Vasil Sikharulidze and Malkhaz Mikeladze

December 6, 2024

Following Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali post-2008, Georgia's sovereign integrity has been increasingly compromised, prompting the ruling Georgian Dream party to adopt a cautious approach towards Moscow. This shift has led to polarization within Georgian society, complicating its Euro-Atlantic integration. The country's reliance on Russian investment and trade has raised concerns about maintaining genuine independence. Russia employs various levers, including political manipulation, economic ties, disinformation campaigns, and likely interference in the parliamentary elections of 2024, in order to sustain its influence. Following these rigged elections, Georgia’s turn away from the West and toward Russia intensified rapidly.

Read Russia's Grip on Georgia (PDF)

By Laura Linderman

On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze declared the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, rejecting talks until 2028 and refusing EU budget support. Kobakhidze asserted that Georgia would enter the EU in 2030, "with dignity" - a claim rejected by the vast majority of Georgians who view this as a betrayal of the country's pro-European aspirations.

This decision sparked nationwide protests that reflect the broad public consensus in support of European integration. Demonstrators have gathered in Tbilisi, Batumi, and cities across Georgia, condemning GD's decision and the subsequent police brutality against mostly peaceful protesters. Demonstrations have continued since the announcement, with protesters blocking streets, clashing with riot police, and facing dispersal attempts using water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray. President Salome Zourabichvili has pledged to stay on as Georgian President, emphasizing that the illegitimate Parliament cannot elect a legitimate President.

BACKGROUND:  Prior to the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgia's economy was experiencing double-digit economic growth, despite the fact that most ordinary Georgians live near poverty. This growth was fueled, in part, by financial flows from Russia, including tourism, trade, and potentially sanctions-evading investment. Russia is a significant market for Georgian products like wine, and the influx of Russian money had created a wealthy elite dependent on these financial flows. The economic growth figures helped the Georgian Dream (GD) secure support and acquiescence from some segments of the population.

This dependence on Russian money creates a conflict between Georgia's political aspirations of joining Europe and its economic realities. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia did not produce much that Europe wanted to buy, while Russia was a major consumer of Georgian products. This economic reality, coupled with GD's close ties to Russia, likely contributed to the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, further consolidating its grip on power and jeopardizing Georgia's European future.

The protests that followed Georgian Dream's decision to suspend EU accession negotiations were fueled by a strong desire for EU integration among a distinct majority of the Georgian population. While the GD government maintained its rhetoric about commitment to eventual EU membership, its decision to postpone accession talks until 2028 provoked immediate public anger and confirmed long-standing suspicions that the government lacked genuine commitment to EU integration. The government's ratification of a Russian-style "foreign agents" law over the summer, coupled with its strategic courting of older, rural conservative constituencies more vulnerable to fears of cultural upheaval and potential conflict with Russia, further reinforced the perception that GD was prioritizing appeasement and political expediency over meaningful European alignment.

The timing of the announcement coincided with a European Parliament resolution documenting electoral irregularities. This resolution echoed widespread criticism of the elections, which were marred by concerns about the secrecy of the vote, vote-rigging, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, as reported by international observers. GD's decision, perceived by many as a rejection of the popular will in favor of closer ties with Russia, led to a significant portion of the population demanding immediate progress toward EU membership.

IMPLICATIONS:  Since the November 28^th announcement, numerous civil servants have resigned in protest, including Georgia's ambassadors to the United States, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Italy, Czechia, and the Netherlands. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia imposed sanctions on GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and several high-ranking Interior Ministry officials, barring them from entering their countries. The Baltic states also condemned the suppression of protests and reaffirmed their support for the Georgian people's European aspirations. In addition to these resignations and sanctions, various sectors of Georgian society mobilized in opposition to the GD's decision. Students from universities organized marches and protests, demanding a reversal of the decision and calling on their universities to suspend classes so students could participate in demonstrations. The Georgian Trade Unions Confederation criticized GD's lack of transparency and condemned police violence against protesters. The International Chamber of Commerce in Georgia warned that halting the EU accession process would negatively impact the country's economy and investor confidence. Both major banks, Bank of Georgia and TBC Bank, and leading internet providers Magti and Silknet condemned the government's actions and reaffirmed their commitment to European integration.

The implications of GD’s decision and the subsequent protests are multifaceted and far-reaching:

• Erosion of Democracy: GD’s actions, including the alleged election rigging and violent suppression of protests, have significantly damaged Georgia’s democratic credentials. International observers have expressed concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the shrinking space for civil society in Georgia, especially the ratification of the Russian-style foreign agents law. The use of excessive force against protesters, including journalists, further highlighted the government's disregard for fundamental freedoms.

• Strained EU Relations: The decision to halt EU accession has severely strained Georgia’s relationship with the EU. European officials have condemned GD's move as a betrayal of the Georgian people’s aspirations and a rejection of the country's European future. The suspension of EU budget support and the potential for sanctions against GD leaders further isolate Georgia from its European partners.

