On March 23-24, President Kurmanbek Bakiev initiated a national civil forum in Kyrgyzstan through the Kurultai of Consent, a traditional form of public gathering, which coincided with the fifth anniversary of the Tulip Revolution. On March 17, the opposition held an alternative Kurultai on the eighth anniversary of the “Aksy- events”, when six people were killed during antigovernment manifestations. The two events signify an emerging type of interaction between government and opposition and a struggle for improving their public legitimacy, a resource clearly lacking for both sides.

BACKGROUND: The issue of gaining social support is becoming acute especially for the supporters of the president, and calling a Kurultai in this context is a political maneuver in a deteriorating socio-economic situation. The wintertime energy deficit caused tripled tariffs during the last three months of 2009, while the income tax was raised to 20 percent in the beginning of 2010. These numbers might not seem that significant, but taking into account that the average income in Kyrgyzstan is US$ 60 and the average pension rate is US$ 30, it becomes clear that the potential for social unrest is increasing. The Bakiev administration has implemented privatizations of the energy sector, where the distribution company “North-electro” was according to some sources sold for US$ 3 million, while independent estimates have assessed the company’s value to US$ 154 million. The construction works of the hydro-electrical stations Kambar-Ata I and II are postponed indefinitely, also freezing the promised Russian investments of US$ 2 billion for these projects.

In light of these events and with the help of the president’s majority in parliament, a constitutional reform was passed. Constitutional amendments initiated by the pro-presidential party “Ak Zhol” allowed the establishment of a new institution – the State Conference – with the authority to appoint a person performing the president’s functions in case of the elected president’s disability or death.

On January 21, President Bakiev signed the Decree to call the Kurultai of Consent as an answer to the rise of social discontent. The official justification of the Kurultai was a “need to provide national dialogue for the formation of a new political nation”. According to Bakiev’s television appeal, the Kurultai should stimulate social mobilization. A total of 750 delegates participated, 150 of which were appointed by the president’s quota. Quotas were provided for religious minorities, with ten places for Muslim leaders, five for the Protestant Church, three for the Russian Orthodox Church, and one place each for Buddhist and Jewish leaders, according to Kanybek Osmonaliev, head of the state committee for religious issues. In addition, 35 Kyrgyz citizens working abroad as labor migrants were included. Other participants were chosen through open voting by local communities.

The Kurultai is not allowed to take decisions but as was mentioned by Sultan Jumagulov, one of the organizing leaders and head of the expert-analytical service under the president, “discussions might serve as a base for further decisions of the president”.

The opposition refused to take part in the Kurultai. This decision was taken in a session of the United People’s Movement (UPM), uniting six leading opposition parties. The UPM’s members believed the Kurultai of Consent would turn into a “formal meeting” aiming to “justify the ruling elite’s activities, including the privatization of strategic sectors and constitutional reform”.  The opposition instead decided to call a Kurultai of “Discontent” with the ruling elite’s policies on March 17, the anniversary of the Aksy events. 

IMPLICATIONS: From the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010, the holding of Kurultais at different levels is becoming a regular feature of the political process in Kyrgyzstan, where regional and tribal groups have held civil forums aimed at deciding questions of social representation. In this context, Bakiev asked the delegates of the Kurultai: “Can we preserve our family and kinship relationships and at the same time develop our statehood, based on equal rights for all?”. This question is also of interest to opposition leaders, considering the family rule of the president and the alleged planned succession to his son Maksim Bakiev. Despite the confrontational tone of some speakers at the Kurultai, including calls to reconsider the conviction of former Minister of Defense Ismail Isakov to eight years in prison and criticism of the one-sided mass media coverage and blocking of Internet resources, the Kurultai introduced a new institution to the already existing entities run and controlled by the authorities.

The opposition’s Kurultai gathered between 1,500 and 3,000 people, according to different estimates. Four principal issues were discussed: the planned succession of Maksim Bakiev; the persecution of political views opposed to those of the government; the results of privatizations; and the implications of rising taxes. Debates on these issues were followed by thoughts and discussions about the results of the March revolution and the causes of current problems, which allegedly resemble those under former president Askar Akaev, when the opposition frequently held such forums. The opposition’s Kurultai however failed to produce any wider resonance. The main outcome was the submission of a protest letter to the president, the delivery of which was followed by the imprisonment of 20 persons, however information about these events was blocked by local mass media.

While the holding of Kurultais hardly served to reduce existing tensions between the ruling elite and the opposition, or those between state and society, they did draw attention to the lack of representative institutions in the political system.

The absence of such institutions constitutes an important problem in Kyrgyz politics, as the parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh, is under constant pressure from the executive branch. A fear of what a strong parliament would imply for the possibilities of opposition parties to increase their power has led to the total control of the Jogorku Kenesh by the president and his party, which has the majority of seats and appoints government officials and judges at all levels.

The Kurultai is essentially duplicating the representative function of the parliament, and the parliament’s weakness implies a need for other representative institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, the main such institutions consist of the President’s conference, the Social Chamber, and now the Kurultai of Consent. Although the goals of the Social Chamber and the Kurultai are overlapping, the weak support for the Social Chamber is one reason for the holding of Kurultai. The ruling elite need a new institution which is not formally dependent on the president, but will be able to propose initiatives especially during crises, when the ruling elite may decide to take unprecedented steps. Initiatives proposed in the Kurultai could serve to legitimize radical actions, after which the formal institutions, such as the parliament and the judiciary, would legitimize them as well.

CONCLUSIONS: The call for Kurultai is not a new phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan, president Akaev frequently called Kurultais during political and economic crises. The Kurultai is thus a rather functional instrument in Kyrgyzstan’s politics, the main purpose of which is the forum itself, rather than the result. The call for a Kurultai demonstrates both the lack of legitimacy for the parliament as a representative body and the inefficiency of the proportional electoral system under which the current parliament was formed. Obviously, the lack of communication between parliamentarians and local communities also contribute to the lack of legitimacy for the parliament. Social support is becoming a critical political resource in Kyrgyz politics and the two March events signaled a new struggle for legitimacy between power and opposition in preparation for the 2010 parliamentary elections.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Asel Murzakulova is a Senior Lecturer at the Oriental Studies and International Relations Department of the Bishkek Humanities University, Kyrgyzstan. the Bishkek Humanities University, Kyrgyzstan.