By Sergey Sukhankin

The recent negotiations between Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Olaf Scholz in Astana have underscored the increasing interest of Western economies in Kazakhstan’s abundant natural resources. The country is richly endowed with strategic minerals, which could provide a substantial counterbalance to the dominance of China and Russia in the global supply chain, a situation that presents various economic and geopolitical challenges for Western nations. Nonetheless, in spite of its wealth in natural resources, Kazakhstan’s significant dependency on China and Russia complicates its potential role in meeting the West’s growing demand for strategic minerals. It is imperative that Western countries develop a concrete strategy that delineates specific steps to assist Kazakhstan in its transition from an overwhelming reliance on hydrocarbons to a more diversified export profile that includes strategic minerals. Absent such initiatives, it will be exceedingly difficult for Kazakhstan to position itself as a viable alternative to both China and Russia.

BACKGROUND:  Leading Western economies, including the U.S., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have expressed a pronounced interest in collaborating with Central Asian nations to explore their extensive yet underdeveloped reserves of strategic natural resources. Of particular significance are rare earth elements (REEs) and rare metals (RMs) such as uranium, lithium, tantalum, niobium, indium, scandium, vanadium, thallium, and gallium. This burgeoning interest is driven by two primary factors.  First, the objective of achieving net zero emissions necessitates a substantial increase in the utilization of critical metals. As projected by the International Energy Agency, the rising adoption of clean energy technologies is expected to quadruple the demand for REEs and RMs by 2040. Second, the recent policies enacted by Russia and China to restrict exports of critical metals have compelled Western nations to seek alternative sources for these essential materials. Given the geopolitical challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa – another significant producer of critical metals – Central Asia emerges as the only viable alternative, with Kazakhstan playing a pivotal role. In addition to its vast resource base, the Kazakhstani government has demonstrated a strong commitment to developing its considerable potential in the strategic minerals sector. President Tokayev has asserted that these minerals could serve as the “new oil” for the nation and its economy. Kazakhstan has not only entered into multiple international agreements to facilitate the entry of Western companies into its strategic minerals sector but also plans to declassify information regarding its REE and RM deposits, a move that underscores its dedication to becoming a global leader in this industry. Furthermore, the country intends to collaborate with neighboring Tajikistan in the search for and extraction of critical metals.

