This year, Kyrgyzstan’s Freedom House democracy index will likely change from being “partly free” into “not free”, placing the country in the same category as its Central Asian neighbors. From being the most democratic state in the region a decade ago, Kyrgyzstan has turned into the regional state where dynastic leadership is most likely. This month alone Kyrgyzstan saw four violent attacks against journalists and political activists. The situation is unlikely to change in the coming years.

BACKGROUND: Ten years ago, Kyrgyzstan’s vibrant civil society and intrepid journalists tried to convince former president Askar Akayev to abstain from running for president for a third period. The pressure continued to mount in the early 2000s, forcing Akayev to flee Kyrgyzstan in 2005. At that time, most observers in Kyrgyzstan believed the newly-elected Kurmanbek Bakiyev would need time to clear the government from the corrupt heritage of the previous regime. As Bakiyev began to rapidly consolidate his power, many experts still hoped that since Kyrgyzstan had at least modest experience in political pluralism, the regime would not be able to fully suppress democratic debate. However, despite Kyrgyzstan’s experience with strong civil society and independent media, the country succumbed to the level of authoritarianism of neighboring Central Asian countries within a relatively short period. In effect, the political capital that Kyrgyzstan earned in the 1990s was squandered in the 2000s.

During his leadership, Bakiyev strengthened his personal control over the security and military structures. He sought early elections this July and further centralized the government. Presently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the National Security Service are directly subordinate to the President. Importantly, however, by appointing his son Maksim to lead the Central Agency on Development, Investment, and Innovation, Bakiyev made Kyrgyzstan’s political life predictable. Kyrgyzstan is today the Central Asian country with the greatest likelihood of a dynastic power transfer. The Agency run by the president’s son is to control all foreign financial inflows, including aid and credits; it is also responsible for controlling major national hydroelectric and gold companies. In his new post, Maksim Bakiyev is granted strong leverage over the national economy and political life. It remains to be seen whether he will decide to implement sensible business projects such as the construction of Kambarata hydropower stations.

The Bakiyev regime’s interest in maximizing profits affects the foreign policy domain as well. By first deciding to expel the U.S. military base from the Manas airport in February and then changing his decision in June, President Bakiyev was able to secure higher fees from the U.S. government for the Manas base. How the increased fees are spent by the Kyrgyz government remains undisclosed to the public, hinting that individuals in power are the main benefactors of the payments. Although it is difficult to estimate how much of the payments associated with the U.S. base fuels the regime's strength, one can assume that the base represents a substantial source of financial empowerment.

IMPLICATIONS: Kyrgyz politicians, including MPs and the president, often mimic Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s policy choices. The most recent examples include limiting freedom of speech on the internet in a way similar to Kazakhstan, and toying with the idea of legalizing capital punishment as in Russia. Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship will foster even greater imitations of the large neighbor’s decisions in Kyrgyzstan. Today, as in Kazakhstan, far fewer NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are willing to participate in public life, while local mass media often refuse to publish statements made by civil society activists. Compared to the early 2000s, the peak of Kyrgyz civil society’s expansion, the visibility of local NGOs has decreased. According to the NGO activists themselves, most achievements of civil society have been written off by the ruling regime since March 2005.

This year alone, journalists Syrgak Abdyldayev, Amaz Tashiyev, Aleksander Evgrafov and Genady Pavluk were attacked. After being severely beaten in March, Adbyldayev spent several weeks in hospital and sought political asylum abroad, while Tashiyev died shortly after the attack. On December 9, Akayev’s former aide Bolot Januzakov was severely beaten. On the same day Aleksander Knyazev, a professor at the Kyrgyz-Slavic University who often criticizes the current regime for usurping power, was also assaulted. Evgrafov, a Russian journalist, was attacked on December 15 by policemen and warned not to criticize Kyrgyzstan in his work. Pavluk, who was about to launch a newspaper together with opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev, was pushed from the fifth floor during a trip to Almaty on December 16. Pavluk died a few days later. 

On March 13 Bakiyev’s former aide Medet Sadyrkulov died in an accident that was allegedly orchestrated by his opponents. Sadyrkulov is alleged to have assisted the president in constructing financial schemes and had a significant influence over cadre politics. But after opposing some of Bakiyev political decisions in January, Sadyrkulov could potentially join the opposition. Sadyrkulov’s death showed that even Bakiyev’s closest allies are not immune to persecution.

This year, Kyrgyzstan prevented a number of human rights activists from entering the country. In the most recent case, Tajik human rights activist Nigina Bakhriyeva was not allowed into Kyrgyzstan upon her arrival from Dushanbe. Just weeks earlier, two activists from the Russian Memorial human rights group were similarly denied entry. Local NGO leaders saw a direct link between the refusal to allow Bakhriyeva into the country and her September training of Kyrgyz lawyers. Bakhriyeva’s work with Kyrgyz lawyers followed the Kyrgyz authorities’ harsh suppression of residents in the southern city of Nookat in October 2008.

In the past five years numerous opposition leaders, NGO activists, and journalists have fled Kyrgyzstan in fear of violence and unjust trials. The political role of the security services has increased tremendously, making any attempt to return to the country dangerous. The police and various law-enforcement agencies, such as the fiscal police and the prosecutor, are intervening in the lives of civilians more frequently. The budget of the National Security Service doubled after the president's brother Zhanysh Bakiyev was appointed as its head, while the salaries of state security employees also increased.

As this year ends, Kyrgyzstan’s human rights and democracy situation is turning increasingly similar those in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, unlike its neighbors, where killings or beatings of human rights activists, journalists, and opposition leaders peaked several years ago and where authoritarian leaders are now unchallenged by opponents, Kyrgyzstan is still discovering the brutalities of the Bakiyev regime. Local activists, who had learnt to speak out openly before Bakiyev came to power, are now bound to find a way of co-existing with the authoritarian regime. The sense of helplessness against the possibility of an attack devised by the regime is shared by many in Kyrgyzstan as unexpected and wry acts of violence have become Bakiyev’s language of choice with his opponents.

Luckily for the president, the bulk of the country’s population depends on migrant remittances from workers in Russia, Kazakhstan and, to a lesser degree in Europe, United States and South Korea. Bakiyev does not face urgent demands to create new jobs or to provide social services.  Opposition forces, in the meantime, have also been unable to prove strong enough to challenge Bakiyev beyond accusing him of corruption and authoritarianism. In this environment, Kyrgyzstan’s future is bleak. Bakiyev is likely to continue ruling the country, while Kyrgyzstan explores new heights of authoritarianism.

CONCLUSIONS: Following a short-lived political and economic openness in the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan has largely squandered its achievements in the 2000s. Moreover, there is a strong possibility of a dynastic succession of power in the country. While the incumbent Bakiyev has effectively centralized his government and established a loyal parliament, violence is used to solidify his rule over the broader society.  Local civil society activists and journalist are vulnerable to being beaten or killed. The downgrading of Kyrgyzstan into a “not free” state should therefore come as no surprise.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.