By Pauline Le Grand

This Saturday, on October 26th, Georgia, will decide its future trajectory in parliamentary elections. The country stands at a crossroads and must decide whether to continue towards a European future or turn towards authoritarianism. After achieving candidate status for the European Union in 2023, the passing of the “foreign agent” law by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party raised concerns over the country’s democratic progression and stalled its EU ascension. The GD remains a strong contender for this election, especially in Georgia’s more conservative regions, and risks steering Georgia away from the EU for good. This election will not only test the resilience of Georgia’s democratic institutions but will also reveal the country’s broader geopolitical alignment in an increasingly polarized region.

BACKGROUND:  On October 26th, Georgians will head to the polls to decide their future. This election is one of the most significant in Georgia's history as it will determine whether Georgia will remain on its European path or succumb to the Kremlin's sphere of influence. In December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status for the European Union on the understanding that the country would work to make significant changes towards accession. Yet, since then, Georgia appears to have done just the opposite and its accession process has been frozen. In April 2024, the current government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, passed the law on transparency of foreign influence, referred to as a copy-paste of Russia's foreign agent law. Civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20 percent of funds from overseas had to register on the Government's list as they were deemed to be carrying out the interests of a foreign power. The bill was first proposed in 2023 but withdrawn due to popular discontent. This year, despite promising to not revisit the law, despite even fiercer popular opposition gathering thousands of Tbilisi citizens in front of Parliament for weeks, and despite pro-European President Salome Zurabishvili's veto, the government adopted the bill on May 28th. Of an estimated 300,000 CSOs in Georgia, only 476 CSOs registered, with the others ignoring the law in protest. They preferred to wait for the government's investigation and resulting hefty fines with the hope that the upcoming election will lead to a reevaluation of the bill. The government also passed an anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda law in September as part of a legislative package 'On Protection of Family Values and Minors'. The law is a clear violation of freedom of expression and assembly. The Georgian Dream party has promised that if re-elected, it will effectively ban all opposition groups and turn Georgia into a single-party state. The GD, backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in power for the last twelve years and is determined to maintain its hold of the government. Despite the GD's apparent authoritarian turn and seeming unpopularity, it is projected to obtain a significant percentage of the vote. The question is whether it will secure enough votes for a supermajority, which would enable it to amend the constitution freely, distancing Georgia further from democracy and ultimately from the European Union.

IMPLICATIONS: In early October, the Georgian Dream launched an incredibly successful poster campaign across the country. While the capital of Georgia is relatively progressive and anti-GD, 70 percent of voters are registered outside the capital. Regional voters are overall less critical of the current government, focused on issues of employment and wages, stability and peace, and are generally culturally conservative. Regional voters have higher turnout and are therefore key to the outcome of the election and to Georgian Dream's constitutional super-majority (3/4 of Parliament).

The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rise to power was viewed by some as a positive turning point for Georgia. The party successfully ousted former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had come to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Initially, Saakashvili's leadership brought significant improvements, including the removal of a corrupt elite, implementation of free-market reforms, and impressive economic growth. However, towards the end of his tenure, Saakashvili and his United National Movement (UNM) party tightened control over the political system, allowed elite corruption to spread, and expanded law enforcement powers excessively. Many felt that Saakashvili and the UNM had implemented changes too rapidly and aggressively. In contrast, GD's early years saw improvements in human rights and media freedom, along with a reduction in heavy-handed law enforcement. The party continues to benefit from lingering discontent with the Saakashvili era and fear of its potential return. GD has also cultivated support through social welfare programs, particularly pensions. Many voters worry these benefits might disappear if they don't support the ruling party. This fear is particularly pronounced in areas where electronic voting is being introduced, as some voters believe the new system compromises ballot secrecy, leading to pressure to vote for GD.

Fear remains a central and effective theme in Georgian Dream's (GD) election strategy. The mere possibility of losing pensions is often enough to drive voters to support GD. Similarly, the prospect of the United National Movement's (UNM) return motivates some Georgians to cast their ballots this Saturday. The UNM is inextricably linked to memories and fears of war.