IMPLICATIONS:  If Kazakhstan successfully attracts foreign financial capital and expertise in its strategic minerals sector, the country has the potential to emerge as one of the world’s leading players in this industry. Furthermore, partnerships and collaborative initiatives between Kazakhstan and other regionally resource-rich countries, such as Tajikistan and potentially Uzbekistan, could positively influence the global critical metals industry while simultaneously reducing the West’s strategic and precarious dependence on China and Russia. Engaging in partnerships with Kazakhstan to fulfill its demand for strategic minerals presents a mutually beneficial opportunity for Western nations; unlike other suppliers, Kazakhstan is not facing comparable political destabilization (as seen in Sub-Saharan Africa), nor is it encumbered by geopolitical ambitions (like China) or neo-imperialist aspirations (like Russia), both of which could threaten regional stability and deter potential investors. However, Western efforts to leverage Kazakhstan’s extensive resource base may be impeded by three external factors. The first issue pertains to economic sustainability. If Kazakhstan, along with other Central Asian nations, successfully attracts foreign direct investment (FDI) in its critical metals sector, the commencement of large-scale production may lead to a significant decline in global prices for these commodities. Under such circumstances, the exploration and extraction of critical metals – processes that are hazardous, costly, and ecologically unsustainable – could become less economically viable for the country, while also posing potential harm to its ecosystem. Despite President Tokayev’s assertions, from a purely economic perspective, critical metals do not currently appear capable of serving as the “new oil” for the Kazakhstani economy. This situation could be exacerbated in the event of a surplus of critical metals in the global market. The second issue is the “China factor.” Currently, China dominates the global critical metals industry, possessing 35 percent of proven resources, 68.5 percent of extraction and mining capacity, and 80 percent of output. With the European Union’s dependency on Chinese REEs and RMs approaching 98 percent, coupled with China’s growing interest in Central Asian natural resources – driven by the rapid development of its domestic microchip and green energy sectors – Central Asia emerges as a region of strategic significance for China. Given China’s substantial influence in the macro-region, reinforced through soft power, investments, trade relationships, and the indebtedness of local actors, it poses a significant challenge for the EU and the U.S. to compete effectively with Beijing. Additionally, the Chinese approach to business, which emphasizes non-interference in domestic affairs and eschews democracy promotion, is likely to align more closely with the cultural values and traditions of many Central Asian countries, which are not fully democratic. The third issue concerns the “Russia factor.” Russia’s interest in Kazakhstan’s critical metals sector is motivated by factors distinct from those of China. Strategically, Russia aims to maintain its significant role in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector, as Kazakhstan produces over 40 percent of the world’s uranium and serves as a key supplier for Russia. Russia not only partially owns uranium mines in Kazakhstan but also plays a crucial role in the country’s export framework, with the port of Saint Petersburg serving as a vital transportation hub for these exports. From a logistical perspective, identifying alternative routes to Russia – such as the Middle Corridor – would necessitate legislative changes related to uranium transportation and require additional investments to enhance the capacity of these routes.  Even if these conditions are met, the possibility of Russia adopting a more assertive stance should not be overlooked. Historically, disputes have arisen between Russia and Kazakhstan over oil-related matters in the resource-rich Caspian Sea. Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Kazakhstan has sought to position itself as an alternative supplier of hydrocarbons to the EU, which was marked by a “mysterious” explosion that resulted in the deaths of two workers at Tengiz, Kazakhstan’s largest oil field. The increasing anti-Kazakhstan rhetoric in Russian propaganda channels – reminiscent of narratives used against Ukraine prior to 2022 – often focuses on uranium-related issues. Therefore, one should not discount the possibility of provocations from Russia should circumstances develop in a manner deemed unacceptable to it. These three factors pose significant obstacles for Kazakhstan’s potential to play a significant role in the West's shift away from reliance on China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia) for critical metals. Importantly, neither China nor Russia is likely to relinquish their dominant positions as suppliers of REEs and RMs without resistance, in the face of Kazakhstan’s emerging presence in the market.

CONCLUSIONS:  Kazakhstan, with its abundant natural resources and commitment to a peaceful foreign policy, presents an ideal trade partner for Western countries seeking to meet their demand for REEs and RMs while diversifying their supply chains away from China and Russia. However, achieving this goal poses significant challenges due to Kazakhstan's vulnerabilities in relation to both countries. Without a concrete strategy from the West – a detailed plan that extends beyond simple import-export arrangements, resource exploitation, and vague commitments – Kazakhstan will struggle to fulfill Western demands on its own. Geopolitically insecure and lacking sufficient funding, technology, and expertise, Kazakhstan risks remaining a land of unfulfilled opportunities without comprehensive Western assistance. To avert this scenario, the U.S. should collaborate with the European Union to help Kazakhstan reshape its economic model, transitioning from an economy primarily reliant on oil exports to one that focuses on the export of strategic metals. This transition will likely require coordinated efforts to adjust infrastructure for specific objectives, significant investments, and innovative strategies to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of the macro-region, which also includes influential regional players such as Turkey and Iran.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada).

COMPETITION VS PARTNERSHIP: UZBEKISTAN-KAZAKHSTAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT

By Nargiza Umarova

Recent geopolitical crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have created favorable conditions for the development of intercontinental land trade routes, significantly enhancing the role of Central Asia as a transit region linking major Eurasian markets. This shift was anticipated to improve intraregional transport connectivity and facilitate the integration of Central Asian republics into global supply chains – both essential for the region’s economic growth. However, unity among the five Central Asian states on these initiatives remains elusive. Currently, these countries prioritize the creation of international transit corridors over local connectivity. Low coordination between them leads to duplication of projects, and the focus on their own interests becomes a source of unhealthy competition. Rivalry is particularly evident in the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, each seeking alternative access to Turkish and European markets via the Caspian Sea.

