BACKGROUND: On October 2 2003, Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a blueprint for the development of the armed forces. The 73-page document presented by Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov is widely believed to be a draft of Russia’s new military doctrine. While not representing a radical departure from the military doctrine of 2000, the draft updates it in several respects. While the former was a product of the military’s preoccupation with NATO expansion, the new doctrine reflects Russia’s focus on terrorism and other ‘soft security’ threats, and its renewed ambition to dominate the post-Soviet space. The draft also re-affirms Russia’s commitment to transforming its military into a professional force that can fight in asymmetrical conflicts. With regard to force posture, the MOD draft incorporates Russia’s own lessons in Chechnya and the U.S. and British post-9/11 combat experience. Its strategy sections point to a visible shift from combined arms operations to more up-to-date forms of applying military force. A new emphasis on the independent role of air power as a policy instrument is accompanied by a pledge to develop and acquire modern long-range precision-guided missiles. With regard to land warfare, Russian military planners want a lighter and more flexible infantry force and greater strategic airlift capabilities. The draft also calls for more Special Forces troops fit for asymmetrical warfare as well as for raising standards of individual combat training in the army as a whole. All these changes, the draft makes it clear, are required to protect and further Russian interests in the CIS. This notion feeds into the geopolitical and threat assessment presented by Ivanov. There is a renewed emphasis on employing military force to defend Russian economic interests abroad and to protect Russian-speaking minorities in the CIS. This clearly reflects President Vladimir Putin’s growing confidence that the West is on the brink of acknowledging Moscow’s special role in maintaining stability and security in the region. Attempts are made to establish linkages between terrorism and other ‘soft security’ threats on the one hand, and the need for Russia’s military presence in the CIS on the other. The MOD document calls for an offensive posture to combat threats emanating from weakness of regimes in the neighboring states. To neutralize these threats, the MOD says it will structure its armed forces for pre-emptive missile strikes and special operations, a provision which has caused an uproar in Georgia and may create tensions in Russia’s relations with other post-Soviet states. The draft also contains a thinly disguised warning to NATO not to seek for itself a more pro-active role in the CIS. It states that ‘if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its existing military doctrine, this will demand a radical overhaul of Russian military planning, including changes in Russian nuclear strategy’. An aspect of the new doctrine that has been grossly misrepresented is its nuclear policy provisions. Contrary to press reports, the MOD draft reiterates principles guiding the use of nuclear weapons contained in the 2000 doctrine. These include a pledge to deploy nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or a biological attack, and a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack in ‘situations that are vital for the survival of Russia and its allies’. While some have argued that the latter provision is an attempt to extend Moscow’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ to its CIS allies, the threat of nuclear strikes against a conventional aggressor is more likely to be a veiled warning to China that Russia will not tolerate military pressure in the Far East.

IMPLICATIONS: Many priorities mapped out by the draft doctrine represent Moscow’s wish to realize the opportunities posed by the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’, and what the Kremlin views as America’s diversion from the CIS. The draft makes it clear that there are limits to the rapprochement between Russia and the West, and that Moscow will not back down on its assertive policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, the question of whether the new doctrine signals Moscow’s willingness to employ armed force to further its interests in the CIS is quite another matter. The answer, at least in the short-term, would be in the negative. Firstly, the remit of the doctrine is too broad and its ability to serve as a useful guide for action is questionable. Secondly, the stated policy with regard to Russian interests in the ‘near abroad’ is at variance with Moscow’s actual capabilities. It is not unreasonable to suggest that for many years to come, Russia will lack both economic and technical means needed to project military power in the CIS and beyond. Following in the US footsteps and fighting enemies on their soil is a seductive but unattainable goal. The Russian armed forces lack capabilities to fight long-range wars and perform pre-emptive strikes. The army is bogged down in Chechnya and is currently only in the beginning of a lengthy process of modernization and professionalization. The Russian military can deploy a very limited number of mostly outdated precision-guided weapons. Most of Russia’s ageing Tu-160 and Tu-95M strategic bombers are not combat ready. At the tactical level, the Air Force fields very few aircraft equipped with multi-purpose radars that can guide “smart” bombs and missiles on target. This gap between plans and resources calls into question Russia’s ability to become a CIS ‘policeman’.

CONCLUSIONS: The released document is a doctrine for the government that seeks to balance better relations with the U.S. and NATO with a neo-imperialist policy in the CIS. At the level of policy implementation, however, the doctrine is unlikely to have a short-term impact on Russia’s policy in the ‘near abroad’. Like previous military doctrines, the new draft lacks clarity and fails to rank priorities, containing vague and contradictory passages about Russian security interests and military strategy. Clearly having numerous authors, some in favor of a traditional anti-Western posture and some advocating radical reforms and tighter co-operation with the West, the doctrine aims at offering ‘something for everyone’: threats to re-think nuclear strategy and take on ‘weak’ CIS regimes to appease conservatives and the left-wing opposition; and pledges to build a modern and mobile army for the liberals’ consumption. In practical terms, the doctrine’s ambiguity will give President Putin enough flexibility to continue to change policy direction as and when he sees it fit.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Denis Trifonov (BA, MSc Oxon) does research in International Relations at Lincoln College, Oxford. He teaches international history and politics, and works as a Russia/CIS analyst for several political risks consultancies.