BACKGROUND: Almost all the governors in Afghanistan’s 32 provinces were self-appointed. A number of them had been governors in the pre-Taliban period and they simply reoccupied their offices when the Taliban regime collapsed in November-December 2001. Others were appointed governors and military commanders by the dominant armed factions in their particular provinces. The Northern Alliance, which continues to dominate the Karzai government, had a major say in all such appointments. Karzai and other pro-West members of his cabinet lacked military muscle and were, therefore, in no position to appoint the governors of their choice. It was a fait accompli and Karzai was required to work with whoever was in office at the time of his appointment as interim President in December 2001. Most of the governors also held office as military commanders, giving them unparalleled powers in the provinces. The combination of the two offices made all such warlords powerful enough to resist the authority of the central government. The Karzai government was thus confined to Kabul because it was dependent on the goodwill of the warlords-cum-governors to implement the center’s decisions. Some months ago, President Karzai ordered the separation of the civil and military offices and made it clear that those holding political jobs of governors would have to give up their position as military commanders. Karzai’s orders weren’t taken seriously initially because some of his previous decisions remained unimplemented. In fact, some government officials that Karzai had sacked or transferred early this year managed to remain on their jobs in defiance of the President’s orders. In the process, Karzai earned the reputation of a President who made good speeches but lacked the will and the authority to turn his words into deeds. A number of governors and military commanders enjoyed an unsavory reputation owing to their brutal and tainted past. The US military authorities needed the services of the warlords in their war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Thus anyone willing to fight the al-Qaeda and Taliban was generously provided arms and money. The warlords not only became militarily strong but also managed to occupy the choicest offices in the post-Taliban administration. It was an anomalous situation because the US as a matter of policy wanted to strengthen the Karzai government but its policy of arming and equipping the warlords made them strong enough to challenge Karzai and his cabinet. The administrative reshuffle ordered by Karzai retained Ismail Khan as Governor of Herat but deprived him of his powers as the corps commander of the province. General Baz Mohammad Ahmadi replaced him as Herat’s military commander. One of the first comments that Ahmadi made was with regard to the unnecessarily large military force that Ismail Khan had raised in the province. Ahmadi’s stance would certainly accentuate his conflict with Ismail Khan, who has close ties to Iran, a reason that makes America keen to cut Ismail Khan down to size. Karzai also replaced Zabul’s Governor Hamidullah Tokhi, a former Hekmatyar associate, and Urozgan’s Governor Jan Mohammad Khan. Both were removed due to the worsening security situation in the two provinces, where Taliban forces have been active. Kandahar Governor Gul Agha Sherzoi was also replaced. Some military and security commanders were also replaced in Kandahar, Urozgan and Zabul to tackle the growing Taliban threat.

IMPLICATIONS: If implemented in letter and spirit, the administrative changes would bolster Karzai’s reputation and serve as a warning to other governors and military commanders. It would send a strong message that the central government is keen to extend its writ to the provinces and implement its decisions. Governors and military commanders still reluctant to cooperate with Karzai would either have to fall in line or risk losing some of their powers. The message being sent is clear: the U.S. and its Western allies are determined to strengthen President Karzai. Some warlords also interpreted U.S. backing for Karzai as a signal that he would be supported in his bid to seek election as President in elections next June. The move to strip Ismail Khan of his military powers was the most significant attempt to date by Karzai to assert his authority and widen his popular base. It was also a warning to Uzbek warlord Abdur Rasheed Dostum, who operates as nominal deputy defense minister but refuses to abandon his power-base in northern Afghanistan and come to Kabul to take up his responsibilities. Dostum’s rivalry with Tajik warlords Atta Mohammad has kept Mazar-i-Sharif and other northern cities and provinces in turmoil and frustrated donors and aid workers pursuing reconstruction work in that area. Moreover, military commanders loyal to defense minister Marshal Mohammad Qasim Faheem would also view all this with alarm. Though untouched by the administrative reshuffle, they would remain alert to any move that could weaken their position in future. However, Ismail Khan is unlikely to willingly accept decisions that erode his power. He could possibly team up with former mujahideen colleagues to stop Karzai and his pro-West, liberal and royalist supporters from dominating Afghanistan. They are likely to receive Iran’s backing in such a project. Russia too is close to the former mujahideen, particularly to those grouped in the Northern Alliance. The struggle for power in Kabul could, therefore, create a pro-West camp led by Karzai and former king Zahir Shah’s supporters pitted against the pro-Moscow and pro-Tehran camps comprising former Mujahideen groups.

CONCLUSIONS: Karzai’s hand was forced by the surge in violence in parts of the country to make his move. By ordering the administrative changes, Karzai not only made a bid to extend his government’s influence but also address the concerns of the UN and aid organizations who have repeatedly stressed that deteriorating security was the main challenge facing war-ravaged Afghanistan. If successfully implemented, the reshuffle would make governors and military commanders to obey Karzai’s policies, accept the writ of the central government and transfer revenues generated in their provinces and from customs duties on Afghanistan’s borders to Kabul. However, one would have to wait whether Karzai can build upon this move and order more changes in the administration. Of particular interest would be his ability to order changes in the composition of the defense ministry, which is dominated by minister Faheem’s Tajik followers from the Panjsher Valley. Donors have linked their financial support for a countrywide disarmament drive with reforms that would make the defense ministry and the slowly emerging Afghan National Army ethnically balanced. Karzai’s ability to make the army and police a truly national force would help overcome the deep ethnic divisions that still plague Afghanistan and improve his standing among his people.

AUTHOR\'S BIO: Rahimullah Yusufzai is an executive editor of The News International, Islamabad. He is also a correspondent of the BBC, ABC News and Time magazine. He has published research papers on Afghanistan and travelled widely in that country to cover the Afghan story since the communist revolution of April 1978.