By Umair Jamal

The June 25 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defence Ministers in China illuminated how enduring tensions between Pakistan and India are hindering the bloc’s counterterrorism initiatives while compounding New Delhi’s diplomatic challenges within the organization. India’s refusal to endorse the meeting’s joint communiqué, following its unsuccessful attempt to include references to the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, demonstrated its waning influence in Eurasian multilateralism. Whereas Pakistan succeeded in presenting the unrest in Baluchistan as a matter of SCO concern, India was unable to garner support for its narrative on Kashmir. Concurrently, China’s advocacy for a more pronounced Iranian role in the SCO—evident in the forum’s condemnation of Israeli military actions, which India opposed—suggests a growing divide, potentially transforming the organization into a venue for great-power rivalry. This impasse accentuates India’s strategic dilemma: it must either align with the SCO’s emerging anti-Western consensus or risk marginalization within the China-dominated security framework of Central Asia.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states Summit gets underway in Samarkand 02

The 2022 Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Samarqand, Uzbekistan. Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

BACKGROUND: The SCO evolved from the 1996 Shanghai Five, initially established as a Sino-Russian initiative aimed at stabilizing Central Asia. However, its enlargement in 2017 to include both Pakistan and India introduced volatile bilateral dynamics into the organization. Traditionally, the SCO has concentrated on combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, yet the divergent stances of India and Pakistan have increasingly politicized these very concerns. Pakistan characterizes India’s actions in Kashmir as constituting state terrorism. Islamabad maintains its support for the region’s right to self-determination and remains committed to a negotiated resolution of the dispute. In contrast, India accuses Pakistan of facilitating cross-border militancy, resulting in an impasse that has repeatedly obstructed consensus within the SCO.

The April 2025 attack in Pahalgam, which resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, along with India’s subsequent missile strikes on Pakistan, significantly escalated bilateral tensions in the weeks leading up to the SCO meeting in China. India’s effort to raise the Kashmir issue during the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting proved unsuccessful, as references to the matter were excluded from the preliminary joint communiqué intended for endorsement by all member states. In contrast, Pakistan’s inclusion of references to unrest in Baluchistan in the draft appeared to align more closely with the organization’s stance against external interference, thereby garnering broader resonance within the bloc.

China’s discreet yet consistent support for Pakistan has altered the internal dynamics of the SCO in recent years. On multiple occasions, Beijing has permitted Islamabad to obstruct India’s terrorism-related narratives, while simultaneously advancing its own conception of the SCO as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. For example, India’s recent refusal to endorse the SCO’s condemnation of Israel’s attack on Iran further isolated New Delhi from the prevailing consensus within the group, highlighting its increasing divergence from the bloc’s anti-Western trajectory. This discord is structural in nature. India’s strategic alignments with the U.S. through frameworks such as the QUAD and I2U2 are at odds with the SCO’s objectives, whereas Pakistan’s China-backed diplomatic strategy aims to leverage the organization to constrain India’s influence. With Iran’s accession as a full member, the SCO is likely to intensify its anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric, thereby compelling India to confront progressively more difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

IMPLICATIONS: The persistent tensions between India and Pakistan during SCO meetings are generating substantial obstacles for the organization while reshaping regional power dynamics. India increasingly finds itself in a strategic quandary. Remaining within the SCO necessitates engagement with both Pakistan and China on contentious issues such as Baluchistan and may compel tacit support for initiatives aligned with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conversely, a complete withdrawal from the forum would entail forfeiting strategic influence in Central Asia, thereby ceding greater regional influence to China and Russia.

Recent military confrontations between India and Pakistan underscore how their bilateral disputes are impeding the SCO’s capacity to foster effective security cooperation. Although the U.S. facilitated a ceasefire between the two countries following the latest clashes, the underlying issue persists: India aspires to leadership within the Global South, yet its strategic vision diverges from the SCO’s predominantly anti-Western orientation. India’s choice not to utilize the SCO platform to present its case against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack reflects a diminishing confidence in the organization. Despite actively engaging Western capitals to highlight the issue of cross-border terrorism in the aftermath of its retaliatory strikes, India conspicuously refrained from advancing its position during the SCO summit.

