Wednesday, 06 April 2005

NAZARBAYEV’S GRAND DESIGN FOR KAZAKHSTAN‘S DOMESTIC PURPOSES

Published in Analytical Articles

By Stephen Blank (4/6/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Nazarbayev’s speech certainly extols Kazakhstan’s independence and aims to safeguard it against potential threats by a program of economic reform and social initiatives that carry with them a strong whiff of paternalism. These socio-economic initiatives aim not only to provide the basis for the security of Kazakhstan’s people but also for their full movement into a modern state and economy. Thus he calls for a blueprint for moving the main industries of Kazakhstan from oil and gas to tourism.
BACKGROUND: Nazarbayev’s speech certainly extols Kazakhstan’s independence and aims to safeguard it against potential threats by a program of economic reform and social initiatives that carry with them a strong whiff of paternalism. These socio-economic initiatives aim not only to provide the basis for the security of Kazakhstan’s people but also for their full movement into a modern state and economy. Thus he calls for a blueprint for moving the main industries of Kazakhstan from oil and gas to tourism. food processing, textiles, oil and gas machine building, transport logistics, metallurgy and construction. To this end he calls for a new ideology of creation of small businesses while preserving a core of state owned businesses. Those businesses or firms that are not part of this core would be privatized. Nazarbayev therefore also calls for substantial social welfare initiatives to ensure that every citizen has access to higher education and support for a substantial program of social insurance for mothers and children as well as adults. Nazarbayev also advocates wage raises for public sector workers and the unemployed. There is little doubt that he considers it imperative that Kazakhstan provide for both more broad-based economic and social progress as well as security for its citizens so that they will not be tempted by doctrines like radical fundamentalism and terrorism due to lack of perspectives for socio-economic growth. However Nazarbayev’s program also goes beyond creating a basis for long-term economic growth and social security. He also outlined proposals for substantive political reform from the top. He, like his spokesmen abroad, regularly extolled Kazakhstan’s achievements as showing that it is a democratic state, i.e. they reproached those in the United States and elsewhere who will accuse the regime of being what it fact is, a moderately authoritarian state that grants freedoms but does so from above, not from below, and that lacks the real attributes of democracy. As part of his speech Nazarbayev repeatedly claimed that Kazakhstan had already built the foundations and more of a democratic state. In truly eclectic fashion he claims that the model he pursues is akin to both that of Western countries and the “new Asian democracies”. He claims to have instituted regular democratic elections, a multiparty pluralist system, and over 5000 NGOS. This indicates the essential fallacy of this thinking since NGOS, to be genuine, must be created from below. He claims as well that there is no censorship, freedom of speech and defended basic human rights, e.g. the freedom to travel and return safely. Nazarbayev also claims to have instituted legislative accountability and authority, but is not resting on his laurels. He advocates the further decentralization of power and regulation of state government to make it more effective and transparent. Thus he is calling for an improved system of localization or devolution of powers to local levels that will supposedly increase democratic participation and accountability at those levels.

IMPLICATIONS: While he may appeal to Western and Asian sources of inspiration, Nazarbayev more accurately stands in the tradition of Tsarist reformers who sought to make the state more effective a vehicle for the promotion of economic growth and social stability and sought to build structures for local government that would enhance popular participation, effectiveness and even more democratic elements at that level. But if we are looking at contemporary models perhaps the most appropriate exemplar of his approach or the state most congenial to what he appears to be doing is Singapore. There too a state which was firmly run from above, achieved prodigious levels of economic development and social stability, including substantial welfare benefits. The government presided above a state of law, a kind of Rechtstaat to use the 18th and 19th century term for a state based on law but that was not a democracy with kingly or presidential accountability to it. Thus Singapore remains a state with very firmly enforced police powers that clearly circumscribe as well as regulate the freedoms granted from above. Likewise, it provides a vehicle for a circumscribed polity where a legislature functions but where ultimately the president is supreme and not truly accountable to it. Whereas Singapore’s wealth is founded on trade and mercantile pursuits given its location and the defense of property rights there; Kazakhstan\'s economic potential depends, first of all on energy and raw materials which are plentiful. Although the government has taken precautions to set aside large amounts of energy revenues and plow them back into the local economy, Kazakhstan\'s future still remains tied to the price of energy. In this respect it significantly differs from Singapore and resembles other petro-states. These states too also often showed a major commitment to social welfare, paternalistic rule from above, including experimentation with initiatives from above that created limited openings within the political system. But they also run risks that we can see in Kazakhstan, particularly corruption and a tendency toward nepotism. The latter, in fact, is common throughout Central Asia as Nazarbayev, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan have all encouraged their daughters to found political movements and become players in their country\'s politics, clearly a desire “to keep the dacha in the family”. Nazarbayev’s domestic program also represents an attempt to avert extremist threats by a comprehensive program of socio-economic development and by the creation of sufficient transparency that would encourage popular participation while the actual framework wherein it could be expressed remains one that is limited from above. But there is also another purpose behind the creation of this template for the future development of the state. There is little doubt that he, like his colleagues, has been alarmed by Ukraine\'s revolution and has taken counsel with Moscow on measures to prevent this “infection” from spreading. By ceaselessly proclaiming that Kazakhstan is already a democracy he hopes to neutralize calls from America and Europe for reform or the threat posed by a pending corruption trial in America where his own corruption and that of his family will figure prominently. Although Kazakhstan is undoubtedly the most “liberal” state in Central Asia, it is by no means a democracy for the present, and even under the best interpretation, his reforms will not lead to that conclusion even if we cannot foresee the future beyond his rule.

CONCLUSIONS: The template outlined here is clearly one that is developmental and bears resemblance to Singapore and to the Gulf monarchies, particularly the Emirates. But it is also clear that as Kazakhstan lives in a violent neighborhood and is very much hostage to the price of energy. Thus its developmental perspective remains to a considerable degree an open-ended question. Nazarbayev is surely correct in wishing to use the opportunities provided by the current high energy prices to move the economy towards a stronger and more diversified basis. But will his desire to retain unchallenged power and to pass at least some of it down to his family permit that to occur when forces beyond his control such as terrorism, the demand for democracy that has led to violence in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the price of oil and gas, and Uzbekistan’s deepening crisis that can spill over into Kazakhstan, suffice to hold these forces at bay? Nor is it clear how future developments in the Central Asian policy of such states as Russia, China, and America will affect his domestic grand design. Thus this grand design remains a tribute to his political acumen which we have seen for the last fifteen years, but the likelihood of its success in being realized cannot be described as being anywhere near certain. In other words, despite his best efforts, for some time, as regards Kazakhstan’s evolution and progress, the jury will remain out.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.

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