Under Saakashvili's leadership in 2008, Russia invaded South Ossetia, a territory beginning just 40 kilometers from the capital. The 1992-1993 war with Abkhazia also lingers in the collective Georgian memory. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine reignited these concerns for Georgians, who strongly support Ukraine. The fear of another conflict weighs heavily on the minds of Georgians, particularly older voters who constitute the majority of the electorate – a fear GD has not hesitated to exploit.

A week after its initial poster campaign, GD launched a new series depicting Ukrainian buildings destroyed by Russian bombs alongside intact Georgian structures. This campaign sparked online outrage, with Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili commenting on Facebook: "How desperate and pitiful must you be to shamelessly and brazenly offer your people a poster crafted in the 'forges of the KGB'! 'With dignity' towards hell!" Nevertheless, GD's message remains potent; they warn that a vote for the opposition is a vote for war. Ivanishvili even suggested apologizing to South Ossetia for the 2008 war, which he blamed on Saakashvili's government. GD also hints at the possibility of reconciliation between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia with Russian assistance.

GD's successful fear campaigns stand in stark contrast to the opposition's apparent weaknesses. No single party emerges as particularly strong. Fragmented across four different coalitions, none offers a promising alternative. The opposition lacks connection with the regions; once outside Tbilisi, the already scarce opposition campaign posters virtually disappear. In some areas, voters have never even heard of certain opposition parties. Even in Tbilisi, those inclined to vote against GD struggle to choose a party, uncertain which might garner more votes.

CONCLUSION: This weekend's election will undoubtedly be a pivotal moment for Georgia's foreign policy orientation and liberal democracy, both within Georgia and more broadly. With a high risk of external interference, particularly from Russia, the stakes are high. Moldova's close call last weekend in the EU referendum serves as a reminder of the fragility of democracy and regional tendencies towards illiberalism. Still, the hope remains that Georgia's path will continue to align with Europe and the West, reflecting the population's overwhelming desire to join the European Union. Georgia is caught between an older population that remembers with great fear these two wars and is willing to back down to Russia and a politically active younger population who dreams of a liberal and European future. October 26th will show the rest of the world which pull is stronger today in Georgia.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Pauline Le Grand is a research intern at the Rondeli Foundation in Tbilisi, Georgia, where she researches Russia's influence in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

By Stephen Blank

On September 18, 2024, Armenian authorities announced the exposure of an attempted coup orchestrated by Russia. Seven individuals were arrested, all of whom had been recruited, trained at a Russian military base, and financially supported by Russian officials. This recent incident sheds important light on Russia’s broader relations with its neighboring countries, extending beyond the Caucasus. Moscow seems to perceive most, if not all, post-Soviet states as susceptible to such destabilization. Although Armenia’s situation is shaped by its specific relationship with Russia, it may not be as exceptional as it initially appears.

