BACKGROUND: Only days after the dismantlement of Soviet Union, the five newly independent Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – launched their own re-unification experiment. (After the proclamation of its neutrality, Turkmenistan discontinued participation in the Central Asian summits, though it did not withdraw officially). They slowly attempted to advance their own Commonwealth vis-à-vis the CIS and applied different titles to their formation. Initially, in 1991, it was the Central Asian Commonwealth, later, in 1994, it became Central Asian Economic Community, and in the 2001/2002 summits it acquired the current name of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. From the outset of independence, the region has been the object of increased interest of regional and external powers. The geopolitical transformation that is underway in Central Asia changed the status-quo in this part of the world in two principle ways, seemingly mutually contradictory: Russia’s geopolitical status in the region diminished and has been put into question. Meanwhile, America’s political and military presence in the region has become an undeniable reality which could become protracted and long-term. This region became an area of the U.S. Central Command’s responsibility. Meanwhile, the launch of the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001 followed by the establishment of the U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan became a new turning point in the post-Soviet developments in Central Asia. One of the major signs of the fundamental foreign policy diversification of Central Asian states was the establishment of a strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the U.S. in March 2002. This unprecedented event in their relations will undoubtedly have systemic geopolitical implications. Against this background, anxiety has been growing in Russian political and military circles about Moscow’s possible loss of influence in the region in the near or mid-term future. Newly independent Central Asia finds itself very entangled. Whose zone of influence, whose zone of dominance and whose zone of responsibility is it now? Is this a zone of its own? IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s entry into CACO was suggested by Uzbekistan at the May 2004 summit of this organization. At the time, this was justified by the recognition of the existence of vital Russian interests in the region and commonality between them and those of the states of the region. However, the Dushanbe political event illustrated something else. Central Asians failed to solve their numerous regional problems; tension or mistrust between and among them increase; and they need someone to reconcile or mediate them. This was one of the main messages of the summit in Tajikistan. The other message was that the long-term, strengthened and extended American military presence in Central Asian cannot be tolerated by Russia. Neither message is justifiable, however. The widespread opinion that Russia will undertake any efforts to compensate/balance increasing American military presence is grounded on a miscalculation of the role of Central Asian countries themselves. Inviting the U.S. was in no way an anti-Russian act on their part simply because any challenge to Russia from the territory of Central Asia will, in turn, challenge the security of the very Central Asian states as a result of the Russian response. Not America but Central Asia would be the target of Russian counteraction with respect to any unfriendly action out of the territory of Central Asia. All sides are well aware of this circumstance. That’s why the stereotypical interpretation and justification of Russian efforts regarding its bases and membership in CACO, reflected in the above mentioned messages, misleads public opinion and the international community. Russia created its base in Tajikistan as if it had not existed or as if no other foreign (U.S.) bases existed in the region to provide security assistance. It is no less unilateral than was, according to erroneous explanations by some Russian officials and experts, the establishment of the American bases. Of course, the U.S. could also apply for membership in CACO. The fact is that all sides found themselves preoccupied with the old but inadequate balance of power model of international relations. Parallel to these events, in June 2004, right before the SCO summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s and Russia’s presidents signed an agreement on strategic partnership. Such a rapid turn in the Uzbekistan’s foreign policy was nothing but an element in the chain of events that brought Russia into CACO. From now on Uzbekistan is a strategic partner of the former (or current) rivals: the U.S. and Russia. Many were inclined to explain this in the following way: Uzbekistan as a “subcontractor” expected rewards in return for its support of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US nevertheless turned to excessive criticism of Uzbekistan over its lack of democratic reforms and human rights, and gave very little in terms of expected response for providing an air base and over-flight rights for the operation in Afghanistan. In this sense, it remains to be determined which partnership – the Uzbek-US or Uzbek-Russian – is really strategic. Whichever the case, Russia seems to return to its strategic position in Central Asia. The main question id whether this means only the restoration of the Russian strategic dominance there, or the responsible provision real security assistance to the five regional five countries. America has so far kept a low profile in Central Asia. The dominant analytical view about the possible U.S. posture in the region has stemmed so far from the traditional perception that it is a Russian sphere of influence and even dominance. This echoes a similar approach of three years ago, that any American undertakings in Central Asia should definitely be adjusted with the Russians.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s entering into CACO as a full-fledged member and the opening of its military base in Tajikistan was in fact not a Russian offensive but rather a Central Asian surrender. Indeed, no one forced them to do so. There is no doubt that Russian active participation in Central Asian affairs was needed and long expected. So was the Uzbek-Russian rapprochement. But this is not yet a ground to distort the geographical composition and political structure of a solely Central Asian cooperation organization. Unfortunately, the states of the region were able to demonstrate neither their full independence nor their own long awaited unity, but instead demonstrated their need for a the mediator in the conflict-prone regional affairs, undermining and overlooking thereby the self-value of the integration of solely Central Asian countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov, PhD in Political Science, Professor at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy; Senior Expert at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.