BACKGROUND:  In 2018, the Central Asian states initiated a mechanism for regular Consultative Meetings aimed at enhancing multilateral cooperation in transport communications. A key priority identified was the alignment of national transport systems, a crucial prerequisite for boosting mutual trade and expanding the transit potential of the region’s countries. To facilitate this alignment, plans were proposed to establish a Regional Center for the Development of Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations, to develop a Strategy for Regional Transport Corridor Development in Central Asia, and to adopt a Regional Program for Transport Communication Development. However, years later, these initiatives remain unimplemented, although some positive developments have occurred. In 2018, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resumed railway service along the critical Galaba-Amuzang-Khoshadi route, resulting in nearly a twofold increase in mutual trade. A similar outcome was observed between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan following the launch of the multimodal corridor Tashkent-Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam-Kashgar in the same year.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated considerable activity in advancing local transport projects. As the largest economies in Central Asia, these nations account for nearly the entire volume of intraregional trade, motivating them to develop new mutually beneficial freight routes. In 2021, the two countries agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda road and railway, which will connect Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region with Uzbekistan's industrial Navoi region, effectively reducing the distance between them by more than three times. Additional plans include the construction of the Darbaza-Maktaaral railway line and the Beineu-Shalkar road. Despite successful cooperation within the region, Astana and Tashkent occasionally find themselves in competition in the external transport and logistics arena, which can be characterized as a conflict of interests. A prominent example of this rivalry is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. Following the onset of the war in Ukraine, demand for the Middle Corridor among global cargo-generating centers in both the East and West has surged significantly. This land trade route from China to Europe traverses Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and Turkey. The TITR serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor, whose operations are hindered by anti-Russian sanctions. The route is experiencing robust development, with transportation volumes reaching 2.7 million tons in 2023 and projected to increase to 4.2 million tons in 2024. Since the start of this year, container transit from China through the Middle Corridor has increased by a factor of 14. Within a few years, the route’s capacity could expand to accommodate 10 million tons of cargo annually. With appropriate infrastructure improvements and enhanced terminal capacities, the Trans-Caspian route is projected to become 35 percent faster and 40 percent more cost-effective than the Northern Corridor in the near future.

IMPLICATIONS:  It is important to emphasize that nearly all Central Asian countries are involved in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), not solely Kazakhstan. According to experts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), there are three primary transit routes within the Middle Corridor: the northern route, which passes through northern Kazakhstan; the central route, which traverses southern Kazakhstan; and the southern route, which runs through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan occupies a uniquely advantageous position within the Central Asian segment of the China–European Union–China supply chain. This strategic edge stems from its shared borders with both China and Russia. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is also striving to establish a significant role in transit transportation between China and Europe. Uzbekistan’s involvement in multimodal transport routes such as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Caspian Sea–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Black Sea region, or Georgia–Turkey–European Union (part of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, TRACECA), as well as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey–European Union, supports its ambitions in this area. It is relevant to highlight the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, which allows cargo from China to reach Uzbekistan in two days, compared to the ten days required via Kazakhstan. Plans are underway to construct a railway along a similar route, which would considerably enhance the positions of Tashkent and Bishkek in railway freight transportation from China to the Middle East, thereby bypassing Kazakhstan’s current monopoly. At present, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with railway checkpoints on its border with China. In the development of trans-Caspian transport routes toward the West, Central Asian states operate as both partners and competitors. Partnership is evident in their collaborative efforts to develop connecting routes that enable the nations of the region to link up with various transit branches of the Middle Corridor. For instance, as noted earlier, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda railway, which will be integrated into the Kazakh section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). In 2019, Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, launched an alternative trade route to Europe via the Caspian Sea, known as the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia+) corridor. Recently, the participating countries agreed to establish a consortium—a specialized body to coordinate the activities of this route. This development marks the project’s advancement to an institutional level, which provides a solid foundation for enhancing its competitive potential and boosting the transit capabilities of both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is also worth noting that, as early as 2014, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia institutionalized the Middle Corridor by first forming a Coordination Committee, which later evolved into the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.” These instances highlight the ongoing fragmentation among Central Asian states in the development of extra-regional transport routes. This fragmentation carries the risk of fostering unhealthy competition, which could generate discord among the countries in the region.