BACKGROUND:  Coups have become a central tactic of the Russian state, both within the former Soviet Union and internationally. Through the use of proxies and pro-Moscow elements, Russia has been implicated in coup attempts across the Balkans, including in Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Greece. In Ukraine in 2004, pro-Russian actors poisoned Viktor Yushchenko during his presidential campaign. Additionally, Russia has employed proxies to further its interests in Georgia. Given the presence of Russian proxies, covert operatives, and pro-Russian factions across the states of the former Soviet Union, coupled with the overarching aim of restoring the Russian empire that drives Putin’s foreign policy, it is unsurprising that Moscow frequently resorts to organized strategies of state subversion, including coups. Armenia’s increasingly strained relationship with Russia stems from two key, interconnected events: the rise of the Pashinyan government during the 2018 revolution, which itself was a response to an attempt to manipulate the elections, and Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war against Azerbaijan. The 2018 revolution brought a democratizing agenda to Armenia, creating immediate friction with Russia, as Pashinyan’s government fundamentally contradicted the authoritarian model championed by Putin’s regime.  Despite these tensions, Armenia’s reliance on Russian energy and security, along with the presence of a Russian military base in Gyumri and Armenia’s efforts to maintain control over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowed for a functional, if strained, partnership between the two nations. However, the September 2020 war, which resulted in a decisive Azerbaijani victory, severely disrupted this relationship. During the conflict, Moscow did not offer military support to Armenia, while Turkey actively aided Azerbaijan and solidified an alliance with it. Russia’s primary focus was on securing its strategic interests, positioning its troops as peacekeepers between the warring sides after the fighting concluded, rather than directly assisting Armenia. This outcome has severely undermined the Armenia-Russia partnership, potentially beyond repair. As a result of Russia’s perceived “betrayal” and self-serving policies during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian support for its alliance with Russia has steadily eroded. The Pashinyan government, despite facing nationalist opposition domestically, has largely accepted defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, relinquishing claims to the region, although the issue of a corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave remains unresolved. Armenia’s growing discontent with Russia has manifested in its de facto withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Moscow’s attempt to create a defense alliance with intervention rights across the former Soviet Union. From Putin’s perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Armenia has not only distanced itself from Russia but has also strengthened its ties with the U.S. and the EU, seeking economic assistance and exploring the possibility of acquiring Western (notably French) weapons. These actions jeopardize Armenia’s dependence on Russia and feed into Moscow’s persistent fear of Western influence in the strategically critical Caucasus region. In response, it is predictable that Russia would view Armenia’s pro-Western trajectory as a direct threat and seek to replace the Pashinyan government with a more compliant regime, one that would restore Yerevan’s subservience to Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. Simultaneously Russia has reversed its alliances, positioning itself as a partner of Azerbaijan, a sentiment that Azerbaijan reciprocates. 

IMPLICATIONS:  Given Russia’s continued military presence at its base in Gyumri and its broader leverage over Armenia, this is likely the most favorable arrangement Russia can achieve in the current geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus. When considered alongside the strong position of the increasingly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, this alignment enhances Russia’s strategic hold in the region. However, these maneuvers leave Armenia in a precarious position. Despite its vulnerability, domestic public and elite opinion in Armenia is unlikely to support a return to dependence on Russia. Yet, the coup attempt reveals that even this seemingly optimal arrangement is insufficient for Moscow, which remains dissatisfied as long as Pashinyan’s government stays in power. Consequently, Russia sought to overthrow Pashinyan’s administration and install a regime more amenable to its interests. Russia’s coup attempt is driven by its desire to reassert itself as the dominant power over the three Transcaucasian states and reclaim its strategic advantage against regional rivals – namely Iran, Turkey, and the West. Moscow’s bid for control continues to shape its foreign policy not only in the Caucasus but also in its actions across the broader former Soviet space, as seen in its involvement in Ukraine and Central Asia. The potential rise of Armenian nationalists, who may be unreconciled to the losses in Nagorno-Karabakh, does not seem to alarm Moscow. On the contrary, Russia likely calculates that by fostering an unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it could restore its influence in the region. Perpetual instability would create a need for an external “security manager” – a role Russia would readily assume. Additionally, such a situation would undermine Western influence and its democratizing efforts in the region, allowing Russia to discredit and push out Western agendas. This would enable Moscow to recover as much of its former dominance in the region as is realistically feasible. The attempted coup in Armenia highlights several implications for both Russia and its neighboring states, as well as for other European states, such as those in the Balkans. It exposes the failure of Russia’s policies toward Armenia, demonstrating that Moscow is unable to provide security to its allies despite formal agreements. Additionally, Russia’s capacity to offer economic support has significantly diminished under the weight of international sanctions and the specter of stagflation.  This decline is not limited to Armenia but is also visible in Central Asia, where Russia, despite holding significant economic sway, is increasingly unable to compete with foreign rivals. Moscow’s self-proclaimed role as the primary security provider in Central Asia has been undermined, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine. Notably, no Central Asian state has endorsed Russia’s actions, and Kazakhstan has publicly distanced itself from Moscow’s goals, recognizing the implications for its own sovereignty, especially given the claims by Russian revisionists that northern Kazakhstan should be considered part of Russia. This broader regional disengagement reflects a weakening of Russia’s influence, as its inability to fulfill its security commitments and its shrinking economic capacity force its neighbors to seek alternatives. The coup attempt in Armenia, therefore, is symptomatic of a larger strategic failure that underscores Russia’s declining power and the increasingly fragile nature of its imperial reach across the former Soviet Union and beyond.

