BACKGROUND: Tajikistan has long been a key transshipment state for Afghan drugs on-route to Russia and Europe. Its extensive continuous border with Afghanistan, destabilization from the civil war, and established ethnic and clan ties have combined to created an environment highly conducive to large-scale drug trafficking. Deadlock in bilateral talks earlier this year between Russia and Tajikistan resulted in the Russian government’s decision to remove the RFBS. The phased withdrawal will end the enhanced protection of the Tajik-Afghan border that has been in place since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Originally the withdrawal was due to be completed by early 2005 and consisted of a first phase transfer of responsibilities for the section bordering the Pamirs to the Tajik Border Protection Services, the second and final phase was to cover the remainder of the Tajik-Afghan border. However in a somewhat unexpected turnaround in Tajik-Russian relations, the phased withdrawal has now been extended to 2006. Along the Afghanistan/Tajikistan border, the main hot spots for smuggling drugs appear to be through Pyanj and Moskovskiy in Khatlon province. These are the same areas traditionally protected through a “chain” of RFBS checkpoint squads of between five-ten soldiers, in some cases these checkpoints have also been strengthened by armored personnel carriers. In addition, the mountain passes through Gorno-Badakhshan, which are protected by the Tajik Border Service, are also used during summer periods. However, the current absence of river crossing points makes large scale drug smuggling difficult in this area. Trafficking trends across the main hot spots are increasingly becoming more sophisticated, cautiously planned, supported by the use of high tech radio equipment and heavily supported by armed guards. This results in frequent fire fights between border guards and traffickers along the ‘green line’. An additional trend along these routes is the diversification of the types of heroin being trafficked. Prior to 2002, the prevailing product was relatively poor quality heroin, however seizures statistics show a move towards much purer (and profitable) white heroin. In comparison trafficking characteristics along the Badakhshan areas differ, here patterns include extremely covert operations that normally only involves a few smugglers, smaller consignments and more primitive transport methods across remote and inaccessible areas. This in part helps to explain the relatively low rate of seizures across this area. Allegations of involvement in drugs trafficking have been directed towards government officials, opposition forces and even towards the RFBS. In reality none of these groups have a monopoly – although all of them have benefited and have been implicated in one way or another. In the case of the RFBS long-standing allegations have been made on the use of military aircrafts to move heroin consignments directly into Russia. Whilst this may have been the case, most large scale trans-national trafficking operates through a network structure that involves an array of players – Russian border guards, if involved, in most instances will only be a part of a much bigger and complex picture.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite concerns about the effectiveness of the RFBS, the pullout will have wide-ranging long-term implications for drug trafficking and security. In the first instance, it will create problems of training, capacity and motivation for the Tajik Border Services. Currently the Tajik Border Services only patrol 73 kilometers of the 1340 kilometer Tajik-Afghan border and its conscript troops are paid far less (if at all) than the Tajik recruits in the RFBS. About 90% of RFBS troops in Tajikistan are actually Tajik nationals, and these will experience a significant loss of income. Whilst drug trafficking allegations have been levied towards Russian border guards, it’s far more likely that salary problems associated with the Tajik border guards will leave them highly vulnerable to corruption. Moreover, lost income to the already poverty-stricken Tajik border communities following the RFBS pullout is likely to increase local willingness to engage in trafficking activities. Decreased border protection will also open the way for the emergence of new Tajik groups looking to supply the burgeoning Tajik markets. Experience shows that increased competition among local criminal groups increases both violence and addiction. Weakened border control could also open the way for the trafficking in arms, persons, and other products of concern. In March 2004, during a Tajik Drug Control Agency operation against drug couriers in Dushanbe, a small container with 3 grams of plutonium was found. The container was allegedly on route to unknown individuals in Afghanistan. An additional concern is increased incursions from Afghanistan into Tajikistan by Al Qaeda-linked groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Whilst it has been assumed that IMU militants are no longer a group of concern and have disappeared from Central Asia, this is only on the surface. Militants have been seen crossing the border in small numbers and are believed to have mostly relocated to Northern Afghanistan and along the Afghan Pakistan border region. The ongoing major offensive being conducted by Pakistan military forces to flush out insurgents along its Afghan border might make IMU members more inclined to come back to Tajikistan hideouts. It is also clear that border security on the Afghan side is extremely weak and operates outside the control of the central Kabul administration. Commanders in charge of the Afghan provincial border authorities are suspected of having strong links to the illegal drugs trade. These same commanders also have close links with Tajikistan through clan and family ties. Coupled with this are the increasing numbers of clandestine laboratories operating throughout the North of Afghanistan. These aspects combined make Tajik drug routes an attractive, and somewhat easy, option.

CONCLUSIONS: Creating a security belt by way of enhanced border control has been a key element of the international community’s anti-drug trafficking campaign across the region. Such security belts also have the additional benefit of decreasing the movement of militants and other products of concern – something that most observers acknowledge the RFBS have impacted on. Certainly, in the short-term at least, an implication of the RFBS withdrawal is a likely increase in illegal cross border movement (including drug trafficking). Unless Tajikistan, or the international community, is prepared to commit significant amounts of resources to up-grading the capacity of the Tajik Border Service the result will be a deterioration in Central Asian security. The extended timescale to 2006 for the RFBS withdrawal provides a window of opportunity for all involved to start responding to what will be long-term capacity gaps within the Tajik Border Service. Underpinning border control efforts should be an improvement to the salaries of Tajik border guards (an aspect that some sections of the international community have been reluctant to directly provide funding for). Provision by the international community of sophisticated x-ray checkpoint machines will have little, or no, impact if those that operate them are either not being paid, or the pay is so low that the only way to survive is through bribes and institutionalized corruption.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Justine Walker has 12 years involvement in drug policy issues, is a PhD candidate with the University of St Andrews in Scotland and has just returned from working with the United Nations’ Central Asia Office on Drugs and Crime.