CONCLUSIONS:  Given the growing trend of deepening intra-regional ties in Central Asia, driven by the current geopolitical realities, it is increasingly crucial for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to integrate their transport project potential and establish joint coordination mechanisms. A coordinated approach to managing transit transportation through the Caspian Sea along the China-Europe-China axis is necessary, grounded in principles of equality and mutual benefit. Ensuring that the interests of one party do not overshadow those of the other is key to fostering balanced cooperation. Moreover, harmonizing the activities of the CASCA+ corridor consortium with the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” appears essential, with the goal of ultimately merging both structures into a unified coordinating body with legal status. Developing common approaches to international transport corridors and accelerating the adoption of the “Strategy for the Development of Transport Corridors in Central Asia,” which was first proposed in 2018, is equally important. Additionally, the proposal to establish a Regional Centre for Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations remains a pertinent issue.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan” (Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Her research activities are focused on studying the developments of Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors.

By Robert M. Cutler

Armenia’s military dependence on Russia has deep roots, originating in the Soviet era and solidifying after Armenia joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992. Russia has supplied most of Armenia’s military equipment, including during the First and Second Karabakh Wars, reinforcing Armenia’s dependence on Russian military support. Despite efforts to diversify its military relations, including with France and the European Union, Armenia remains deeply tied to Russia through extensive military, economic, and geopolitical connections. This dependence is likely to persist, shaping Armenia’s international relations and military strategies into the future.

BACKGROUND:  Armenia’s military dependence on Russia dates back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, under which it had the legal status of the highest-level administrative division as a “union-republic.” After 1991, the newly independent Republic of Armenia inherited Soviet-era equipment and continued to maintain close ties with Russia. Confirming its reliance on Russian military assistance, Armenia joined the Russian-led CSTO in 1992. The relationship deepened in the early 1990s, during the First Karabakh War with Azerbaijan, as Russia gave the Republic of Armenia’s army crucial military support to consolidate its advances on occupied Azerbaijani territory. Since then, Russia has provided Armenia with most of its military equipment, as well as significant financial aid and logistical assistance. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia was the primary source of Armenia’s military supplies. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Russia provided no less than 94 percent of Armenia’s arms imports during this period. Armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks were among the weapons systems delivered. Armenia utilized all these weapons against Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in late 2020. In exchange, Armenia has consistently shown strong diplomatic support for Russia on key international matters, including the illegal annexation of Crimea. Although Armenia has occasionally accused Russia of neglect, the overall evidence indicates a long-standing strategic partnership. The 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the two nations, which exists independently of their collaboration within the CSTO, officially established their military alliance. On the economic side, Armenia has been a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) since January 2015. Russian armed forces continue to operate the 102nd Military Base at Gyumri, first established 70 years ago. The agreement on the base’s operations has been extended multiple times. In 2010 an interstate treaty provided for its continued operation until 2044. Under the terms of the treaty, neither Armenia nor Russia can terminate the agreement by itself; both parties must agree. The Gyumri military base currently hosts 3,000 Russian soldiers, while five miles from central Yerevan – at Erebuni Airport – another air base is home to a squadron of attack helicopters. In 2019, after a 2018 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan sent a mission to Syria, officially for humanitarian reasons, though it included military personnel. In May 2021, Pashinyan initiated two deployments from the Gyumri base into southern Armenia, specifically targeting the Syunik region. This area lies between Azerbaijan’s main territory and its exclave, Nakhchivan, and encompasses the land strip sometimes referred to as the “Zangezur corridor.”