CONCLUSIONS:  Russia’s failure to deliver on its security promises, alongside its visibly declining economy, has paved the way for Central Asian states to pursue both greater regional cooperation and increased foreign engagement. These developments are perceived by Moscow as threatening, as they represent a shift away from Russian influence. The Armenian case exemplifies Russia’s inability to effectively wield its instruments of power in former Soviet republics, leaving it increasingly reliant on force and deceit to maintain control. Coups, such as those attempted in the Balkans and now Armenia, along with heightened espionage and sabotage efforts across Europe, have become the primary mechanisms through which Russia conducts its foreign policy. This dynamic threatens Europe and as seen in Armenia, also places the Caucasus and Central Asia under constant risk of destabilization. Putin’s regime depends on the systematic use of coercion and manipulation to survive. This reliance renders it a persistent threat to every European and post-Soviet government, from London to Dushanbe. The attempted coup in Armenia is a clear illustration of this reality and signals that further crises are inevitable as Putin’s regime struggles to sustain the remnants of an empire. The effort to oust Pashinyan is not an isolated incident but a warning of future instability, a symptom of Russia’s inability to accept that its imperial aspirations are no longer viable. Thus, the Armenian coup is likely the first in a series of crises that will unfold across Eurasia. It serves as a stark reminder that Russia’s weakening grip on its former territories will continue to generate turbulence. We can no longer claim ignorance of these possibilities; the warning signs are clear, and we have been forewarned of what lies ahead.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute at www.fpri.org.

By Robert M. Cutler

Armenia’s military dependence on Russia has deep roots, originating in the Soviet era and solidifying after Armenia joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992. Russia has supplied most of Armenia’s military equipment, including during the First and Second Karabakh Wars, reinforcing Armenia’s dependence on Russian military support. Despite efforts to diversify its military relations, including with France and the European Union, Armenia remains deeply tied to Russia through extensive military, economic, and geopolitical connections. This dependence is likely to persist, shaping Armenia’s international relations and military strategies into the future.

BACKGROUND:  Armenia’s military dependence on Russia dates back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, under which it had the legal status of the highest-level administrative division as a “union-republic.” After 1991, the newly independent Republic of Armenia inherited Soviet-era equipment and continued to maintain close ties with Russia. Confirming its reliance on Russian military assistance, Armenia joined the Russian-led CSTO in 1992. The relationship deepened in the early 1990s, during the First Karabakh War with Azerbaijan, as Russia gave the Republic of Armenia’s army crucial military support to consolidate its advances on occupied Azerbaijani territory. Since then, Russia has provided Armenia with most of its military equipment, as well as significant financial aid and logistical assistance. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia was the primary source of Armenia’s military supplies. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Russia provided no less than 94 percent of Armenia’s arms imports during this period. Armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks were among the weapons systems delivered. Armenia utilized all these weapons against Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in late 2020. In exchange, Armenia has consistently shown strong diplomatic support for Russia on key international matters, including the illegal annexation of Crimea. Although Armenia has occasionally accused Russia of neglect, the overall evidence indicates a long-standing strategic partnership. The 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the two nations, which exists independently of their collaboration within the CSTO, officially established their military alliance. On the economic side, Armenia has been a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) since January 2015. Russian armed forces continue to operate the 102nd Military Base at Gyumri, first established 70 years ago. The agreement on the base’s operations has been extended multiple times. In 2010 an interstate treaty provided for its continued operation until 2044. Under the terms of the treaty, neither Armenia nor Russia can terminate the agreement by itself; both parties must agree. The Gyumri military base currently hosts 3,000 Russian soldiers, while five miles from central Yerevan – at Erebuni Airport – another air base is home to a squadron of attack helicopters. In 2019, after a 2018 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan sent a mission to Syria, officially for humanitarian reasons, though it included military personnel. In May 2021, Pashinyan initiated two deployments from the Gyumri base into southern Armenia, specifically targeting the Syunik region. This area lies between Azerbaijan’s main territory and its exclave, Nakhchivan, and encompasses the land strip sometimes referred to as the “Zangezur corridor.”

