The French government’s decision to sell several Mistral-class amphibious warships to Russia has aroused concerns, especially in Georgia and the Baltic states, that the Russian Navy will use the vessels to intimidate or even invade its neighbors. Yet, the ship would add little to Russia’s already substantial military advantage over these countries. The real problem with the sale is two-fold. First, it could help revitalize Russian military shipbuilding. Second, the transaction could divide NATO members, weakening their leverage with Moscow.

BACKGROUND: Weighing over 20,000 tons and extending approximately 200 meters in length, the Mistral is the second-largest warship in the French Navy. It can transport amphibious landing craft, 16 heavy-lift helicopters, dozens of tanks or armored vehicles, and hundreds of sailors and marines. In peacetime, the Mistral’s large size would establish a highly visible Russian naval presence wherever it sailed. In wartime, the vessel can function as a command ship for combat operations.

During Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's March 1-3 visit to Paris, French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed the sale. Like other French government representatives, Sarkozy argued that the Cold War was over and, if the West expected Moscow’s help regarding Iran’s nuclear program or other 21st-century threats, it had to trust Russian officials sufficiently regarding arms sales and other issues.

In a letter to the French Ambassador to Washington, several U.S. Senators noted the irony of France’s willingness to sell Russia a major warship that could be employed against Georgia even though Moscow has violated the cease-fire agreement Sarkozy negotiated with Medvedev. Obama administration officials are uneasy about the deal, but, after French officials ignored the complaints of Robert Gates when the Secretary of Defense visited Paris in February, they have stopped trying to block it, at least in public Although acknowledging the concerns of some European governments, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has repeatedly declined even to object to the sale. Since he claimed to be shocked that Russia’s recently released military doctrine considers NATO a threat, Rasmussen could hardly cite similar reasons to oppose the proposed transaction.

French commentators have stressed the domestic economic considerations behind the sale. Building the Mistral-class warships keeps over a thousand people employed at the STX shipyards in Saint-Nazaire. French Navy orders are about to end, so the shipbuilder, which is already laying off workers and selling shares to the French government in return for cash to stay afloat, desperately needs foreign clients. Aware of this vulnerability and seeking to make sure the French think that Moscow might turn elsewhere if thwarted in Paris, Russian government representatives have made indiscrete probes to shipbuilders in Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries about their possibly providing Mistral-like ships to Russia.

The Russian Navy sees buying the Mistral as helping to fill an important gap in Russia’s defense assets. The Russian military lacks a large amphibious assault ship like the Mistral that can anchor in coastal waters and send troops ashore using helicopters and landing craft. The Mistral could also serve as an impressive command ship for naval task forces. Russian shipbuilders would find it difficult to construct such a complex vessel without foreign assistance. French officials have indicated they would not include any important weapons systems in the transfer, but the Russian military has recently begun to exploit French eagerness to complete the transaction by demanding the inclusion of additional military hardware and software in the sale. On March 25, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of the General Staff, told the Russian government weekly Rossiiskaya Gazeta that “Russia's leadership and Defense Ministry have a clear position on the issue. Should a final decision be made on Mistral, we will purchase this ship only if it is fully equipped – with all control and navigation means and armaments. The only exception is the helicopters: these will be our own.”

Russian shipbuilders have objected to the proposed purchase of the Mistral, arguing that the money would be better spent on buying Russian-made ships, which would generate jobs and revitalize domestic production. But it is unclear whether Russian naval designers and shipyards could soon construct such a large ship. If Russia purchases Mistral-class ships from France, they would cost at least 500 million Euros (US$ 750 million) each and Russia would receive its first vessel in 2015. The Russian shipbuilding industry would probably take much longer to construct the ship, and the final costs could even exceed those of the French option, given the lengthy delays and substantial cost overruns experienced with other Russian-made warships.

Opponents of the sale have frequently cited the unguarded remarks of Admiral Vladimir S. Vysotsky, the commander of the Russian Navy, to the effect that if a ship like the Mistral had been available during Russia’s August 2008 war with Georgia, then the Russian Black Sea Fleet could have accomplished its amphibious operations in 40 minutes rather than the 26 hours they required. Yet, the direct combat contribution of a Mistral-class ship to another Russian attack would be marginal. Compared to the most advanced NATO warships, the Mistral’s defenses are deficient in such areas as armoring, compartmentalization, fire-fighting, and systems redundancy. NATO militaries could easily sink a Mistral-like ship, though no NATO government seems prepared to defend Georgia with force. More importantly, the Russian Army demonstrated in 2008 that it can overwhelm Georgian defenses in a ground conflict. Since then, Moscow has enhanced its military potential against Georgia even further. Thanks to its new military bases Russia is acquiring in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian armed forces can now plausibly rapidly inflict damage on Georgia even without a navy.

IMPLICATIONS: The more disturbing effects of the Mistral sale are that it could help revitalize Russian military shipbuilding, which has never recovered from the breakup of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Russia’s defense sector found it extraordinarily difficult to manage the transition from the integrated Soviet-wide command economy to a post-Soviet environment characterized by considerably reduced domestic demand and the widespread prevalence of free-market conditions in which defense firms found themselves competing with other Russian companies for orders, supplies, and human resources.

For the past decade, Russia’s shipbuilding industry, which depends heavily on military contracts, has been able to produce only a few small-sized warships each year. The recurring production delays and cost overruns associated with efforts to renovate the Admiral Gorshkov, sold to India in 2004, underscore the currently weak state of Russian shipbuilding. Similar weaknesses in Russia’s aerospace sector have required the government to purchase unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel after the Georgian War highlighted Russia’s inadequacies in this area.

Given these considerations, the Russian government has pressed France to allow Russia’s shipyards to manufacture some Mistral-class warships under license. Russian negotiators have offered to buy the original Mistral outright, but want to produce additional Mistral-class vessels at home. The French government would like Russia to purchase at least two Mistral-class ships made in France. Under either arrangement, French engineers and other naval experts would modernize Russia’s indigenous capabilities to produce Mistral-class ships. Russia could then use these modernized assets to construct other types of ships, for the Russian Navy or for export to China, Iran, Venezuela, or other Russian military allies. The Russian defense industry could receive an even greater boost if the French consented to transfer additional military equipment with the ship. The Mistral’s sale would also represent the largest defense transaction between Russia and a NATO country. Russian defense planners might hope it could establish a precedent allowing them to purchase additional NATO-made weapons, with further transfers of military technologies under license or through reverse engineering.

The Mistral transaction could also assist Russian efforts to strengthen its bilateral ties with major European governments. Russian diplomacy traditionally strives to negotiate with the large European countries separately rather than being confronted with a united front in NATO or the EU. Encouraged by Russian officials, Russian companies have been negotiating major commercial deals with France, Germany, and Italy to gain influence in these important states. Most recently, Russian diplomats have tried to secure support in these countries for a new European security treaty that Russian policymakers hope could weaken and constrain NATO’s activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

CONCLUSIONS: The French government seems determined to complete the Mistral sale. Those concerned about the deal should direct their efforts at persuading French authorities to limit the number of ships included in the transaction and the amount of advanced technologies transferred to Russian shipbuilders constructing additional Mistral-class ships under license. The restrictions should apply to any post-sale supply and service contracts as well as the initial transaction. Ideally, NATO governments should prevent the issue from becoming a source of public intra-alliance divisions, but France’s allies could justifiably protest should Paris unexpectedly reverse its stance about not selling Russia sophisticated electronics or weapons systems along with the ships.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Director of the Hudson Institute Center for Political-Military Analysis. He is the author, among other works, of Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008).