia or China, and their non-interventionist approach to local norms and values, which sometimes contrasts with the EU.

Prominent Gulf-based corporations, such as ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Masdar (UAE), are already actively engaged in developing Uzbekistan’s green energy potential and have announced ambitious future plans. For Uzbekistan, access to the Gulf's financial and technological resources addresses a critical need, enabling it to navigate the complex dynamics between Russia, China, and the EU—traditional power players in Central Asia. Moreover, if Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan cooperation in green energy proves successful, Uzbekistan could leverage these Gulf partnerships to diversify its foreign economic policy more effectively and enhance its regional and global strategic position.

However, these optimistic projections are tempered by concerns raised by experts regarding Uzbekistan's ability to translate its substantial potential into tangible outcomes. The primary issue lies in the country’s persistent challenges with deeply entrenched corruption and the ineffective management of resources, both of which hinder economic growth and deter foreign investment.

Unfortunately, the clean energy sector appears to be no exception. For instance, one investigative analysis uncovered structural corruption within the sector. Another recent investigation highlighted significant deficiencies in innovation within Uzbekistan's power grid and exposed multiple corruption schemes, while also drawing attention to Uzbekistan’s strengthening ties with Russia, which is reluctant to support Uzbekistan's modernization and transition to a green economy.

A second concern relates to the high cost of green energy production. Experts argue that even in economically and technologically advanced Western countries, green energy remains secondary to traditional energy sources. For Uzbekistan, unless production costs are significantly reduced—a process that could take considerable time—green energy may remain a luxury rather than a feasible primary energy source.

A third challenge, even if the first two are successfully addressed, is the region’s increasingly arid climate. Uzbekistan is already experiencing the adverse effects of sandstorms and similar natural phenomena, which disrupt the operations of solar panels and wind turbines. If these trends persist, they could undermine Uzbekistan's ability to achieve economies of scale, a key factor for reducing costs through the mass production of green energy. This climatic volatility poses a significant risk to the long-term viability of Uzbekistan's green energy ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan's potential success in transforming its significant green energy potential into practical achievements could yield substantial multidimensional benefits for both the country and the broader region. However, achieving this outcome requires effectively addressing two interdependent challenges.

The first is tackling endemic corruption and the ineffective management of resources—longstanding issues that have plagued Uzbekistan and its leadership since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although President Mirziyoyev has initiated reforms, progress in combating these systemic problems remains insufficient.

The second challenge is Uzbekistan's strengthening ties with Russia, which could hinder its ambitious initiatives. Russia has little interest in supporting Uzbekistan's economic growth or its transition to a cleaner energy mix. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to favor efforts to enhance intra-regional economic and political cooperation, as these developments would bolster Central Asia's autonomy and reduce its dependence on Russia. Addressing these issues is critical for Uzbekistan to realize its green energy ambitions and contribute to regional development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

China is moving forward with the long-delayed 523-kilometer railway connecting Kashgar in northwest China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, proposed in the 1990s, officially began construction on December 27 in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan. This route offers a faster, cheaper alternative to existing connections between China and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia.

Excluding Russia from the project has drawn criticism from Moscow, which views Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, Russia, heavily reliant on China due to Western sanctions over its 2022 Ukraine invasion, is unable to oppose the development.

The CKU railway, seen as a regional game-changer, promises to enhance trade and connectivity across Central xAsia. However, it also raises security concerns, as the route may facilitate cross-border activities of drug traffickers, terrorist groups, and militant organizations.

BACKGROUND:  The CKU railway, first conceived in 1997, faced significant delays due to financial, political, technical, and geopolitical challenges. A major obstacle was political instability in Kyrgyzstan, which stalled progress for 15 years. The project was revitalized in 2012 following a visit to Beijing by then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, renewing momentum for this strategic initiative under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Geopolitical factors also contributed to delays in the CKU railway project. Kazakhstan and Russia opposed the new route connecting China to Europe, as they benefited significantly from the existing northern corridor via Russia, which generated substantial revenue. Concerns over losing this economic advantage fueled their resistance. Financing the mega-project was another major challenge. In 2023, reports emerged suggesting the CKU railway’s postponement for an indefinite period due to unresolved funding issues.