 IMPLICATIONS: Despite claims that Russia abandoned Armenia before the Second Karabakh War, evidence suggests continued support. After the July 2020 clashes that led up to the war in the fall, there were reports of nine Russian flights delivering military supplies to Armenia. This flight activity intensified as the war approached, and overall Russia transported 510 tons of war materiel to Armenia. When Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev expressed misgivings to President Vladimir Putin about these shipments, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the cargo was intended for construction activities at the Gyumri base. This explanation was skeptically received in Azerbaijan, particularly after the surprise and dismay following the earlier Russian deliveries to Armenia. A significant illustration of this close military cooperation was the attendance by Armenia’s former defense minister, Arshak Karapetyan, at an August 2021 military exhibition in Moscow. Karapetyan met there Dmitry Shugayev, the Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, and Alexander Mikheyev, the Director of Rosoboronexport. These meetings covered the full range of Armenian-Russian military-technical cooperation, reflecting the enduring and comprehensive nature of their bilateral military alliance. In 2020, Iskander surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 300 kilometers and forming a crucial part of Armenia’s arsenal, were reportedly used to strike Azerbaijani territory far behind the front lines during the Second Karabakh War. These missiles also targeted the historically, culturally, and strategically significant city of Shusha, which Armenian forces had occupied. Russia routinely sells its military systems to Armenia at the domestic Russian price, rather than at the higher international price set for foreign buyers. To facilitate this, Moscow generally offers low-interest loans to Yerevan. Since 2020, it has provided at least US$ 300 million in such loans to help Armenia replenish its military arsenal. Discussions are continually ongoing to increase this amount further. Moreover, the Russian FSB’s Border Guard Service is responsible for overseeing most of Armenia’s international borders. Additionally, Russia has been incorporating Armenian armed forces into its Southern Military District. This reorganization includes the creation of joint Russian-Armenian ground forces. The air defense systems of the two countries have been unified for some time. Russia is responsible for maintaining the security of Armenian airspace. Armenia’s relationship with Russia has only deepened over the past three decades. Its dependence extends far beyond its involvement in the CSTO and EAEU and its comprehensive bilateral treaty. Russian state companies have a significant presence across the Armenian economy. They control important sectors such as transportation, where the Armenian state railroad company is entirely owned by its Russian counterpart; the energy sector, where one Russian state trust owns Armenia’s gas distribution system and another oversees the Metsamor nuclear power plant; and the banking sector, where Russian financial institutions are overwhelmingly dominant.

 CONCLUSIONS: Armenia appears to be exploring options to decrease its reliance Russian military support and modernize its forces, but its strategic partnership with Russia is a cornerstone of the country’s post-Soviet identity. The partnership, marked by extensive military collaboration, geopolitical alignment, and economic and security dependence, plays a crucial role in shaping Armenia’s international relations and military strategy, despite signs that Yerevan is seeking to diversify its alliances and broaden its strategic options. Thus, despite receiving the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor the border situation, and despite signing an arms deal with France to acquire radar systems and other equipment from French manufacturers Thales and Safran, Armenia’s strategic choices have placed it firmly under Russian dominance. Efforts by the EU and its members, particularly France, to extend their influence in Armenia for their own purposes, have not diminished Yerevan’s subservience to Moscow, which – as described above – influences almost every facet of the country’s life. Even the declared intention to leave the CSTO at some indefinite time in the future will not affect the bilateral military treaty with Russia that will remain in force, until 2044 unless both sides agree to abandon it. France and other powers, including the U.S., should focus on Armenia’s genuine security concerns rather than exploiting it for geopolitical purposes. Unfortunately their current strategies, often driven by radical irredentist Armenian interest groups that continue to focus on Karabakh, often exacerbate divisions in the South Caucasus rather than bring stability. But using Armenia and its conflict with Azerbaijan to further their own strategic interests will only fuel ongoing conflict and deepen mistrust, jeopardizing Armenia’s long-term security and diminishing the chances for lasting peace in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler was for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, and is a past Fellow of the Canadian International Council.

