By Nargiza Umarova

The Islamic Republic of Iran is strengthening the Afghan dimension of its transport diplomacy, while also developing partnerships with Central Asian states. Several notable events have recently occurred in this area, and a collective analysis of these developments demonstrates Afghanistan’s active involvement in the expanding network of Eurasian overland routes. China is providing practical support for this within the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing’s strategy involves diversifying east-west logistics routes via Central Asia to minimize the growing risks of uncertainty in maritime shipping. Uzbekistan is expected to benefit particularly from this progress, as it prioritizes southern transit corridors and maintains pragmatic policies towards both Afghanistan and Iran.

BACKGROUND:

In June 2026, an Afghan delegation led by Deputy Minister for Railways, Mawlavi Mohammad Ishaq Sahibzada, visited Iran to discuss transport logistics infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway. The parties discussed technical specifications, standards, financing mechanisms and the stages of project implementation. Prior to the meeting in Tehran, media reports had indicated that Afghan commercial banks were willing to invest in the new railway line connecting the provinces of Balkh and Herat, estimated to cost US$ 780 million. It was later revealed that Iranian companies would undertake the construction of the infrastructure facility in exchange for participating in the development of Afghanistan’s mineral resources.

The Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif transport line will serve as an extension of the cross-border trade route that originates in the Iranian city of Khaf, and will be a key component of the Afghan section of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC), which is approximately 2,100 km long. The FNRC extends to Kashgar in China and utilizes a uniform 1,435 mm standard gauge, crossing the borders of two Central Asian states: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In a global context, this will create a more competitive continental East-West Corridor, in which Afghanistan and its northern neighbors will play a pivotal connecting role. 

The strategic importance of the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway project is determined by its potential to connect Iran and Türkiye with the Central Asian republics and China via Afghanistan. It is worth noting that Ankara is a third party to the agreement on the joint construction of a railway to Mazar-i-Sharif, which was signed in Istanbul during the 36th regional meeting of the International Union of Railways in October 2025. 

In light of the Strait of Hormuz crisis triggered by the military standoff with the U.S., it has become critical necessity for Tehran to establish additional transport routes to China, one of its largest trading partners. Beijing is interested in both the Iranian market and the Islamic Republic’s extensive transit capabilities. On May 25, 2025, the first freight train departed from Xi’an, China, bound for the Iranian dry port of Aprin, marking the official launch of direct land transport between the two countries. The Xi’an-Aprin railway route passes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, making use of the Uzen (Kazakhstan)-Bereket (Turkmenistan)-Gorgan (Iran) railway line. This line was opened in 2014 and forms part of the eastern route of the International North-South Transport Corridor.

Within the framework of the six-party meeting mechanism for heads of railway administrations, a China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Türkiye/EU railway corridor is being developed. This involves Uzbekistan in container transport along the southern branch of the East-West Corridor. This development forms part of the wider initiative to establish the China-Europe Railway Express Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. The expansion of the network of freight routes connecting Chinese and Central Asian cities should also be viewed in this context. Since early 2026, several regular and test block trains have been launched from industrial and economic centers in China, such as Chongqing, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Hubei and Xining, bound for Central Asian countries, with the potential to extend into Iran and beyond.

IMPLICATIONS:

The practical progress being made on constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway line, alongside the already operational Khaf-Herat railway, reflects Iran’s desire to diversify its freight transport corridors, particularly in view of the ongoing risks of disruption to maritime shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran is therefore prioritizing the expansion of rail connections with Afghanistan and its Central Asian partners. Implementing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif infrastructure project is central to achieving this objective, as announced by the Iranian government in August 2026.

In light of the escalation of the Afghan-Pakistani conflict, the rail link between Iran and Afghanistan has given Kabul a significant opportunity to access the markets of the Persian Gulf states, Türkiye and the EU, offsetting the costs resulting from the temporary lack of access to the seaports of neighboring Pakistan. This has also boosted Iranian-Afghan trade, with an annual volume reaching US$ 3.6 billion. Similarly, bilateral freight traffic has sharply increased. From March 2025 to March 2026, over 640,000 tons of cargo were transported via the Khaf-Herat railway, compared to fewer than 15,000 tons during the previous period. Monthly volumes have already approached 130,000 tons, and projections indicate growth to 160,000 tons per month, or 1.5 million tons per year.

