BACKGROUND: Shortly before the recent Putin-Bush summit, Vagit Alekperov, head of Lukoil, one of Russia’s premier oil firms, floated an interesting trial balloon. He proposed a joint U.S.-Russian force to patrol oil fields in order to assure energy security. Inasmuch as bilateral energy relations between the United States and Moscow were a major item on the summit agenda this trial balloon probably represented a Russian effort to float a proposal that could be shot down without embarrassment to it but which clearly represented a major Russian policy objective. Specifically it appears that the deal Alekperov was proposing entailed a joint force to patrol Iraqi oil fields, which means Russian support for the U.S.-supported UN resolution on Iraq. The price to be paid by Washington would be an American agreement to guarantee Baghdad’s preexisting $9 Billion debt to Moscow and a sizable Russian share in prospective oil contracts from Iraq’s oil fields. However, Alekperov’s idea, which apparently failed to materialize for the moment, has possibilities insofar as Caspian energy fields are concerned. For some time before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Russian emissaries unofficially told Americans that Moscow would be prepared to look the other way or even support an invasion of Iraq if Iraqi debts were guaranteed and Russia received contracts for future development of some of Iraq’s oil fields. At the same time, after September 11 there was a decided expansion of the rhetoric concerning U.S.-Russian energy partnership to counter OPEC. To date little has come from either initiative. Nonetheless it appears that Russia is still pursuing these ideas as part of a broader strategic partnership with America and foreign investment in Russian energy has definitely greatly expanded since September 11. However, the place where such joint security guarantees or patrols to ensure energy security would be useful is the Transcaspian area. Unfortunately the prospects for this look rather dim now. Nevertheless the idea ought to be put on the agenda.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s efforts to dominate the Transcaspian energy producers’ economies are unremitting and public knowledge. The political consequence of such domination would be those states’ continued backwardness and a neo-colonialist structure for their economics and politics, precisely the conditions that will sooner or later ensure failed states, violent political explosions, and renewed terrorism. It is also highly likely that Russian efforts to undermine these states’ actual economic independence has included attacks by forces susceptible to Russian influence or payments upon pipelines in Azerbaijan and Georgia. These attacks would aim not only to weaken those economies, but to demonstrate their continuing inability to provide the West with energy thereby eliminating a rival to Russian-dominated energy transfers. Third, such attacks would demonstrate that nobody could protect pipelines besides Russia. Thus in many respects, these attacks bear all the hallmarks of a classic protection racket where the intended victim either pays for protection or sees his business ruined. A fourth reason for such attacks is likely connected to Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s numerous calls for membership in NATO, or for NATO protection of those pipelines. These overtures to NATO clearly arouse Russia’s ire, but since Russia can do little overtly about this, it must resort to such subterfuges to punish these states and accomplish the objectives listed above. However, as the strategic role of these states increases, the temptation or need for NATO and/or the United Sates to assume a grater role in protecting energy holdings and pipelines may well grow. Therefore, if Russia is seriously interested in a partnership with America, it would be useful to call Moscow’s bluff and put the issue of joint patrols squarely on the agenda. Joint patrols would prevent unilateral domination by anyone of those pipelines, but would also suspend attacks by Russian influence forces because it would be too counter-productive for Moscow to employ that tactic under the changed situation. That would also make it harder for Russia to impose its economic and other preferences upon these states. Further restraint of Russia’s deep-rooted neo-imperial tendencies would be beneficial to Russia’s people, the former Soviet members from the Baltic to Central Asia, Europe, and the United States, in short to all concerned. On the plus side this experiment in cooperative security would also represent a major step to guarantee that Central Asian economies function better and that they are less vulnerable to terrorist attacks on those pipelines or exploration sites. That, in turn, might be an important step toward greater regional security, something from which all concerned would benefit.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia has hitherto sought to restore a neo-imperial program in the former Soviet republics. Its military and Foreign Ministry also remain unreconciled to the loss of empire and its economic and political elites have therefore embraced not just efforts at military reunification of the Russian empire under a quasi-capitalist structure but also the creation of that capitalist structure, mainly buttressed by Russian domination of its former colonies’ energy holdings. This unilateralism is bound to lead to disaster because it perpetuates bad governance across the entire post-Soviet region and because ultimately Moscow cannot bear such costs, illusions to the contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, Alekperov’s call, suitably transformed by either or both Washington and Brussels, could open the path to a general structure of cooperative security in the Transcaspian region which would make visible the benefits of a strategic partnership between Russia, local states, and the West and also illuminate the costs of not doing so. Undoubtedly Alekperov, as much of a monopolist as his other colleagues in Moscow, did not have such partnership in mind for the CIS. If anything, Russia’s energy companies which seek monopoly positions in the CIS would resist this initiative. On the other hand, if Washington and Moscow truly want to build an enduring strategic partnership, his plan, suitably amended, offers a way to do so in what could truly be a win-win situation for all concerned.

AUTHOR BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.