BACKGROUND: Kyrgyzstan’s February 27 parliamentary elections was fraught with multiple violations of the Electoral Code which together with inconclusive results brought about a runoff poll on March 13 in those constituencies where candidates failed to win 50% of votes. Even after the second round, the winner of numerous parliamentary seats remain to be determined. Meanwhile, the list of successful candidates is already represented by a considerable number of deputies from the pro-Presidential parties “Alga Kyrgyzstan”, “Adilet” as well as independent loyalists. One of the challenging districts was the university constituency, where the President’s daughter, Bermet Akayeva, contested on her own party ticket, “Alga Kyrgyzstan!”, and failed to win a majority on February 27. Thanks to strong ‘administrative resources’, Akayeva secured the parliamentary seat in the second round of voting. However, her dubious victory echoed the anti-Akayev sentiment among the electorate of Kyrgyzstan. Compared with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where authorities managed to steer clear of a runoff poll, Kyrgyzstan’s preliminary election results demonstrated the political fragility of Akayev’s leadership and the weakness of state governance. Observers from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia, China and other Central Asian countries predictably reported that there were no infringements during the first round, both the OSCE and independent local observers found that both the first and second round of voting were accompanied with a vast rollback of democratic standards. The infringements included the disqualification of former ambassadors from running for Parliament, unequal conditions of campaigning among candidates, the interference of authorities into the electoral campaign in favor of pro-presidential candidates, and an information blockade. The U.S.-funded Kyrgyz-language Radio “Azzatyk” (Liberty) broadcast was closed; the “MSN” opposition newspaper was attacked; and popular internet resources blocked. This provoked protests in Bishkek and other regions including Jalalabad, Osh, Uzgen, Naryn, Kochkor, Ton and Talas. Although Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov characterized the situation in the country as stable, the situation has been rapidly deteriorating. The waves of vehement protests in both north and south of Kyrgyzstan are best seen as the people’s desperate response to gross infringements of law by authorities, and to what is widely perceived as the usurpation of power by Akayev’s clan. Recently organized People’s Assemblies in the Osh and Jalalabad regions of Southern Kyrgyzstan, comprising tens of thousands of protesters, during March 20-22 managed to wrest control of government buildings and airports in these strategic regions. This has shifted the momentum from the government to the opposition forces. At present, the opposition is no longer simply focused on reviewing elections results, but has raised its ambitions to the resignation of Akayev, regional governors and chiefs of law enforcement bodies. Importantly, opposition leaders also intend to gather a Kurultay similar to those held in the South in the northern Talas province, the native region of Akayev’s very influential wife. Prominent opposition leaders such as Kurmanbek Bakiev and Roza Otunbayeva called for, respectively, the old parliament to convene and assess the elections, and to extend parliamentary powers for a year in order to hold an early presidential election and to pave the way for the election of a new Parliament. Although Akayev’s spin doctors seek to mute opposition rhetoric, his disapproval ratings are becoming alarmingly high throughout Kyrgyzstan.

IMPLICATIONS: After Akayev’s first presidential term expired, he has manipulated the people’s confidence, publicly announcing his determination not to stand for re-election to the presidency. Yet he prolonged his rule by referendums. The continued low level of living standards, the absence of new jobs or a strategy for social security, a huge flow of external migration, increasing drug abuse among young people have characterized Kyrgyzstan along with the simultaneous enrichment of Akayev’s family as well as its increasing penetration into the Parliament. This has sparked tremendous resentment throughout the country’s regions. Furthermore, by pushing his family, clan and entourage into the Parliament, Akayev swept away the chances of the “centrist” independent politicians and businessmen to win parliamentary seats and antagonized them. Compared with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where presidential power is increasingly consolidated and NGOs are sluggish, Kyrgyz local communities and civil society organizations take a crucial part in the electoral process throughout the country. Having accused the opposition over mass unrest and instability across the country, authorities underestimated the persistent involvement of civil society groups in the democratic process. Independent mass media outlets and NGOs demonstrated their steady commitment to democracy, covering current events with relative impartiality, nominating well-trained independent election observers, facilitating civic actions of peaceful resistance, and taking mediating role between protestors and authorities in Jalalabad, the first arena of mass protests. On the other hand, having used various “dirty” technologies during the electoral process, Akayev and his strategists totally undermined their image among the public. A few examples of this include the explosion on March 3 in the apartment of charismatic opposition figure Roza Otunbayeva; the intimidation of university staff and students from the university district where Akayev’s daughter Bermet was one of the candidates; and the soviet-styled propaganda through state-run TV and Radio Companies against the opposition. All these suggested Akayev’s moral, public and political resources were exhausted and his leadership had undergone an unpredicted agony. Looking back just few months ago, both international and local analysts argued Kyrgyzstan was not ripe for revolutionary changes, as the opposition movement had failed to implement its political agenda due to its internal divisions. However, by now both the opposition parties, the political elite and independent NGOs have been unified into a civic movement that has established itself as a very effective consultative body between the political establishment, civil society activists, independent politicians, businessmen and the student movement. This forum already represents a substantial danger to the ruling regime. Until recently, the absence of revolutionary leaders in Kyrgyzstan had dominated the views of foreign observers. Former Foreign Minister and UN envoy Roza Otunbayeva immediately joined the political establishment since her returning to Kyrgyzstan in late summer. Otunbayeva’s international experience and in-depth knowledge of the political culture’s peculiarity allowed her to become an engine of the current political process. As some observers noted, the apparent alliance of Otunbayeva with Bakiev’s impacted the latter’s political leadership, which is day by day becoming more determined. An emerging alliance between southerner Bakiev and northerner Otunbayeva, the most influential players of the political establishment, could be seen as a pragmatic and compromising option not only for both southerners and northerners, but also for conservatives and liberals among the public. From a geopolitical point of view, Bakiev would maintain skillfully a dialogue with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Central Asian neighbors, while Otunbayeva would help Kyrgyzstan regain the credibility of international community.

CONCLUSIONS: A growing chorus of civil society groups and resistance of ordinary voters across the country would be insufficient without frequent and aggressive pressure from key international donors. In light of Bush’s second-term foreign policy to end tyranny and to spread democracy all over the world, Akayev’s administration is already pressured by the U.S. Government through various statements of U.S. Embassy and U.S. top officials. Simultaneously, international financial institutions and western nations increasingly investing to liberal democracy and market economy of Kyrgyzstan have been late starters in their attention to the current processes. As hard and unyielding debates between the ruling elite and the opposition establishment is pushing the country towards an unpredictable future, the scope for mediation between the two sides remains strong. Taking into account the geopolitical rivalry between the U.S., Russia and China in the region and specifically in Kyrgyzstan more than any other regional country, the most acceptable choice would be to nominate a neutral actor such as a UN representative to this task. A democratic outcome in Kyrgyzstan, which appears as an increasing possibility all the while as the risk of violence increases, would be beneficial not only for Kyrgyzstan itself. It would radically shift the geopolitical map in Central Asia and would inspire change across the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aya Telekova is a political analyst based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.