 IMPLICATIONS: Despite claims that Russia abandoned Armenia before the Second Karabakh War, evidence suggests continued support. After the July 2020 clashes that led up to the war in the fall, there were reports of nine Russian flights delivering military supplies to Armenia. This flight activity intensified as the war approached, and overall Russia transported 510 tons of war materiel to Armenia. When Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev expressed misgivings to President Vladimir Putin about these shipments, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the cargo was intended for construction activities at the Gyumri base. This explanation was skeptically received in Azerbaijan, particularly after the surprise and dismay following the earlier Russian deliveries to Armenia. A significant illustration of this close military cooperation was the attendance by Armenia’s former defense minister, Arshak Karapetyan, at an August 2021 military exhibition in Moscow. Karapetyan met there Dmitry Shugayev, the Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, and Alexander Mikheyev, the Director of Rosoboronexport. These meetings covered the full range of Armenian-Russian military-technical cooperation, reflecting the enduring and comprehensive nature of their bilateral military alliance. In 2020, Iskander surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 300 kilometers and forming a crucial part of Armenia’s arsenal, were reportedly used to strike Azerbaijani territory far behind the front lines during the Second Karabakh War. These missiles also targeted the historically, culturally, and strategically significant city of Shusha, which Armenian forces had occupied. Russia routinely sells its military systems to Armenia at the domestic Russian price, rather than at the higher international price set for foreign buyers. To facilitate this, Moscow generally offers low-interest loans to Yerevan. Since 2020, it has provided at least US$ 300 million in such loans to help Armenia replenish its military arsenal. Discussions are continually ongoing to increase this amount further. Moreover, the Russian FSB’s Border Guard Service is responsible for overseeing most of Armenia’s international borders. Additionally, Russia has been incorporating Armenian armed forces into its Southern Military District. This reorganization includes the creation of joint Russian-Armenian ground forces. The air defense systems of the two countries have been unified for some time. Russia is responsible for maintaining the security of Armenian airspace. Armenia’s relationship with Russia has only deepened over the past three decades. Its dependence extends far beyond its involvement in the CSTO and EAEU and its comprehensive bilateral treaty. Russian state companies have a significant presence across the Armenian economy. They control important sectors such as transportation, where the Armenian state railroad company is entirely owned by its Russian counterpart; the energy sector, where one Russian state trust owns Armenia’s gas distribution system and another oversees the Metsamor nuclear power plant; and the banking sector, where Russian financial institutions are overwhelmingly dominant.

 CONCLUSIONS: Armenia appears to be exploring options to decrease its reliance Russian military support and modernize its forces, but its strategic partnership with Russia is a cornerstone of the country’s post-Soviet identity. The partnership, marked by extensive military collaboration, geopolitical alignment, and economic and security dependence, plays a crucial role in shaping Armenia’s international relations and military strategy, despite signs that Yerevan is seeking to diversify its alliances and broaden its strategic options. Thus, despite receiving the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor the border situation, and despite signing an arms deal with France to acquire radar systems and other equipment from French manufacturers Thales and Safran, Armenia’s strategic choices have placed it firmly under Russian dominance. Efforts by the EU and its members, particularly France, to extend their influence in Armenia for their own purposes, have not diminished Yerevan’s subservience to Moscow, which – as described above – influences almost every facet of the country’s life. Even the declared intention to leave the CSTO at some indefinite time in the future will not affect the bilateral military treaty with Russia that will remain in force, until 2044 unless both sides agree to abandon it. France and other powers, including the U.S., should focus on Armenia’s genuine security concerns rather than exploiting it for geopolitical purposes. Unfortunately their current strategies, often driven by radical irredentist Armenian interest groups that continue to focus on Karabakh, often exacerbate divisions in the South Caucasus rather than bring stability. But using Armenia and its conflict with Azerbaijan to further their own strategic interests will only fuel ongoing conflict and deepen mistrust, jeopardizing Armenia’s long-term security and diminishing the chances for lasting peace in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler was for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, and is a past Fellow of the Canadian International Council.

WILL THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION RECONFIGURE REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION?
By Rafis Abazov

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana has rekindled discussions on the role of the organization in reshaping regional educational cooperation. Historically known for its focus on security and economic issues, the SCO is increasingly recognizing education as a cornerstone for sustainable development and regional stability. This shift is significant for member states—China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian countries—as they navigate the complexities of globalization and seek to bolster their human capital. The main question is whether declarations at the summit denote a shift in the regional educational architecture.

