The recent official visit of Indian President Pratihba Patil to Tajikistan may be emblematic of a new focus in Indian foreign policy. India’s establishment of military bases, upgrading of diplomatic relations and increase of financial activity in Tajikistan might be interpreted as a new ‘forward’ strategy. Geography reveals the rationale – Tajikistan borders Afghanistan and is separated from Pakistani administered Kashmir by a strip of Afghan territory. Moreover, the former Soviet republic shares borders with China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This raises a pertinent question - is India is developing a regional strategy derived from Lord Curzon and the British ‘forward’ school?           

BACKGROUND: Lord Curzon once stated “It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent”. The symbolic trappings of President Patil’s trip, as she became the first Indian President to visit Tajikistan and the only foreign leader to attend the celebrations of Tajikistan’s Independence Day, were clear. Patil’s visit to the shrine of the Sufi saint Mir Sayyid Ali Hamdani, credited with assisting the spread of Islam in the Kashmir valley, made the point plainly – India is overtly courting Tajikistan. Patil’s explicit discussion of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, in which she stated that New Delhi is waiting for Pakistan to act against the perpetrators, seemed to clarify New Delhi’s intentions. This could easily be dismissed as another move in the unremitting Indo-Pakistani security dilemma. However, the contents of the rest of the meeting suggest otherwise.

During official discussions in Dushanbe, the presidents discussed the potential for greater cooperation in the energy sector and for an increase in bilateral trade. President Rahmon made clear his wish to see an enhanced level of Indian ‘capacity building’ – in military training and in the development of Tajikistan’s pharmaceutical, IT and food processing industries. Interestingly, President Patil pointed out Tajikistan’s geographical proximity to India, observing that Dushanbe is closer to New Delhi than the Indian capital is to some of India's own cities. Most revealingly, discussions were held on the work Indian companies are doing to upgrade the Varzob-I hydroelectric plant and the contentious redevelopment of Ayni airbase. It is the combination of these two concerns that seems to encompass the twin prongs of Indian forward policy in Central Asia. In this new iteration, the strategic issues at the heart of Curzon’s view have become synonymous with modern India’s need for energy.

Of course, it would be tempting to dismiss India’s move northwards as another facet of New Delhi’s troubled relationship with Islamabad. This view, however, fails to take into account the potential opportunities for Indian companies in Tajikistan. Underinvestment in hydroelectricity capacity means the country is currently only able to produce a fraction of its assumed annual potential of between 40,000 and 80,000 million kilowatts. Discussion of the hydroelectric issue at the recent meeting was a continuation of a policy first announced by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during President Rahmon’s 2006 visit to New Delhi. Its recurrence indicates a commitment to the development of the moribund Tajik energy sector, which in the understated language of Indian diplomacy has been described as being ‘mutually beneficial’. At a Tajik-Indian business conference held in Dushanbe on September 8^th (attended by President Patil), President Rahmon made his desire for increased Indian involvement clear, noting that Tajikistan currently uses only 5 percent of its water energy resources, and that only 20 percent of the cotton fibre produced in the country is currently processed. He not only encouraged investment in these sectors but also suggested Indian businesses consider the Tajik tourism, hotel management, mineral prospecting, and agricultural goods processing sectors.

IMPLICATIONS: Aside from these discussions, Indian engineers are currently engaged in building a 118-km transmission line within Tajikistan, running from the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric power station in the south of the country to the Afghan town of Pol-e Khomri in Baghlan Province. From India’s perspective, the potential for this power line is impressive. It will allow surplus energy produced at the Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power stations to be exported to South Asia. If India is able to build and control the export capacity for this electricity, its role as a player in regional politics could expand considerably. On top of this, Tajikistan’s plentiful deposits of uranium, gold and tungsten could well provide future supplies for India’s raw material requirements. It therefore becomes clear this meeting may unmask a shift in New Delhi’s long-term regional strategy.

When assessing the implications of these developments for Indo-Tajik relations, the question of India’s military footprint comes into view. Unsurprisingly, given its contentious nature, the issue was largely avoided by President Patil. Nevertheless, the presence of Indian forces at both Ayni and Farkhor stand as possible evidence of a new military policy towards Central Asia. Indeed, since Pakistan does not allow India overland access to Afghanistan, New Delhi has had to channel its economic and relief assistance to Afghanistan through Farkhor. The 2007 statement of Farkhor’s operational readiness announced India’s first official foreign military base, and ensured that India became one of only four external powers with bases in Central Asia. The presence of Indian forces in Tajikistan, just two kilometres from the Tajik-Afghan border, discloses New Delhi’s desire to project its power and influence into Afghanistan and beyond. If Kabul has long served as a proxy theatre for the simmering Indo-Pakistan conflict to play out, Tajikistan now features as an extension of that domain.

The successful development of the second site, Ayni, is decisive to any assessment of Indian strategy. Should Ayni become an operational base, it would enable India to project power beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan and into the heart of Central Asia. Work on the base, which is only 10km from Dushanbe, is thought to have been completed earlier this year. The upgrading of relations between the Indian and Tajik defense forces over the last decade makes this plausible. It should be borne in mind that Indian Air Force technicians helped Tajikistan to retrofit their Soviet and Russian fighters, and civilian and military personnel are currently teaching English to Tajik defense staff. Perhaps most significantly, India conducted its first Central Asian military exercise with Tajikistan in 2003.

CONCLUSIONS: India’s moves in Tajikistan, underscored by the prudent diplomacy shown in President Patil’s visit, have generated unease in Islamabad, Moscow and Beijing. For its own security, Tajikistan will not be content to maintain a passive role. In a July 2009 news conference with President Zardari of Pakistan, President Rahmon stated that "as a friendly and peaceful country [we] are urging the two great powers of South Asia, India and Pakistan … to take every necessary step to find political ways of settling this disputed issue". Veiled in this plea was the restatement of an enduring truth for the countries of Central Asia whose relative weakness has made them poorly equipped to shape their own futures. If India is truly performing the opening act of a forward policy, the success of the venture will rest less on President Rahmon’s actions than on the diplomatic élan of a relatively inexperienced foreign policy community in New Delhi. Yet the early signs might reassure Mr. Rahmon. The moderation and poise exhibited by President Patil indicates that New Delhi may well understand the predicament, and is therefore calibrating its policy towards Tajikistan with an understanding of the regional dynamic and the country’s own prerogatives.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ben Welch is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies.