BACKGROUND: The most important element of Putin’s administrative reforms is replacing the election of governors with their appointment. Many analysts appraised this measure positively, especially in the North Caucasus where the level of administrative corruption, including elected officials, is the highest in Russia. However, the results of the reforms prove the contrary. Whereas it matters little to people in Central Russia whether regional leaders are elected or appointed, for the indigenous nations of the North Caucasus elections are a customary institution and an integral part of ordinary life. Real and effective power has, now as in Czarist times, been exercised by informal leaders who were elected in communities of various character and nature. The greater the gap between formal and informal power, the greater the probability of governance collapse. The Kremlin put aside refractory, stubborn but popular leaders, such as Ruslan Aushev in Ingushetia, and banked on obedient but unpopular figures. The net result of this policy is the increasing alienation of the local people from all authorities, be they local or central. Ingushetia is the most vivid example of this development. Security forces general Murat Zyazikov was practically appointed president, as the Kremlin disqualified all real competitors for the election. His appointment was intended to prevent the proliferation of Chechen terrorism in Ingushetia. As a result, preventive ‘mopping-up’ operations against suspicious persons were launched, and in six months from January to June 2004, more than 100 young men disappeared without a trace in the tiny republic, and were apparently either taken to so-called filtration camps or simply killed by Russian soldiers. This occurs against the background of an economic meltdown in Ingushetia. Since Zyazikov’s appointment, Ingushetia has been plagued by increasing unrest, and ethnic Ingush are increasingly involved in armed resistance to Russian authorities. On June 21-22, 2004, in the commemoration day of deportation of Chechens and Ingush people in 1944, virtually all of Ingushetia was seized by gunmen for several hours. The situation in Dagestan is not much better. The republic’s leadership has lost popular support and seems to rely only on Moscow. Dagestan may now compete with Chechnya in numbers of terrorist and sabotage acts, about 70-90 of which occur annually. The most visible forms of resistance to local and Federal authorities are in the form of non-traditional Islam, branded as ‘Wahhabis’ by authorities. Dagestani ‘Wahhabis’ declared a holy war (jihad) against Russia as early as in 1999. All in all, approximately ten different Jamaats are involved in the Dagestani jihad network. About 500 fighters have for several years waged a sabotage and terrorist campaign against law enforcement bodies in Dagestan. While it is unlikely that Chechen and Dagestani gunmen coordinate their activities permanently, they are clearly employing the same slogans of Islamic fundamentalism and fighting a common, Russian enemy. Karachay-Cherkessia’s situation is similarly deteriorating. In autumn 2004, an enraged Karachay crowd briefly captured Kremlin henchman and President Mustafa Batdyev’s residence and demanded his immediate resignation. The Islamic radical movement is exceptionally strong in the republic. Official statistics provided by the Ministry of Interior show that 219 ‘Wahhabis’ have been placed under permanent surveillance although no formal charges can be brought against them. Informed experts assess the real number of radical Islamists to ca. 1,500-2,000, increasing unabatedly due to an influx of young people who prefer to join armed groups of new jamaats in the absence of other social prospects. Kabardino-Balkaria, finally, has been one of the most stable republics of the region. But presently, news from the republic resembles summaries from war reporting. Special military operations are carried out in its capital, Nalchik. on a regular basis. In the course of such operations, tanks are employed to evict groups of armed Wahhabis from multi-storey apartment buildings. Official statistics of Kabardino-Balkaria’s Ministry of Interior estimate about 400 ‘Wahhabis’ and their aides in the republic.

IMPLICATIONS: Attempts to impose unified regional laws is a component of Putin’s administrative reform. Pursuant to the Federal law “On general principles of local self-government organization in the Russian Federation” all basic, grassroots local self-government bodies are to define their boundaries promptly. Attempts to implement the law in the North Caucasus immediately brought about numerous ethnic conflicts. Disputes around the creation of an Abazin municipal entity in Kubina aul and a Nogai municipal entity in Adyghe-Khable flared up. The Balkars decisively protest against the regional law on municipal boundaries in Kabardino-Balkaria. Old conflicts manifest themselves even in Adygea which until recently used to be the most quiet republic of the region. In this case, the principal irritant has become another idea launched within the framework of administrative reform: the enlargement of regions by way of merging Russian territories with national republics. The Russian population of Adygea, comprising nearly 70% of the total population, supports unification with the Krasnodar region while Adygeans are categorically against this transformation. The protests of the Adygeans are increasingly receiving the support of radical Islamic organizations of the Wahhabi vein. According to some data, up to 300 Wahhabi supporters exist in Adygea, and the number of adherents of the doctrine is increasing as state power and the traditional clergy’s authority is declining. In all times and in all countries, increased loyalty on the part of ethnic elites can and has been achieved through the expansion of these elites’ participation in state affairs. In the 1990s, the Russian government pursued this policy and in fact succeeded. The political activity of ethnic elites declined in most regions, with the important exception of war-torn Chechnya. Today, a revival of political activity among ethnic elites is taking place alongside a rising tide of popular dissatisfaction with the authoritarian policies of the Kremlin. A ethnic elite estranged from the power is able to use such popular discontent and to invest in ethnic-religious terms. By doing so, the ethnic elite could achieve an intensity of popular resistance that no army can overcome. Speaking of Russian realities, it must be noted that the Russian army has lost the function of containing separatist tendencies long ago. The people fear the military when it is in the barracks, but he military’s record of waging war for a good ten years and doing so unsuccessfully undermines its ability to deter anyone.

CONCLUSIONS: The political situation in the North Caucasus republics are characterized by a number of features. The first is that regional and, more recently, federal powers are experiencing an unprecedented crisis of trust among the local people. Second, against this background, parallel structures of power in the form of Islamic jamaats are rapidly developing. These parallel structures are not necessarily prone to terrorist methods or radical fundamentalism, but they create a social space within which Russian legal norms are virtually ineffective. Third, the inability of the state to enforce its own laws implies a loss of control over territory, even if few in the region speak of outright secession. The emergence of three fronts (Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani) of armed resistance to the Federal powers as well as occasional armed attacks of Islamic radicals against Federal authorities in other republics of the North Caucasus create an entirely new situation, widely different from only 2-3 years ago, when Chechnya was the only focal point of the armed resistance to the Federal power.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Emil Pain is Director of the Center of Ethnopolitical Studies in Moscow.