BACKGROUND: One important implication of the Kyrgyz revolution was that it showed the political strength of the hitherto neglected southern regions of the country. The revolution may being southern forces to power, and has in any case strengthened the political power of the South. In this sense, the recent Kyrgyz events are reminiscent of the regionalism that characterized Tajikistan civil war in 1992-97. The war led to the exclusion of the previously dominant North from the political leadership and the arrival to power of Southern forces. Aside from this, the perhaps central factor in Kyrgyzstan was the ease with which the opposition forced President Akayev to abstain from taking a fight and in the end to renouncing his position. The question is whether this is indicative of the weakness of legitimacy and real power of all political regimes n Central Asia? Are radical political tools the only instrument that could lead the societies of Central Asia into democratic development, or could they instead lead them to the destruction of the social order and the appearance of new, dangerous consequences for all countries of the region? Pundits now consider whether the other republics of Central Asia will be the next to meet new challenges by opposition forces seeking to replicate the Kyrgyz version of a ‘rose revolution’. In particular, the revolt in Kyrgyzstan worried the Kazakhstani and Tajikistani elites, considering the fact that presidential elections are scheduled in both countries in 2006. Tajikistan already underwent a political experiment in 1989-1991, when secular and democratic movements could not control the political situation in the country, allowing religious groups to take the initiative. These factors transformed the peaceful stage of democratic transformation in Tajikistan to the violence that in turn generated a civil war that killed 50,000 people and turned 100,000 into refugees. Following the peaceful agreement between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik Opposition in 1997, the Opposition was given control over 30% of the government structures. The main part of the Opposition until today remains connected with the Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan (IPRT), which transformed its strategic line from confrontation with the Government to peaceful coexistence with it. The unwieldy political dialogue between the opposing sides provided each with great experience of conducting a political dialogue, which included both sides altering their original positions. This happened to a great extent because all participants in the conflict realized that the continuation of civil war could lead to the shattering of the unity of Tajikistan into a series of regional sovereignties. Tajikistan is the one State in Central Asia where a religious party was legalized. The main dilemma with this political configuration resided in the Constitution of Tajikistan, whose article 8 defines the country as a democracy and a secular state. Simultaneously, the political program of the IPRT proclaims the strategic goal of building an Islamic State. During the process of negotiations, the IPRT agreed to compromise with the Tajik Government by recognizing the secular State. Conversely, the Tajik Government also compromised by changing article 28 of the Constitution, hence allowing the IPRT to participate in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

IMPLICATIONS: Since the civil war, Tajikistan has held parliamentary elections, in February of 2000 and in February of 2005, as well as one presidential election, in 1999. During the first parliamentary election in 2000, only the IPRT crossed the 5% threshold and with gained two seats in the parliament with 7,31% of the votes. None of the secular democratic parties came over the threshold. Most seat were captured by two pro-government parties, the People’s Democracy Party of Tajikistan, which gained 64,9% and 38 seats, and the Communist Party of Tajikistan, with 20,9% and 5 seats). In the 2005 parliamentary elections, secular opposition parties such as the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (based on the ‘Justice and Development’ party, banned in 2000) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) failed to reach the 5% threshold. As in 2000, only the IPRT among the opposition reached the threshold and increased its share to 8,9%, capturing only two seats. The Communist Party of Tajikistan lost heavily, receiving only 13,4% (three seats plus one in the majoritarian system). Most votes were gained by the pro-government PDPT, with 80%. Three opposition parties, the IPRT, DPT, SDP as well as two pro-government parties refused to recognize the results of the election in Dushanbe because of numerous alleged violations. However, this protest did not endure. After some time, the Communist Party reneged on its decision and agreed to participate in the new Parliament. The IPRT later followed suit. The IPRT has considerable political experience earned during the civil war and the post-conflict period. Its leaders do not want to take on the responsibility of political activism, and realize that they are not ready to organize peaceful protests. They also understand that secular parties do not have substantial support among the population. Most of their supporters are out Tajikistan (about 15-20% of the working population is estimated to be in Russia). Moreover, Tajikistan is isolated geographically, from the North by Uzbekistan and from the South by Afghanistan. One of the lessons that the IPRT has learnt is that without changes in Uzbekistan, the Tajik Opposition will not se any success. That is why the IPRT, as the main Opposition force, closely monitors and adapts to the situation in Uzbekistan. In 2006, Tajikistan will go to the polls to elect a President. After the political events in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmonov will face increasing difficulties in extending his presidency. The Parliament approved changes to the Constitution which allow Rahmonov to stand for re-election in 2006. CONCLUSIONS: The time between October and December 2005 will be a very crucial time for Tajikistan. The political situation will be dangerous in the case that President Rahmonov fails to achieve a compromise with the IPRT before the presidential elections. The notion that the Government is in control of the country simply does not stand up to scrutiny, but the President has a significant support among the population which does not want to see renewed civil war. Rahmonov also maintains considerable support among most of traditional and official Islamic circles. Nevertheless, if he would enter into a conflict with the IPRT, he could lose his popularity very quickly. Indeed, one of the reasons for his popularity is the compromise he conducted with the IPRT and the signing of a power-sharing agreement, from which Rahmonov acquired a great deal of symbolic capital as the person who put an end to the civil war. Another reason is that the IPRT restrains the attacks of pan-Islamic movement operating in the northern Region of Tajikistan, and keep loyalty to the Government’s nation-building project based on identification with the Samanid dynasty. In short, the situation in Tajikistan will depend to a great extent on the continuation of dialogue between the Government and the IPRT. This in turn illustrates that no significant political and social changes in Tajikistan will occur in disregard of the religious factor. Moreover, significant political changes in Tajikistan would be possible only following crucial political changes in Uzbekistan.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Shozimov Pulat is the senior researcher of Tajik Academy of Sciences and the Fulbright Scholar of Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), John Hopkins University in Washington DC.