By Stephen Blank
Russia's aggression against Ukraine has triggered an ongoing and deepening decolonization process across the Caucasus and Central Asia. As part of this process local governments face multiple challenges stemming from Russian policies to restrict their economic or political independence and retain or regain their imperial privilege. These challenges, however, are presenting new opportunities for both local governments and the EU to confront them thereby strengthening their mutual ties, regional security and economic development, as well as cooperation and security against Russian efforts to restore imperial domination in both the Caucasus and Central Asia.
BACKGROUND:
Recent trends in the Caucasus and Central Asia are offering the EU unprecedented opportunities to extend and consolidate its influence. These trends stem from Russia’s difficulties in its aggression against Ukraine but they are clearly part of the longer arc of Russia’s ebbing influence in these regions despite its efforts to thwart the global trend of decolonization. These trends have the active support of local governments precisely because they allow them to enhance their real, not just formal, independence from Russia and establish mutually beneficial and long-term relationships with the EU. At the same time, should the EU exploit these opportunities, not only would it benefit from profitable trade, transport, and connectivity ties with local governments; it would forestall the recrudescence of Russian influence over the region, which is a precondition for Russian adventurism abroad.
These opportunities pertain first to the Caucasus, especially Armenia and Azerbaijan, and second to Central Asia. Thus, they span the entire territory of these two regions. Moreover, these are only among the most recent examples of EU presence here as it is increasingly engaged across the region. In the first instance, Brussels has asked Yerevan and Baku how it might best support development of regional transport and connectivity routes in the South Caucasus. Magdalena Grono, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia told reporters that progress achieved toward building sustainable peace in the region had been "incredibly impressive." Much of this progress builds on previous EU and U.S. efforts, most notably the U.S. Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). In addition, the EU recently announced preparations for a €50 million economic support package intended specifically to assist Armenia in coping with Russian trade restrictions. EU President Ursula Von Der Leyen denounced Moscow’s “economic coercion,” accusing Russia of weaponizing economic relations for political purposes.
IMPLICATIONS:
The political significance of this assistance is unmistakable despite its modest amount. Beyond signaling a readiness to defend Armenia against Russian economic pressure, this transfer of funds represents part of a larger EU program of economic, political and institutional measures to reduce Armenia’s vulnerability and strengthen its independence. Because Brussels recognizes that Moscow’s threats against Armenia will not stop at economic coercion, it is integrating this economic program as part of a larger policy of assistance against cyber-attacks, election interference and disinformation campaigns. For example, the EU has deployed specialist teams to help Armenian institutions resist external influence operations and strengthen electoral resilience and its overall democratization. Thus, the EU appears ready to counter not only the examples of Russian economic pressure against Armenia that have already appeared but also future manifestations of Russian influence operations and information warfare against Armenia. If that is indeed the case, it would represent a major turning point and policy initiative of great benefit to both Brussels and targeted states like Armenia.
The second new opportunity for the EU also emerges from the war against Ukraine. Ukraine’s ongoing targeting of Russian infrastructure is generating consequences that significantly affect Central Asian energy policies. Although several Central Asian states possess and produce large amounts of oil and gas; they have historically lacked the infrastructure to refine and then distribute gasoline and energy products domestically. Instead, they have relied on Russia for those processes.
However, and due to Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy infrastructure, Moscow either cannot fulfill those contracts or is blocking the export of finished energy products to Central Asia. Since there is no alternative to Russian exports, the blocking of them triggers price rises and shortages in Central Asia. However, in countries like Tajikistan these shortages could lead to serious dislocation if not a genuine crisis. As a result, the idea of a Central Asian pipeline network, including Azerbaijan, has resurfaced.
These discussions offer the EU a serious opportunity to advance both the construction of this regional pipeline infrastructure integrating Central Asia with Azerbaijan, and the ensuing creation of a pipeline network tying trans-Caspian producers to Europe. The EU possesses both the capital and the technological knowhow to invest in and help build this network. Doing so would alleviate Central Asia’s short-term dilemmas and, moreover, provide a safer long-term retort to Russia’s efforts to perpetuate the region’s subordination through its energy leverage. In this way a short-term answer to the current shortages would also lay the groundwork for a stable long-term solution to this problem and enhance regional independence, economic security, and prosperity.
Furthermore, the EU is already investing in regional infrastructure. Kazakhstan, for example, has offered the management of both the seaports and airports at Aktau and Kuryk to EU investors. Therefore, a scheme involving EU investment and/or management of a new energy infrastructure is eminently feasible and compatible with the logic of Kazakhstan’s offer. Also in this area, Brussels could take an active role in promoting regional development, economic security, and enhanced independence for Central Asia much as it is doing for Armenia. And here too it would be building on the foundation of existing programs as Kazakhstan’s example suggests.
CONCLUSIONS:
Russia’s unwinnable war against Ukraine has unleashed a series of transformational processes across world politics. One significant consequence is the acceleration of decolonization processes across the Caucasus and Central Asia. That process, in turn, offers the EU and regional governments multiple new opportunities to strengthen economic integration and regional cooperation, trends that will further impede any Russian efforts at regaining its empire. Those tendencies also benefit the EU by reducing its members’ exposure to dependence upon Russian energy and Moscow’s ensuing leverage over their policies. In this way concerted and targeted EU policies, many of which are already underway, can increase security in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
These policies, by also reinforcing regional trade networks, also help to overcome the local rivalries from which only Moscow benefits. They invigorate regional cooperation and cohesion while also providing major stimuli for future economic development within the Caucasus and Central Asia and potentially also in Europe. Those processes and trends also will help mitigate the causes of local rivalries and foster regional peace among former enemies. The EU’s success in working with regional governments to meet these challenges may also lead both sides to look for further avenues of mutual cooperation and benefit, for example cooperative projects to meet the challenges of water supply and environmental degradation. Indeed, we are only at the beginning of a process that can lead to much greater benefit for both sides in the future, if indeed they seize these opportunities.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.
