BACKGROUND: As no elections are scheduled either in Armenia or Azerbaijan in 2006, the OSCE and its Chairman-in-Office, Belgium, considered that it would be politically feasible to reach a breakthrough in a resolution to the long-standing Karabakh conflict. The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan discussed a one-page document listing basic principles for a settlement of the conflict at the February summit in Rambouillet, France, but failed to reach an agreement on two of nine principles. The Presidents met once more in June in Bucharest on the margins of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation and again no progress was registered. These failures were followed by an interview of the US Co-Chair Matthew Bryza to Radio Liberty, where he essentially confirmed information about the framework agreement leaked by officials in Baku and Yerevan over the past year, but refused to reveal the stumbling blocs. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have criticized Bryza’s disclosure. Reacting to speculations about the basic principles for a settlement of the conflict, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs on 3 July issued a statement revealing more details about the “fair, balanced and workable core principles that could pave the way for the two sides to draft a far-reaching settlement agenda.” The principles are based on the redeployment of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories around Mountainous Karabakh, with special modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin districts (including a corridor between Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh), demilitarization of these territories, and a referendum or population vote – at a date and in a manner to be decided through further negotiations – to determine the final legal status of Mountainous Karabakh. The parties would renounce the use or threat of use of force, and international and bilateral security guarantees and assurances would be put in place. The deployment of an international peacekeeping force and a joint commission for implementation of the agreement would be established and international assistance would be made available for de-mining, reconstruction, and resettlement of internally displaced persons in the formerly occupied territories and the war-affected regions of Mountainous Karabakh.

IMPLICATIONS: The failure of the presidential summits in Rambouillet and Bucharest was yet another blow to the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and to Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict, to mediate the conflict. Though the basic principles are a step forward, the disagreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue, with Azerbaijan insisting on the principle of territorial integrity, while Armenians stress the right to self-determination. The devil is in the detail: for as long as it will not be clear who should participate in the referendum on self-determination and when it should be held (according to available information “at least a decade” after the liberation of most occupied territories around Karabakh), there is a large space for speculation. To further complicate matters, both parties continue to cater uncompromising statements for their domestic constituencies, hampering acceptance of a painful compromise. Already after the failure of the February summit, Azerbaijan threatened to “reconsider the negotiation course and view other options” and Armenia threatened to consider recognizing Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan is increasingly critical of Ambassador Kasprzyk and the OSCE Minsk group, signaling its growing unhappiness over the lack of progress in negotiations. Kasprzyk’s report on fires affecting the areas close to the line of contact issued on 10 July has triggered a wave of criticism. Baku expressed discontent at the fact that the OSCE team failed to identify those responsible for starting the fires and limited itself to statements that fires are a usual phenomenon in the region at this time of year, though the situation is likely to have been exacerbated this year by extreme heat and strong winds. Azerbaijan used the issue of fires for bringing Karabakh back to the UN agenda and on 8 September, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the UN to urgently assist in preventing environmental damage from fires in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and organize a mission to the region to assess the short-term and long-term impact of the fires. Armenia disassociated itself from the resolution – though it supported its content, it has serious problems with its title and continues to oppose bringing any Karabakh issue to the UN. As a result, there will be an OSCE-led multi-national expert mission with experts from the OSCE, the UN Environmental Program and other agencies, dispatched to the region later this year. In addition to the UN, Karabakh’s profile is rising at the Council of Europe, and may be featured at the autumn session of its Parliamentary Assembly. Also, the EU is finally coming up with a coherent policy for the Caucasus and there are cautious talks about the possibility of EU peacekeeping operation for Karabakh, should an agreement be signed. By revealing key principles and shedding some light on the negotiations, the Co-Chairs attempt to stir discussion about the peace prospects in the region and to step back from the process and give full responsibility for progress or lack thereof to the parties. As the US Co-Chair Bryza put it, “[the Co-Chairs] have exerted all of the creativity and all the negotiation energy they could… [The Presidents] have to decide whether [they] want it or not… So we are saying OK, it’s yours now.” The latest information about the negotiations also suggests that Armenia is departing from its earlier position “first status, than land back” and increasingly considering a step-by-step approach, with local Armenian forces first retreating from the occupied territories and the final status of Mountainous Karabakh being decided through a referendum at a later point.

CONCLUSIONS:The secret negotiations have so far not recorded any meaningful progress, yet the May 1994 cease-fire continues to be in place and that alone is a testimony to the work of the OSCE. The key obstacle to peace is deep mutual distrust. Over the past decade, both sides repeatedly cited the lack of domestic support for a painful compromise as a reason to keep the negotiations secret. Meanwhile, however, none of the parties engaged in a meaningful domestic discussion about the positive implications of a possible peace agreement and as a result, the domestic constituencies continue to be unprepared for a compromise. There seem to be a subtle change in the Armenian position, which is likely to be a reflection of the changing power balance in the region. Despite Armenia’s economic growth and strong rhetoric, Armenia is well aware that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the late 2006 launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Eruzrum gas pipeline together with the planned construction of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railroad will contribute to the booming economic growth of Azerbaijan. Military spending in Azerbaijan is increasing rapidly and with it Baku’s leverage at the negotiation table. Yet Armenia rightly points out that Azerbaijani military action would have far reaching international negative implications for Azerbaijan, and that Azerbaijan underestimates the defensibility of Nagorno Karabakh. The negotiations will continue under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan are scheduled to meet on 25 and 26 September in the United Nations in New York to prepare for a meeting of the two presidents, which is likely to take place on 15 and 16 October at the margins of the CIS summit in Minsk, Belarus. But it remains to be seen whether the Presidents will be able to bridge their positions.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Blanka Hancilova, Phd, specializes in international development. The article reflects the opinion of the author only.