BACKGROUND: Most political parties in Kyrgyzstan identify themselves either as in opposition or as centrists. In the early independence the main opposition parties had been set up by southerners. Absamat Masaliev, Adakhan Madumarov, Omurbek Tekebaev and other southern opponents are affiliated to the different opposition political parties. Until recently the only exception among the opposition figures was northerner Feliks Kulov, leader of the “Ar-Namys” party. Kulov, former Vice-President, Minister of National Security and mayor of Bishkek, is still in jail and recognized as a political prisoner by international human rights organizations. The other northern opposition figures are less known among the public and now engaged in the southern-led opposition bloc. Most centrist parties, on the other hand, were founded by northerners and favored by the President during the previous parliamentary election in 2000. The “Adilet” and “My country” parties are among them. To date, centrist parties along with independent candidates make up the majority of the parliamentary seats, allowing the President to control decision-making process in the Parliament. Many individual candidates who won parliamentary seats in the South won with the President’s support. Thus, Akayev has skillfully moderated frictions between the northerners and southerners by recruiting a pro-presidential elites to top positions and ensuring their loyalty. One of the foremost opposition figures from the south is former Prime-Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev who resigned after Aksy tragedy in 2002. He was nominated a few months ago as a presidential candidate by the southern radically-inclined opposition. His Soviet and current political background as a top bureaucrat helped him unite southern opponents against Akayev. Bakiev and his family clan are known as one of the richest in the country and belong to a respected tribe in the south. In response to Akayev’s Moscow statement announcing his intention to remain in power, Bakiev and his fellow opposition leaders most recently organized a new bloc, the “People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan”. It aims to work out a common position over candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The sudden death of Communist leader Masaliev, who led Kyrgyzstan for several years in the Soviet era, also formed an impetus for the bloc. Despite his commitment to communist values, Masaliev remained a key ideologist among the southern elite, as most of them systematically tended to follow his advices. When Bakiev was officially announced as a presidential candidate, he was blessed by Masaliev. According to ongoing polls by the opposition newspaper “Moya stolitsa”, Bakiev ranks in second place, he nonetheless, lacks charisma and eloquence. His Soviet experience of management as a plant director do not serve as credentials to think he would bring the market economy to a new level. But since the southern population is the largest in the country, he might count on support of southerners, including ethnic Uzbeks. The other presidential candidate from the south is 39 year-old Adakhan Madumarov, a very articulate speaker, who though serving in Parliament for a second term is political loner. His ambition prevented him from joining either Bakiev’s or Kulov’s opposition blocks. By now, the most formidable challenger to the incumbent Akayev is fellow northerner Kulov, who belongs to a noble tribe in the north. Surveys find Kulov holding the first place among presidential candidates. A former military commander, Kulov served under Akayev but is now in jail, considered a political prisoner. He has proper tribal credentials, and known as a moderate. If Kulov is elected president, he would not only enhance economic growth, increase judiciary independence, but also strengthen the power of the Interior and National Security Ministries. Like Putin, Kulov would inevitably be surrounded by military bureaucrats and the intelligence community, who might gradually narrow the activity of independent mass media and civil society groups.

IMPLICATIONS: As the upcoming parliamentary election approaches, the political divide between opposition and centrist parties is currently becoming clear. Some mainly serve to back the president, like “Adilet” which is led, at least in name, by outstanding writer Chingiz Aitmatov. Aitmatov’s election as a party leader was not accidental. First, Aitmatov publicly suggested Akayev as the first president of Kyrgyzstan. Second, Aitmatov and Akaev’s wife have common roots in Talas region, one of the northern provinces. In recent local elections, the party scored several victories. The party’s day-to-day leader is First Deputy Prime Minister Kybanychbek Jumaliev, a family loyalist to Akayev who hails from the South. Another Deputy Prime Minister, Djoomart Otorbaev, runs the centrist “My Country” party. Otorbaev is a westernized politician, advocating liberal economics and is surrounded by liberals from the business and academic communities. The party no longer appears favored by the Government. It came in third in the local elections of October 10, after the pro-presidential parties “Alga Kyrgyzstan!” and “Adilet”. Despite Otorbaev’s corporate style and very insightful strategic outlook for Kyrgyzstan, he and his party compose a minority within the ruling elite. Therefore, “My country” cautiously designs its long-term political agenda and takes wait-and-see position prior to the national elections. It is hampered by the defection of Foreign Minister Muratbek Imanaliev, who went on to form a party of his own. The pro-presidential party “Alga Kyrgyzstan!” is intensifying its election campaigning across the country, supported by the President’s daughter Bermet Akayeva. The party’s campaign is reminiscent of election campaigning by the Communist Party during the Soviet era. For example, having used vast administrative resources “Alga Kyrgyzstan!” came out on top in local elections with twelve seats. Yet, unlike Kazakhstan’s President’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva, Bermet is less politically mature and lacks necessary experience in public policy. The prospect of Bermet being groomed as a political leader to succeed her father is perilous, as the family’s engagement lucrative economic activities along with the increasing impoverishment of the population is likely to bring about resistance throughout the country.

CONCLUSIONS: The struggle for political power is characterized first and foremost by an overshadowing contest between the country’s two regions, the north and the south. Secondly, there is an equally significant confrontation between the ruling family clan itself and an opposition-inclined elite attempting to take over power. Nevertheless, under the sizable and continuous support of international donors, a stubborn involvement of civil society activists in the electoral process as well as grass-roots support to independent political parties are set to make a considerable impact on the current political landscape in Kyrgyzstan. One major question remains unanswered, though: who will be able to successfully lead Kyrgyzstan and to move it towards full-fledged democracy?

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aya Telekova is an independent analyst from Kyrgyzstan, currently a Visiting Scholar in the United States.