BACKGROUND: Trubnikov, whose remit comprises Russian relations with CIS members and intelligence sharing and collaboration with Washington in the war on terrorism, strongly denounced U.S. military policy and presence in Central Asia even though he has frequently extolled the cooperation with Washington in the war against terrorism. In reply to a question about Russia’s view of foreign forces in Central Asia, he went on to state that Moscow opposed all foreign troop presence there, specifically citing Chinese forces and going out of his way to do so. Trubnikov emphasized that Central Asia is a sphere of vital Russian interests and that those governments, presumably including the U.S. government, have agreements with Moscow as to when the U.S. forces will leave. Yet he also voiced the complaint that he believes America will not leave Central Asia after the war on terrorism ends. While these denunciations of American policy are standard for Moscow, though they have been increasing in frequency and stridency lately, the open criticism of China is astonishing. China is Russia’s ally in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is a genuine collective security organization whose founding treaty permits or even calls upon members to send troops to defend other signatories who may be attacked by terrorists, insurgents, separatists, etc. Thus China’s right to send troops and conduct exercises with other members, including Russia, is recognized by international treaty and incontestable. Indeed, China has conducted such exercises with Kyrgyzstan in 2002-03 and in 2003 with members of the SCO. The SCO grew out of the earlier border delimitation treaty of 1996 between China and all the post-Soviet republics. Its transformation from an organization intended to build confidence over borders into a collective security organization was largely a Chinese initiative. Its aims were to fight terrorism, insurgency, separatism, etc., in Central Asia, and for China, particularly in Xinjiang. Second, it was supposed to become a vehicle to obstruct further American inroads into Central Asia. Third, it was a centerpiece of Sino-Russian collaboration, and thus fourth, China has proclaimed it as a model for what it wants to achieve in other parts of Asia with its neighbors. As a result, Beijing has made full use of its provisions to increase its military presence in Central Asia as provided for by the treaty and has pushed hard to upgrade the SCO into a multi-dimensional security organization that also harmonizes trade and economic issues among its signatories. Russia, for its part, has been pushing more strongly its own Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with Central Asian governments and it clearly has aimed all along to create an exclusive sphere of influence in Central Asia as well as the entire former USSR.

IMPLICATIONS: However, until now, despite considerable criticism of Washington’s presence in Central Asia and considerable scholarly and expert writing about latent Sino-Russian tensions, no Russian official made any negative remarks about the Chinese military presence there. After all, both states were formal allies thanks to their bilateral treaty and the SCO treaty and charter. Indeed, Russian and Chinese officials missed no chance to stress the identity and congruence of both capitals’ views on international affairs and pending issues. This is what makes Trubnikov’s deliberate remarks about opposition to Chinese military presence in Central Asia so eye-catching. In the past, many scholars and analysts have speculated about the possibility of Sino-Russian rivalry in Asia in general and Central Asia in particular, but there had never been any overt sign of such important differences regarding Central Asia, although Russia clearly sought to restrict China’s access to energy sources there. Moreover, recent official visits had once again provided the occasion for bilateral statements of an identity of views and of growing friendship between China and Russia on a host of issues. Trubnikov’s remarks suggest that behind this carefully constructed facade of amity and unanimity there are serious tensions and divergences of view between Beijing and Moscow. Apparently, Russia resents Chinese efforts to expand its capability and pretexts for projecting power into Central Asia that limits Russia\'s ability to do so, especially as Russian military power is being forced out of Tajikistan and the U.S. bases in Central Asia show no sign of going away. Those two points were incidentally among the negative signs that Trubnikov brought up in his interview. Tensions in the bilateral Russian-Chinese economic relationships in Asia include the issues of pipelines to China, the direction of the Trans-Korean railroad, a centerpiece of Russian policy in Korea, and Chinese efforts to gain access to energy companies in Russia or Central Asia. But until now, such tensions have never been publicly admitted and the protestations of unanimity have outweighed the statements of difference and rivalry, despite mounting evidence of the latter. It remains to be seen if China\'s efforts to breathe life into the SCO’s military and other organizations will now meet with Russian obstructions. Already in 2002, then Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov complained that the SCO was ineffectual, as was proven on September 11, 2001 and its aftermath. Now, apparently it may be becoming too effective for Moscow’s taste and too much of an instrument of Chinese, as opposed to Russian, or even collective security policy.

CONCLUSIONS: If there is dissension over the SCO and Chinese power projection into Central Asia, this will manifest itself in one way or another and the organization’s effectiveness will stagnate or even decline. More interestingly, if open dissension between Moscow and Beijing erupts, even if it remains bounded by diplomatic conventions and similar interests on other issues, this will undoubtedly affect local governments in Central Asia and Russian and Chinese policies there, and potentially U.S. policy and its military presence in Central Asia. Sino-Russian relations matter greatly to whether local governments will become more or less amenable to a U.S. military presence whatever form it might take, as well as for energy policy. Obviously because Trubnikov’s remarks were only the first sign of a possible rift in the SCO, only time will tell as regards the answers to these questions. It nevertheless does illustrate the need to monitor the relationship, given the possibility that another major turn of the wheel in Central Asia’s international relationships is about to take place.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Dept. or the U.S. Government.