This pattern of selective engagement suggests that New Delhi perceives the China-led forum as increasingly peripheral to its core security interests—a perception that stands in sharp contrast to its intensified diplomatic outreach to the U.S. and EU in recent weeks. India’s disengagement from the forum conveys a clear signal to states such as Pakistan and China: New Delhi prioritizes its Western alliances over participation in Eurasian multilateral mechanisms. By choosing not to raise the Pahalgam incident within the SCO framework, India implicitly acknowledged the organization’s limited utility in addressing its counterterrorism agenda. However, this strategy entails certain risks, as India’s terrorism-centric narrative, promoted primarily through its Western partnerships, has recently received limited international traction. Many states remain preoccupied with the potential nuclear implications of India-Pakistan tensions, while terrorism-related issues have garnered comparatively little global attention.

India’s marginalization within the SCO may inadvertently enhance Pakistan’s standing as the more engaged and consistent Eurasian partner, thereby exposing the limitations of New Delhi’s multi-alignment strategy. Pakistan has strategically leveraged the SCO platform to elevate its international profile, presenting itself as a cooperative actor aligned with the organization’s principles. 

Meanwhile, Islamabad actively seeks to obstruct Indian statements that conflict with its strategic interests, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with Beijing. By focusing on shared security concerns—such as terrorism—that resonate with Central Asian member states, Pakistan positions itself as a more constructive and cooperative actor within the SCO framework. In contrast, India’s persistent emphasis on Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism in Kashmir is perceived by other members as invoking a protracted bilateral conflict that necessitates substantive dialogue between the two parties. Within this context, the SCO is viewed as a potential facilitator, but only if both countries demonstrate a willingness to engage. While Pakistan has signaled openness to such mediation through the SCO, India has consistently rejected third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute.

China appears to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing India-Pakistan rivalry within the SCO. It leverages these divisions to diminish India’s influence in Eurasian institutions, to assess the reliability of Russia—traditionally a neutral actor—and to advance its own financial mechanisms as alternatives to Western systems. In this context, Iran’s accession as a full member introduces additional complexities for India, compelling it to navigate between aligning with SCO positions and preserving its expanding strategic relations with Israel. Moreover, Iran’s inclusion is likely to enhance coordination between China and Pakistan on issues such as Afghanistan and regional energy initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of India’s marginalization within the organization.

India’s challenges within the SCO undermine its credibility as a self-proclaimed leader of the Global South. Its positions frequently diverge from those of the majority of member states, thereby casting doubt on its representative claims. The SCO’s counterterrorism cooperation has also been significantly impeded by the India-Pakistan impasse, which prevents joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and meaningful dialogue on bilateral tensions. This persistent dysfunction has historically provided greater operational latitude for militant groups and carries the risk of escalating into open conflict, as illustrated by the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack.

CONCLUSIONS: The SCO has arrived at a critical juncture, as the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to obstruct its operational efficacy. India’s marginalization at recent meetings underscores its difficulty in reconciling strategic partnerships with the U.S. and effective engagement within a China-led multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Pakistan—bolstered by Chinese support—has adeptly utilized the SCO as a platform to contest India’s stance on Kashmir and to portray itself as a constructive and responsible partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Looking ahead, three scenarios appear increasingly plausible. First, the existing stalemate may persist, with India continuing to obstruct references to Kashmir and Baluchistan while opposing proposals perceived as anti-Western. Second, Iran’s recent accession to the forum may consolidate an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bloc within the SCO, further marginalizing India’s influence. Third, China may exploit these internal divisions to transform the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, thereby diminishing India’s strategic role within the organization.