Technical complexities have also hindered the execution of the CKU railway project. A key issue is the incompatible railway gauges between China and Central Asian countries. While China uses a standard gauge of 1,435 mm, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rely on a broader gauge of 1,520 mm. This mismatch has posed significant logistical and engineering challenges to the project's implementation.

Another factor contributing to delays was the failure of participating countries to reach a consensus on the railway route due to conflicting interests. China and Uzbekistan favored a southern route, which offered shorter and faster transit to Europe. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan advocated for a northern route that, while longer and more expensive, would connect the north and south of Kyrgyzstan, fostering development and boosting its economy. Ultimately, under pressure from China and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan conceded to the shorter and less costly southern route.

In May 2023, China and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement to commence the CKU railway project during an official visit by the Kyrgyz President to Beijing, with the China Railway Construction Corporation completing a feasibility study the same year.

In June 2024, officials from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement to implement the project, establishing a robust legal framework for constructing the railway. The line will begin in Kashgar, Xinjiang, pass through Kyrgyzstan, and extend into Uzbekistan, with future plans for extensions to West and South Asia.

After nearly three decades of deliberation, the CKU rail corridor is now progressing. The project promises to reduce freight transit times by one week and shorten the China-Europe route by 900 kilometers, marking a significant milestone in regional connectivity.

IMPLICATIONS: Beijing's decision to advance the CKU railway project represents a strategic masterstroke, poised to deepen China's influence across Central Asia and beyond. The initiative comes at a critical juncture, as Russia remains embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and faces crippling Western sanctions, creating a vacuum in the region's geopolitical landscape.

The CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes by providing a direct, efficient corridor to the continent. This development not only strengthens China’s connectivity but also enhances its role as a dominant trade and infrastructure player in the region.

In the future, the CKU railway could become a central hub for rail connectivity in Asia, linking Central Asia with South and West Asia. Once completed, the railway may be expanded east-west or north-south by integrating it with other countries' rail networks. Potential extensions include a route from Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Additionally, Uzbekistan's existing connections with Turkmenistan and Iran could position the CKU railway as one of the shortest routes between China and Western Europe.

With the CKU corridor operational, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are set to emerge as vital transit countries for Chinese exports. Both nations stand to gain significant economic benefits from transit fees, enhancing their economic roles in regional and global trade.

As a pivotal element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CKU railway represents a strategic project to enhance China's connectivity with Central Asia. This landmark railway will traverse the challenging terrain of western China and Kyrgyzstan’s highest mountains, linking the railway networks of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In its final phase, the project aims to integrate with railway systems in Europe, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Türkiye.

The CKU rail corridor is poised to boost regional trade, foster economic cooperation, and provide the landlocked nations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with critical access to global markets. Furthermore, the project will deliver essential infrastructure to both countries, strengthening their economic resilience and regional standing.

The CKU railway project is estimated to cost US$ 8 billion, with US$ 4.7 billion allocated for constructing the Kyrgyz section. Given Kyrgyzstan’s GDP of $9 billion, this expenditure represents a significant economic burden. As a result, the financially constrained country has sought a US$ 2.35 billion loan from China to fund its portion of the project, raising concerns about Kyrgyzstan potentially falling into a Chinese debt trap.

Once completed, the CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes. Geopolitically, this project is crucial for China, offering an alternative to the current route through Russia and reducing reliance on Moscow for trade with Europe.

On the other hand, the CKU railway raises significant security concerns as it will pass through opium-producing areas, potentially creating a new route for drug smuggling. The corridor could also facilitate the cross-border movement of terrorist and militant groups. This poses a particular threat to China’s Xinjiang province, which has been targeted by separatist and Islamic extremist groups. The railway’s potential to exacerbate regional security challenges underscores the need for robust measures to address these risks.

CONCLUSIONS: The CKU railway has the potential to be a transformative project for Central Asia, elevating the region’s significance as a transit hub between China and Europe. It marks the realization of Beijing’s decade-long ambition to expand its connectivity with Eurasian countries.

The ongoing Ukraine war and Western sanctions against Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have further amplified the importance of the CKU corridor. This new route provides an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia, currently the primary transit route between East and West, thereby diminishing Moscow’s strategic relevance in regional trade.

Geopolitically, Beijing views the timing as opportune to advance the CKU railway project in Russia's so-called backyard, leveraging the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. The launch of this mega project is poised to enhance China’s influence in Central Asia, potentially shifting the balance of power between Beijing and Moscow in the region.

