A PROFILE OF CHECHEN STRONGMAN ADAM DELIMKHANOV
By Kevin Daniel Leahy (6/26/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)
At half-time during a recent Russian Football Premier League tie between Terek Grozny and CSKA Moscow, the game’s referee was confronted by an especially zealous Terek fan who upbraided the official on the calibre of his first half performance, allegedly threatening him with unspecified repercussions unless his second half performance proved more agreeable. According to Novaya Gazeta, the “fan” in question was none other than Adam Delimkhanov, Chechnya’s representative to the Russian State Duma and a close associate of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow President, Ramzan Kadyrov. This unseemly confrontation in the bowels of Grozny’s main sports stadium belies, or perhaps explains, the undoubted influence Delimkhanov exercises within Chechnya’s pro-Moscow political theatre.
BEYOND GEORGIA: RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN EURASIA
By Mamuka Tsereteli (6/11/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)
With its continued policy of intimidation and military provocation toward Georgia, Moscow is seeking to prevent Georgia’s integration into transatlantic security structures. Russia also wants to achieve a much greater geostrategic objective: to close the strategic access route to the heartland of the Eurasian continent for Western interests. The ports and railroad systems of the South Caucasus, as well as an air corridor through the region, provide a vital supply link for NATO and allied forces in Central Eurasia, including in Afghanistan.
CASPIAN ENERGY GAME HEATS UP
By Richard Weitz (6/11/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Last month, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov became the first Turkmen president to visit Azerbaijan since his deceased predecessor, Saparmurad Niyazov, traveled there in 1996. Any reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would be doubly important from the perspective of world energy markets. First, the two countries possess extensive oil and gas reserves within their territories.
RUSSIA AND THE GEORGIAN CRISIS: WHAT DOES MOSCOW WANT?
By Stephen Blank (6/11/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The Russian-initiated crisis against Georgia exemplifies the paradigm of coercive diplomacy. Ironically occurring after earlier statements at the beginning of 2008 that indicated that Moscow wanted a kind of détente in its relations with Tbilisi, it has both stirred up the likelihood of a conflict with Georgia and shown a reversion of Russian diplomacy back to the kind of pretexts for the use of force that Hitler and Stalin habitually employed in their wars.
BACKGROUND: The two triggers for this crisis were first the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in the face of Russian objections and threats that this would destabilize the situation in the Caucasus, and second, the intention to award Georgia and Ukraine membership Action Plans (MAPs) for NATO.
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