It is estimated that, once the Khaf-Herat railway line is fully operational, the annual volume of interstate freight traffic could increase to 3 million tons, and transit freight to 1.7 million tons. These figures are in line with Tehran’s ambitious plan to increase the volume of cargo transported by rail to 60 million tons per year. This goal will be achieved by developing North-South and East-West international transport corridors, which will require close cooperation with neighboring countries, including those in Central Asia. Tehran has already announced plans to increase rail freight traffic with Kazakhstan to 5 million tons per year, with Turkmenistan to 4 million tons, and with Uzbekistan to 2 million tons.

In order to speed up the transportation process and remove the physical barriers hindering the movement of cargo, Iran has reached agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan regarding the passage of its wagons, which should ensure their free movement throughout the CIS. However, these agreements have not yet been implemented.

CONCLUSIONS:

A review of Afghanistan’s foreign policy activities over the past few months reveals a noticeable synchronization of efforts between Kabul and Tehran in promoting the construction of a railway line to Mazar-i-Sharif. This project would establish an additional transport link to Central Asia via the Uzbek border. In this context, the visit of an Afghan technical delegation to Tashkent on July 22, 2026, is noteworthy. During negotiations with the Chairman of the Board of Uzbekistan Temir Yullari, a joint-stock company, the parties held detailed discussions on commencing engineering surveys to prepare a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Railway Corridor, as well as the possible transfer of project documentation and a preliminary feasibility study for the construction of the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway to the Afghan side. The parties also addressed the modernization of infrastructure at Hairatan station, the construction of new warehouse complexes and an additional 1,650-meter access track at Naibabad station, which is located along the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif route. In April 2026, Uzbek specialists had already laid 1,000 meters of access tracks on this section to simplify and accelerate cargo handling.

On July 27, an official meeting took place between Afghanistan’s Minister of Public Works, Mullah Mohammad Issa Sani, and Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister, Jamshid Khodjayev. According to Afghan sources, the Uzbek authorities expressed an interest in investing in the railway network between Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. However, this information has not been officially confirmed by Tashkent. 

If Uzbekistan is intent on contributing to the implementation of the new project, it could encourage the country to participate in developing the Five Nations Road. Although the original route was designed to bypass Uzbekistan, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway offers the potential to connect with the FNRC via a spur extending into Tajikistan through the Sughd section. This would enable the route to bypass the congested transport hub in Tashkent, shortening the journey to Afghanistan by several hundred kilometers. 

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Nargiza Umarova is a Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration, and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Zabikhulla Saipov

The August 31–September 1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek offered a revealing snapshot of Afghanistan’s changing role in the region. The massive SCO gathering brought together the leaders of China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Its expanded SCO Plus meeting added Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Laos, Mongolia, Türkiye, Togo and Vietnam, alongside the UN and other organizations. U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor was in Bishkek meeting Central Asian leaders, while former U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was engaging Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul. The juxtaposition is revealing: Afghanistan may have receded from Washington’s formal strategic agenda, but it has not receded from the calculations of the states surrounding it, or from every channel of U.S.–Afghan interaction.

BACKGROUND:

The precipitous U.S. departure from Afghanistan in 2021 altered the form of U.S. involvement, but it did not change the geography that had made Afghanistan central to Washington’s engagement with Central Asia. Afghanistan shares approximately 2,329 kilometers of common land and water borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, while all five Central Asian states remain exposed to security, economic, and connectivity issues pertaining to Afghanistan. After 2001, Afghanistan became a central organizing factor in Washington’s engagement with Central Asia, shaping security cooperation, military access, border assistance, counterterrorism policies and regional diplomacy. The withdrawal changed that equation, but not the underlying geography.

Since 2021, Uzbekistan has been particularly active in treating Afghanistan not only as a security concern but as a potential connecting link between Central and South Asia. The Termez Dialogue, launched in May 2025 as a permanent platform is perhaps the clearest example of this approach. Its second meeting in June 2026 moved toward practical mechanisms for political dialogue, connectivity, transport and logistics, climate adaptation, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. Rather than treating Afghanistan solely as a security perimeter, Tashkent is attempting to embed the Afghan question within a broader architecture of regional connectivity. This institutionalization also began to acquire a specifically Central Asian format in August 2025, when Uzbekistan convened the first meeting of Central Asian special representatives on Afghanistan, which agreed to establish a regular Contact Group for coordinated regional dialogue on the Afghan issue.

Institutionalization, however, is moving in both directions. In April 2026, Afghanistan itself initiated the first Afghanistan–Central Asia Consultative Dialogue in Kabul, bringing together all five Central Asian states and proposing regular consultations, expert cooperation and a roadmap for cooperation in trade, transit, security and connectivity. The subsequent Afghanistan–Central Asia Think Tank Forum in June 2026 extended this process into the intellectual and policy sphere, explicitly seeking research-based proposals and locally generated regional narratives. Thus, Uzbekistan is building platforms through which Afghanistan can be incorporated into wider regional cooperation, while Kabul is simultaneously seeking to engage Central Asia on its own terms. Afghanistan remains an unavoidable geographic reality, but the institutional response to that reality is increasingly being shaped within the region itself.

IMPLICATIONS:

Central Asian ownership, however, should not be confused with Central Asian consensus. Uzbekistan emphasizes connectivity, trade and regional integration; Tajikistan remains particularly attentive to border security, inclusive government, and militant threats; Turkmenistan prioritizes energy, transit and neutrality; Kazakhstan approaches Afghanistan through economic and diplomatic engagement; and Kyrgyzstan, although less directly exposed geographically, participates in wider regional security discussions. These differences may explain why flexible regional mechanisms are emerging alongside existing multilateral institutions.

For Kabul, the emerging collaborative architecture may represent both an opportunity and a necessity. The April Consultative Dialogue was initiated by the Afghan side, but its timing is particularly significant given Afghanistan’s increasingly constrained external environment. Tensions and armed confrontation with Pakistan have disrupted one of Afghanistan’s principal trade and transit corridors, while the wider war involving Iran has created additional uncertainty around western routes and regional commerce. Against this backdrop, Kabul’s turn toward Central Asia may amount to more than diplomatic activism. It can be understood as an effort to widen Afghanistan’s room for maneuver by strengthening alternative northern connections to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the wider Eurasian market. In this sense, the Afghanistan–Central Asia dialogue may function as a form of strategic insurance at a moment when some of Afghanistan’s traditional routes and external options have become more vulnerable. Kabul is therefore increasingly seeking to participate in shaping the regional architecture around it. This does not automatically imply political convergence or recognition by Central Asian governments; rather, it reflects an attempt by Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to turn geography into diplomatic and economic leverage.

The Bishkek SCO summit illustrates the wider environment in which this process is unfolding. The sheer composition of the gathering demonstrated the breadth of the Eurasian strategic conversation in which Afghanistan is situated. Afghanistan remained outside the summit, yet its political future and security implications remained part of the agenda. The SCO’s call for an inclusive Afghan government showed that regional powers continue to attach political conditions to their vision of Afghan stability.

Uzbekistan used the same broader setting to advance institutional mechanisms of its own. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted Uzbekistan’s initiative to establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent under the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, indicating Tashkent’s interest in strengthening the region’s permanent capacity to address emerging security challenges. Together with the Termez Dialogue, the initiative illustrates a broader Uzbek strategy: institutionalizing regional cooperation rather than relying exclusively on ad hoc responses to individual crises.

Gor’s presence in Bishkek demonstrated that the U.S. remains engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly from outside the Afghan theater. His meetings with Central Asian leaders focused on strategic partnerships, economic and investment cooperation, transport, energy, critical minerals and the C5+1 framework. On September 5, Khalilzad met Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul to discuss Afghanistan–U.S. relations and opportunities for constructive engagement. Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry presented the meeting as part of discussions on bilateral relations, economic growth and self-reliance, while the U.S. State Department clarified that Khalilzad is no longer a government employee and was acting in a personal capacity. These engagements therefore should not be interpreted as evidence of a new official U.S. policy toward Kabul. Their significance lies elsewhere: the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared; rather, it now exists through channels considerably different from the military-centered relationship of the pre-2021 period.

The geometry of U.S. involvement is changing as Washington cultivates Central Asian partnerships without a military presence in Afghanistan, while Central Asian governments are simultaneously deepening practical engagement with Kabul through regional mechanisms. The U.S. does not necessarily need to sit at every table where Afghanistan is discussed. But understanding what those tables are producing may become increasingly important for a U.S. strategy that seeks to remain relevant in Central Asia.

The emerging regional architecture is not necessarily anti-American, nor does Central Asian engagement with Kabul imply recognition of the Taliban or alignment with China or Russia. Much of it is the practical consequence of geography, security concerns and economic necessity. The U.S. may therefore face a different Afghan question than it did before 2021. Previously, Afghanistan often shaped Washington’s requirements for Central Asia. Increasingly, Central Asian approaches to Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s own efforts to engage Central Asia, may shape how the country connects to the wider region.

CONCLUSIONS:

The U.S. left Afghanistan, but Afghanistan did not leave Central Asia. What has emerged since 2021 is neither a simple regional takeover of the Afghan question nor a disappearance of U.S interest. Instead, Afghanistan is becoming embedded in a regional architecture being built from several directions: Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states are developing mechanisms for security and connectivity; Kabul is seeking to participate in that architecture on its own terms; and institutions such as the SCO are incorporating the Afghan question into a much broader Eurasian strategic conversation. Washington is still engaged with Central Asia, but increasingly without the Afghan theater as the organizing center of that engagement. At the same time, the U.S.–Afghan relationship has not simply disappeared. For U.S. policy, the challenge is therefore to recognize how the Afghan factor itself is changing. Afghanistan has not become less relevant to Central Asia; rather, Central Asia is increasingly determining what that relevance means.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Zabikhulla Saipov is an independent researcher on contemporary history and diplomacy of U.S. and wider Central Asia relations. He holds BSc honors degree from Uzbekistan State World Languages University, Tashkent; MIA degree from SIPA, Columbia University, New York, and PhD in political science from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent. 

By Kodirjon Eshonkulov

On July 2–3, 2026, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev paid Uzbekistan's first presidential state visit to Georgia in 23 years, elevating bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. Coming weeks after a similar upgrade with Kazakhstan and a wave of Georgian ministerial visits across Central Asia, the trip is not a bilateral curiosity but a marker of a structural shift: Central Asian states are actively re-anchoring their westward connectivity strategy in the South Caucasus, and doing so on terms decoupled from the European Union's political relationship with Tbilisi. For the future of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and Middle Corridor connectivity, the durability of this Caucasus terminus may matter as much as the eastern infrastructure itself.

BACKGROUND:

Uzbekistan and Georgia established diplomatic relations in 1994, formalized a year later through a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and have since maintained a modest but steadily expanding relationship built on trade, direct Tashkent–Tbilisi and Tashkent–Batumi flights, and cultural exchange through Tbilisi's Georgian Cultural Center Megobroba, active since the same year. Bilateral trade reached roughly US$ 270 million by the end of 2025, a meaningful but still marginal figure relative to Uzbekistan’s overall trade portfolio. Momentum built gradually: Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze visited Tashkent in March 2025, and Days of Georgian Culture were held in Tashkent this past March. 

What distinguishes the July 2026 visit is both its symbolism and its timing. Mirziyoyev’s trip was the first at head-of-state level in over two decades, and it produced a Joint Declaration establishing a strategic partnership, alongside sectoral memoranda spanning economy, healthcare, agriculture, finance, customs, education, ICT, and culture. Crucially, it did not occur in isolation. It followed Georgian Dream ministers’ consecutive June visits to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and preceded Kazakhstan’s own strategic partnership agreement with Georgia (signed June 30 in Astana) by only days. A visit by Turkmenistan’s president to Tbilisi is reportedly also being prepared. Taken together, this is not a single bilateral gesture but a coordinated Georgian campaign to institutionalize relations across the entire Central Asian core, and a reciprocal Central Asian interest in securing a reliable Caucasus foothold. Beyond official protocol, the visit registers concretely at the level of Uzbekistan’s exporting businesses. Investment and Trade Minister Laziz Qudratov described how domestic manufacturers in textiles, food processing, and household appliances plan to complete final production stages inside Georgia’s Poti free economic zone before re-exporting to third-country markets — a practical illustration of how exporters, not only diplomats, are recalibrating around the Caucasus route. Local reporting on the visit also cited a nearly US$ 400 million prospective portfolio of hotel and residential projects tied to the deepening exchange. Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili, for his part, publicly framed the partnership as reinforcing Middle Corridor connectivity between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, suggesting the recalibration is felt on both sides of the route rather than driven solely from Tashkent.

IMPLICATIONS:

The logic behind this convergence is best understood through the lens of the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian trade route linking Central Asia and China to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea, explicitly designed to bypass Russian territory. Since 2022, the corridor has moved from a secondary alternative to a strategic necessity for Eurasian trade planners, precisely because the northern route through Russia carries mounting sanctions risk and reputational cost. For Uzbekistan, this matters concretely: the CKU railway, once operational, will generate westward-bound freight that needs a credible onward path to European markets. Georgia's Black Sea ports, Poti and Batumi, are the corridor’s terminal gateway. A CKU line that ends without a secure, upgraded, and diplomatically stable corridor beyond the Caspian is a truncated asset. Mirziyoyev’s visit, and the accompanying attention to industrial, logistics, and tourism cooperation, should be read as an attempt to secure that missing western half of the chain.

This is where the visit’s timing against Georgia’s own geopolitical trajectory becomes analytically significant. Georgia’s EU accession process has been effectively frozen since 2024, following the Georgian Dream government’s foreign-agents legislation and its own decision to suspend accession talks until 2028. The European Council has described the process as being at a “standstill,” and the EU has cut assistance and partially suspended visa facilitation. Yet, notably, working-level cooperation between Georgian officials and their EU, NATO, and U.S. counterparts has reportedly continued largely undisturbed, and Brussels has kept investing in interconnection projects that run through Georgian territory, including Black Sea undersea cable plans advanced via a Romania-Georgia memorandum earlier this year.

This produces what might be called a decoupling of infrastructural and normative logics. Political-value alignment between Tbilisi and Brussels has deteriorated, but the geographic and commercial rationale for treating Georgia as an indispensable transit state has not, incentivizing Central Asian capitals to deepen engagement with Georgia on infrastructure, trade, and logistics. This gives Tashkent room to pursue a transactional, interest-based diplomacy toward the Caucasus, a pattern consistent with Uzbekistan’s broader post-2016 foreign policy style, which has generally prioritized connectivity and economic diversification over alignment with any single bloc’s political conditionality.

Armenia constitutes another important part of the equation. Georgia is currently viewed, including by Armenian officials, as the most EU-oriented state in the South Caucasus and as a de facto gateway for Armenia’s own European aspirations. Should Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization progress, particularly regarding transit arrangements sometimes referenced as the Zangezur corridor, a second Caucasus route could eventually supplement the existing Azerbaijan–Georgia axis, further reducing Central Asia’s dependence on any single transit state and adding redundancy to the Middle Corridor architecture. For now, however, the corridor’s practical backbone remains the Azerbaijan–Georgia pairing, with Uzbekistan’s new strategic partnership effectively buying insurance on the Georgian half of that pairing.

CONCLUSIONS:

Mirziyoyev’s Tbilisi visit should not be filed away as routine diplomatic housekeeping. It is best understood as one node in a broader, near-simultaneous Central Asian recalibration toward the South Caucasus, running parallel to, and largely independent of, the EU’s own frozen political relationship with Georgia. The distinction matters: it suggests that the Middle Corridor’s institutional foundations are being built on transactional infrastructure diplomacy rather than shared democratic conditionality, a divergence that may serve Central Asian connectivity interests in the near term but could complicate future efforts to fold these corridors into EU-backed connectivity frameworks such as Global Gateway. For the CKU railway’s long-term commercial viability, the durability of Uzbekistan’s new Georgian partnership, and the corridor’s insulation from further South Caucasus political volatility, will matter as much as the completion of the tracks themselves.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Kodirjon Eshonkulov is an independent researcher specializing in Central Asian geopolitics, transboundary infrastructure politics, international relations with Europe and a recent graduate of Ajou University’s Graduate School of International Studies in South Korea. He was worked as a political correspondent on Uzbekistan’s social and political reforms after 2017. He has published several articles in The Times of Central Asia about Uzbekistan’s water scarcity problem and its relations with Afghan Taliban government on the Koshtepa canal. 

By Umair Jamal

The Afghan Taliban’s growing investment in drone technology is seemingly a response to their conventional military limitations. Rather than a surprising development, it reflects a broader global trend where actors with limited resources use affordable drone systems to challenge better-equipped opponents like Pakistan. This capability not only strengthens the Taliban’s asymmetric warfare options but also raises serious concerns about technology proliferation to other militant groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and its impact on regional stability.

BACKGROUND:

Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban have faced severe constraints, including the lack of a functional air force and heavy international sanctions. It seems they have turned to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a feasible and cost-effective solution for surveillance and limited strike missions.

According to ACLED data, the Taliban first began using drones in a military capacity in February this year, with at least 12 recorded instances of strikes into Pakistan. These have included cross-border attacks targeting Pakistani security posts, with some attempts reaching deeper into Pakistani territory. Initially employed for propaganda, the platforms have evolved into weaponized systems.

The Taliban are actively working to build domestic drone production capabilities. Reports point to front companies such as Dinit Technology offering lucrative contracts to engineers and robotics experts in Afghanistan to join the program. Moreover, recruitment efforts have also targeted universities, with Taliban officials showing interest in student drone projects. 

The Daily Mail recently reported that the Taliban are using a former Special Air Service (SAS) base in Logar Province as the primary test site for the new drones. According to one report, the Taliban are now sourcing electronic and mechanical parts – GPS modules, electric motors, flight control systems, and sensors – from black markets and smuggling networks for these purposes as the group lacks any formal agreement with any country. Although designed for civilian use, these items are reportedly being repurposed to produce increasingly sophisticated drones capable of medium-altitude flight, reconnaissance, and precision strikes.

Local production and maintenance facilities are seemingly being established at a rapid pace. For many Afghans, these developments may be viewed with a mix of nationalist sentiment and concern about prolonged conflict as advancing drone capabilities could draw increased foreign attention and potentially intensify conflict in the region. Communities near the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan are already experiencing the direct effects of heightened tensions and increased militarization. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Taliban’s drone program is a clear example of how emerging technologies enable resource-limited actors to challenge conventionally superior opponents. 

This logic has become increasingly evident during Russia’s war in Ukraine, where drones have proved highly effective against better-resourced forces. Arguably, the same advantage applies to both state and non-state actors, explaining why both the Taliban and groups like the TTP are heavily investing in drone capabilities.

For Pakistan, which has traditionally relied on conventional military superiority, this development poses a direct challenge. For instance, cross-border drone activity has already increased pressure on border defenses and air surveillance systems. 

Pakistan, like many countries heavily invested in traditional military hardware, has lagged in developing effective counter-drone technologies. Its defense doctrine and procurement have historically prioritized conventional assets such as fighter jets, tanks, and artillery systems, leaving gaps in addressing low-cost and asymmetric threats like modified commercial drones. 

This technological lag has become particularly evident in recent border incidents, where Pakistani forces have struggled to consistently detect and neutralize small and low-flying UAVs used by the Taliban and TTP. As a result, Islamabad has had to rely on ad-hoc measures and international partnerships to bolster its counter-drone capabilities, highlighting the urgent need for greater investment in specialized electronic warfare, radar systems, and drone-jamming technologies tailored to the evolving regional threat landscape.

There are concrete examples that illustrate the growing threat. For instance, the TTP has repeatedly used commercial, suicide, and quadcopter drones against Pakistani security forces in multiple operations along the border regions, demonstrating their increasing tactical sophistication. 

The conflict took a stark turn in December 2025 when the TTP formally announced the creation of its own dedicated Air Force unit. This development reflected a heavily altered operational reality on the ground. Data from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) acknowledged that security forces faced over 400 quadcopter and drone-related militant incidents in late 2025 alone. This sudden surge has opened critical gaps in Pakistan’s conventional military defense. While the state’s defense apparatus can effectively neutralize high-value projectiles using localized electronic jamming, it struggles against the stark asymmetry of commercial off-the-shelf drones costing a mere US$ 200 to US$ 1,000 per unit. By deploying these cheap systems at volume, the TTP usually employs saturation strategies that threaten to overwhelm the military’s conventional electronic jammers and physical defense systems.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the TTP’s growing use of drones has become a serious operational challenge for law enforcement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Senior KP police officials have acknowledged that commercial and quadcopter drones are increasingly used for surveillance of security convoys and to guide suicide attacks, making traditional policing methods inadequate. At times, the TTP follow a saturation strategy, employing drones and militants armed with sophisticated infantry weapons, stretching the presence of security forces, and then attacking through heavy blasts, e.g. car bombs. 

