BACKGROUND: Since December 2002, there have been increasing signs of a revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In late 2001, this organization renamed itself the Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT), thus openly proclaiming its purposes of controlling the entire Central Asian region, disregarding the five existing nation-states and their boundaries. The Kyrgyz newspaper “Vecherniy Bishkek” reported on July 23 that bomb explosions in the “Oberon” market in the Bishkek on December 27, 2002 and in a branch of “Bakay bank” in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh on May 8 were directly linked to the Islamic Movement of Turkestan. This notion received further confirmation by in an interview with the first deputy Interior Minister of Uzbekistan Bakhadir Matliubov to “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” on July 29, 2003. He argued that the Osh bomb was assembled and detonated by members of the IMT, Ilkhom Izzatullaev of Kokand and Azimbek Karimov of Andijan. Both cities are located in Uzbekistan\'s portion of the Ferghana valley. Matliubov stated that “after the defeat of Taliban, followers of radical Islamist organizations spread into all countries of Central Asia”. Furthermore, reports have emerged that residents of remote districts of Uzbekistan’s southern Surkhandarya region noted the appearance of armed men in mountain areas, supposedly members of the IMT, and that influx of foreign funds to the IMU has also occurred. Experts on international terrorism indicate real threat stemming from the combination of re-organized terrorist infrastructure and available manpower and financing, indicating that the countries of Central Asia still have to do more and cooperate in order to safeguard themselves from terrorism.

IMPLICATIONS: Financing for the IMT units, it has been argued, comes through Pakistan, whereas militants themselves infiltrate into Kyrgyzstan from neighboring Tajikistan. Since 1999, President Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan has regularly vowed that there is not a single terrorist on the soil of his country. However, the sequence of events proves that Tajikistan has continuously been used by terrorists as a staging point for actions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. There is little to suggest that this could not be the case again. In 1999, the IMU invaded the southern Batken region of Kyrgyzstan from the Sogd province and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region of Tajikistan, and the following year, IMU fighters invaded the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan from the Shaartuz district of Tajikistan. This led Rakhmonov to lose face, as it exposed his inability to control Tajikistan’s territory – or the various field commanders integrated in his government after the 1997 peace treaty that ended the Tajik civil war. As Rakhmonov’s control over Tajikistan’s territory has not improved appreciably, the long-term cooperation against terrorism and stability in Central Asia are still facing the challenge of Tajikistan’s weakness. There are credible reports from western intelligence services that IMT fighters are finding hospitality in Tajikistan. Up to a hundred IMT members are hiding in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, in the villages of Khushad, Khevaspor, and Ayvanj, in the Shaartuz district of the Khatlon and Sogd regions of Tajikistan. Moreover, reports indicate that IMT operatives are able to operate in Pakistan, including its ideological leader Tahir Yoldash. Several hundred IMT members may be operating in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, where they have long-standing close links with outlawed Islamist movements such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Patronage of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, which incidentally was the main ideological sponsor of the Taliban, is also present for the IMT. With the JUI being an influential member of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the Islamist coalition group that forms the government of the NWFP, the IMT leaders have been able to find sanctuary among Pakistani Islamist circles. Pakistani officials openly state that their counter-terrorism efforts are focused almost solely on the fight against Al-Qaeda and Pakistani sectarian groups threatening the government. In turn, Taliban or regional extremist groups, who pose a lesser threat to the Pakistani government, are not being given priority. The IMT has detachments of fighters in Afghanistan as well. In the Kunar and Paktia provinces of Afghanistan, IMT guerrillas are reportedly operating with Al Qaeda or Taliban units. But their activity is not limited to the southern parts, as small groups of IMT fighters have been spotted in mountain passes of the northern Badakhshan province, near Tajikistan’s borders, and possibly protected by Northern Alliance field commanders. The strength of criminal networks in Central Asia also helps the IMT. IMT fighters have retained strong connections especially with traffickers of narcotics in Central Asia, and are reported to use the same smuggling routes used by traffickers for bringing fighters across the borders between Afghanistan and Central Asia, and between Central Asian states.

CONCLUSIONS: These events all paint a very troubling picture of growing security threats to Central Asia. In a time of desperate needs for economic transformation and reforms, when all countries of the region, especially Afghanistan, need stability in order to attract foreign investments and rebuild their national economies, some forces are intent on destabilizing the regional situation. This is direct challenge to the regional security of Central Asia and thereby to international security more broadly. With the ongoing deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorist groups and their sponsors are feeling reinvigorated, and are acquiring the courage to base themselves in Kashmir and Tajikistan, as well as in Afghanistan itself, with a view to stage hit and run operations. The threat of radical Islamic terrorism in Central Asia is not over. While the IMT remains geographically scattered, it is increasingly re-organizing, and apparently able to keep communications open between its various detachments. Moreover, while much of its strength is held up in areas far from the Fergana valley, increasingly small numbers of fighters are active inside Central Asia. This poses a clear and present danger, especially if the IMT follows the path of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Iraqi resistance groups of focusing on hit and run operations on soft targets. Cooperation between Central Asian states in the struggle against terrorism is therefore as important as ever.

AUTHOR’S BIO: James Purcell Smith is an expert on Russian and Eurasian affairs, based in New York.