BACKGROUND:The attention given North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear weapon on October 9 has overshadowed the signing of the long-sought CANWFZ the previous month. On September 8, 2006, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed the CANWFZ at Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakhstan. The signatories timed the ceremony to coincide with the fifteenth anniversary of the closure of the nuclear testing ground there. Before September 1991, the USSR had conducted almost 500 nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk. The government of Uzbekistan first proposed a CANWFZ in 1993. Formal drafting of the treaty began after the five Central Asian presidents endorsed the proposal at a February 1997 summit in Almaty. In February 2005, their negotiators finalized the language of the text and its attached protocol. The CANWFZ agreement consists of a preamble and 18 articles. In accordance with Article 3, the signatories pledge not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise try to acquire a nuclear explosive device. They also agree not to allow other parties to conduct such activities on their territories—which cover more than 3.8 million square kilometers—or assist them to do so elsewhere. The content of the Protocol resembles that found in other NWFZs. It provides a means for the five countries defined under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon states (the so-called “P-5” of Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) to pledge to respect the CANWFZ by not stationing or testing nuclear weapons in the zone. It also contains the standard clause in which the P-5 guarantee the CANWFZ signatories that they will not attack them, or threaten to attack them, with nuclear weapons. Governments consider these so-called negative security assurances a major benefit of joining a NWFZ. From the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation, the CANWFZ stands as a landmark development for several reasons. First, the Treaty established the world’s fifth NWFZ solely in the Northern Hemisphere, which contains the preponderance of nuclear weapons states. Its geographic coverage also resulted in the first multilateral security agreement to embrace all five Central Asian countries—an important accomplishment because of Turkmenistan’s traditional aloofness from such initiatives. Second, Kazakhstan is the first former nuclear weapon state to adhere to a NWFZ. By some accounts, it inherited the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal—consisting of over 1,400 nuclear warheads deployed on heavy bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles—when the USSR disintegrated in 1991. During the next few years, Kazakhstan worked with the international community to eliminate this unwelcome Soviet legacy. Since then, Kazakh leaders have taken a strong position in favor of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Third, the United Nations, including the General Assembly and members of the UN Secretariat, directly participated in drafting the CANWFZ Treaty’s provisions. The Central Asian governments made a deliberate effort to ensure that the Treaty conforms to the principles and guidelines on establishing NWFZs adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999. All existing NWFZs were negotiated before the drafting of these provisions. Fourth, the Semipalatinsk Treaty represents the first NWFZ to contain a provision recognizing the environmental damage associated with nuclear weapons production. Under Article 6, its members pledge to support rehabilitation of areas damaged by past nuclear tests and other Soviet-era nuclear activities on their territories. The Central Asian governments also agree to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear weapons tests, as contributing to environmental and nonproliferation goals. Fifth, the CANWFZ participants must allow for comprehensive supervision of their peaceful nuclear materials and activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Article 8 explicitly requires treaty signatories to adopt the so-called Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA enhanced inspection rights at members’ civilian nuclear facilities. In recent years, the United States, Russia, and other governments have sought to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to counter nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by encouraging all countries to adhere to the Additional Protocol. The Treaty signatories also pledge to meet IAEA-approved international standards for the physical protection of their nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. IMPLICATIONS: The last unique feature of the Semipalatinsk Treaty is that the CANWFZ borders two declared nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia. Accommodating these two countries’ security requirements has complicated the initiative. Not only did Central Asian governments need years to reach their own consensus on these issues, but Western governments objected to the resulting compromises. Whereas China and Russia have pledged to support the CANWFZ, France, Great Britain, and the United States have declined to sign the Protocol until the Treaty signatories address their objections. Three features of the CANWFZ trouble the American, British, and French governments. First, they complain that, rather than absolutely prohibiting the transit of nuclear weapons through the CANWFZ, Article 4 of the Treaty allows each signatory to decide independently whether to allow such transit. Thus far, only the government of Turkmenistan has unilaterally banned the movement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction through its territory. The other CANFWZ signatories have refused to exclude the possible transit of foreign vehicles across their borders—including the landing of nuclear-armed warplanes or visits by warships carrying nuclear weapons. Second, American, British, and French officials cite the absence of a Treaty provision excluding other countries from later joining the CANWFZ. (An earlier draft text explicitly provided for possible expansion.) The fear is that Iran, which borders Turkmenistan, might eventually sign the CANWFZ to bolster claims that its nuclear program is motivated entirely by peaceful purposes. Western officials widely suspect that Tehran aspires to develop the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The government of Mongolia, which declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone as early as 1992, has also expressed interest in joining the Treaty. Although none of the existing nuclear weapons states have objected to its membership, the CANWFZ signatories have indicated they do not consider Mongolia, which does not share a border with any CANWFZ party, as falling within the treaty’s intended geographic scope. Finally, the American, British, and French governments express unease with Article 12 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, which affirms the continued validity of existing international agreements. In particular, these governments about the continuing role of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed in Tashkent in 1992. Under Article 4 of the CST, members pledge to render each other “all necessary assistance, including military assistance” in case of external aggression. Four of the five CANWFZ signatories (Turkmenistan being the sole exception) still adhere to the CST, which underpins the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In the past, Russian military officials have made statements suggesting that their CSTO allies—which include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—could fall under the umbrella of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. American, British, and French officials believe that these CST/CSTO provisions call into question the establishment of an effective NWFZ in Central Asia. CONCLUSIONS:At the urging of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, negotiations over the Protocol continue. These discussions involving the CANWFZ signatories and the P-5 could be protracted. Resolving disputes over the protocols attached to other NWFZs has sometimes taken years. Although no country currently appears prepared to deploy or use nuclear weapons in Central Asia, the recent North Korean detonation underscores the urgency of taking measures now to bolster the fraying nuclear nonproliferation regime. AUTHOR’S BIO:Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.