• Strained US Relations: The US decision to suspend its Strategic Partnership with Georgia, in response to GD's halt of EU accession negotiations, signals a deterioration in US-Georgia relations and underscores US concerns about GD government's commitment to democratic values and the rule of law. By suspending the partnership, the US aims to pressure the Georgian government to reconsider its actions and to demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles. The suspension also raises questions about the future of US assistance to Georgia, which has been instrumental in supporting the country's democratic and economic development. This move could weaken Georgia's security and stability, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions with Russia. Additionally, it may embolden anti-Western forces within Georgia and undermine the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people

• Geopolitical Realignment and Russian Influence: The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin's praise for GD's decision, just minutes after the announcement, has raised suspicions about potential Russian influence behind the move. The sources also highlight GD's adoption of policies, such as the "foreign agent" law, that mirror Russian legislation and have been criticized by the EU and the US.

• Implications for Regional Stability: The potential geopolitical realignment of Georgia has significant implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus. A shift towards Russia could embolden the Kremlin to exert more influence in the region and potentially threaten the sovereignty of other neighboring countries, particularly Armenia.

• Economic Fallout: The halting of EU accession has created significant economic uncertainty for Georgia. The potential for reduced foreign investment and trade disruptions could severely impact the country's economic growth. While Georgia's recent economic growth has been partly fueled by Russian money, this raises concerns about economic sustainability and potential dependence on Russia. The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rejection of EU budget support will limit financial assistance and hinder development. GD's actions have damaged Georgia's international reputation and risk international isolation. Widespread protests, including strikes by schools and universities, are disrupting economic activity and further undermining investor confidence. The ongoing political instability threatens to derail Georgia's economic progress and international standing.

CONCLUSION:  GD's decision to halt EU accession has triggered a nationwide crisis, revealing a stark disconnect between the ruling party and the overwhelming pro-European sentiments of Georgian citizens. While GD claims to be pursuing a "European path with dignity," its actions suggest a shift towards Russia's sphere of influence, raising concerns about the country's sovereignty and democratic future. This shift is motivated, in part, by a strategic calculation that aligns with the interests of certain political and economic elites within Georgia, who have benefitted from closer ties with Russia and favor an appeasement strategy with the North. GD has employed a range of tactics to consolidate its power, including manipulating elections, intimidating voters, and suppressing dissent, drawing parallels to the authoritarian playbook seen in countries like Hungary. The opposition's struggle to counter GD's narrative and mobilize sustained public resistance highlights the challenges facing pro-democracy forces in Georgia.

AUTHOR BIO: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow and Director of Programs at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council.

By Pauline Le Grand

This Saturday, on October 26th, Georgia, will decide its future trajectory in parliamentary elections. The country stands at a crossroads and must decide whether to continue towards a European future or turn towards authoritarianism. After achieving candidate status for the European Union in 2023, the passing of the “foreign agent” law by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party raised concerns over the country’s democratic progression and stalled its EU ascension. The GD remains a strong contender for this election, especially in Georgia’s more conservative regions, and risks steering Georgia away from the EU for good. This election will not only test the resilience of Georgia’s democratic institutions but will also reveal the country’s broader geopolitical alignment in an increasingly polarized region.

BACKGROUND:  On October 26th, Georgians will head to the polls to decide their future. This election is one of the most significant in Georgia's history as it will determine whether Georgia will remain on its European path or succumb to the Kremlin's sphere of influence. In December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status for the European Union on the understanding that the country would work to make significant changes towards accession. Yet, since then, Georgia appears to have done just the opposite and its accession process has been frozen. In April 2024, the current government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, passed the law on transparency of foreign influence, referred to as a copy-paste of Russia's foreign agent law. Civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20 percent of funds from overseas had to register on the Government's list as they were deemed to be carrying out the interests of a foreign power. The bill was first proposed in 2023 but withdrawn due to popular discontent. This year, despite promising to not revisit the law, despite even fiercer popular opposition gathering thousands of Tbilisi citizens in front of Parliament for weeks, and despite pro-European President Salome Zurabishvili's veto, the government adopted the bill on May 28th. Of an estimated 300,000 CSOs in Georgia, only 476 CSOs registered, with the others ignoring the law in protest. They preferred to wait for the government's investigation and resulting hefty fines with the hope that the upcoming election will lead to a reevaluation of the bill. The government also passed an anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda law in September as part of a legislative package 'On Protection of Family Values and Minors'. The law is a clear violation of freedom of expression and assembly. The Georgian Dream party has promised that if re-elected, it will effectively ban all opposition groups and turn Georgia into a single-party state. The GD, backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in power for the last twelve years and is determined to maintain its hold of the government. Despite the GD's apparent authoritarian turn and seeming unpopularity, it is projected to obtain a significant percentage of the vote. The question is whether it will secure enough votes for a supermajority, which would enable it to amend the constitution freely, distancing Georgia further from democracy and ultimately from the European Union.

IMPLICATIONS: In early October, the Georgian Dream launched an incredibly successful poster campaign across the country. While the capital of Georgia is relatively progressive and anti-GD, 70 percent of voters are registered outside the capital. Regional voters are overall less critical of the current government, focused on issues of employment and wages, stability and peace, and are generally culturally conservative. Regional voters have higher turnout and are therefore key to the outcome of the election and to Georgian Dream's constitutional super-majority (3/4 of Parliament).

