BACKGROUND: Conscript service, according to President Islam Karimov, has tended to engender corruption within the armed forces since local officials are placed in a position of deciding \'whom to call for military service, and for whom to extend an induction term, or whom to completely omit, and sometimes for a certain gain, they arbitrarily decide to release someone from the army\'. In turn, this encouraged a culture of corruption to exist within the Uzbek armed forces, undermining discipline, and ensuring personnel upheaval and further constraining the forces\' ability to meet high levels of combat readiness. Reducing the length of conscript service from 18 months to one year, may go some way to addressing its widespread unpopularity amongst Uzbek youth, but it will not prove an instant remedy and it will perpetuate manpower problems, as Botir Mirzamuhamedov, head of the Uzbek MoDs conscription department, acknowledges. In 1995, Uzbekistan ratified its first military doctrine. Tashkent eschewed weapons of mass destruction, rejected territorial claims on its neighbours and stated that it would only resort to military action in defence of its territory or that of a country with whom it has bilateral defence agreements. It promoted the role of the UN in international affairs, as well as its integration into international and regional security structures. The military doctrine, though defensive in its outlook, called for the maintenance of combat ready forces to deal with threats against its territorial integrity. Due to the civil war in Tajikistan and continued instability in Afghanistan, some Central Asian states regarded the Uzbek military doctrine and the growth of its armed forces with reservation. It espoused, for instance, intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states in the interests of regional stability. Since the mid-1990s, recognizing the criminal, insurgent, and terrorist threats that were becoming more evident, Uzbekistan began to develop a capability to address these increasingly \'domestic\' threats. The first national security strategy and military doctrine reflected the Soviet system that the Uzbek leadership was familiar with. Consequently, these documents focused on the traditional Soviet external threat, national in its origin. Kazakh rivalry for regional leadership was one factor. The Civil War in Tajikistan and its export of crime and terrorism into Uzbekistan may have raised the first flag, but all of the security structures were heavily burdened by the legacy of the Soviet system and the limited professional experience of the mid- and upper-management that were responsible for establishing these Uzbek organizations. IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan\'s new military doctrine, ratified at a National Security Council meeting in February 2000, remains in essence defensive, though it clearly differs in its emphasis from the earlier doctrine. The new military doctrine identifies the two main threats to national security as \'terrorism and religious extremism\' - often confusing the two phenomena. It envisages the formation of \'an integrated, highly mobile, self-sufficient and flexible military to secure peace\'. These forces should be \'well equipped\' and \'professionally well trained\'. Since 1999 Uzbekistan has sought to strengthen its boundaries and to form a new, highly mobile ground force, as a defence against insurgency and a means of effectively combating regional terrorism. Priority is given to achieving \'professionally trained border guards\'. The military doctrine is also portrayed in Tashkent as confirming the friendly or peaceful intentions towards its neighbours. In order to adequately meet both external and internal security threats it aims at strengthening the armed forces. It proposes closer military cooperation with the U.S., EU, Japan, China, CIS and NATO. These targets are difficult to realise in practical terms, which has meant that Tashkent has searched for assistance beyond its traditional allies. U.S. Special Forces from CENTCOM\'s Special Operations Command are playing a leading role in the training of their Uzbek counterparts, improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Uzbek armed forces, as it has done in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan as well. The training focused on counterinsurgency operations, with Special Forces A-Teams spending about a month each quarter in each country working with their elite Special Forces counterparts. This training established strong military-to-military contacts and relations that helped encourage other security cooperation and assistance programmes. However, owing to the nature of these arrangements it is difficult to assess the extent of U.S. involvement. Special Operations Forces train foreign military personnel under the Joint Combined Exchange Training Programme. Actual numbers of Uzbek servicemen involved in such training are low, though given the nature of Special Forces this might not be entirely unexpected, as illustrated through the 2001 IMET programme, which in 2001 trained a total of 13 Uzbek servicemen, including a small proportion of Uzbek Special Forces. Uzbekistan currently lacks a dedicated SF type infantry training programme. There is also the problem that the infantry training they received before going to the U.S. was highly influenced by Soviet operational doctrine, tactics and procedures; and they are significantly different than the West\'s. If Uzbek Special Forces personnel were trained in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) at the JFK Special Warfare Centre, Fort Bragg, for instance, they would have to overcome the gulf that exists between U.S. and Russian understanding of Information Warfare. CONCLUSIONS: In 2003 greater emphasis will be placed on antiterrorist training and defensive countermeasures against insurgents; artillery troops will train in guerrilla warfare, utilising pin-point strikes in support of special subdivisions. Coping with the threat environment demands soldiers with professionalism and specialist skills. Uzbekistan\'s security problems are predominantly internal and its armed forces, finding themselves in transition like the other Central Asian militaries, are struggling to adapt to the changed security environment where heavy division-based forces are no deterrent to insurgent or terrorist groups. Its relationship with the west, in particular the U.S., has substantially developed in the aftermath of 9/11: Uzbekistan now finds itself playing several roles, partner against terrorism, strategic partner to the U.S. as well as participating in PfP. Its transformation in adopting such roles more fully will require time and continued western commitment, whilst its armed force slowly evolves into a combat capable antiterrorist force able to react rapidly to emerging threats. This will necessitate more than a reliance on the public affirmation of president Karimov, applying the lessons of the past and responding to external stimuli: U.S. engagement coupled with closer regional and international integration could be crucial ingredients in promoting regional stability. AUTHOR BIO: Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at Canterbury (UK). He is also the editor (together with Anne C. Aldis) of the forthcoming Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/ Portland:Frank Cass, 2003.