Wednesday, 23 August 2006

COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER HOSTAGE-TAKING IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Cerwyn Moore (8/23/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: News of the surrender of Imam Shamil, the Dagestani leader of Islamic resistance to Russian imperial policies in the North Caucasus, was greeted with celebrations across Russia. His capture, on August 25, 1859, was welcomed with firework displays in a number of provincial towns outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
BACKGROUND: News of the surrender of Imam Shamil, the Dagestani leader of Islamic resistance to Russian imperial policies in the North Caucasus, was greeted with celebrations across Russia. His capture, on August 25, 1859, was welcomed with firework displays in a number of provincial towns outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. On a number of occasions prior to his surrender in 1859, Imam Shamil had been surrounded by Russian forces. In 1839 Shamil and his murids were encircled by Russian forces at the aul of Akhulgo in Dagestan. After fierce resistance, which led to the death of hundreds of Russian soldiers, the siege of the aul came to a stalemate. Shamil and his murids, along with dozens of families were trapped, starving as a result of the Russian siege. Russian forces sought a bargaining chip from Shamil, as a way to open further discussions about his surrender. Historians suggest that guarantees were brokered by both sides before Shamil agreed to hand over his son, Jamal al-Din. However, Russian forces reneged upon this agreement, sending Shamil’s son to St Petersburg whilst simultaneously unleashing a barrage of artillery on the aul. The following evening Shamil and his followers slipped through the Russian lines using the cover of darkness. Over ten years later in a bid to gain leverage with the Russian authorities, Shamil and a group of fighters descended on the house of Princess Anna in nearby Georgia. This type of raid, known as a nabeg in Chechnya, was commonplace in the North Caucasus. The primary role, however, was to gain leverage over other auls. In contrast, the raid on Princess Anna’s estate was designed with a political motive in mind. Princess Anna was a former confidante of the Tsar’s wife, and one of the largest landowners in Georgia, and Shamil sought to kidnap her as a way to bargain with the Russians for the release of his son. The kidnapping of the Princess also captured Russia’s imagination, securing international renown for Imam Shamil, and indicating how such tactics could lead to international coverage. Hostage-taking, then, has historical precedents when considering the North Caucasus today. But, this historical example is important precisely because it demonstrates how the culture of hostage-taking became politicised. Still further, this not only demonstrates how hostage-taking became politicised, but also how it became directed towards outsiders rather than auls. Added to this, of course, was the targeted nature of Shamil’s ‘counter hostage-taking’ which has, since 2003, become commonplace. But what are the implications of the more recent use of ‘counter-hostage-taking’, and does it signal a transformation in the resistance to Russian rule in the North Caucasus?

IMPLICATIONS: In a recently published obituary, it was pointed out that the wife and child of Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev had been kidnapped by pro-Kremlin Kadyrov groups. Over the last two years, similar reports have also emerged which highlight how this tactic has been adopted by pro-Kremlin Chechen groups. Although subsequently released, the relatives of the then Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov were arrested, while relatives of Dokku Umarov and Shamil Basayev remain in custody. Over the last three years this tactic has gained pace. Although not a policy, one newspaper, published in 2005, noted that the “relatives of separatist commanders were being arrested en masse”. Amongst other implications, this tactic of ‘counter hostage-taking’ brings the continued violence in the region into focus. First, this tactic results from the transfer of power from Russian authorities to pro-Kremlin Chechen groups. In 2003, the interim Chechen administration, under the stewardship Akhmad Kadyrov, sought to develop strategies to undermine the ongoing resistance. At the same time, as activists and reporters have noted, a significant number of amnestied fighters began to become incorporated into pro-Kremlin militias. These groups had intimate knowledge of family and clan connections and the whereabouts of relatives of separatist fighters. To this end, local knowledge was exploited by the pro-Kremlin Chechens as part of a broader Russian policy of ‘normalization’ in the republic. As some reports by the Russian human rights group Memorial indicate, zachistka or ‘cleansing’ operations coordinated by the Kadyrovtsi have targeted villages and particular regions. Since 2003 this has led to a divide in the normal bonds of Chechen society, as Chechen-on-Chechen violence increased. Thus, targeted ‘counter hostage-taking’ provides an individualized corollary to this tactic, providing evidence of a further stage of internecine violence in Chechnya. Second, ‘counter hostage-taking’ has also been discussed by speakers of the Russian Duma, as an appropriate policy to deal with the continued threat. One Chechen source noted that the tactic of ‘counter hostage-taking’ had been devised ‘in the hope of forcing them to give up their struggle’. Far from being condemned by politicians in the Kremlin, the policy has lead to a public debate. Vladimir Ustinov sought legislative support for the policy of ‘counter hostage-taking’. When Ustinov addressed the Russian parliament on this issue, he said that “detaining a terrorist’s relatives during a terrorist attack would undoubtedly help us save lives”. The issue was, in part, raised as a reaction to the events in Beslan, with Ustinov placing the tactic in the same category as ‘pre-emptive policies’. In contrast, human rights groups such as Memorial and Human Rights Watch place the strategy as ‘part of a pattern of Kremlin-backed Chechen forces targeting the relatives of known separatists’. As statements by Chechen rebels indicate, this tactic may, then, have led to a further radicalization of elements in the Chechen separatist ranks, pushing the separatist movement further underground.

CONCLUSIONS: The issue of ‘counter hostage-taking’ has been largely ignored in the West. And this creates an environment in which the Chechen issue can be interwoven into the broader anti-terrorist policies related to the ‘war on terror’. Whether ‘counter hostage-taking’ is an explicitly designed policy or a more reactive tactic, resulting from events such as the Dubrovka hostage taking in Moscow or the Beslan tragedy, remains unclear. However, it does seem to reflect a broader tendency to use such tactics, including ‘extraordinary rendition’, by leading powers after 9/11. As the case of Imam Shamil demonstrates, ‘counter hostage-taking’ has historical precedents. This tactic has undoubtedly played a role in the radicalization of the Chechen resistance. These attempts to exert pressure on the Chechen rebels also serve to widen the divide between the pro-Kremlin Chechen groups and the myriad of associations and organizations now involved in resisting Russian forces. Much like the U.S.-led policy of ‘extraordinary rendition’, the facilitation of ‘counter hostage-taking’ by pro-Kremlin Chechens has been justified by the wider discourse of the ‘war on terror’. Whereas the U.S. policy reflects a global shift after 9/11, in the Chechen case the tactic of ‘counter hostage-taking’ is localized, simultaneously reflecting a long-standing conflict and a transformation in the nature of violence, marking a period of Chechen-on-Chechen violence, further radicalization, and a shift away from earlier examples of Russo-Chechen war.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Cerwyn Moore is a Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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