By Tomáš Baranec and Beskid Juraj
May 10th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
A new wave of escalation hit Nagorno-Karabakh in early April. In the course of what was probably Azerbaijani reconnaissance by force, claiming dozens of dead on both sides, Baku managed to secure several heights controlled by Armenian forces. Immediate hostilities have receded for now, but the question remains how the military strength of both sides has changed in recent years, what this means for the future of the peace process, and the role of Russian arms in the resurrection of this conflict.
By Eduard Abrahamyan
April 27th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
The recent unprecedented escalation around Nagorno-Karabakh highlighted deep systemic shortcomings in existing international mediation initiatives. The OSCE Minsk Group, dedicated to settling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has become largely irrelevant in the new operational situation. The intense fighting erupted on April 2 and lasted for four days until a Russia-brokered ceasefire between the adversaries was mutually agreed upon on April 5. The fighting put an end to the 22-year-old ceasefire regime, and the security environment of the South Caucasus. The escalation was clearly a consequence of a shift in the military balance of power, consistently fueled by Russia’s distribution of advanced offensive arms to Azerbaijan and the evident impracticability of the Minsk Group.
By Almaz Rza
April 11th, the CACI Analyst
Starting from mid-day on April 5, the cease-fire regime was restored after heavy fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces along the line of contact since April 2. According to information posted on the website of Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry, “military forces are now working on strengthening their position in newly liberated areas.”
Dozens of soldiers and civilians were killed as the worst fighting in two decades threatened to spread beyond the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory and adjacent occupied territories. International organizations have warned that the escalating conflict could spiral into a “full-scale war” over Nagorno-Karabakh, threatening to destabilize the region.
By Kairat Bekov and Gregory Gleason
April 1st, 2016, The CACI Analyst
Competition over technological advantage has replaced rivalry over territorial advantage in the great games of contemporary Central Asia. One of the main thoroughfares of the modern “Silk Road” is the telecommunications highway. The impending advent of fifth generation telephone technology is opening yet a new sphere of interaction among the countries of Central Asia offering as many opportunities for regional cooperation as it creates for competition.
By Roger N. McDermott
February 25th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
Moscow has stated that among its defense and security priorities for 2016, Central Asia and the South Caucasus will top its agenda. Kavkaz 2016, the main strategic military exercise of the year, will take place in the Southern Military District (MD), while Tsentr 2015 occurred in Central MD with among its vignettes a rehearsal of intervention in Central Asia. Surprisingly in this context, the Defense Ministry plans to restructure the 201st Base in Tajikistan from divisional to brigade status. This initiative is driven by Moscow’s growing concerns about the future of Central Asian security as it faces multiple potential threats stemming from Afghanistan and Islamic State (ISIS). But paradoxically, Moscow’s latest moves to strengthen the basing of its forces in Tajikistan serves as an indicator of official perceptions that the region could suffer a serious security challenge.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.