BACKGROUND: During the commemoration of the Khojali massacre in late February, the Azerbaijani public was shocked by a pornographic scandal connected with Ganimat Zahidov, the editor-in-chief of the opposition Azadlig newspaper. On February 25, Zahidov and the Azadlig technical director Azer Ahmedov were both kidnapped and physically abused by a group of unknown people. During the press conference on the next day, Zahidov maintained that the kidnappers were beating him for publishing critical articles about President Aliyev. Afterwards, the kidnappers brought them to a Baku restaurant where they took pictures of the journalists with prostitutes in a secluded room. The pro-governmental mass media immediately took its chance to trumpet the “amorality” of the opposition and its press. However, the attention abruptly shifted from the scandal to the murder of the editor of the popular journal Monitor, Elmar Huseynov (see the 9 March edition of the Analyst). In fact, Huseynov’s death put the authorities in an inconvenient spot. A continuation of the defamation of the opposition press could be interpreted as an indirect involvement in the murder. The ruling elite tried instead to present Huseynov not only as a critic of the authorities, but also as an opponent of the opposition. The authorities endeavored to prove that the journalist’s death was not in the interest of the ruling elite and began to investigate the case with excessive alacrity. Finally, during a special operation on March 10, a criminal group headed by the head of the Criminal Investigation Department, colonel Haci Mammadov, was neutralized. Twelve other members of the group, all high-ranking police officers, were arrested. The investigation showed that the group had been involved in kidnapping nine people, and of killing at least three other police officers who were investigating the kidnapping cases. The scandal was a devastating blow to the reputation and image of both the police and Ramil Usubov, the Minister of Internal Affairs. Despite predictions of Usubov’s resignation, the President did not dismiss him, arguing that the event was “a black spot in the history of the Department of Interior Affairs, but we cannot tarnish the reputation of the entire ministry.”

IMPLICATIONS: No one was surprised that a scandal involving opposition newspapers would emerge preceding the upcoming parliamentary elections. Three months before the 2000 parliamentary elections, the authorities inflated the story about “hijacking” a plane by a member of the Musavat party, thereby detaining the editor of the Yeni Musavat newspaper Rauf Arifoglu, accusing him of helping terrorists. Five years later, the opposition is trying to achieve an agreement with the government on common rules of behavior during the parliamentary elections. Through the Media, they announced expected concessions from the government, emboldened by the position of the Council of Europe and the U.S.. Instead, the scandal signaled a beginning of attacks on the opposition with the aim of achieving several goals. Aside from discrediting the opposition and intimidating journalists, it served to divert public attention from the upcoming elections. In a society with traditional values, this scandal may very well have achieved some of its goals, as seen in pro-governmental media reports interviewing ordinary citizens infuriated by the amoral behavior of journalists. But the process was abruptly interrupted by the murder of Elmar Huseynov, which seems to have caught the government by surprise. The struggle within the ruling elite is becoming increasingly visible. As a matter of fact, President Aliyev is trying to conduct reforms, and in the process aims to get rid of a number of cabinet and administration figures. All those whom the President would sacrifice in order to secure reforms will be forced to leave the political arena, and thereby lose both influence and large incomes. As a result, those recalcitrant members of the administration strive to prevent reforms by discrediting the President and his reforms. Indeed, whichever group was behind Huseynov’s murder caught the right time. In the midst of the anti-opposition campaign, the murder of journalist who is known for his anti-governmental articles tatters the reputation of Aliyev’s government. Even though the ruling elite were the least interested side in murder, the killing electrified the society and gave an impetus for the further unification of opposition forces. The police scandal flowed logically from this situation. After the murder of the journalist, the President needed to show the public and his opponents in the administration forcefulness and the presence of a program for fighting organized crime. Furthermore, uncovering of the criminal group had the added value of diverting the attention of the public. A final possible aim was to strike against Ramil Usubov, the staunch henchman of the late President Heydar Aliyev. In so doing, Ilham Aliyev may have sought to show that he will not hesitate to decapitate the most loyal people of his administration. Rumors of Usubov’s upcoming dismissal seem quite possible in this regard. Finally, the President’s attempt to regain the initiative was illustrated by an amnesty announced to practically all political prisoners. On March 20, 2005 the President pardoned all opposition members who were imprisoned for the coup attempt following the October 2003 election, thus eliminating pressure from the Council of Europe.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent scandals and violence may unfortunately not be the last. The closer Azerbaijan will move toward the parliamentary elections, the higher the chances that more sordid details will be revealed. In this struggle, an unholy alliance of odious members of the presidential administration with opposition figures should not be ruled out. Under pressure from the international community and with the looming specter of rose, orange, and tulip revolutions, the Azerbaijani government is faced with the imperative to enforce fair and transparent elections. But given an invigorated opposition and the recalcitrance of the “old guard”, the position of President Aliyev is anything else than strong. Walking a fine line, any mistake on the President’s part will be used by both the opposition and opposing groups within his administration to weaken him and his leadership. The only option for the President is to forcefully take the initiative to implement changes in society. Any further postponing of the issues of reforms is now a danger to the President’s position.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Anar Valiyev is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Louisville, School of Urban and Public Affairs. He holds an MA in history from Baku State University and an MPA from Indiana University Bloomington.