For the SCO to retain its relevance, it would need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan; however, China’s evident alignment with Pakistan renders this prospect improbable. The organization’s viability as a significant security platform now hinges on its capacity to transcend its current status as merely another stage for persistent India-Pakistan rivalry. With each successive meeting concluding without consensus, the prospects for such a transformation appear increasingly uncertain.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

 

 

Published in Analytical Articles

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The downing of three expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets by low-cost, Chinese-manufactured J-10C aircraft during the Pakistan–India aerial conflict on May 7 highlighted the affordability and operational capability of Chinese fighters. In light of this encounter, several countries are now reassessing their Rafale procurement plans. Uzbekistan, which had previously expressed interest in acquiring 24 Rafale jets, is currently engaged in negotiations with China to purchase JF-17 aircraft. China has increasingly focused on expanding arms exports to Central Asia, a market traditionally dominated by Russia.

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BACKGROUND: On May 7, India launched missile strikes against six locations in Pakistan, attributing responsibility to its long-standing rival for the April 22 attack that claimed the lives of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) deployed Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighter jets, which succeeded in downing five Indian aircraft, including three Rafale jets recently procured from France. Pakistan utilized China’s advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles to carry out the strikes on the Indian fighters. The India–Pakistan confrontation, characterized by missile exchanges, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, concluded on May 10 following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S. 

In 2016, India concluded a US$ 8.8 billion agreement with France for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets. Pakistan entered into a US$ 1.525 billion deal with China for the acquisition of 20 J-10C aircraft.

China ranks as the fourth-largest supplier of conventional weapons globally, following the U.S., France, and Russia. The country produces the majority of its military equipment domestically and primarily exports to developing nations. China is increasingly asserting itself as the dominant arms exporter in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, while also expanding its presence in Central Asia. Chinese aircraft have gained recognition as cost-effective alternatives to Western models, particularly among developing states. 

China has been consolidating its defense partnerships with Central Asian nations in recent years. In 2015, it supplied FD-2000 long-range air defense systems to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, following defense equipment contracts signed by the two countries with China in 2013. The FD-2000 is capable of intercepting a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. In 2022, China further deepened its regional security ties by signing bilateral security cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan during a visit by former Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe. 

China has now emerged as a principal defense supplier to Central Asia. At the China–Central Asia Summit in 2023, Beijing articulated its intention to strengthen military cooperation and security engagement with the region at a time when Russia is increasingly preoccupied and resource-constrained due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

China is actively capitalizing on the current geopolitical landscape. Last year, it supplied EVOMax unmanned systems to Kazakhstan, whereas Tajikistan in 2024 procured the Chinese-manufactured HQ-17AE air defense system, which significantly enhances its capacity to defend against a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Uzbekistan also continues to enhance its military cooperation with China, procuring FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems in February. The FM-90, an upgraded version of the HQ-7, is designed for short-range defense against threats such as cruise missiles and drones. In contrast, the KS-1C serves as a medium-to-long-range air defense system. Together, these systems provide Uzbekistan with a layered and integrated air defense architecture capable of countering a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

China’s defense exports to Central Asia were minimal between 2010 and 2014, accounting for only 1.5 percent of the region’s total arms imports. However, this figure rose substantially to 18 percent during the 2015–2019 period, reflecting a marked increase in Beijing’s regional defense engagement. According to one estimate, Russia’s arms exports to Central Asia declined by 64 percent between 2020 and 2024. This downturn created a vacuum, which other suppliers—including India and China—moved to fill. During this period, China accounted for 17 percent of the replacement in arms supply, further solidifying its growing influence in the region’s defense sector.

BACKGROUND: The performance of Chinese-manufactured aircraft during the brief military confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces has not only reignited global interest in Chinese defense technology but also challenged the perceived superiority of Western military hardware.

