BACKGROUND: Robert Kocharian’s legitimacy and authority in Armenia has been questioned and challenged repeatedly since he came to power after president Ter-Petrossian’s resignation in February 1998, as the constitutionality of the events leading to the resignation was questioned. This was followed by charges of rigged elections in 1998, reinforced by criticisms from international observers. Kocharian’s problems were exacerbated when less than a year later, Vazgen Sargissian – the powerful Armenian defense minister and erstwhile Kocharian supporter – formed an alliance with Kocharian’s challenger in the 1998 presidential elections, Karen Demirchyan. This alliance won the parliamentary elections in May 1999, effectively sidelining Kocharian. On October 27, 1999, however, Vazgen Sargissian and Karen Demirchyan were assassinated in a terrorist act in parliament. Many of Sargissian’s enraged supporters blamed Kocharian for the tragedy and tried to force him to resign. Instead, Kocharian managed to pull an improbable feat, using the few levers he had to find cracks in the camp of Vazgen Sargissian’s supporters. Six months after the assassinations and the ensuing political crisis, the parties that supported Sargissian and Demirchyan had split with their majorities throwing their support behind Kocharian. Kocharian was more powerful than ever, but that power never translated into uncontested legitimacy and wide popular support. Nonetheless, the fragmentation and demoralization of the opposition meant that nobody could convert the existing political discontent in the country into an active political movement against Kocharian. Despite the opposition’s ineptness, the Spring 2003 presidential elections provided a focal point for the expression of that discontent. Kocharian claimed victory, but again lacked the blessing of the international observers and the concession of defeat by Stepan Demirchyan, who had replaced his father Karen as Kocharian’s challenger. A campaign of demonstrations ensued, but after several weeks it ran out of steam and protesters left the streets. The enthusiasm for challenging Kocharian received a new boost after the events in Georgia last fall. The invigorated Armenian opposition decided to renew the campaign against Kocharian, and the newly energized Armenian public thought that if Shevardnzdze could be forced out, so could Kocharian. The campaign had an impressive start with tens of thousands of people participating in demonstrations in March and April, and managed to rattle the nerves of the ruling coalition in that brief period. But this campaign seems to have failed, raising the question why the Armenian opposition has repeatedly failed to achieve what the Georgian opposition achieved last fall, and what this latest failure mean for Armenian politics.

IMPLICATIONS: The analogies between Georgia and Armenia, popular both in Armenia and elsewhere, are profoundly misguided. The most important and consequential difference between Armenia and Georgia was the fatal weakness of the Georgian state. Its institutions of governance were paralyzed and demoralized and the state’s authority barely extended outside of Tbilisi. By contrast, Armenia’s institutions of governance are incomparably better developed, and state control over the security and law enforcement structures is much more solid. Shevardnadze’s orders fell on deaf ears, but similar insubordination is hard to imagine in Armenia. When the Armenian police was ordered to use force to break up a demonstration during the latest unrest, it dutifully fulfilled the order. Second, Kocharian may not be supported by the majority of the Armenian electorate, but he is supported by a powerful “selectorate.” One of the most important facts about Armenian politics is the incestuous and symbiotic relationship between the military leadership, those in charge of law enforcement, and big business. This alliance is in full command of the means of violence. It also controls enormous resources compared to what is available to the opposition. Shevardnadze’s support base was far less powerful or organized. Third, Armenia’s opposition is far more incoherent and short of ideas than their Georgian counterparts. It includes politicians and groups that only share the desire to force Kocharian out. It is hard to see where they stand on many pressing issues the country faces. Once asked what his preferred solution to the Karabagh conflict is, Stepan Demirchyan replied “a just solution.” It is equally unclear what this opposition would do differently regarding poverty reduction, corruption, or relations with Turkey. Instead, the opposition’s discourse consists of criminal accusations and unsubstantiated promises, giving many ordinary Armenians little reason to support it even if they are opposed to the current administration. A factor favoring the government in its periodic confrontation with the opposition is the fear among many Armenians that internal destabilization, which would be likely if the opposition pushes too hard, may make Armenia and Karabagh militarily vulnerable. Serious domestic unrest in Armenia may tempt Azerbaijan to resume hostilities, which most people in Armenia want to avoid more than they want to oust Kocharian. Hence the opposition cannot push things too far, and its pool of recruits is limited. Kocharian has not come out unscathed of the latest confrontation with the opposition, however. The government had to use force and arrest dozens of supporters of the opposition, including high ranking politicians. That Kocharian withstood this latest campaign may attest to his power, but the fact that he had to use force and put opposition activists in jail may also mean weakness. Moreover, such actions have almost certainly turned many neutrals against Kocharian and increased the international scrutiny of his domestic behavior. Interestingly, several members of the governing coalition opened a dialogue with the opposition over Kocharian’s determined objections. Now that the demonstrations are dying down, that dialogue will probably be suspended. But it is significant that when tensions reached a point, some in the governing coalition were trying to cushion the blow against them in case things went south. If members of this coalition feel the ship is really sinking, this indicates they may decide to jump ship. Not unlike the opposition, Kocharian’s coalition is a marriage of convenience, which may crack in a serious crisis. The opposition’s latest campaign did not amount to such a crisis, however, and it is unlikely that the opposition can force one any time soon.

CONCLUSIONS: The opposition’s latest challenge has managed to shake things up in Armenia, but failed in its ultimate goal of forcing Kocharian to resign. The Armenian opposition has yet again revealed its incapability, and the predictable consequences of refusing to articulate a real alternative to Kocharian’s policies. The good thing for the opposition and for Armenia in general is that the opposition will have to change its strategy radically, and abandon the hope of mobilizing support just on the basis of Kocharian’s perceived or real failures. Slogans and accusations have to be replaced by arguments. Otherwise, the current opposition will go from weak to simply irrelevant, which would further deepen the malaise characterizing Armenian politics for already so many years.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Arman Grigorian is a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at Columbia University and a Visting Lecturer of Government at Wesleyan University, specializing in international security and the modern politics of the Balkans and the Caucasus. He formerly served the first post-Communist government of Armenia, where he was born and raised.