WILL THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION RECONFIGURE REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION?
By Rafis Abazov

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana has rekindled discussions on the role of the organization in reshaping regional educational cooperation. Historically known for its focus on security and economic issues, the SCO is increasingly recognizing education as a cornerstone for sustainable development and regional stability. This shift is significant for member states—China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian countries—as they navigate the complexities of globalization and seek to bolster their human capital. The main question is whether declarations at the summit denote a shift in the regional educational architecture.

BACKGROUND: Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has primarily concentrated on security cooperation and economic integration among its member states. However, the need for a skilled workforce, capable of driving innovation and economic growth, has brought education into the spotlight. The Astana SCO-2024 Summit underscored this shift, highlighting the potential of educational cooperation to foster mutual understanding, enhance economic ties, and promote cultural exchanges. In recent years, the SCO has launched various educational initiatives. The establishment of the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and regional scholarship themes led to a sharp increase in regional student mobility – for example China reached a milestone in 2022 by attracting one million foreign students, while Kazakhstan attracted almost 30,000. Indeed, these efforts facilitated academic exchanges, joint research projects, and cultural interactions among students and scholars from member countries. The Astana summit built on these foundations, proposing a more structured and collaborative approach to educational cooperation, as almost one quarter of the 31 agreements signed during the summit were dedicated to the area of science and education. On top of this, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education hosted the regional conference “Cooperation in the field of higher education and production integration,” focused on developing a unified approach to accreditation, curriculum design, quality assurance, student mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the important areas discussed at the Astana summit was the enhancement of academic exchanges and research collaborations. By fostering partnerships between universities and research institutions across member states, the SCO aims to create a robust network of knowledge and innovation. Such collaborations can lead to significant breakthroughs in various fields, from science and IT technology to social sciences and smart agriculture. 

The proposed initiatives include exchange programs for students and faculty, joint research projects, and the creation of cross-border academic networks and joint research labs to study the impact of climate change at the regional and sub-regional levels. These efforts are expected to enhance the quality of education and research in member states, making them more competitive on the global stage. Another critical focus is the harmonization of educational standards across SCO countries. This alignment would not only enhance educational opportunities but also support a more integrated approach to developing double diploma programs between universities. 

The summit proposed the creation of a common framework for higher education within the SCO. This framework would include standardized guidelines for curriculum development, accreditation processes, and quality assurance mechanisms. Such harmonization can make it easier for students to transfer credits between institutions in different countries and for professionals to have their qualifications recognized across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of digital education and technological integration. 

The SCO members acknowledged that there is a rapid shift towards online learning, and an urgent need to invest in digital infrastructure and resources. The Astana summit highlighted the potential for collaboration in developing e-learning platforms, distance education programs, and digital literacy initiatives. In this context, the leading Chinese universities (such as Chinese Agriculture University) took initiatives to exploring ways of leveraging technology to bridge the digital divide among member states by promoting access to quality education and facilitating lifelong learning and upskilling, essential for adapting to the rapidly changing job market.

The creation of cohesive and inclusive frameworks would help to upscale the internationalization of education by integrating educational systems, and organizational cultures across SCO member states, and developing joint digital infrastructure. However, these initiatives require significant investments. Indeed, economic disparities among member states pose significant challenges. While some countries have advanced educational and digital infrastructures, others may struggle with limited resources and capacity. At least three countries – China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have allocated significant resources for bridging this gap, supporting deeper educational collaboration, and accelerating the adoption of online learning, access to digital tools and other resources.

CONCLUSION: The Astana summit SCO-2024 has set the stage for the SCO to play a transformative role in regional educational cooperation. As member states work to align their educational systems and policies, the organization is poised to reshape the regional educational architecture significantly. With a focus on academic collaboration, standardization, and digital innovation, the SCO is on a path to create a more integrated and dynamic educational ecosystem. 

The success of future initiatives will depend on building on the foundations laid by existing programs. Strengthening and expanding platforms like the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and numerous educational consortiums can provide a solid base for more ambitious projects. These platforms can serve as hubs for collaboration, innovation, and cultural exchange. Effective implementation requires the active engagement of various stakeholders, including governments, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Collaborative efforts and partnerships can ensure that initiatives are well-designed, adequately funded, and effectively implemented.