China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the recent India–Pakistan conflict. The market valuation of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC)—a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the producer of the J-10C fighter jets—surged by over US$ 7.6 billion following the aerial engagement on May 7. On the same day, CAC’s share price on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rose by more than 17 percent, coinciding with Pakistan’s Defence Minister’s confirmation that five Indian fighter jets had been downed overnight.

The air warfare offered China an opportunity to showcase its advancements in aviation technology on the global stage, underscoring the effectiveness of China’s “low-cost, high-capacity” production model in the defense sector. The performance of Chinese J-10C against French Rafale, which is over three times more expensive, highlights the operational competitiveness of more affordable Chinese alternatives. This event is likely to accelerate the expansion of China’s military exports in the coming years. Although the Rafale retains technological advantages over Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 Thunder and J-10C, the results of this live combat scenario is expected to adversely affect the export prospects of France’s Dassault Aviation.

The J-10C fighter jet is scheduled to make its debut at the 2025 Paris Air Show—one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions, historically dominated by Western manufacturers. The inclusion of the J-10C in this prestigious event signifies a growing recognition among global industry leaders of China’s rising aerospace capabilities.

In the aftermath of the India–Pakistan aerial confrontation, China’s J-10C and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets have gained increased appeal among Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan expressed interest in purchasing 24 Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tashkent in November 2023. However, Uzbekistan has earlier this year engaged in negotiations with China to procure JF-17 jets. The recent air combat between India and Pakistan is likely to further incentivize Tashkent to finalize a deal with Beijing. China’s appeal as an arms supplier is also enhanced by its willingness to facilitate technology transfers to recipient states. Notably, China is assisting Uzbekistan in establishing its own domestic defense industry. 

China is poised to capture a significant share of Central Asia’s arms market, capitalizing on shifting regional dynamics. All five Central Asian republics have increased their defense expenditures at a time when Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms sales to the region has eroded following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. 

CONCLUSIONS: The live air combat between India and Pakistan has significantly elevated the global market value and demand for Chinese arms and aircraft, strengthening Beijing’s defense sales narrative, particularly in Central Asia. The recent acquisition of Chinese defense systems by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signals a departure from traditional defense alignments in the region, reflecting a broader pivot among Central Asian states toward Chinese military technology. 

China views Central Asia as a strategic gateway to West Asia and the Black Sea region. Its growing security engagement and expanding arms sales serve as crucial instruments for deepening its strategic foothold in the region through sustained defense collaboration with Central Asian states. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email,  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

Published in Analytical Articles

By Chimguundari Navaan-Yunden and Tuvshinzaya Gantulga

Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus marks a pivotal evolution of its "third neighbor" strategy, aimed at strengthening partnerships beyond its traditional ties with Russia and China. This strategic shift has gained urgency in light of changing regional dynamics within Greater Central Asia. Since 2020, Mongolia has intensified its diplomatic activities, exemplified by presidential visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024. Economic interactions, while still modest, show promising growth, notably in trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, where exports have notably increased. These developments align with broader regional trends towards greater independence from Russia and China, as Central Asian countries seek to establish cooperative mechanisms. Ultimately, Mongolia's westward pivot not only enhances its sovereignty but positions it as a crucial player in promoting regional stability and cooperation in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.

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BACKGROUND: Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus represents the latest evolution of its third neighbor strategy—a long-standing policy aimed at cultivating partnerships beyond Russia and China to enhance Mongolia’s sovereignty. This westward pivot has emerged as a strategic necessity for Mongolia, particularly as regional dynamics across Greater Central Asia undergo significant transformation.

Mongolia's diplomatic activity with Central Asia has accelerated markedly since 2020. High-level visits, previously sporadic, have become increasingly frequent and substantive. President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh's recent state visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024 resulted in numerous bilateral agreements, bolstering cooperation in trade, transport, and cultural exchange. The visit to Uzbekistan yielded 14 bilateral agreements and the inauguration of Mongolia's Embassy in Tashkent. Similarly, the Kazakhstan visit established a formal strategic partnership. Mongolia's diplomatic outreach extended to Turkmenistan, marking the first bilateral presidential visits since diplomatic relations began in 1992, and to Kyrgyzstan, where bilateral relations have steadily improved following President Sadyr Japarov's 2023 visit to Mongolia and the opening of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Ulaanbaatar.

Economic engagement, while still modest, demonstrates upward momentum. Trade with Kazakhstan has reached approximately $150 million annually, with Mongolian exports of horse meat growing from $2.9 million in 2017 to $8.3 million in 2022. Kazakhstan's exports to Mongolia, primarily industrial and consumer goods, increased from approximately $72.9 million to $93 million during the same period. Mongolia's trade with Kyrgyzstan doubled from about $2 million in 2017 to over $5 million by 2022, driven by re-exported used cars and consumer goods. Trade with Uzbekistan grew dramatically from under $1 million in 2017 to nearly $10 million by 2022, focused on meat exports and Uzbek fertilizers. Meanwhile, trade with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan remains negligible. For Mongolia, with $20 billion GDP and over 90% of export goes to China, this is a significant development.

Mongolia's engagement with the Caucasus remains nascent but shows promising signs. High-level diplomatic exchanges include former President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj's official visits to Armenia in 2015 and Georgia in 2016, enhancing trade and cultural ties. Azerbaijan received a working visit from former President Khaltmaagiin Battulga in 2018, exploring collaborations in energy and investment. While trade volumes remain limited, recent growth is evident, particularly with Azerbaijan, where exports surged to approximately $1.6 million in 2024, primarily in livestock products.

These developments have occurred against the backdrop of emerging region-wide structures in Greater Central Asia, as countries seek to develop collective mechanisms for cooperation outside the frameworks dominated by Russia and China. Mongolia's engagement with these structures aligns with the broader regional trend toward developing greater agency and connectivity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.

IMPLICATIONS: Mongolia's deepening engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus presents crucial economic and strategic diversification opportunities. Enhanced diplomatic and economic ties provide Mongolia with a hedge against over-reliance on China, currently its dominant trading partner, and alternative options given restrictive Western sanctions against Russia. The geographic and economic profiles of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with their combined population of approximately 56 million, offer ample market opportunities for Mongolia.

Politically, Mongolia's democratic governance, a distinctive feature in the region, offers a stable and transparent framework for engagement. This reliability in governance and commitment to international norms facilitates more predictable and trustworthy partnerships in areas crucial for regional development, such as trade facilitation, infrastructure investment, and the establishment of robust legal frameworks for transport corridors. This unique identity enhances Mongolia's value to Western partners and provides a practical model for how democratic principles can support economic and strategic cooperation in a challenging geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, Mongolia's active participation in cultural events like the World Nomad Games reinforces shared heritage with Central Asian states, promoting a regional identity that bridges East and West.

The integration into regional mechanisms offers Mongolia access to emerging transport corridors, particularly the "Middle Corridor" that connects Asia to Europe without crossing Russian territory. This connectivity could mitigate Mongolia's landlocked status and provide more direct routes to global markets. The successful development of these corridors would significantly reduce Mongolia's vulnerability to geopolitical pressures from its immediate neighbors.

Central Asian and Caucasus countries benefit from Mongolia's outreach through expanded diplomatic networks and opportunities for collaborative initiatives in transport, energy, agriculture, environment and mining. Mongolia's strategic neutrality and pragmatic foreign policy approach are viewed positively in the region, enabling enhanced collaboration without triggering sensitive geopolitical responses from Russia and China.

The burgeoning regional integration subtly shifts dynamics for Russia and China. Although both powers are likely to tolerate Mongolia's increased engagement due to its non-military, primarily economic and diplomatic nature, deeper regional cooperation could eventually dilute their influence. Increased regional activity that transcends Russian and Chinese dominance, along with coordinated economic policies, could reduce regional dependency on Moscow and Beijing, leading to cautious observation from both capitals.