This evolving threat has forced provincial police in Pakistan’s KP province to accelerate modernization efforts, including procurement of anti-drone systems, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized training for rapid response units. Moreover, police forces in KP province that face attacks from TTP have undertaken modernization efforts, with provincial police setting up a dedicated drone training school in Nowshera. Recently, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police received 76 AI-powered drones with advanced surveillance and thermal imaging technology.

The pressure from TTP drone-enabled operations has compelled law enforcement agencies to shift from conventional ground-focused tactics toward integrated counter-drone strategies, highlighting the urgent need to bridge critical capability gaps along the border regions. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police claimed in July that it foiled 341 drone attacks by TTP militants with the help of modern technology in the last six months.

The Afghan Taliban, for their part, have actively employed modified commercial drones not only for reconnaissance but also as counter-attack tools in response to Pakistani conventional strikes. They have publicly framed these operations as their de facto Air Force missions. For instance, the Taliban have allegedly used drones to hit ISIS-K elements in Baluchistan, reportedly in retaliation to Pakistani cross-border actions.

These drone strikes seemingly serve a dual purpose. They provide the Taliban with a much-needed ability to project strength and respond to external pressure, while also offering valuable propaganda material. For a regime facing domestic criticism for its inability to counter Pakistani incursions, drone operations have become a political lifeline as they help the Taliban portray themselves as capable defenders and boosting regime legitimacy. Repeated operations also allow the Taliban to improve target location accuracy and operational effectiveness

One of the most critical implications of this development is the extreme difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of controlling proliferation. Arguably, cheap and dual-use drone technology is far easier to acquire and modify than advanced weapons systems. Components are widely available on global black markets, with reports suggesting the Taliban acquire parts through smuggling networks, possibly involving suppliers from the broader region and beyond. International efforts to restrict access are likely to have limited impact given the commercial nature of the technology.

This proliferation risk extends beyond the Taliban. If the group continues advancing its program, expertise and components could spread to other militant factions operating from Afghan soil. This can further intensify cross-border militancy and complicate counter-terrorism efforts for Pakistan and Central Asian states.

More broadly, the program highlights the global challenge of dual-use technology proliferation. Even isolated regimes like the Taliban can develop disruptive tools through commercial channels. This adds to existing instability in South and Central Asia and tests the effectiveness of current international export control regimes.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Taliban’s pursuit of a domestic drone program represents a logical and predictable adaptation to their strategic constraints. While still evolving, these capabilities demonstrate how asymmetric tools are reshaping modern conflict. 

The spread of this technology to groups like the TTP, combined with the lag in counter-drone defenses among regional powers, creates a more dangerous security environment.

As these capabilities mature, they risk heightening border tensions, increasing militarization, and generating new challenges for stability across South and Central Asia. 

In this regard, greater international attention to monitoring dual-use technologies and fostering regional cooperation on counter-drone measures will be essential to mitigating these risks. Ultimately, the trajectory of the Taliban’s drone program may significantly influence the future security landscape of the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Stephen Blank

The Pakistan-Afghanistan war, on top of the war against Iran, is forcing Moscow to attempt to balance its security and economic interests in and beyond Central Asia with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is critical to Russia because it provides an alternative to Iran, allowing Moscow’s transcontinental trade project INSTC to move forward and offering a gateway to Asia. Concurrently, Moscow has upgraded its ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan both to deter ISIS-K terrorists and to secure broader geostrategic aims. Yet it also increasingly appears that Moscow is willing to offer Afghanistan arms, ostensibly to deter terrorists. However, in the broader regional context, this move underscores Moscow’s propensity for playing a double game with and against its partners.

BACKGROUND:

The Iran war and Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan threaten the further erosion of Russian influence in Central Asia. Consequently, Russia has embarked on what can only be called a double game vis-à-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has attacked Afghanistan because it claims Afghanistan harbors the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorist group, which performs attacks against Pakistan. This complaint is more than a little ironic given Pakistan’s own long-standing and well-known record of sponsoring terrorism against India.  More significant, however, is the fact that this charge, if true, signifies that Kabul has escaped Islamabad’s tutelage. However, the war also disrupts Russia’s ambition to sell Russian gas to South and Southeast Asia through pipelines traversing Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

At the same time, Russia has steadily built a “full-fledged” and “pragmatic” partnership with Afghanistan to prevent it from sponsoring terrorist groups like ISIS-K and their targeting of Russia and Central Asia, where Russia still claims to be the ultimate security manager.  According to Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, full-fledged partnership includes bilateral defense and security cooperation. Indeed, Shoigu openly proclaimed Russia’s opposition to any third-party military presence in Afghanistan or neighboring countries, a shot across both Pakistan’s and the U.S.’s bow and a sign of its ambition to establish a protectorate over Afghanistan.

