BACKGROUND: In the early hours of 7 July, Georgian peacekeepers, police, and local authorities detained nine Russian vehicles carrying military equipment to Russian peacekeepers based in Tskhinvali. Once vehicles were inspected, Georgian authorities confiscated two trucks carrying 300 unguided helicopter missiles. The Ossetian response was rapid. Armed Ossetians detained a Georgian villager and a child for two hours, allegedly because they had entered Ossetian territory illegally while working in the fields. Two Ossetian armored vehicles illegally entered Georgian-controlled territory along a recently created “diversion route”—an area now known as the “Redlands”: a road bypassing Tskhinvali and linking isolated Georgian villages in Didi Liakhvi to Patara Liakhvi. (For over two weeks Ossetians forces have blocked all roads to Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages, isolating many Georgian villages.) Meanwhile, Georgian peacekeepers and local villagers reported that armed Ossetians had infiltrated Georgian territory surrounding the Redlands, above the Georgian villages of Prisi, Argvitsi, and Eredvi in Patara Liakhvi. Following this, the commander in chief of the Ossetian peacekeeping forces, Kazbeg Friev, told reporters that he could not be responsible for Ossetians forces that are not peacekeepers. Prisi village, the closest to Tskhinvali and ethnically mixed, began to evacuate. Georgian peacekeepers rushed to defuse the situation in what quickly developed into a standoff between Georgian and Ossetian troops. Eventually, Russian peacekeepers were called in to clear the area; however, over seven hours passed before the area was visibly cleared of Ossetian forces. As evidenced by subsequent events, Georgian officials claimed that the Russians never completed their job of removing the Ossetians. The next morning Ossetians detained 50 Georgian policemen in Vanati village on Georgian-controlled territory. They were paraded in front of television cameras and Tskhinvali residents, and forced to kneel on the ground in the center of Tskhinvali. On 9 July, all but three policemen were released, including the commander. With information that Ossetians were digging trenches around Prisi and infiltrating Vanati, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Locals panicked and called on authorities to defend them or provide them with arms, and evacuating increasingly rapidly. That evening, Ossetians fired on Georgian troops in the Redlands. Three Georgians were wounded, one went missing, while an unknown number of Ossetians were either killed or injured. In response, the Georgian Interior Ministry deployed troops to the region and organized villagers into groups of 15 to 20 persons and provided them with arms to defend villages. Ossetians again fired shots around Nikozi, a Georgian village neighboring Tskhinvali, and blocked a diversion route linking Nikozi to isolated Georgian villages in Proni Gorge. Events escalated further on 9 and 10 July as Ossetians fired at the Georgian villages of Prisi and Argvitsi, wounding two Georgian civilians and three troops. The latest shooting occurred on 10 July near the Georgian village of Tamarasheni in Didi Liakhvi. Goga Khaindrava explained, “In this situation, we are close to having a war”. One villager said “We know the Ossetians are digging trenches and preparing for war…. This is the calm before the storm.”

IMPLICATIONS: What started as Georgian flag-waving initiatives to reestablish control over the separatist South Ossetian region by holding cultural events and delivering flour, fertilizer, and cooking oil to villages near Ossetian-controlled territory, has lead Georgia to the brink of a civil war. Georgian authorities stress that if a full-scale conflict erupts, the blame will fall on Russia—not Georgia or Ossetia—and that it will be a conflict between Georgia and Russia rather than Ossetia and Georgia. Georgians and Ossetians, respectively, note that Russia has complete control over South Ossetia. The Russian government props up South Ossetia by financing pensions, government salaries, and security forces, and by providing Russian passports and residency documents to South Ossetians. The de facto president, Eduard Kokoev, even announced that Tskhinvali region now falls under Russian jurisdiction, while posters of Russian President Putin declaring “Putin is Our President” greet visitors to Tskhinvali. The fact that the arrival of Lev Mironov, Russia’s Ambassador for special affairs, to Tskhinvali on 11 July promptly ended Ossetian hostilities is a powerful symbol of Russia’s influence over South Ossetia. Observers claim that South Ossetia holds no strategic value to Russia. Unlike other contentious former Soviet territories, there are no energy resources for Russia to defend. However, as the most pro-Russian region in the Caucasus, Russia retains control over South Ossetia for political rather than economic reasons. Through Tskhinvali, Russia retains significant influence not only over Georgia but the entire Caucasus region. Georgians believe that Russian peacekeepers, backed by their government, are largely responsible for the rapid escalation of last week’s events. They note that Russians merely watched while Ossetians blocked village roads, dug trenches, and destroyed diversion routes that would have allowed Georgian authorities to evacuate Didi Liakhvi and Proni Gorge. Moreover, they stood by as paramilitary troops infiltrated Ossetian villages and as Ossetian troops illegally entered Georgian territory to detain officials and fire on Georgian residents. Georgian authorities stress that this is a provocation on the side of Russia as well as Ossetia. For, without Russia, Ossetia would not have the confidence to provoke Georgia so aggressively. Aleko Kiknadze, commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, concurred and demonstrated how Russians merely observed Ossetians as they dug trenches around Prisi cemetery. Consequently, Didi Liakhvi and Proni Gorge residents are isolated. Without Russian peacekeepers’ assistance, Georgian vehicles delivering humanitarian aid cannot pass. If the situation persists through winter, Georgia could have a serious humanitarian crisis on its hands. Goga Khaindrava stressed, “If there are no results to the Moscow negotiations, there will be war”. Meanwhile, Georgians and Ossetians residing on Georgian territory have launched regular demonstrations calling for peace and urging authorities not to yield to Kokoev’s provocations.

CONCLUSIONS: Empowered by two Rose Revolutions, Georgians want freedom from Russian influence in their internal affairs. Events that started as peaceful initiatives to regain territorial integrity have rapidly brought Georgian troops to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. While everyone awaits direction from the forthcoming 14 July Moscow meeting, many are skeptical that negotiations will yield concrete results and believe another conflict is imminent. Meanwhile, conflict zone residents hold their breath and wait for war. AUTHOR’S BIO: Theresa Freese is a graduate of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and is currently conducting research on conflict resolution issues surrounding South Ossetia.