BACKGROUND: The sparse information percolating out of eastern Uzbekistan leaves little doubt that the encounter between Uzbek security forces and demonstrators in Andijan on May 13 led to a massive loss of life. The number of casualties is in dispute; Tashkent maintains that 173 Uzbeks were killed in the clashes while human rights and Muslim activists place the numbers far higher; one Hizb ut-Tahrir offshoot, 1924.org, claims the wildly inflated figure of 20,000 dead. Nearly everything about the encounters, which began shortly after midnight on 12 May is in dispute, but the catalyst for the clash was the trial of 23 men, which began on February 10. The 23 defendants were members of the Akramiya movement, an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The 23 men, arrested on 23 June 2004, were charged for organizing a criminal organization, undermining the constitutional basis of the republic of Uzbekistan, preparing or distributing documents that contain a threat to public safety, and setting up, leading, and participating in extremist religious organizations. The uprising in Andijan was sparked by an effort to free the men from a local penal facility where they were being held. Shortly before midnight on May 12, armed men attacked a traffic police post, killing four on duty officers and seizing submachine guns, grenades and pistols from the post’s weapons depot. The assailants then moved on and attacked a military base, shot five servicemen and acquired more weaponry. Duly armed, the insurgents in a fifteen-vehicle convoy then moved on the Andijan prison, where between 600 and 2,000 inmates were held. Attacking the facility, the gunmen distributed weapons and liberated nearly a third of the inmates, including the 23 defendants. The militants then moved to downtown Andijan, attacking the buildings of the National Security Council and the regional administration and police department. Repulsed at the two law enforcement sites, the gunmen commandeered the administrative building and took about 20 hostages, and before dawn began calling their relatives to bring women and children to the site to form human shields around the building. The stage was set for an inevitable showdown. Top officials from Tashkent flew to Andijan and attempted to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis. Uzbek Interior Minister Zakir Almatov stated that during negotiations the protesters refused to dilute their demands, one of which was the release of Akram Yuldashev, noting, \"The guerrillas, hiding behind women and children and captured hostages, are not willing to make a compromise to solve the conflict. The representatives of civil society, relatives and interested parts also joined the negotiations.\" By late afternoon, the square outside the administrative building was filling with hundreds of onlookers. The gunmen eventually emerged from the building behind bound hostages in front followed by women and children. Around 5:30 p.m. firing began; it remains unclear who fired the first shot. Thousands of Andijan residents then fled towards the border with Kyrgyzstan, about 25 miles away.

IMPLICATIONS: As the refugees in Kyrgyzstan told their stories, Tashkent found itself in the middle of its worst public relations crisis since independence. Uzbek officials maintained that both Uzbek and foreign militants had carefully planned events in Andijan to provoke a harsh government response that would radicalize the population to confront and possibly overthrow the government. Western governments and human rights organizations deplored the loss of life amid rising calls for an international investigation, which Tashkent rejected on the grounds that an investigation of an internal terrorist incident would compromise national sovereignty. In the absence of substantial hard information Tashkent found itself on the defensive against unsubstantiated claims. Activists charged that more violence occurred in Pakhtabad with hundreds supposedly killed, but have provided no evidence. The Uzbek government maintains that no such incident occurred. The Uzbek government gradually continued to press its interpretation of what happened in Andijan, insisting that it was an armed militant uprising. Four days after the clash, Uzbek Prosecutor-General Rashid Qodirov gave a fuller account of the events, noting, “During the attack [on the police station], the criminals murdered four personnel of the patrol post, [and] four more were seriously wounded. They took 264 firearms, 40 grenades, and more than 8,000 bullets. After that, the same armed band raided the nearby military base and seized a huge amount of weaponry, including 53 machine guns, four rifles, and more than 2,000 bullets, as well as a ZIL-130 truck.” Tashkent’s version of events received support from a number of sources. On May 16, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke of the Andijan unrest as a “Taliban-like provocation,”. Eight days later Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan expressed firm support for Tashkent’s crackdown on the three forces of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. Tashkent also received support from a major Islamic theologian, Chief Imam of Egypt and Sheikh of al-Azhar Muhammad Tantawi. Tashkent also received support from western academics. Professor Shirin Akiner of the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies traveled to Andijan, where over two days she interviewed nearly 40 people, from madrassa students to hospital workers, morgue employees and graveyard wardens. Her conclusions, first aired in the Uzbek media, were that the government’s official statistic of 173 dead was largely accurate. On June 7, Akiner subsequently released an expanded report on her investigation, credibly detailing the same conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS: Although western media coverage has proven to be far below standard, the Andijan violence has already torn a rift in U.S.-Uzbek relations that threatens continued cooperation in the war on terror. Washington hardly speaks with a single voice on the issue, as the State Department’s concern with human rights clashes with the Pentagon’s more pragmatic desire to retain access to its Karsi-Khanabad air base in southern Uzbekistan. The downing of a Chinook helicopter with 17 crew on June 28 in Afghanistan’s Konar province near Asadabad will reinforce Pentagon arguments that a continued presence in Uzbekistan is essential. But the media obfuscation continues on this, as U.S. sources reported that Tashkent had restricted U.S. operations at Khanabad, ostensibly because of dissatisfaction over coverage of Andijan. According to a highly placed source in Tashkent, the reality was far more pragmatic and fiscal; as promised U.S. aid to upgrade Kahanabad’s runway and facilities had not been forthcoming, the base had deteriorated to the point where Uzbek authorities imposed night flight restrictions because of safety concerns. Whatever happens now, it will happen in the media “global village.” If Washington continues to pursue its bifurcated foreign policy, it would seem that the ultimate winners will be Moscow and Beijing, as they have supported Tashkent’s perceptions and actions. In the 21st century “Great Game,” Washington faces a tough choice between its rhetoric and reality. As the proverb puts it, “the dog barks and the caravan moves on.” If Washington is committed to a presence in Central Asia to quash terrorism, it could well do with quieting some of the barking.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. John C.K. Daly is a UPI international correspondent dealing with Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, terrorism and energy issues.