However, Russia’s interests transcend defense. The war against Iran has ruptured the feasibility of Russia’s, Iran’s and India’s major transit, trade and connectivity route through Central Asia and then through Russia to Europe, the INSTC (multi-modal International North-South Transportation Corridor). The other existing corridor, the increasingly lucrative Middle Corridor or TITR (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) from China to Central Asia and then to the Caucasus and Europe bypasses Russia. Thus, since failure to find an alternative to Iran for INSTC will have dire geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences for Russia, it has turned to Pakistan for help. Pakistan cannot afford exclusion from transcontinental trade routes and has agreed to explore connecting its port at Gwadar either by land or by sea to INSTC.

IMPLICATIONS:

Moscow typically has sought to have a foot in both camps in every conflict scenario throughout the Global South and the Pakistan-Afghan war is no exception. But this case is far more central to Moscow’s interests than its power projection in for example Africa or the Middle East. In order to maintain its self-appointed “leading position” in Central Asia, it is crucial for Russia to exercise leverage over Afghanistan to deter an outbreak of Islamic terrorism targeting either Central Asia or Russia.

Likewise, it is critical to Russia’s economic health and continuing ability to finance its war against Ukraine and its heavily strained state budget that it continues to find Asian markets for its oil and gas. Doing so also entails developing trade routes like INSTC to Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia, especially given its desire to be acknowledged as an independent Asian power. Therefore, balancing between Pakistan and Afghanistan while developing alternatives to Iran’s connectivity have become requirements of Russian policies to realize vital Russian interests, especially as its economy is reeling and its position in Central Asia erodes.

Further erosion is inevitable if Islamic terrorism “migrates” to Central Asia without Moscow being able to deter or stop it. By the same token, exclusion from transcontinental trade routes will undermine Moscow’s ideological and rhetorical pretense of hegemony, and demonstrate that Russia lacks the means in terms of tangible material capability to back up its arguments or sustain a position that answers to Central Asia’s most pressing questions, i.e. economic development.

Concurrently, if Russia cannot develop let alone sustain viable, economically justifiable outreach to South and Southeast Asia, its hard-won influence and standing in those countries will diminish by an order of magnitude, negating its claims of being an Asian power and making it still more dependent on China.

Despite its vital need to keep the balance between Pakistan and Afghanistan, many recent reports suggest that Moscow is secretly negotiating an arms deal with the Taliban. Ostensibly, the aim would be to use the weapons to suppress ISIS-K and prevent further terrorist strikes in Central Asia and or Russia. While this makes sense if leveraging Russia’s Central Asian position and ambitions vis-à-vis Afghanistan are the priority; in reality, it highlights the priority of security over economic development in Russian policy.  It also illustrates the abiding temptation to make secret deals involving the security services or force structures as primary instruments of foreign policy.

Given the Taliban’s track record, it is unlikely that it can or will hold up its end of the bargain. Moreover, should these reports be true this news will enrage Pakistan and likely torpedo efforts to have it join INSTC. That trade project, unlike the Middle Corridor, never got off the ground and is therefore already being eclipsed. This has gravely serious and negative implications for Russia and is likely to aggravate all the trends making for the decline of Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as South and Southeast Asia. 

An arms deal with the Taliban will further entrench the belief among governments who monitor Russian behavior that Moscow is cannot be relied on as a partner. It will also confirm the notion held by many Western governments that Russia, like the Soviet Union, remains a sponsor of state terrorism and must, at best, be kept at arm’s length.

CONCLUSIONS:

Thus Russia continues to play a double game towards its partners, attempting to have both an empire and prosperous foreign trade relations, even though their logics are quite incompatible. Moscow also has yet to grasp that it cannot denounce and support terrorism at the same time without paying an incommensurate price for its quest after short-term gains. In Central Asia, Russia still seeks to pursue wildly contradictory aims without paying the price for doing so. If Moscow does, in fact, arm the Afghan government, it will once again be playing with dynamite.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.