BACKGROUND: Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has primarily concentrated on security cooperation and economic integration among its member states. However, the need for a skilled workforce, capable of driving innovation and economic growth, has brought education into the spotlight. The Astana SCO-2024 Summit underscored this shift, highlighting the potential of educational cooperation to foster mutual understanding, enhance economic ties, and promote cultural exchanges. In recent years, the SCO has launched various educational initiatives. The establishment of the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and regional scholarship themes led to a sharp increase in regional student mobility – for example China reached a milestone in 2022 by attracting one million foreign students, while Kazakhstan attracted almost 30,000. Indeed, these efforts facilitated academic exchanges, joint research projects, and cultural interactions among students and scholars from member countries. The Astana summit built on these foundations, proposing a more structured and collaborative approach to educational cooperation, as almost one quarter of the 31 agreements signed during the summit were dedicated to the area of science and education. On top of this, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education hosted the regional conference “Cooperation in the field of higher education and production integration,” focused on developing a unified approach to accreditation, curriculum design, quality assurance, student mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the important areas discussed at the Astana summit was the enhancement of academic exchanges and research collaborations. By fostering partnerships between universities and research institutions across member states, the SCO aims to create a robust network of knowledge and innovation. Such collaborations can lead to significant breakthroughs in various fields, from science and IT technology to social sciences and smart agriculture. 

The proposed initiatives include exchange programs for students and faculty, joint research projects, and the creation of cross-border academic networks and joint research labs to study the impact of climate change at the regional and sub-regional levels. These efforts are expected to enhance the quality of education and research in member states, making them more competitive on the global stage. Another critical focus is the harmonization of educational standards across SCO countries. This alignment would not only enhance educational opportunities but also support a more integrated approach to developing double diploma programs between universities. 

The summit proposed the creation of a common framework for higher education within the SCO. This framework would include standardized guidelines for curriculum development, accreditation processes, and quality assurance mechanisms. Such harmonization can make it easier for students to transfer credits between institutions in different countries and for professionals to have their qualifications recognized across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of digital education and technological integration. 

The SCO members acknowledged that there is a rapid shift towards online learning, and an urgent need to invest in digital infrastructure and resources. The Astana summit highlighted the potential for collaboration in developing e-learning platforms, distance education programs, and digital literacy initiatives. In this context, the leading Chinese universities (such as Chinese Agriculture University) took initiatives to exploring ways of leveraging technology to bridge the digital divide among member states by promoting access to quality education and facilitating lifelong learning and upskilling, essential for adapting to the rapidly changing job market.

The creation of cohesive and inclusive frameworks would help to upscale the internationalization of education by integrating educational systems, and organizational cultures across SCO member states, and developing joint digital infrastructure. However, these initiatives require significant investments. Indeed, economic disparities among member states pose significant challenges. While some countries have advanced educational and digital infrastructures, others may struggle with limited resources and capacity. At least three countries – China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have allocated significant resources for bridging this gap, supporting deeper educational collaboration, and accelerating the adoption of online learning, access to digital tools and other resources.

CONCLUSION: The Astana summit SCO-2024 has set the stage for the SCO to play a transformative role in regional educational cooperation. As member states work to align their educational systems and policies, the organization is poised to reshape the regional educational architecture significantly. With a focus on academic collaboration, standardization, and digital innovation, the SCO is on a path to create a more integrated and dynamic educational ecosystem. 

The success of future initiatives will depend on building on the foundations laid by existing programs. Strengthening and expanding platforms like the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and numerous educational consortiums can provide a solid base for more ambitious projects. These platforms can serve as hubs for collaboration, innovation, and cultural exchange. Effective implementation requires the active engagement of various stakeholders, including governments, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Collaborative efforts and partnerships can ensure that initiatives are well-designed, adequately funded, and effectively implemented.

The SCO has the potential to reconfigure regional educational architecture by enhancing educational cooperation and recognizing education as a cornerstone for regional development and peaceful integration. The outcomes of the Astana meeting signal a promising future for educational collaboration in the SCO region, with the potential to yield significant economic, social, and cultural benefits. As the SCO continues to evolve, its focus on education can play a transformative role in shaping the region’s future. By fostering a more interconnected and innovative educational landscape, the SCO can contribute to a more prosperous, stable, and cohesive region. 

The Astana summit has marked a new chapter in this journey, setting the stage for the SCO to reconfigure the regional educational architecture in meaningful and impactful ways. Joint research projects and academic exchanges can generate new ideas, technologies, and solutions to common problems. This, in turn, can drive economic growth and increase competitiveness, positioning the SCO region as a leader in various fields.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and participated at the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan.