By Suren Sargsyan

On May 4-5, Yerevan hosted two significant events: the 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) and the first Armenia–EU Summit. The gatherings brought together leaders from EU member states as well as representatives from Canada, the UK, and NATO. The Armenia–EU Summit concluded with a joint declaration and several cooperation agreements, prompting renewed debate over whether Armenia intends to pursue eventual membership in the EU. The question is particularly relevant given Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ambiguous statements regarding Armenia’s strategic orientation. While the government has expanded cooperation with the EU across numerous sectors, it has simultaneously emphasized that Armenia does not intend to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Consequently, it remains unclear whether Yerevan seeks eventual EU membership or merely aims to deepen relations with the EU while avoiding a confrontation with Russia.

BACKGROUND:

Since Armenia’s 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” political observers, media outlets, and analysts have frequently argued that the country is gradually reorienting itself toward Europe. Many interpreted the rise of a reform-oriented government as a signal that Armenia would seek deeper integration with the EU and possibly pursue membership in the future. Such assessments often portrayed Armenia as distancing itself from Russia and adopting a more Western-oriented foreign policy.

In practice, however, Armenia has not taken concrete steps toward EU accession during the years following the revolution. Instead, the government has continued a long-standing policy of strengthening ties with the EU while maintaining relations with Russia. This approach is consistent with the policies pursued by previous Armenian administrations, which also sought to diversify the country’s external partnerships.

Armenia’s engagement with the EU predates the current government. Key milestones include the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1996, participation in the European Neighborhood Policy from 2004, involvement in the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009, and the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. These initiatives demonstrate that successive Armenian governments have viewed closer cooperation with Europe as beneficial for political, economic, and institutional development.

At the same time, none of Armenia’s previous administrations formally declared EU membership as a strategic objective. The current government has likewise avoided making such a commitment. Instead, Armenian officials typically provide cautious and often ambiguous responses when asked about accession prospects. This ambiguity allows multiple interpretations and sustains public debate without requiring a definitive policy choice. Public opinion nevertheless remains broadly supportive of the prospect of EU membership in general, and visa liberalization in particular. According to surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute, 51 percent of Armenians would support EU membership if a referendum were held, while 32 percent would vote against. Such attitudes make the topic politically attractive, particularly during election periods. By avoiding a clear rejection of membership aspirations, the government can appeal simultaneously to pro-European constituencies and to voters who favor maintaining strong relations with Russia.

IMPLICATIONS:

The EPC Summit in Yerevan was significant not only because of its scale and high-level participation but also because it was held in a non-EU member state. If Armenia genuinely intended to pursue EU accession, this gathering would have provided an ideal opportunity to announce such ambitions and seek political support from European leaders. Virtually all relevant decision-makers were present, creating a favorable diplomatic environment for such a declaration. No such announcement was made, suggesting that EU membership is not currently a priority within Armenia’s foreign policy agenda. The absence of such a step indicates that Yerevan remains focused on deepening cooperation with the EU rather than initiating a formal accession process. This situation reveals a degree of tension between public sentiment and official policy. While support for European integration appears relatively strong among the Armenian population, the government has avoided translating these preferences into a concrete strategic objective. The primary reason appears to be geopolitical rather than domestic. The decision to pursue EU membership depends not only on Armenia’s political will but also on the willingness of the EU to accept new members. Enlargement remains a complex issue involving economic, political, institutional, and security considerations. Brussels evaluates candidate countries according to extensive criteria, including governance standards, economic performance, social development, and regional stability. Consequently, accession is a lengthy and demanding process even under favorable circumstances.

In Armenia’s case, additional geopolitical factors further complicate the issue. EU member states would inevitably consider Russia’s position when evaluating any Armenian application. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU and maintains extensive security ties with Russia. It also hosts Russia’s only military base in the South Caucasus. Given these realities, many European governments would be reluctant to support a process that could significantly increase tensions with Moscow.

Moreover, EU enlargement requires unanimous approval by all member states. Even countries with stronger institutional links to Europe have faced lengthy and uncertain accession processes. As a result, Armenian membership, even if formally pursued, would likely require many years or even decades to achieve. It would also necessitate extensive economic, political, and legal reforms that could generate significant domestic costs.

Comparisons with Georgia and Ukraine are often made in discussions of Armenia’s European aspirations. These cases provide useful reference points because both countries have actively pursued closer integration with the EU while facing strong Russian opposition. However, Armenia’s geopolitical circumstances differ in important ways.

Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia does not share a border with Russia. This reduces certain direct security risks associated with Russian pressure. At the same time, Armenia lacks a direct land or maritime connection to any EU member state. This geographical reality limits economic integration and creates logistical challenges.

Furthermore, the EU itself remains divided on the question of further enlargement. While some member states support enlargement, others remain cautious due to concerns about institutional capacity, financial costs, migration, and security implications. The prolonged and uncertain experiences of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia illustrate that membership aspirations do not necessarily translate into rapid progress.

Economic considerations also constrain Armenia’s options. Despite efforts to diversify its international partnerships, Russia remains Armenia’s principal economic partner. Russia accounts for a substantial share of Armenian exports, imports, investment flows, and labor migration. Any move toward EU accession would therefore have significant economic implications and could provoke responses from Moscow that Armenia would need to manage carefully.

Regional dynamics further complicate the issue. Armenia must also consider the interests of neighboring Iran. Although EU membership does not automatically imply NATO membership, Tehran could interpret such a move as part of a broader Western geopolitical alignment. Given the importance of Armenian-Iranian relations, Yerevan is unlikely to disregard Iranian concerns.

The position of the U.S. adds another layer of complexity. Although Washington generally supports European stability and cooperation, U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus has focused primarily on regional stability, economic connectivity, and broader geopolitical initiatives while Armenia’s potential EU accession hardly factor into U.S. strategic priorities. 

Among these constraints, Russia’s influence remains the most significant. Armenia’s security dependence, economic integration, and geographic realities create structural limitations that make a rapid strategic shift toward EU membership highly unlikely.

These factors also raise a broader question: if neither Armenia nor the EU is seriously pursuing accession, what was the primary purpose of the summit? Plausibly, the event was intended primarily as a demonstration of political support for Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. Hosting such a high-profile international gathering enhanced Armenia’s diplomatic visibility while reinforcing the government’s image as a credible partner for Europe.

CONCLUSIONS:

There is currently little to suggest that Armenia regards full EU membership as an immediate or realistic foreign policy objective. Although the government continues to expand cooperation with European institutions, it has avoided taking the political steps necessary to initiate a formal accession process. The absence of any membership declaration during the Armenia–EU Summit reinforces this assessment. At the same time, none of the principal external actors have strong incentives to support or concede to Armenian accession. Russia remains firmly opposed to such a development, while the EU lacks a clear consensus on further enlargement. Iran would likely view the prospect with concern, and the U.S. interest in the issue is limited. 

Discussions about EU membership in Armenia often serve domestic political purposes rather than reflecting an actionable policy agenda. The issue remains attractive to many voters and therefore continues to feature prominently in political discourse. Nevertheless, Armenia’s current strategy appears to focus on maximizing cooperation with the EU while preserving functional relations with Russia and other regional actors.

Accordingly, Armenia’s objective is best understood not as the pursuit of full EU membership but as the maintenance of deep political, economic, and institutional ties with the EU without fundamentally challenging the existing regional balance of power.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Vali Kaleji 

While the Armenian government appears to seek a short-term balance between the U.S. and Russia in the railway sector, its long-term objective is to end Russia’s monopoly and extensive influence over this critical infrastructure in Armenia. The realization of this objective, as well as reforms in the electricity and gas sectors, largely depends on the outcome of the decisive parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026. These elections will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

 Photo by Denis Belitsky, 2023

BACKGROUND:

On 13 February 2008, Armenia signed an agreement transferring full control of the state-owned Armenian Railways to South Caucasus Railway (Yuzhno-Kavkazskaya zheleznaya doroga, YuKZhD), a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZhD). Subject to mutual agreement, the contract may be extended until 2048. The agreement followed a concession model, transferring operational, managerial, and investment responsibilities to the Russian side. Although ownership of the railway infrastructure formally remained with the Armenian government, operational control, investment decisions, tariff policy, and network development were effectively placed under Russian authority, constituting influence without formal ownership.

The 2008 railway agreement was effectively a continuation, and one of the consequences, of the 2002–2003 “debt-for-assets” agreement between Armenia and Russia, which settled Armenia’s US$ 96 million debt to Russia. The 30-year concession agreement is widely regarded as a major turning point in the development of Russia’s structural influence over Armenia’s economy and infrastructure in the post-Soviet period. Under the debt-for-assets arrangement, ownership or management of six major industrial and economic assets in Armenia, including electricity, gas, electronics, and defense-related sectors, was transferred to Russia, facilitating Russian dominance and influence in other sectors, including railways and telecommunications.

To reduce this monopoly and dependency, the Armenian government signed an agreement with Iran in 2009, one year after the 30-year concession agreement, to construct the “Marand–Norooz–Meghri–Yerevan” railway. Russia opposedthe project, and despite considerable efforts by Armenia, the railway was never realized, leaving Russia’s monopoly over Armenia’s railway network intact.

Plans to revive Soviet-era railway routes in the southern South Caucasus failed to materialize in the transformed regional environment following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. However, the peace agreement signed by Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on August 8, 2025, marked a new phase in the construction and integration of road and railway routes in southern Armenia. Nevertheless, despite the completion of approximately 80 percent of the 110-kilometer Horadiz–Aghband railway line in southwestern Azerbaijan (around 140 kilometers including auxiliary routes), and Turkey’s initiation of a new 224-kilometer railway line from Kars to the Nakhichevan border, scheduled for completion before 2030, the rehabilitation and construction of the railway line in southern Armenia has yet to begin.

In these circumstances, during a press briefing on February 13, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that a country maintaining “friendly relations” with both Russia and Armenia could “purchase the concession management rights” of Armenia’s railways, which are currently under Russian management. He presented this as a potential solution to Armenia’s loss of “competitive advantage” by having international routes pass through the country. When asked which states could assume such a role, Pashinyan mentioned Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Qatar, while noting that the list was not exhaustive.

IMPLICATIONS:

Pashinyan’s recent statements may represent the latest step by the Armenian government to reduce the country’s dependence on Russia in the infrastructure sector. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian control and influence over Armenia’s railway network and railway management became particularly significant due to Armenia’s status as a landlocked country. After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia’s railway routes with Azerbaijan (the eastern route) and Turkey (the western route) were closed. The disruption of railway connections between Armenia and Azerbaijan also severed Armenia’s rail link with Iran via the Julfa–Nakhichevan route. Consequently, over the past three decades, Armenia’s only active railway connection has been the northern route, a Soviet-era railway line running through Georgia to Russia and the Black Sea. Notably, despite the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia following the August 2008 war, this railway corridor, like the road route, has remained open and operational.

The absence of Armenia’s railway connectivity in three directions, eastward towards Azerbaijan, southward towards Iran, and westward towards Nakhichevan and Turkey, and the country’s dependence on the northern route through Georgia to Russia significantly strengthened the monopoly position and influence of the Russian-controlled South Caucasus Railway company. The Armenian government’s new approach therefore represents a step toward reducing Russia’s monopoly and influence over Armenia’s railway infrastructure, while also diversifying the country’s rail connections.

However, the most noteworthy aspect is Russia’s continued presence in these developments. Although Russia was excluded from the agreements reached during the Washington summit, it nevertheless expressed readiness to discuss possible participation in the Trump Route with Armenia. Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the Fourth CIS Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, argued that “there are ample grounds” for such involvement. Among other points, Kalugin referred to South Caucasus Railway, which “holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.”

On the other hand, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan revealed that he had asked Russia to “urgently address” the full restoration of railway sections adjacent to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan and the Turkish border. The issue concerns three key railway sections: Yeraskh–Nakhichevan, Gyumri–Kars, and Ijevan–Gazakh. Pashinyan stated that he had raised the matter with Russia more than a month earlier.

However, the Armenian government appears to support Russian participation and investment only in railway sections located outside the so-called “Trump Route.” Addressing possible Russian involvement in the project, Nikol Pashinyan stated that the route is a bilateral initiative with the U.S., adding that “any third-party involvement can be discussed only bilaterally.” Pashinyan also responded to the South Caucasus Railway’s expressed readiness to transfer only the Meghri railway section, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass, from its administration to Armenia, arguing that the statement reflected a “misunderstanding.” “The [Meghri railway] section is not under Russian management for it to be handed over to Armenia. It is Armenia’s sovereign territory, and we have not delegated the management of that sovereign territory to anyone. There is no railway there to be managed by anyone,” Pashinyan stated.

In fact, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated, the Russian Federation has decided to begin substantive negotiations on the restoration of two sections of Armenia’s railway network that would reconnect Armenian railways with the railway network of the Republic of Azerbaijan near the town of Yeraskh and with the railway network of the Republic of Turkey near the settlement of Akhuryan. The total length of the sections to be restored has been announced as 1.6 kilometers and 12.4 kilometers, respectively. All of these sections exclude southern Armenia, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass. Nevertheless, the reopening of these railway sections forms part of the Pashinyan government’s Crossroads of Peace project.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s exit from political and military dependence on Russia is unlikely without ending Russia’s monopoly over the country’s economic infrastructure. The Armenian government took an initial step in this direction by nationalizing the country’s electricity grid, and on July 9, 2025, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed a law permitting the nationalization of the national electricity distribution company. However, this decision became politically contentious following the arrest of opposition leader Samvel Karapetyan, who had acquired full ownership of the Armenian Power Grid Company and the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant in 2017.

Armenia’s dependence on Russian-controlled economic infrastructure extends beyond railways and electricity. The exclusive supplier of natural gas in Armenia’s domestic market is Gazprom Armenia, a Russian-Armenian company established in December 1997, whose shares are wholly owned by Russia’s Gazprom. Consequently, Armenia’s efforts to end Russia’s monopoly and influence over its economic infrastructure face significant obstacles. The realization of this objective will largely depend on the outcome of the crucial parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, which will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Alpaslan Özerdem and Olesya Vartanyan

After more than three decades of closure, the Türkiye-Armenia border may soon reopen. A string of recent developments, including the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to Yerevan, agreements to simplify visa procedures, and moves toward direct land trade, suggest that normalization is shifting from cautious diplomacy toward practical implementation. If it does, it would mark one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. Yet reopening the border will require careful political management. Without it, renewed contact could generate friction rather than stability.

BACKGROUND:

The land border between Türkiye and Armenia has been closed since 1993. Ankara shut the crossing in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the first war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the border has symbolized one of the most enduring geopolitical divides in the region. For communities on both sides, the closure produced long-term economic and social consequences. Armenia’s access to regional markets has remained constrained, while eastern Turkish border regions have also faced limited cross-border economic opportunities.

Regional dynamics began shifting after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which altered the political balance in the South Caucasus and created new incentives for diplomatic engagement. In the aftermath of the war, Ankara and Yerevan appointed special envoys in 2021 to explore the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the border.

Since then, negotiations have progressed slowly but steadily. Several confidence-building measures have been agreed and some already implemented. These include agreements allowing third-country citizens to cross the border, the resumption of direct flights between Istanbul and Yerevan, and discussions on facilitating trade and travel. In early 2026, the pace of normalization accelerated visibly. In March, Turkish Airlines launched regular scheduled flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan route. The two governments agreed to simplify visa procedures, and reports emerged that direct land trade between Türkiye and Armenia would begin as part of a broader US-led Caucasus peace push. Last December Bloomberg reported that Ankara was weighing a full reopening of the border within six months, while senior Turkish officials publicly expressed optimism, stating that they hoped “everything develops quickly.”

Physical preparations also indicate growing readiness. Armenia has renovated the Margara checkpoint on its side of the border, declaring the facility technically ready for operation. Türkiye has likewise upgraded infrastructure at the Alican crossing. These preparations suggest that the technical conditions for reopening could be met relatively quickly if political decisions align.

Still, reopening the border remains politically sensitive. For Türkiye, the process remains closely linked to the broader relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly negotiations over a comprehensive peace agreement following the collapse of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh authorities in 2023. Since last August, when the two countries signed several accords at the White House, Baku and Yerevan have taken a number of steps forward, including facilitating transit trade to Armenia through Azerbaijan and Armenia’s recent agreement with the United States on the TRIPP transit route, which will facilitate the operation of a transit route between Azerbaijan and its enclave of Nakhchivan in southern Armenia. These are promising steps, but a final peace agreement is still pending, which Türkiye must take into consideration.

Ankara has long coordinated its approach toward Armenia with Baku. Turkish policymakers have repeatedly emphasized that normalization should not undermine Azerbaijan’s strategic interests, and progress in Türkiye-Armenia relations has often moved in parallel with developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. How close are the parties to a final agreement on the border? The string of practical steps in early 2026 suggests the process has crossed a threshold from symbolic confidence-building to operational preparation. Yet the absence of a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal means that Ankara retains a political brake on the timeline. A stall or deterioration in those talks could slow or freeze the border track; conversely, a breakthrough could accelerate it rapidly.

Domestic political considerations also matter. In Armenia, normalization with Türkiye remains controversial for segments of society deeply affected by historical grievances, and the issue will feature in the country’s upcoming June parliamentary elections. In Türkiye, policymakers must balance diplomatic engagement with Armenia against their longstanding strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

IMPLICATIONS:

If and when the border reopens, the effects will extend well beyond bilateral relations. Armenia has long depended on limited transit routes through Georgia and Iran to access external markets. Opening the Turkish border would provide an alternative corridor, linking Armenia more directly to European and Middle Eastern trade networks. It would also reinforce Türkiye’s role as a regional connector between the South Caucasus and broader Eurasian markets. In this context, reopening the border aligns with wider connectivity initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, which aims to strengthen east-west trade routes across the region.

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has weakened since the start of the war in Ukraine and the collapse of its peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. As Moscow’s role recedes, regional actors are increasingly seeking alternative economic and diplomatic partnerships. In parallel, instability in the Middle East, including conflict involving Iran, has heightened uncertainty along key transit routes. For Armenia, which has relied on access through Iranian territory, reopening the Turkish border would reduce dependence on a single corridor and provide greater strategic flexibility.

On the other hand, the expansion of trade and transit routes associated with reopening the Türkiye-Armenia border could deepen regional interdependence and, in turn, support longer-term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Durable reconciliation rarely rests on diplomatic agreements alone; it often emerges when economic cooperation and shared interests make renewed conflict increasingly costly. Expanded trade, transportation links, and cross-border mobility can help create these incentives by encouraging regional actors to view cooperation not as a concession but as mutual gain.

At the local level, decades of closure have left many towns near the frontier economically stagnant. Renewed cross-border access could stimulate transportation links, tourism, and commercial exchange. Armenian producers would gain easier access to Turkish markets, while Turkish businesses could expand trade with Armenia and potentially beyond. However, regions that have been economically isolated for decades may struggle to adjust quickly to new competitive pressures, and if cross-border trade develops unevenly, local communities could perceive the reopening as disruptive rather than beneficial.

The practical challenges of reopening should not be underestimated. Local authorities, customs agencies, border police, and regulatory bodies on both sides have never previously operated together. Communities along the frontier have lived in close geographical proximity but political separation for decades. In the Armenian village of Margara, residents have long lived within sight of the Turkish side of the river without direct contact. Renewed engagement may generate economic and cultural exchange, but it could also expose differences in administrative practices, expectations, and social attitudes that will require careful management on both sides.

CONCLUSIONS:

The reopening of the Türkiye-Armenia border represents more than a bilateral diplomatic milestone. It reflects a broader transformation in the political landscape of the South Caucasus. The rapid accumulation of practical steps in early 2026, from flights to visa agreements to land trade, indicates that the process has moved beyond the realm of aspirational diplomacy. Yet the outcome is not guaranteed. The process remains closely linked to developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, domestic political considerations in both countries, and evolving regional geopolitics. Whether Ankara ultimately opens the border before or after a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal will be a critical signal of how much Türkiye is willing to decouple the two tracks. Whether the border ultimately becomes a bridge between the two societies or simply another contested frontier will depend on how effectively these challenges are addressed not only in the coming months, but in the longer term.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Alpaslan Özerdem is Dean of the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst specializing in South Caucasus security and peace processes and a PhD student at George Mason University.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Armenia’s agreement with the U.S. on cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy may signify a major geopolitical shift in the South Caucasus. Specifically, the deal signals Yerevan’s effort to diversify its energy partnerships and reduce long-standing dependence on Russia, which has dominated Armenia’s nuclear sector since the Soviet era. Moscow`s response to the news has been very critical. Russian experts and policymakers warned about technological risks and questioned the feasibility of U.S.-supplied Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Russian officials and state media frame the initiative as both a security concern and a geopolitical challenge, emphasizing Rosatom’s experience and warning that Armenia could become a testing ground for unproven technologies.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia’s nuclear sector has historically been closely linked to Russia. Armenia’s Nuclear Power Plant at Metsamor, built during the Soviet period, supplies up to 31 percent of the country’s electricity. The plant’s second unit continues operating after modernization programs that extended its lifetime (until 2036) and upgraded its capacity. Due to particularities of the nuclear-producing energy sector, Armenia’s dependence on Russia is complex and multidimensional extending to maintenance of infrastructure, scientific cooperation and other aspects, deepening the dependency on Russian involvement in the country’s energy system. Metsamor’s aging reactors and the country’s growing electricity needs have forced Armenian authorities to consider constructing a replacement facility. Thus, the government began evaluating options for new nuclear capacity examining potential cooperation with multiple countries including Russia, the U.S., China, and South Korea. Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the government would select the partner offering the most competitive combination of price and technology. 

The turning point came in February 2026, when the U.S. and Armenia finalized a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement establishes the legal framework for exporting nuclear technology to Armenia and opens for U.S. companies to participate in building a new nuclear facility. Furthermore, during a visit to Yerevan (9–10 February), U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance announced that Washington could invest up to US$ 9 billion in Armenia’s nuclear energy sector, which includes long-term fuel and maintenance contracts. 

Small modular reactors are central to Armenia’s new strategy – this was clearly voiced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in October 2024, when he mentioned that the Armenian government aims to build a small modular reactor as the next nuclear facility. The main competitive advantages of these facilities is that they are viewed as more flexible and potentially cheaper to deploy in smaller energy markets. Armenia’s government believes that over the years the technology could provide a suitable replacement for the Metsamor facility while maintaining the country’s energy security. 

Predictably, the initiative has triggered a strong and quite negative reaction in Moscow: Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom currently plays the key role in Armenia’s nuclear sector and has long been interested in building new reactors in the country. Therefore, the possibility that Armenia might select an American reactor technology threatens Russia’s economic interests and influence in a region traditionally considered part of Moscow’s geopolitical sphere. Russian media outlets have framed the agreement as a major strategic shift in Armenia`s foreign economic policy, and rather unfriendly toward Russia. Commentators in Russian publications argue that Pashinyan’s decision could weaken Russia’s position in the South Caucasus while strengthening US influence in Armenia’s energy infrastructure, establishing a long-term strategic foothold. Clearly, the debate therefore extends beyond energy policy and touches on the broader geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West.

IMPLICATIONS:

In Russian argumentation, Armenia’s nuclear agreement with the US carries multiple strategic implications where two factors tower above others. First, the deal is described as threatening both Russia’s dominance in Armenia’s energy sector and its global position as a leading actor in nuclear technologies. Rosatom has invested significant resources in maintaining the Metsamor plant and extending its operational life. Russia, primarily through Rosatom and state-backed financing, has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the modernization of Armenia’s nuclear plant, including a US$ 270 million loan, a US$ 30 million grant, and additional upgrade contracts. Russian officials have also repeatedly highlighted Russia`s global leadership in nuclear construction and its extensive experience in operating reactors abroad. In this context, losing the Armenian market to U.S. competitors would represent both an economic loss and a symbolic blow to Russia’s international nuclear industry. 

Second, Russian officials have emphasized safety concerns related to the proposed SMR project. Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, warned that Armenia’s location in a seismically active region makes nuclear construction particularly sensitive. According to Shoigu, Soviet engineers designed Metsamor’s foundation to withstand the devastating 1988 earthquake, demonstrating the reliability of Russian technology. He argued that the introduction of unfamiliar reactor designs could introduce new safety risks that regional governments would have to consider. 

Shoigu also questioned the technological maturity of U.S. SMR designs. He pointed out that the U.S. has yet to complete a fully operational SMR project domestically, suggesting that the technology remains largely untested in practice. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that Armenia could effectively become a testing ground for experimental U.S. nuclear technologies if it proceeds with the project, and that the scale of the proposed US$ 9 billion agreement raises questions about financial risks and long-term feasibility. Safety concerns resonate strongly across the post-Soviet space due to the legacy of major nuclear accidents, most notably the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The memory of such incidents continues to shape public perceptions of nuclear energy from Belarus to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, arguments emphasizing nuclear safety, which Russian officials frequently invoke in discussions about Armenia’s potential adoption of small modular reactors, are not merely rhetorical but can find receptive audiences in societies where historical experience has made the risks associated with nuclear technology particularly salient.

Despite these tensions, Armenian officials insist that the decision regarding a new nuclear plant has not yet been finalized and that Yerevan continues to review proposals from multiple partners, including Russia. Armenian authorities have even requested additional technical briefings from Moscow regarding Russian modular reactor technologies, indicating that competition for the project remains open. 

Another factor that could affect a potential U.S.-Armenia nuclear deal is Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary election on June 7. Some Western experts believe that the U.S.-Armenia nuclear agreement would likely be weakened or delayed if Pashinyan is defeated in the elections, however not automatically disbanded. (Pro)Russian experts suggest that an opposition win could sharply change Armenia’s foreign-policy course, improving ties with Moscow. 

The Armenian side clearly understands that the final decision, should it not comply with Russia`s expectations, would have broader geopolitical implications for the country. This has an even more pronounced meaning given that over the past several years political relations between Russia and Armenia have deteriorated as Armenia has sought to diversify its foreign policy and strengthen ties with Western partners. For Russia, the potential loss of influence in Armenia’s nuclear sector represents much more than a commercial setback – it could manifest a broader erosion of Moscow’s role in the South Caucasus at a time when Western countries are expanding their presence in the region and Russia’s influence and posture are eroding.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. marks a potentially transformative moment in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. While the project remains at an early stage and Armenia continues to evaluate competing proposals, the possibility that U.S. companies could build the country’s next nuclear reactor has already triggered strong negative reactions in Moscow. Russian officials have criticized the proposal on technical, economic, security and geopolitical grounds, emphasizing safety concerns and highlighting Rosatom’s experience in nuclear construction. At the same time, Russian media portray the initiative as part of a broader Western strategy to expand influence in Armenia and weaken Russia’s traditional role in the region, in strategic proximity of southern Russia. For Armenia, the nuclear agreement represents an effort to diversify strategic partnerships and strengthen energy independence. Yet the decision also clearly carries risks, including exacerbated political friction with Russia. Ultimately, the competition over Armenia’s nuclear future illustrates the intensifying geopolitical rivalry shaping the South Caucasus. The outcome of this contest will influence not only Armenia’s energy security but also the balance of power in a region where infrastructure, economics, and geopolitics remain deeply intertwined.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Laura Thornton

Armenians head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of parliament at a time of critical regional and geopolitical consequences. Following the 2018 Velvet Revolution and Nagorno-Karabakh war, the country has embarked on a new path of democratic reform and foreign policy alignments. Previously dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is now forging new ties with the European Union (EU) and United States, while redefining the country’s relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. The election presents a choice beyond minor policy options but a vision for the country’s governance and geopolitical alignment. Given the stakes, both domestic and foreign actors have intensified their tactics, manipulating existing vulnerabilities, and present serious threats to the election process.

BACKGROUND:

The election is taking place at a historic pivot point for Armenia’s positioning in the region and beyond. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has tied to Russia militarily, economically, and ideologically. Armenia has been part of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid and key trading partner. Russia also owns key infrastructure in Armenia, including railways and telecommunications. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts damaged ties between the two states, with Yerevan suspending its participation in the CSTO and demanding the removal of Russian border troops. 

While turning away from Russia, the government has pursued European Union (EU) accession and signed a framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a transit route in the south Caucasus. Further, regional calculations have dramatically changed, paving the way for a redefined relationship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a peace agreement being formed with the former and new border and trade discussions with the latter. 

Two main opposition blocs, which are closely tied to Russia, are challenging the ruling Civil Contract party of Pashinyan. The ruling party is running on “peace,” which it defines as continuing the negotiations with Azerbaijan and building closer ties with the EU and U.S. The opposition blocs oppose the government’s peace agreement, accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control, and say EU goals are unrealistic.