However, the project carries significant security risks. The presence of drug smugglers and militant groups in the region raises concerns that the CKU corridor could be exploited by these armed groups, further complicating Central Asia's already fragile security environment.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Vali Kaleji

The construction of the first phase of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline (TAPI) gas pipeline constitutes a key component of the Taliban's broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects that were suspended following their return to power. The successful implementation of these initiatives is expected to enhance the internal legitimacy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, unlike the preceding two decades, the leadership of Pakistan and India have not participated in the construction of the first phase of the TAPI gas pipeline. Adopting a pragmatic and incremental approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance this energy transfer project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in a phased manner. It appears that Pakistan and India have cautiously opted to wait and watch regarding their involvement in the TAPI gas pipeline.

BACKGROUND:  The transfer of Turkmenistan’s gas resources to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India has faced numerous challenges over the past three decades and remains unimplemented. This initiative has been referred to by various names over time, including “Trans Afghan” (1995), “Consortium of Central Asia Gas Pipeline, CentGas” (1997), “Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline, TAGP” (2002), and TAPI (2010). These projects proposed the construction of a 1,814 kilometer pipeline to transport natural gas from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gas field, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. The Afghan section of the pipeline, spanning 816 kilometers, will traverse the provinces of Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar. The pipeline will enter from Quetta in Balochistan and pass through Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Fazilka, a city at Indian border 150 kilometers from Multan. From Fazilka, the pipeline will enter India. 

The pipeline was designed with an estimated annual transmission capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm). It will supply 5 percent of the gas to Afghanistan, 47.5 percent to Pakistan, and 47.5 percent to India during its 30-year operational period. Afghanistan will receive 500 million cubic meters of gas for the first decade, 1 bcm in the second decade, and 1.5 bcm in the third decade. 

To implement the TAPI pipeline project, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and India’s Vice President Hamid Ansari convened in 2015, in Turkmenistan’s remote Karakum Desert, to inaugurate the proposed pipeline. However, the construction was hindered by several factors, including financial constraints, insecurity in Afghanistan, and the terrorist activities of groups such as the Taliban, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, persistent tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, further obstructed the project’s progress.

A decade later, on September 10, 2024, the construction of the Serhetabat-Herat section of TAPI was inaugurated on the border of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. The ceremony was attended by Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, as well as the Acting Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammed Hasan Akhund.

Unlike the earlier inauguration, the leaders of Pakistan and India were notably absent from this event. The ceremony marked the commencement of TAPI’s first phase, spanning from Serhetabat (formerly Gushgy) in Turkmenistan to Herat in Afghanistan. The subsequent three phases are planned to extend the pipeline from Herat to Helmand, from Helmand to Kandahar, and finally from Kandahar to the Pakistan border.

Adopting a pragmatic and phased approach, the Taliban leadership has chosen to advance the TAPI project in collaboration with Turkmenistan in four distinct stages. This incremental strategy enables the Taliban regime to demonstrate its political resolve, operational capacity, and ability to ensure the security of the project to Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India.

Over the past two years, the Taliban has achieved significant milestones, including the completion of the first phase of the TAP-500 energy system project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan), the inauguration of the Herat Noor-ul-Jihad Substation and Turkmenistan electricity transmission project, the opening of a 177-meter railway bridge on the Serhetabat–Torghundi railway at the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, the initiation of the Shatlyk-1 gas compressor station construction at the Shatlyk field in Mary Province, the launch of a fiber-optic communication line along the Serhetabat-Herat route, and the commencement of the 22-kilometer Torghundi-Sanabar railway construction, marking the first segment of the Torghundi-Herat railway.

These accomplishments have likely bolstered the Taliban’s confidence as they proceed with the implementation of the first phase of TAPI.

IMPLICATIONS:  The project is a critical element of the Taliban’s broader strategy to revive significant energy transfer and transit projects, including CASA-1000 (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission line), the Lazorde project (linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), the Chabahar port transit initiative (connecting Afghanistan, Iran, and India), and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan railway route. These projects, which were suspended following the Taliban's return to power, are expected to generate employment and income for various provinces in Afghanistan, thereby bolstering the Taliban’s domestic legitimacy. 