China's Belt and Road Initiative has significantly shaped regional infrastructure development, but Mongolia's growing ties with Central Asia introduce an alternative approach to connectivity that might circumvent Beijing's leverage. Similarly, Russia's attempts to maintain regional influence through the Eurasian Economic Union face challenges as Mongolia and Central Asian states pursue more diverse partnerships. This diversification of regional relationships represents a gradual but significant shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Mongolia's third neighbors (the U.S., EU, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkiye) view this westward pivot positively. Strengthening Mongolia's regional ties aligns with broader Western strategic goals, including promoting stability and sovereignty in Central Asia. High-profile European visits to Mongolia, followed by tours to Central Asia (e.g., French President Emmanuel Macron’s and former UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s multi-leg visits), illustrate growing interest in Mongolia's bridging role. These engagements allow Western countries to enhance their regional presence without being perceived as exclusively engaging with authoritarian regimes.

The U.S., which has traditionally engaged Central Asia through the C5+1 format, could consider integrating Mongolia into this dialogue, potentially transforming it into a C6+1 arrangement. As outlined in the American Foreign Policy Council's (AFPC) April 2025 report, such integration would better reflect Mongolia's shared strategic and economic challenges with the region, particularly in critical minerals essential to global supply chains. Similarly, Japan and South Korea recognize Mongolia's potential as a gateway to continental Asia, leveraging soft power and economic investments to enhance regional integration.

CONCLUSIONS: Mongolia's pivot toward Central Asia and the Caucasus is driven by strategic necessity and presents significant opportunities for regional integration. The past years' diplomatic and economic initiatives signal genuine, albeit incremental, progress. Although concrete outcomes remain limited, the diplomatic momentum could lead to substantive cooperation in trade, transport, and infrastructure.

For Mongolia, regional integration serves as a diplomatic insurance policy, enhancing strategic autonomy amid geopolitical uncertainty. The pragmatic approach toward bilateral and multilateral cooperation mitigates potential pressure from Russia and China while strengthening ties with Western democracies. The development of region-wide structures that exclude external powers could create space for greater collective agency among the states of Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia.

Mongolia's westward orientation strategically positions it as a significant actor capable of bridging regional divides, promoting economic cooperation, and advocating democratic governance. As suggested in the AFPC’s strategy document, the emergence of a more integrated Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia, could serve as a stabilizing force across the region. Whether this evolves into more tangible regional integration or remains predominantly at the diplomatic level will significantly impact Mongolia's role in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.

The increasing American strategic interest in Greater Central Asia, with its emphasis on developing exclusive region-wide structures and enhancing connectivity, aligns with Mongolia's objectives. This convergence of interests offers Mongolia an opportunity to reinforce its sovereignty through regional integration while contributing to a more balanced regional order less dominated by Russia and China. In this evolving framework, Mongolia's distinctive political identity and strategic positioning could turn the country into an indispensable player.

AUTHORS’ BIOS: Chimguundari Navaan-Yunden is an Ambassador-at-Large and a former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia. Tuvshinzaya Gantulga is a Nonresident Fellow at the Mongolian National Institute for Security Studies and a former foreign policy aide to the President of Mongolia. Both are alumni of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Rumsfeld Fellowship Program and members of the CAMCA Network.

 

 

Published in Analytical Articles
Thursday, 05 June 2025 16:13

Has the West "Lost" Azerbaijan?

Robert M. Cutler

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s April 2025 state visit to China, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marks a significant elevation in bilateral relations. The agreement is more than a symbolic gesture: it reflects a strategic convergence across infrastructure, energy, and digital development. It also signals a re-balancing of power in the South Caucasus in response to Western inertia. As China consolidates its position, the question is no longer whether the West leads but whether it has already surrendered the initiative.