While the political contest does not fall along neat “pro-West vs. pro-Russian” divides as in some frontline democracies, and none of the viable parties embraces a full break from Russia (mindful that the plurality of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner), the parties do differ significantly on the nature of the relationship. The Kremlin has taken note and activated its hybrid warfare playbook, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other democracies, to defeat the ruling party.  

The political landscape is also shaped by a fierce conflict between the government and Church leaders. Church leaders – headed by Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians – accuse the Pashinyan government of “losing” the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and have called for the Prime Minister’s resignation. In turn, the government has prosecuted several bishops on charges ranging from “calling for a coup” to drug charges, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence. Opposition parties have seized on this issue, criticizing the government and defending the Church.

IMPLICATIONS:

Given the partisan divergence on the country’s foreign policy orientation, the geopolitical stakes in the election are high, activating malign actors. The Kremlin sees clearly the threat of the ruling Civil Contract, which has pledged more decoupling from Russia and greater alignment with Europe and the U.S. While recently on a pre-election assessment mission to Yerevan, government officials, civil society representatives, diplomats, and observers described Russia’s hybrid warfare in the country as “unprecedented.” There was also widespread agreement that the country was not adequately prepared for the threat, made worse by the elimination of USAID and its support in bolstering the country’s defenses.

Information is central to the Kremlin’s strategy. Russia dominates the airwaves, with Russian channels freely broadcast on national television, and social media, where there are few regulations. Narratives focus on Armenia’s need for Russian security, and how the Pashinyan government has ceded sovereignty to Azerbaijan, and for the Russian market. Emphasis is on Armenia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Disinformation about elections, institutions, and democracy is prevalent, particularly sowing distrust in the integrity of the upcoming election. Russian information campaigns bolster opposition talking points, such as those accusing the government of suppressing speech and political prosecutions.   

The Kremlin has infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” established by the late Wagner Head Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Russia and Armenian Church leaders are also in lockstep, each amplifying the other’s attacks on the government, messaging on traditional values, and criticism of Western institutions. Russia has also mobilized the Armenian diaspora to vote in previous elections, paying for transport and vote buying. Russian banks and businesses operate throughout the country making financing of influence operations and proxies easy. 

It is widely acknowledged in Yerevan that the country is not adequately prepared to defend against this threat. Government bodies are poorly resourced and often lack the mandate, technology, and tools to investigate or conduct counter efforts. There are also legal loopholes, such as the lack of regulation on third parties, which frequently engage in political activity. Civil society groups, research institutes, and independent media – central to building resilience to hybrid threats – are also poorly resourced, particularly since the elimination of USAID.

Electoral victory for the main opposition blocs, the beneficiaries of Russian influence, would signify a reversal on the country’s current trajectory. Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the Russian Tashir Group, founded the opposition Strong Armenia. The other main opposition bloc, Armenia Alliance, is led by former President Robert Kocharyan who serves on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies. In addition to their obvious Russian ties, the parties reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement (and do not offer a clear alternative), do not approve of TRIPP, and believe Armenia is “not ready” for the EU. 

According to recent polling, Civil Contract is polling at 24 percent, Strong Armenia at nine percent, and everyone else below the threshold. This polling also shows the majority of support for the ruling party comes from older (56+) and more urban citizens. Importantly, those who select Civil Contract are far more likely to identify as “pro-Western” (73 percent) while those who support Strong Armenia believe the country’s policy should be “pro-Russian” (71 percent).

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s election could lead to the continuation of the country’s new foreign alignment course, forging new economic and security relationships and exerting greater freedom from Russian control. Alternatively, the country could abandon this direction, taking a closer path to that of neighboring Georgia, which has alienated the West and forged closer ties with Russia, China, and Iran. At a time of upheaval and uncertainty in the region, a strong alliance of pro-Russian governments along the vertical axis from Moscow to Tehran would have significant consequences. It could block Western interests in and access to the region and beyond, lead to new destabilization between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and embolden Russia to act elsewhere. 

Enhanced U.S. and European support would help fortify the elections from malign actors through increased technical assistance, intelligence, financing, and training to Armenian partners.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Laura Thornton has spent more than 30 years in the democracy, governance, and security space both as a practitioner and policy and advocacy expert. She lived more than two decades in Asia and the former Soviet Union and has held positions at the McCain Institute, the German Marshall Fund, International IDEA, and the National Democratic Institute.