The SCO has the potential to reconfigure regional educational architecture by enhancing educational cooperation and recognizing education as a cornerstone for regional development and peaceful integration. The outcomes of the Astana meeting signal a promising future for educational collaboration in the SCO region, with the potential to yield significant economic, social, and cultural benefits. As the SCO continues to evolve, its focus on education can play a transformative role in shaping the region’s future. By fostering a more interconnected and innovative educational landscape, the SCO can contribute to a more prosperous, stable, and cohesive region. 

The Astana summit has marked a new chapter in this journey, setting the stage for the SCO to reconfigure the regional educational architecture in meaningful and impactful ways. Joint research projects and academic exchanges can generate new ideas, technologies, and solutions to common problems. This, in turn, can drive economic growth and increase competitiveness, positioning the SCO region as a leader in various fields.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and participated at the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan.

THE NEW CHALLENGE TO THE SCO 

By: Stephen Blank

The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana reveals that both Moscow and Beijing are seeking to reformat the organization in order to meet their global rather than its original regional goals. That process represents a serious challenge to the foreign policy autonomy and interests of Central Asian states and probably to regional security. As the center of gravity of world politics shifts ever more to Asia, the role and importance of Central Asia is likely to grow. These trends should be recognized and acted upon to assure that Central Asia does not become a closed sphere of Sino-Russian influence, which would retard its growth and transform it into a breeding ground for conflict.

BACKGROUND: The SCO was first set up to create an institutional framework by which China’s growing importance in and to Central Asia could be regulated. At the same time, it also constituted a forum for Central Asian governments whereby they could address not only each other but also Russia and China concerning their interests and needs and where all the parties could reach agreement on how to contend with shared threats, e.g. the genuine and continuing threat of terrorism. As such the SCO gradually evolved into a viable regional security forum where both Moscow and Beijing could present or implement their regional security initiatives and Central Asian states could present their interests and needs. Thus, it functioned to satisfy all the members’ needs as a purely regional security organization.

However, as world politics evolved towards a world order characterized primarily by great power rivalry and even threats of nuclear confrontation, Russia and China clearly intend to impart a wholly new purpose and direction to the SCO that threatens the interests of the Central Asian states. Membership now includes India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. These additions to the SCO’s roster are primarily attributable to Sino-Russian maneuvers – great power calculations that outweigh regional concerns. Moreover, these new members of the SCO have also brought their rivalries, especially those between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan and Kashmir, and India and China over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into the SCO, probably rendering the organization less effective as a security provider.  Finally, Russia’s war in Ukraine has also undermined its reputation as a security provider in Central Asia, not least because high-ranking scholars like Sergei Karaganov and officials regularly make veiled and even unsubtle threats against Kazakhstan, which they claim to be part of Russia. 

Recent trends, as expressed at the SCO summit in Astana and other high-level Russo-Chinese gatherings, indicate that both Russia and China have abandoned the idea that the SCO serves mainly as a regional security institution. In numerous speeches, Putin, Xi, and spokesmen for their policies now openly state that the SCO, like the BRICS, manifests a new and evolving form of multipolar politics led by Moscow and Beijing, which herald the rise of the East and South against a supposedly decrepit West. In this self-serving ideological depiction of the emerging world order, these formerly regional or economic organizations function to attack the West and validate Moscow’s and Beijing’s hegemony over weaker neighbors like Central Asia. This hegemony entails an unquestioned division of the world into spheres of influence and the extreme minimization of foreign influence in Central Asia.  

IMPLICATIONS: In this new world order, Russia’s visibly declining hegemony over Central Asian security and culture would be restored, possibly by force, and to judge from ongoing economic trends, under Chinese sufferance. While this may well be a delusional dream, it now holds sway in Moscow and represents another desperate effort to hold on to the wrecks of empire. As Sergei Radchenko demonstrates in his superb account of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow cannot claim the mantle of great power and imperial status if it lacks willing clients. Therefore, it will consistently attempt to subordinate its neighbors, including Central Asia. 