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BACKGROUND: The Second Karabakh War of 2020 abruptly exposed the obsolescence of entrenched diplomatic frameworks in the South Caucasus, most notably the OSCE Minsk Group. The November 2020 Trilateral Statement that ended the fighting, brokered under Russia’s aegis, signified an incipient restructuring of regional dynamics. Russia positioned itself as the nominal guarantor of stability, installing a contingent of so-called peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory. Yet this maneuver, driven by residual influence and opportunistic calculus, underscored Moscow’s determination to preserve a semblance of relevance amid shifting fault lines.

While Russia acted following long-established and well-defined interests, the U.S. and the EU hesitated. The initiatives introduced by Western actors, preoccupied with internal crises and other entanglements, lacked coherence, confidence, and strategic vision. The mediation efforts were fragmented and the summits were ad hoc. As a result, the promising diplomatic overtures failed to generate substantive traction. The reactive nature of Western engagement post-2020 contrasts starkly with the proactive moves of regional and other stakeholders having more immediate stakes in the evolving South Caucasus order.

Turkey’s deepening military partnership with Azerbaijan, formalized through the Shusha Declaration of 2021, epitomized pragmatic alignment. Kazakhstan, seizing the moment, accelerated its integration into the emergent Middle Corridor, bolstering East-West logistics networks through the Caspian basin. Concurrently, Gulf states capitalized on Azerbaijan’s post-war stabilization by channeling substantial investments into renewable energy infrastructure, particularly solar and wind projects in the liberated territories. These tangible gestures did not just reflect geoeconomic calculations but represented a recognition of the region’s latent economic potential.

In this context, China modified its traditionally cautious posture in the South Caucasus. Historically deferential to Russia’s informal sphere of influence, Beijing began to reassess the region’s strategic significance following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting destabilization of Eurasian corridors, compounded by Western sanctions and the geopolitical weaponization of supply chains, propelled the South Caucasus from peripheral concern to a central axis in China’s connectivity strategy. This shift was not reflexive or opportunistic. Rather, it reflected China’s measured strategic assessment of the structural transformations in the architecture of Eurasian trade.

By 2022, the foundations for a deepening Sino-Azerbaijani partnership had been firmly established. The signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July 2024 signaled a decisive commitment to broaden bilateral economic ties. The two countries’ trade in 2024 was over 20 percent above its 2023 level, reaching nearly US$ 3.74 billion. Chinese enterprises expanded into sectors previously peripheral to their Eurasian ambitions: telecommunications, green energy, and transport logistics. President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Beijing in April 2025 did not initiate this trend but rather consolidated it. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement was the logical culmination of sustained and deliberate moves that anchored Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward the East.

IMPLICATIONS: The realignment is not mere economic opportunism. Rather, it signals a deeper geopolitical evolution driven by the inadequacy of Western engagement and the region’s preparedness to respond to actors willing to match rhetoric with decisive action. The failure of Western policy is not just about inattentiveness, but also about an inability to grasp the interplay between regional agency, emerging connectivity frameworks, and the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s shifting posture. In this unfolding dynamic, Azerbaijan has moved beyond waiting for Western recognition or support. It has instead begun to assert its own role within a rapidly realigning Eurasian order.

For China, Azerbaijan serves as a gateway not only to Europe through the Middle Corridor but also toward the Middle East, reinforcing China’s broader trade architecture and strategic depth in the region. The CSP is not a symbolic gesture. Its scope is broad and consequential, encompassing coordinated industrial development, infrastructure harmonization, technology transfer, and streamlined customs protocols. These measures are underpinned by capital investments and long-term industrial partnerships. 

For Azerbaijan, the CSP consolidates a deliberate move to attenuate traditional dependencies on Western and Russian interlocutors. It embodies Azerbaijan’s long-articulated aspirations for economic diversification, substantiated now by tangible capital flows and operational partnerships. The CSP’s provisions span petrochemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and renewables. Agreements on aerospace and intellectual property signal a strategic depth, eschewing transactional engagement in favor of embedded, systemic collaboration. 

