BACKGROUND: Georgia has become a focus for U.S. policy in Eurasia not only in terms of spreading the ideals of freedom and democracy, but also in terms of geo-economics and geo-strategy. Since 1999, the U.S. role in the formation of Georgia’s security architecture has increased qualitatively. America has trained the Georgian military, provided technical assistance to its border guards and customs services, and transferred military helicopters to Georgia. The US$64 million Train-and-Equip Program for the reformation of the Georgian military aims to create the nucleus of a new Georgian armed forces consisting of more than 2,000 officers and enlisted personnel. In March 2003, the Georgian Parliament ratified a U.S.-Georgian military agreement, with wide ranging privileges granted to U.S. military personnel, leading to speculation that the agreement is a precursor of U.S. military deployment on Georgian soil. Confidential U.S.-Georgian consultations on the usage of Georgian airfields by US air forces are reportedly underway, whose rationale is underscored by the recent Iraq campaign and Turkey’s reluctance to engage in it. Given its internal and external security threats, the friendship of the world’s only superpower is crucial to Georgia’s survival – at least while its territorial integrity remains uncertain, its budget is in deficit, and the legitimacy of its government remains questionable in the eyes of its own citizens. Yet the process of the formation of Georgia’s external security guarantees has not been accomplished yet. The US-Georgian alliance falls short of perfection, and the partners face certain dilemmas.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s security dilemmas are both external and internal in nature. As Vladimir Socor puts it, it is questionable “whether international law still applies to Russia-Georgia relations”. Russia refuses to withdraw its remaining bases from Georgia in a timeframe acceptable to Georgia, and continues support secessionist entities. It one-sidedly opened a railway connection with Abkhazia, and its granting of Russian citizenship to citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia amounts to a de facto annexation. U.S.-Georgian military co-operation has been followed by the rearmament of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian regimes by the Russian military. Russia maintains a monopoly on the supply of energy to Georgia, and Itera, a private Russian company with close ties to the Russian state, has been trying to acquire strategic assets in the country. Georgia tries to neutralize these threats through closeness with the U.S., but it remains unclear whether the current Georgian government will manage to completely avoid the re-emergence of its erstwhile bandwagoning policy towards Russia, especially if Russia uses carrots and not only sticks. Recent agreements with Russia may have weakened Georgia’s position, for example the lifting of the six months limitation on the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. The discussions of a trilateral regime for the Gali region seem to give Russia a stronger position in Abkhazia with Georgian acquiescence but lesser accountability. Moreover, recent developments regarding Russian bases follow the same line. Russia in 2002 made Georgia agree to a formula whereby the bases’ status, which should have been vacated in 2001 according to the 1999 OSCE Istanbul agreement, would be finalized “until the end of 2003 if conditions permit”. According to one high-ranking OSCE official, the new formula explicitly weakens the Georgian position. The same official expressed concern that it is slightly unclear what Georgia genuinely wants either from Russia or from the international community in this regard. Georgia’s second dilemma is internal and political, and even ideological in nature. The West stipulates certain conditions for countries aspiring to join the club of democratic states. It provides significant aid for, essentially, the implementation of the principles of market economy, democracy, and the rule of law. The Georgian government has been quick to promise reforms and to demand relevant assistance, but the effects of multiyear Western loans and grants is far below expectations. Although the Georgian government declared a belated crusade against corruption in 2000, the Georgian judiciary system is unaware of any single case of the punishment of a high-ranking state figure for bribery. Parallel to that, both governmental and non-governmental sources report an increase of the organized crime in the country. Corruption and organized crime are known to reach into the highest echelons of the Georgian political elite. As a result, the establishment of genuine democracy and rule of law could become dangerous for the government, or components of it. One might therefore question whether the Georgian government will seek to establish true democracy, which of course would endanger the positions and genuine interests of some individuals and groups. Consequently, one may wonder whether strict democratic conditionality would not lead the Georgian government back to the Russian embrace, since Russia never demands either democratization or respect for human rights. This brings the third key dilemma for the future of Georgia, which is faced not by the Georgian government but rather by the U.S.. The U.S. has a choice between either pursuing strict conditionality in Georgia, or close its eyes on the hollowness of Georgian democracy in order not to endanger the stability of Georgian government. This dilemma is difficult to resolve straightforwardly, especially when U.S. foreign policy is undergoing a serious test of international legitimization while desperately needing broad support in its war on terrorism. A senior official of the U.S. administration recently admitted that the U.S. had made the mistake of defining only one political force in the Georgian political spectrum as progressive, and to demonize all others. It later appeared that the progressive camp was rather corrupt. According to the official, the U.S. will not repeat this mistake and its approach to Georgian politicians will be multi-vectoral.

CONCLUSIONS: U.S.-Georgian cooperation has reached a climax. But behind the tactical achievements of the Train-and-Equip Program and the new U.S.-Georgian military agreement, one can trace unsolved strategic dilemmas. If their solution is indefinitely postponed, the effect of the tactical success risks gradually fading away. During the ratification procedure of the U.S.-Georgian agreement, several Georgian MPs simply left the hall. Most of them are known to be a part of a Russian fifth column, but not all of them. A considerable part of Georgian national forces looks to the U.S. with rising suspicion. Today one can notice three main worldviews in the rather diverse Georgian political spectrum: the Democratic, Nationalistic and Oligarchic views. It is doubtful that either of these can be a sufficient ground for a stable statehood in the near future. The task of making an optimal cocktail out of these ingredients falls on Georgian, but also on U.S. politicians, because the rest of the world is either not interested in this problem, lacks the ability to influence it, or is opposed to the very project of Georgian statehood.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. David Darchiashvili is a visiting Fulbright Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. He normally works at the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi, Georgia.