By Huseyn Aliyev (09/03/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The recent change of leadership in the North Caucasus’ Islamist insurgency – the Caucasus Emirate – after Doku Umarov’s death appears to have weakened the insurgents’ ability to launch an effective spring/summer offensive on the ground. Recent reports on the number of conflict-related deaths in the region suggest that since the end of Umarov’s leadership, the Caucasus Emirate is more fragmented and militarily weaker than ever. Amidst the failures of the insurgents to successfully target government forces and the controversial claims by the new leader of the Caucasus Emirate to refrain from suicide bombings and attacks on civilians, local jama’ats (insurgent groups) began re-grouping and posing a challenge to the Emirate’s central leadership.
By Armen Grigoryan (08/14/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)
After the recent clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, Russia’s leadership attempts to act more decisively in order to compromise the OSCE Minsk Group mediation efforts and to compel Armenia and Azerbaijan to accept Russia’s special role in the region. Russia’s proximity and strong influence over political elites and societies gives it an advantage over other Minsk Group co-chairs – the U.S. and France. However, the lack of security guarantees and economic perspectives may induce Armenia to start reviewing its attitudes concerning relations with different international actors and regional integration frameworks.
By Valeriy Dzutsev (08/14/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Against the backdrop of the events in Ukraine, Moscow appears to take steps toward quietly incorporating the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia into Russia. The republican authorities announced that plans were under way for South Ossetia and Russia to establish a unified customs checkpoint at the border between the two countries. Russia is on a collision course with Georgia over the South Caucasian country’s recent signing of an Association Agreement with the EU. As South Ossetia is again becoming an important tool for Moscow’s policies in the South Caucasus, the Russian government appears intent on establishing even greater control over its satellite state in the region and using it against Georgia.
By Carolin Funke (08/14/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) emerged as Georgia’s most respected and influential institution. It has played a significant role in the Georgian public sphere ever since and enjoys a high level of trust among the Georgian population. But as Georgia moves towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the GOC increasingly appears to develop into a political force. Recent statements by the clergy on Georgia’s municipal elections and the GOC’s active involvement against law-making and political processes intended to strengthen social and political pluralism raise concerns over its role in Georgia’s democratic development.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
Sign up for upcoming events, latest news, and articles from the CACI Analyst.