In line with these efforts, the Taliban declared a public holiday in Herat province on September 11, 2024, coinciding with the inauguration of TAPI’s first phase. This move appears to reflect a deliberate effort at public diplomacy or propaganda, aimed at showcasing the Taliban’s commitment to national development and infrastructure revival.

If TAPI becomes operational, it will create jobs for over 12,000 Afghans, and the project could generate approximately US$ 1 billion annually in revenue for the country. This gas supply will be crucial for meeting the energy needs of urban and rural areas, as well as supporting industrial and production centers in densely populated and strategically important regions such as Herat, Helmand, and Kandahar.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of significant energy transfer and transit projects, such as TAPI, holds the potential to strengthen the Taliban’s diplomatic and economic ties with neighboring countries. Such developments are particularly critical for the Taliban leadership, given its international isolation. 

An important aspect of the TAPI project is the decision to construct its four phases without reliance on international financial aid. Both Turkmenistan and the Taliban recognize that, given the lack of international recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, securing financial assistance or loans from institutions such as the Asian Development Bank is not feasible. This constraint likely influenced the decision to proceed with the phased implementation of TAPI exclusively within Afghanistan, excluding the active participation of India and Pakistan at this stage.

The construction and operation of the pipeline are overseen by TAPI Pipeline Company Limited (TPCL), based in Dubai. TPCL is a joint venture between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with each country holding a stake in the project. The state-owned company Turkmen Gas holds a dominant 85 percent share in TPCL, while the remaining 15 percent is equally distributed among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Consequently, it is anticipated that TPCL will finance the construction of the four phases of the TAPI pipeline within Afghanistan.

Should the pipeline be extended to Pakistan and India, the financing strategy would likely involve not only allocating the respective shares of Pakistan and India from TPCL but also securing additional funding through financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank to support the broader extension.

Another significant implication of TAPI, even if limited to its four phases within Afghanistan, is the increased diversification of Turkmenistan’s gas export destinations and routes. Over the past three decades, Turkmenistan has developed gas export pipelines along three primary routes: northern (Russia), eastern (China), and western (Iran and Turkey). The implementation of TAPI would establish a new southern route, enhancing Turkmenistan’s gas export network. This diversification is expected to strengthen Turkmenistan’s position in the regional gas market, providing the country with greater leverage and bargaining power in negotiations.

Additionally, Turkmenistan remains attentive to the dynamics of its competitors, particularly Iran. International sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the past, along with unilateral sanctions by the U.S. in recent years, have significantly curtailed Iran’s foreign investment, production, and export capacity. These sanctions have also stalled major gas transmission initiatives, most notably the Peace Pipeline (Iran-Pakistan-India). In this context, the successful implementation of TAPI could position Turkmenistan as a more reliable and influential player in the regional energy market, capitalizing on opportunities that competitors like Iran have been unable to pursue.

However, Turkmenistan will need to secure additional foreign investment to expand its gas production capacity to ensure a sustainable supply for its growing base of gas-consuming customers. The country’s ability to meet this challenge will be crucial as it seeks to maintain its role as a reliable energy supplier in an increasingly competitive regional and global market.

This challenge will become even more pronounced if Turkmenistan succeeds in implementing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project in collaboration with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the European Union. Such a project, aimed at supplying gas to European markets, would further strain Turkmenistan’s production capacity. The increased demand would necessitate significant investments in infrastructure and technology to scale production while ensuring the reliability and sustainability of its gas exports across multiple routes and to diverse markets.

CONCLUSIONS:  The full implementation of TAPI will hinge on several critical factors. These include the political will of the leaders of the four participating countries—Turkmenistan, Afghanistan under Taliban leadership, Pakistan, and India—along with the ability to ensure security throughout all stages of construction and operation. Particular attention must be given to mitigating threats from groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Additionally, effective operation and distribution of gas through rural and urban areas, as well as the mobilization of the substantial financial resources required for this ambitious project (estimated at US$ 7 to 8 billion), are essential for its success.

Moreover, the project must remain insulated from the complex and often contentious disputes between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The successful completion of the current four phases of TAPI is seen as a critical test for the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate in demonstrating its capability to execute such a significant energy transfer initiative after three decades of delay.

Pakistan and India are seemingly opting to wait and watch to assess the feasibility and progress of the project under the Taliban’s stewardship. Should the Taliban successfully implement these initial phases, Pakistan and India can be anticipated to join efforts to extend the project further.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.