The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rise to power was viewed by some as a positive turning point for Georgia. The party successfully ousted former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had come to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Initially, Saakashvili's leadership brought significant improvements, including the removal of a corrupt elite, implementation of free-market reforms, and impressive economic growth. However, towards the end of his tenure, Saakashvili and his United National Movement (UNM) party tightened control over the political system, allowed elite corruption to spread, and expanded law enforcement powers excessively. Many felt that Saakashvili and the UNM had implemented changes too rapidly and aggressively. In contrast, GD's early years saw improvements in human rights and media freedom, along with a reduction in heavy-handed law enforcement. The party continues to benefit from lingering discontent with the Saakashvili era and fear of its potential return. GD has also cultivated support through social welfare programs, particularly pensions. Many voters worry these benefits might disappear if they don't support the ruling party. This fear is particularly pronounced in areas where electronic voting is being introduced, as some voters believe the new system compromises ballot secrecy, leading to pressure to vote for GD.

Fear remains a central and effective theme in Georgian Dream's (GD) election strategy. The mere possibility of losing pensions is often enough to drive voters to support GD. Similarly, the prospect of the United National Movement's (UNM) return motivates some Georgians to cast their ballots this Saturday. The UNM is inextricably linked to memories and fears of war.

Under Saakashvili's leadership in 2008, Russia invaded South Ossetia, a territory beginning just 40 kilometers from the capital. The 1992-1993 war with Abkhazia also lingers in the collective Georgian memory. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine reignited these concerns for Georgians, who strongly support Ukraine. The fear of another conflict weighs heavily on the minds of Georgians, particularly older voters who constitute the majority of the electorate – a fear GD has not hesitated to exploit.

A week after its initial poster campaign, GD launched a new series depicting Ukrainian buildings destroyed by Russian bombs alongside intact Georgian structures. This campaign sparked online outrage, with Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili commenting on Facebook: "How desperate and pitiful must you be to shamelessly and brazenly offer your people a poster crafted in the 'forges of the KGB'! 'With dignity' towards hell!" Nevertheless, GD's message remains potent; they warn that a vote for the opposition is a vote for war. Ivanishvili even suggested apologizing to South Ossetia for the 2008 war, which he blamed on Saakashvili's government. GD also hints at the possibility of reconciliation between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia with Russian assistance.

GD's successful fear campaigns stand in stark contrast to the opposition's apparent weaknesses. No single party emerges as particularly strong. Fragmented across four different coalitions, none offers a promising alternative. The opposition lacks connection with the regions; once outside Tbilisi, the already scarce opposition campaign posters virtually disappear. In some areas, voters have never even heard of certain opposition parties. Even in Tbilisi, those inclined to vote against GD struggle to choose a party, uncertain which might garner more votes.

CONCLUSION: This weekend's election will undoubtedly be a pivotal moment for Georgia's foreign policy orientation and liberal democracy, both within Georgia and more broadly. With a high risk of external interference, particularly from Russia, the stakes are high. Moldova's close call last weekend in the EU referendum serves as a reminder of the fragility of democracy and regional tendencies towards illiberalism. Still, the hope remains that Georgia's path will continue to align with Europe and the West, reflecting the population's overwhelming desire to join the European Union. Georgia is caught between an older population that remembers with great fear these two wars and is willing to back down to Russia and a politically active younger population who dreams of a liberal and European future. October 26th will show the rest of the world which pull is stronger today in Georgia.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Pauline Le Grand is a research intern at the Rondeli Foundation in Tbilisi, Georgia, where she researches Russia's influence in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

By Kornely Kakachia

November 30, 2023

On November 8, the European Commission recommended granting candidate status to Georgia. The acceptance or rejection of these recommendations will be determined by a vote from the 27 EU member states in mid-December. If approved by the European Council, this decision would mark a significant milestone in Georgia’s extensive pursuit of European integration, reflecting the historical transformations occurring in the region. As the EU endeavors to anchor Georgia within its newly defined geopolitical sphere, the country is still required to address nine priorities, along with two additional conditions related to combating disinformation. These include countering anti-EU disinformation, foreign information manipulation, and interference against the EU’s values. Another pivotal condition for Georgia involves ensuring a closer alignment of its foreign policy with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

By Natalia Konarzewska

April 13, 2021, the CACI Analyst

Georgia’s Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia stepped down on February 18 following the detention of the opposition United National Movement’s (UNM) Chairman Nikanor (Nika) Melia. The previous day, Tbilisi City Court ruled to place Melia in pretrial detention on charges of leading the storming of the parliament during the June 2019 protests. Gakharia resigned amid a protracted political conflict between the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and the opposition following the October 2020 parliamentary elections. The opposition, including UNM, refused to acknowledge the official results and enter the new convocation of the parliament. De-escalation seems unlikely after Irakli Gharibashvili, until then Minister of Defence and known for his uncompromising stance towards the opposition, was appointed to replace Gakharia as Prime Minister.