Wednesday, 20 September 2006

THE ARMISTICE IN WANA: WILL IT LAST?

Published in Analytical Articles

By Rizwan Zeb (9/20/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Since September 11, 2001 and the American attacks on Afghanistan, many have claimed that Pakistan’s Tribal areas, and especially Waziristan, right across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, is a readily available hideout for Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Since the beginning of the on-going war against terror, Pakistan is a frontline state and a major U.S.
BACKGROUND: Since September 11, 2001 and the American attacks on Afghanistan, many have claimed that Pakistan’s Tribal areas, and especially Waziristan, right across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, is a readily available hideout for Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Since the beginning of the on-going war against terror, Pakistan is a frontline state and a major U.S. ally. Pakistan has to date arrested more than 700 members of Al-Qaeda and killed a further 850 of them. Pakistan’s security forces, meanwhile, have suffered a life-loss of 350-400 personnel, with injuries to another 760 in this war. This is a clear indication of its resolve to continue its fight against terrorism. The recent truce between the Utmanzai tribal elders and the administration on September 6, 2006 is perhaps the most significant development. According to the details the main features of the agreement are: No attacks will be launched against law-enforcement agencies, armed forces and government installations. No parallel administration will be set up in North Waziristan. The writ of the Pakistani government will be accepted, which may sound obvious but which is a novelty in the semi-independent tribal areas. Further, nobody will enter Afghanistan’s territory to fight Afghan and NATO troops, whereas travel to Afghanistan as per laws and traditions will be allowed. Moreover, all foreigners will leave, those who can not will be allowed to stay provided they live peacefully and strictly abide by the law and the terms of this agreement. The administration on its part agreed to dismantle several newly built checkpoints. It also agreed that local troops, such as Khassadars and Levies, would man the old check posts. Privileges and benefits allowed to the tribes in the past would be restored, and those people who suffered from this operation as collateral damage would be compensated. Both sides also decided to establish a ten member body encompassing the administration and tribal representatives, which will oversee and make sure that the agreement is implemented. Further, it was also decided that action will be taken against any violator of this agreement. Regardless of what the cynics say, Islamabad before going ahead with the deal consulted with its allies in the war against terror: the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Afghanistan and all are on board, as pointed out by the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, General Ali Jan Orakzai. He also added that if the truce works, it can be extended to Afghanistan. In fact President Bush himself in an interview with the ABC News said that (this deal) does not give “safe haven” to terrorists who may be hiding on tribal lands near the Pakistani-Afghan border, … “I don’t read it that way,” adding “What he is doing is entering agreements with governors in the regions of the country, in the hopes that there would be an economic vitality, there will be alternatives to violence and terror.” British State Minister Kim Howells, while addressing a press conference in Peshawar, termed the deal as a future” model” for insurgency-ridden Afghanistan. People in the area have also expressed their relief by welcoming the deal. However, the deal has its strong critics who see this as Islamabad backing off from the war effort, and having finally given up to the Taliban. This is might be music to certain ears but it is far from truth.

IMPLICATIONS: The views on the pros and cons of this accord are highly divided both in Pakistan and abroad. The critics of the deal are of the view that this provides no guarantee that the Taliban will refrain from attacking. Apparently this might sound reasonable, however if attacks will not stop, the accord will be broken and the government forces will take action. What this view is missing is that this accord nullifies the argument of those fighting the Pakistani forces that they are doing so because of their religious obligation. This turned out to be just another conflict over colliding interests, which can be solved through addressing the grievances and using non-military ways. Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, who is a part of the religious political alliance MMA, played a significant role, which is an additional indication that the MMA is primarily a political alliance. A number of observers have pointed out that Islamabad had made this deal because its military action in the region has failed as it suffered heavy casualties during the operation. If this is the case, what has compelled the fighters to agree to the terms and conditions of this accord? If media reports coming from the area are to be believed, there are signs that these so-called mujahideen are facing some problems of their own. According to these reports, the support and sympathy of the locals enjoyed by these foreigners is weakening. It has been reported that Maulana Sadiq Noor (Abu Talha) and Commander Gul Bahadur have asked the foreigners to leave the area. Recently a clash took place between a few local youngsters and a group of foreigners resulting in the death of two Uzbeks. Therefore it would not be correct to say that it is only Islamabad who was facing problems in the region. Governments in the past neglected the Tribal Areas, one the excuse of allowing locals to preserve traditions. The areas suffer from many problems of governance and most parts lack even basic necessities of life, such as clean water, hospitals, and schools. This situation, coupled with the rise of jihadist elements in the region, has added to the problems. However, Islamabad has to consider a number of factors while dealing with them. It has tried the military option along with development projects but has reassessed its position. It now believes it can do better through halting the military operations and focus more on the development aspect. The sole use of military force does not solve the problem of local hostility to the government, as the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest. It has been very rightly pointed out that peace does not flow from killing fields. Killing fields accentuate existing fault lines. Convictions and causes survive the destruction of people and structures. Causes are strengthened by those who die for them. Therefore it is imperative that the factors which add to hostility must be eliminated. Winning the hearts and minds of the people through providing them with basic necessities of life is a crucial aspect of solving the longer-term problem. This accord will provide the circumstances in which Islamabad can focus more on the development of the area, and eliminating the reasons which lead to such tendencies. By signing this accord, Islamabad has not abandoned its struggle against terrorism; in fact it has taken the next step. Foreign Office spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam stressed that this accord underlines Pakistan’s long-term commitment to ensuring that peace prevail in the area, adding that “a comprehensive strategy was urgently needed to counter terrorism since military action alone had proved ineffective. “We need a long-term strategy to address political disputes, [the] sense of alienation, [the] removal of grievances, and depravation of socio-economic issues.” President Pervez Musharraf was very clear in his commitment with the alliance against terror when he ruled out any possibility of a “patch-up” with “fighting Taliban” and that “there has been no agreement with the Taliban nor will there be any with them in the future.”

CONCLUSIONS:Islamabad’s will and resolve to eliminate terrorists from its soil appears to remain strong. The Tribal Areas, however, are a problematic region. They have been semi-independent since the British times – indeed, neither British India nor the Pakistani state ever extended their full jurisdiction over these territories. Governments in the past neglected the areas, claiming that they are preserving traditions. The area suffers from many problems of governance and most parts of it lack even basic necessities of life, such as clean water, hospitals, education etc. This accord will provide Islamabad with the opportunity to do exactly this. It remains to be seen whether the government takes advantage of this opportunity.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Rizwan Zeb is Senior Research Analyst at the Islamabad based Institute of Regional Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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