Wednesday, 23 August 2006

THE LONDON TERROR PLAN’S PAKISTANI-AFGHAN CONNECTION

Published in Analytical Articles

By Naveed Ahmad (8/23/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: The alleged involvement of British youth of Pakistani origin echoes once again. It was only a year ago that British officials traced the alleged Pakistani connection in the July 7 bombing, claiming that at least one of the suspects was radicalized and trained in a local madrasa. This time the connection seems deeper and far more elaborate.
BACKGROUND: The alleged involvement of British youth of Pakistani origin echoes once again. It was only a year ago that British officials traced the alleged Pakistani connection in the July 7 bombing, claiming that at least one of the suspects was radicalized and trained in a local madrasa. This time the connection seems deeper and far more elaborate. The anti-terror camp widely believes that Mati-ur-Rehman – the most wanted man in Pakistan with expertise in explosives – was the mentor of suspects including Pakistani-origin key British suspect, Rashid Rauf. The 29-year-old suspect, who was arrested from Bahawalpur, was a close associate and relative of Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of the banned radical outfit Jasih-e-Mohammed. Rashid’s younger brother Tayyab Rauf was picked up in Birmingham on the basis of information received from Rashid. The Raufs hail from a sleepy village in the Mirpur district of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Of 745,000 people of Pakistani-origin Britons, a considerable number hails from this unique district of Kashmir. The Kashmiri community in Britain has not fully assimilated with the local culture and rather became more tribal as well as more conservative than it would be in its ancestral home. The British Kashmiris, in particular, import bridegrooms for their daughters from Mirpur or adjoining districts. British Airways even maintains an office in Mirpur to deal with this sizeable clientele as well as handle cargo containers. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Kashmiri people as well as the Pakistani establishment chose to opt for a militant path for resolving the lingering dispute. With Musharraf in the saddle, official support to militants has faded away. However, the deepened connection of the Kashmiri freedom fighters with Afghanistan-based groups is only getting stronger. The fruitless character of talks on Kashmir further fuel the anger of the Kashmiris youth. Moreover, the mosques in Bradford, Manchester, Birmingham and London are led by semi-literate imams imported from Pakistan or other South Asian Muslim communities, who have little exposure to European societies and culture. Despite their British postal addresses, the imams’ worldview remains as narrow as it was back home. Another widely debated factor in Europe’s Muslim community is their financial and social standing. In continental Britain, the Muslim communities normally live in huge clusters instead of moving to a cosmopolitan neighborhood. They fancy the wealth of the Christian west but are taught to strictly follow Islam and adopt the culture of their Asian forefathers. Youth brought up in self-imposed isolation coupled with economic backwardness and a growingly reactionary mindset is naturally more prone to be recruited by missionaries with a violent agenda. The ‘baby terrorists’ of Britain surf the Internet extensively and learn the tactics from Afghan jihad veterans such as Mati-ur-Rahman and Masood Azhar. On the other hand, the scattered, well-educated and relatively affluent Muslim community in America and Canada is considered less prone to breed anger, radicalization and militarization. Unlike Europe, the U.S. as well as Canada offer better economic opportunities and greater religious freedom.

IMPLICATIONS: Analysts in Pakistan as well as in Britain see the London Terror Plot as the second episode of the July 7, 2005, bombings. The available details suffice to prove that the suspects have learnt a lot since those bombings. In the case of the London Terror Plot, the Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda connection seems more elaborate and visible. Analysts believe the new recruits being probed in Britain as well as in Pakistan lack the confidence and skill of their 9/11 colleagues. Since the July 7 incidents, young enthusiasts have been learning how to use weapons, make bombs and remain upbeat about the mission regardless of the strength of the enemy. Those who tried to hit the London subways two weeks after the July 7 bombers last summer were unable to build bombs that detonated. The recent arrests were made possible due to the suspects’ hasty moves to carry out a dry run of the plan in the run up to their eventual plan coinciding with the fifth anniversary of 9/11. This time, the suspects were trying something different. Instead of live explosives, they chose to go for liquid bombs. The history of liquid bombs dates back to 1987, when two North Koreans successfully brought down a South Korean airliner near the Vietnam-Burma border. Again in 1994, Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed drew up a plan to bomb a dozen U.S.-bound planes over the Pacific during a 12-hour period in an operation codenamed Bojinka. The plan was thwarted before it could be executed. Evidence suggests that the London Terror Plan enthusiasts were allegedly moving ahead with Ramzi’s sophistication and precision but were far from executing their plans. None of the alleged terrorists had actually constructed a bomb. None had bought a plane ticket, and many did not even have passports. The British authorities have already let go one of the 24 suspects while the rest would stand before a jury. In the absence of any travel documents and tickets, the British government may not convince a jury beyond reasonable doubt with evidence more credible than Internet Explorer history files and tapes of vague telephone conversations. Under the British legal system, the men can be held for questioning for up to a month before they must be charged. The legal battle may take its course and time-span but the anger of the disgruntled community is already on the rise. Processions in the streets of London have been repeating the same old message i.e. that British policies fuel radical thinking. At the same time, Pakistan is feeling good after applaud from the west. Dual passport holders, especially from Britain, are likely to be monitored more vigilantly in the days ahead. As a direct implication of recent success, the Pakistani government is tightening the noose around the banned Islamist groups who have already gone underground, or their leaders are opting for political careers. The most dangerous consequence could be renewed planning for revengeful attacks but this time by young Muslims from a larger variety of immigrant nations along with Al-Qaeda backed outfits.

CONCLUSIONS: The key challenge facing the Pakistani authorities has been a strict enforcement of the ban on activities of extremist organizations and taking their leadership to task. Such elements have been happily abandoning their banned outfit only to form a new one with a different name and a surrogate leadership, something Islamabad seeks to address. Islamabad has yet to meet its own set target on reforming and modernizing the madrasas. At the same time, the British authorities seem to lack a plan for mainstreaming its immigrant Muslim population by promptly addressing their complaints of racism and religious discrimination at workplaces as well as in the streets. Since the unveiling of the London Terror Plan, Muslim workers from Middle Eastern as well as South Asian descent have been complaining of reduced job opportunities and greater discrimination. The lingering resolution of the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Israeli offensive against Palestinians are meanwhile likely to continue to fuel anti-western sentiments amongst Muslims, moderates and radicals alike.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist, broadcaster and academic whose work regularly appears in The News International, Monthly Newsline and ISN Security Watch (www.isn.ch). He is also a visiting faculty on South Asian politics and conflict resolution at Iqra University, Islamabad.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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