China shares this imperial world view. Its methods in Russia and Central Asia are primarily economic, yet no less coercive than Russia’s more heavy-handed approach. However, Beijing is happy for now to let Russia bear security burdens that it prefers to avoid, given the challenges it faces in Korea, the South China Sea, and India. And it certainly welcomes Russia’s growing dependence on China in economics and as provider of strategic technologies.

If this interpretation of the SCO gains traction, it entails several challenges to Central Asian members and India. First, the vision of the SCO as a Sino-Russian artifact of a multipolar order entails a diminution of Central Asian states’ sovereignty as free international actors. Beijing and Moscow will seek to coerce them into following their agenda, not a Central Asian one. The idea that the SCO is merely an artefact of a great power struggle over multipolarity and spheres of influence not only justifies pressure upon Central Asia to oust U.S. and European presence and influence from the region. It also aims to curtail Central Asia’s increasing outreach to the West and vice versa that is now finally taking place. This exclusionary Sino-Russian approach can only lead to economic isolation, stagnation, and subordination to Moscow and Beijing when both those economies have long since entered upon their own periods of stagnation.

Second, the triumph of this view of the SCO enhances Russia’s and China’s economic leverage on Central Asia. It allows Moscow to continue threatening Central Asian migrants and economies by playing the increasingly popular anti-migrant card in Russian politics.  Beijing will similarly employ the leverage it possesses through trade and investment deals to coerce local governments into an inferior position, especially if other alternatives are unavailable.

Third, Russian and possibly Chinese military threats, particularly against Kazakhstan, will increase. And fourth, at the same time Moscow and China will collaborate at China’s behest, given Russia’s extensive dependence on China, to exclude India from future major trade and transport routes as China has already done. Thus, the SCO will become a vehicle whose purposes also comprise the stifling of India’s growing power and interests in Central Asia. One form these processes will likely take is already underway whereby Russia will seek alignment with Afghanistan, ostensibly to stop terrorism and reaffirm its military hegemony over Central Asia. Indeed, its ambassador to Kabul now proclaims an alliance between the two states, an alliance that can only suppress Indian and Central Asian interests in expanding ties.

As part of this projected reorientation of the SCO, therefore, it will be subordinated to the exigencies of great power rivalry with the U.S. while the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia will be institutionalized within it. The consequences may to some degree be unforeseeable; but are unlikely to redound to the benefit of Central Asian governments.

CONCLUSIONS: For interested parties, i.e. not only regional governments, but also the U.S. and the EU, it is necessary to prevent the resubordination of Central Asia to the renewed imperial fantasies of Russia and China. This entails constant high and low-level interaction among these states with regard to critical issues: terrorism, which clearly remains a real threat, future ties to Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral energy, trade, transportation routes, rare earths, environmental reclamation projects, education, and defense cooperation. Only by such means can the West and its leading organizations contribute to the preservation of regional peace, trade, investment, growth, and mitigate looming environmental threats in Central Asia.

India too must step up its game here and realize the long-held but unfulfilled promise of enhanced ties with and support for Central Asia by carrying out an increasing number of projects on this same agenda with local governments. This would forestall a Chinese-led but Russian-supported effort to curtail Central Asian ties with both the West and Asia’s other key players. The newly announced South Korean plan for increased ties with Central Asia exemplifies what could be done. 

Finally, both the West and leading Asian powers should lend growing support to the rising trend among Central Asian states to enhance their mutual and regional cooperation. To the degree that foreign support and local perceptions foster regional cooperation on the many challenges facing Central Asia, they enhance local and regional capabilities while also raising the cost to Beijing and Moscow of interference in Central Asia. In other words, Western support for individual country projects and especially for multilateral cooperative projects encompassing the agenda presented above, are win-win and mutually beneficial. They build peace, economic growth and development, and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states that is openly at risk from both Beijing and Moscow.

Enhancing Western influence and regional cooperation are proven ways of reducing conflict whereas spheres of influence invariably foster neo-imperial rivalries. The masquerade of Sino-Russian multipolarity will not have different results if we neglect Central Asia. Instead, we will only increase the costs to that region and to our own interests.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fprpi.org.