BACKGROUND: The National Guard constitutes part of the Kyrgyz armed forces and is placed under the control of the President of the Republic and it is part of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF). It played a key role in the counter-insurgency campaign in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in 1999. It is tasked with the protection of foreign dignitaries visiting Kyrgyzstan, responsible for the security of critical infrastructure, clearing up in the aftermath of a natural disaster and crucially it fulfils a vital part of the country’s antiterrorist capabilities. The National Guard antiterrorist units consist of three separate units; the ‘Panthers,’ ‘Snow Leopards’ and ‘Edelweiss.’ The Panthers differ form other Special Forces units from the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MVD) or the National security service, insofar as they possess an airborne capability. Selection for the National Guards is understandably more rigorous than standards found elsewhere in the armed forces. Fitness levels are expected to match those of the airborne troops. On the surface, it is replicating the pattern of elite forces internationally, insisting on higher standards to carry out often difficult and specialized combat operations. Their training, however, is no different to that given to similar units in the MoD. Nevertheless, there are clear challenges facing the National Guard. Given the lack of funds and problems of adequately financing modernization of existing weapons and equipment, the National Guard lacks modern weapons, as well as night vision equipment, body armor and, crucially, air mobility, since the Kyrgyz air force is essentially grounded due to fuel shortages. Basic issues, such as the manufacture and supply of uniforms, continue to beset efforts to raise standards within the various units. Most uniforms worn by the servicemen have been made abroad, or given to them by the Chinese. Chotbayev confirmed that the defense budget allocation for the National Guard is wholly inadequate, receiving around 20 percent of the sum it calculates as necessary —even this if often not fully paid. Indeed, such state-imposed hardships compel servicemen to seek alternative arrangements, often relying on bartering or corruption. Officers serving in the National Guard are paid between 1,400 – 2,300 Soms, leaving them a long way from the levels of salary envisaged by even modest military reform plans. Problems common to the post-Soviet militaries are evident within the Kyrgyz armed forces, based on national conscription and suffering from underfunding and years of neglect. These conditions also pertain to its elite forces, particularly the phenomenon of ‘hazing’ or institutionalized bullying within the barracks. Chotbayev readily admits that these problems exist, though he suggests that all is being done to encourage soldiers to turn to officers with concerns rather than inflicting violence on their colleagues. As Chotbayev accepts, hazing is an endemic problem afflicting the contemporary Kyrgyz armed forces. In this context, it is hardly surprising to find instances of soldiers going AWOL. Yet the elite National Guard, with its higher standards and critical security role, proves no exception. On the fence surrounding its barracks in Bishkek, their are boot marks clearly visible, which were reportedly made by escaping soldiers. The antidote to such problems, which saps morale and projects an image of weakness and corruption, comes in the ever-increasing promises of the Akayev government to improve conditions in the armed forces.

IMPLICATIONS: The conditions in the Kyrgyz armed forces remain poor, and this appears to be reflected even within its most privileged units. Chotbayev, however, sees the solution to the problems of the National Guard in abstract measures such as achieving token permanent representation within the U.S. National Guard in Montana. Such aspirations, as noble as they are in practice, reflect Kyrgyzstan’s need to promote its security interests though its ‘multi-layered’ foreign policy, which results in seeking security assistance wherever it can be found. This is borne out by closely following its international assistance goals. It cooperates closely with the US National Guard, sharing experience, sending its cadets to the U.S. for language courses and receiving training at the Montana National Guard military schools. Meanwhile, in addition to its military ties to Russia, similar activities are also envisaged in China, Turkey and elsewhere. Kyrgyzstan is developing closer security links with China. Indeed, the National Guard is the only security body in Kyrgyzstan that cooperates with the People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese police. Levels of cooperation are likely to deepen still further, bilaterally with China, and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 2004, Beijing plans to send 1,000 uniforms and build two barracks, further deepening ties with the Kyrgyz National Guard. In early October, in an alarming development, three officers from the Kyrgyz National Guards were arrested on suspicion of involvement in the terrorist attacks in Osh in 1998 and the bombing of a market place in Bishkek in December 2002. Although all three, currently remanded in custody, are not thought to have actively instigated the bombings, they are alleged to have had involvement in supplying explosives. A combination of factors, social and economic, has contributed to the sorrowful condition of rogue elements in the antiterrorist units becoming part of the security problem in the country, rather than part of the solution.

CONCLUSIONS: Since the deployment of U.S. and coalition forces in Central Asia and the basing of the U.S. military at Ganci, President Akayev has repeatedly defined the objectives of Kyrgyz military reform. He has expounded the view that Kyrgyzstan needs small, mobile forces, professionally manned and trained, capable of dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and insurgency. Professionalizing the Kyrgyz armed forces, whilst laudable in theory, remains many years away from becoming a reality. Currently, the military continues to be weak, and the country relies on the benevolence of foreign powers providing security assistance, whether on a bilateral basis or through its participation in international and regional security bodies, ranging from its participation in NATOs PfP, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the SCO. The continued deprivations and weakness of even the most elite military units in Kyrgyzstan, tasked with antiterrorist functions, clearly causes concern amongst those seeking to enhance regional security. Without the active engagement of the Akayev government, convincing Kyrgyz policy makers of the necessity to reform these bodies and assume responsibility for enhancing their capabilities, Kyrgyzstan can only be expected to continue to look to outside powers to provide real security.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at Canterbury (UK).