The transport dimension alone is reshaping regional dynamics. The Middle Corridor, stretching from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian basin, and into the South Caucasus and Europe, has demonstrated rapid growth. While still smaller in scale than northern routes traversing Russia, its year-on-year expansion has been notable. A trilateral joint venture among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s rail operators is actively synchronizing digital customs tracking and reducing delivery times to enhance competitiveness.

The Port of Alat, central to Azerbaijan’s maritime logistics, has already undergone substantial upgrades. Cross-border road transport agreements and operational protocols with China, concluded in 2024 and 2025, are streamlining east–west trade flows. China’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan as a "central transit node" underscores the strategic weight of this integration.

The significance of the CSP extends beyond ports and pipelines. Digital infrastructure has emerged as a foundational pillar. Huawei and ZTE, longstanding presences in the region, have solidified their positions through new agreements establishing joint research centers, expanding data infrastructure, and modernizing e-government frameworks. These initiatives are embedding Chinese technological standards into the South Caucasus and positioning Baku as a nascent digital hub.

Energy collaboration has similarly accelerated. China’s Universal Energy is backing the Gobustan solar project, with further discussions ongoing over potential wind energy developments along the Caspian coast. These initiatives are paralleled by an expansion of Chinese soft power, from Confucius Institutes to cultural exchanges and educational programs.

Azerbaijan has not “abandoned” the West. The reality is starker: the West has failed to keep pace with Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic calculus. President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing and the CSP with China are less an embrace of Beijing than a commentary on the chronic insufficiencies of Western engagement. For years, Baku signaled openness to deeper commercial ties, infrastructure investments, and a balanced diplomatic posture. What it often received were half-measures, symbolic gestures, and ideological critiques. 

The waning of Western diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus is not a sudden anomaly. It is the cumulative outcome of incremental miscalculations, fragmentary approaches, and the persistent failure to integrate regional realities into a coherent strategic vision. The 2020 Second Karabakh War marked a decisive inflection point. Azerbaijan’s reintegration of its formerly occupied territories exposed the impotence of frameworks long regarded as the bedrock of resolution efforts. The abrupt reassertion of Azerbaijani territorial sovereignty in 2020, and its completion in 2023, underscored the extent to which Western actors had become disconnected from the region’s evolving dynamics.

Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, though nominally prioritizing the Middle Corridor, remains hesitant and underfunded. The U.S., preoccupied with broader geopolitical contests, has failed to sustain a coherent South Caucasus policy. When attention does surface, it is often filtered through domestic advocacy agendas misaligned with both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Thus, under the influence of domestic lobbies, two of the Biden administration’s last acts were to decline to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct assistance to the Azerbaijani government, and to sign a bilateral strategic partnership charter with the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: The South Caucasus has shifted from constituting a peripheral zone to a strategic nexus. Capital and influence from East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are converging upon the region. Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states have become active participants in this evolving matrix. Azerbaijan, far from merely serving as a bridge, has assumed the role of architect and builder of new routes. Aliyev’s visit to Beijing is emblematic of this shift. Baku no longer waits for external recognition; it engineers its own relevance. 

The West must recognize this not as a defection, but as an adaptation to opportunity over nostalgia. The coming months will be decisive. If the West wishes to remain a meaningful player, it must replace rhetorical overtures with substantive commitments: joint infrastructure ventures, credible support for energy transition, and diplomatic engagement rooted in regional realities rather than encumbered by historical preoccupations.

Azerbaijan’s choice is not between China and the West, but between agency and irrelevance. It has already chosen. The question now is whether the West retains both the capacity—and the will—to respond.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

 

 

Published in Analytical Articles
Tuesday, 18 March 2025 19:37

Coordinating the Corridors

S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

Screenshot 2025-03-20 at 4.33.47 PM

 

Published in Feature Articles

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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