BACKGROUND: Over the past six years, leaders of youth movements and NGOs in post-communist countries – including Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine – have organized massive street protests that have toppled the ruling regimes, normally after flawed elections. Their tactics have been peaceful and creative, including tent encampments, hi-tech communication networks, the use of humor and street art in revolutionary propaganda, and strong identification with meaningful colors or symbols. In 2005, some of these techniques were copied by the leaders of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution. In Kyrgyzstan, a diverse group of opposition leaders sought to employ the successful tactics of previous color revolutions to oust President Kurmanbek Bakiev in early November. This effort was in contrast to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution,’ an unexpected coup in 2005 that started in the south of the country and eventually set the stage for Bakiev’s election. This time, the opposition Movement for Reform set up about 200 tents and a handful of yurts in Bishkek’s central square. The leaders interspersed speeches with musical performances, and distributed food and newspapers to the crowds. Unlike previous color revolutions, which were triggered by dissatisfaction with electoral outcomes, the Kyrgyz opposition was protesting Bakiev’s failure to adopt constitutional reforms aimed at ending the personalization of politics and wealth that had blossomed under former President Askar Akaev. Within the first year of Bakiev’s rule, constitutional reform projects had stalled and people increasingly felt that political and economic power had merely been transferred from A to B – Akaev to Bakiev. Yet soon after the first protests were called, Bakiev showed that he too had learned from the color revolutions. The government pushed back to stifle opposition momentum with three key moves. First, it retained control of the media. It declined requests by opposition leaders for airtime on the state TV station, keeping large portions of the country in the dark about the reform movement and the protests. Electricity for the Bishkek station NTS, owned by one of the most active opposition deputies, was severed, and foreign access to Kyrgyz news services was blocked. Second, the government attempted to discredit the opposition. It declared the new Constituent Assembly, formed by opposition deputies to push through a new constitution, an illegitimate power grab. The government also mobilized its own base of popular support, setting up yurts a few blocks from the opposition protests, sending its own employees to the square to bulk up the crowds, and using its network of appointed university deans and governors to release students from universities and organize regional protests in support of the government. As with the opposition protests, rumors swirled that people were paid to join the pro-government camp. IMPLICATIONS: In addition to these steps, the government sought help and legitimacy from like-minded neighbors. On Tuesday, November 7, Bakiev made phone calls to the heads of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, all notably countries that have not experienced color revolutions and countries that strengthened relations with Kyrgyzstan since Bakiev’s accession to power. It is no coincidence that on the same day, as small clashes broke out between opposition and pro-government protesters, tanks rolled into the square and security forces – which had been mobilized in the capital well in advance of the protests – fired tear gas to scatter opposition protesters. Just one day later, a compromise constitution was signed and opposition tents were dismantled. The opposition realized that the peaceful tactics of past color revolutions would not work here; continuing protests would compel government retrenchment and violence. Fearing a loss of legitimacy, they accepted a watered-down version of the new constitution, and ceased demands for Bakiev’s resignation. Last week’s events in Kyrgyzstan highlight a broader trend across the post-Soviet region and in other parts of the world: governments are responding to the threat of color revolutions with a range of media, military, and legislative strategies. While such strategies are not necessarily new, they have now been shaped and reinforced by the color revolutions. Additionally, bilateral conversations and meetings, in addition to knowledge and information shared in regional forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have become mechanisms that leaders are using not only to foster political and economical cooperation, but also to fend off “revolutionary waves.” It is unclear whether the revolutionary tools employed by the Kyrgyz opposition could have succeeded toppling the regime. Leaders were constrained by low political activism among the Kyrgyz people, and by a general lack of knowledge about the constitutional reforms. Moreover, protesters supported particular elite businessmen and politicians out of personal loyalty and not necessarily for an ideology or reform. Yet the opposition was also challenged by the government’s anti-revolutionary tactics, which signify more than just an ad hoc response to a local political crisis. This anti-revolutionary toolkit – developed to ensure the political survival of regimes – represents a new reality for “reformers” in Kyrgyzstan and across the post-Communist region. CONCLUSIONS: While the opposition rejoiced over the passage of a new constitution that gives the Parliament more power, it is unclear how much of a victory this really is. The constitution was passed in one evening as a political compromise, and contradictions within the document itself have planted the seeds for future debate and conflict. Local analysts and scholars alike do not even have a copy of the ‘official’ constitution, and interpretations of existing versions suggest that presidential powers remain strong. Perhaps more importantly, much of political life in Kyrgyzstan revolves around informal political arrangements and economic networks that exist outside the realm of formal structures. Whether or not the recent changes will lead to tangible improvements in political access and transparency, and economic growth and poverty reduction, remains to be seen and seems more a matter of political will than constitutional reform. AUTHOR’S BIO: Regine A. Spector is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science and a Research Fellow at the New Era Foreign Policy Center at the University of California, Berkeley. She is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Public Policy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for the month of November.