BACKGROUND: The situation in Central Asia has turned increasingly grim in recent years as the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan has increasingly used the Central Asian route. United Nations statistics indicate that the Southern route for traffickers over Iran is stagnating or even declining in importance as the Iranian government has over the last decade made it gradually more difficult, and therefore expensive, for traffickers to transport their goods through the southern route. This forced traffickers to find easier and accessible routes to Europe, and with weak states and endemic corruption both in the regional governments in Central Asia and among Russian border troops stationed in Tajikistan, Central Asia has been an obvious choice. The consequences have been serious for the region in terms of corruption, public health and security. Addiction rates are estimated at over 1% of the population, while corruption in state authorities has boomed. Recent developments indicate that new drug smuggling routes originating in Southeast Asia and China are using Central Asia as a corridor for drugs to Europe. It has been evident that Southeast Asian traders have taken an interest in the weakened region of Central Asia as such a porous region decreases their transaction costs. The only serious limitation of this trade is the Chinese determination to stop drug smuggling. The Chinese borders are nevertheless relatively easy to penetrate, and in spite of an increased level of seizures by the Chinese government, seizures likely constitute only a fraction of the drugs that stay in China or continue over Central Asia to their final destinations. China is today the state in the world that seizes the largest amount of heroin and morphine – 20 percent of world seizures in 2002. A significant amount of the Chinese drug trade is directed towards Central Asia, where networks of transportation already exist. Seizures in Central Asia have also increased, but are more a proof of increased smuggling than any indication of the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies. Trafficking networks that control the drug trade in Central Asia have likely increased their effectiveness, and through increased volumes from China, they have received new sources of finances to further improve their capacity.

IMPLICATIONS: The rapidly increasing trafficking of drugs since the mid-1990s has had severe implications on the political, economic and social security in the region. Central Asia has seen a profound economic recession since independence in 1991, and as the legal economy remains very limited, drugs have become a primary, though illegal, business sector. Drug trade has in turn hindered the emergence of viable legal economies. Regional economies are increasingly criminalized as a greater proportion of the economy is controlled by drug money. Not only is the legal economy decreasing in strength, it is also being bought up by drug money; the result is that the legal economies are increasingly controlled by criminal interests. This has deepened the endemic corruption in the states. The new trafficking routes through China to Central Asia are deepening the region’s drug problem, and may result in making Central Asia a global drug trafficking hub. Traditionally, the primary areas affected by the drug trade have been Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, but as new drug traffickers are entering from Central Asia’s eastern borders, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will be affected to a much higher degree than before. The Chinese and Southeast Asian drugs have further strengthened the position of the drug trade over the legal economy. This development has clear political implications. Central Asian states have been politically weak since independence, but the criminalization of the region has further weakened government structures in many countries, and the potential government response to the drug trafficking. The use of Central Asia as a trade route is dependent on state weakness, as drug traders can expect less problems and cheaper ways of transportation if regional governments are unable or unwilling to check their activities. The increased amount of criminal organizations in the region have further destabilized the states in the region. Rivalling Southeast Asian and Chinese networks seem to be entering the scene, where old networks that dealt with the Afghan trade were established. This raises the threat of an increased level of violence in the Central Asian states derived from the drug trade. To this should be added the risk of terrorist and extremist organizations with links to the drug trade destabilizing the region, as happened with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999. The connection between political instability in drugs is clear: drug trade is expanding most notably in the areas of Central Asia and China that are weak and unruly or in conflict with the central government – Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Xinjiang and Yunnan provinces of China are examples. The social and humanitarian effects of the drug trade are already spiralling out of control, and an increased amount of drugs in circulation accentuates the long-term health risks in the region. The growth of HIV and Hepatitis C is directly related to the drug trade in the region today, and there have been indications that these could reach epidemic levels. The Central Asian region is not equipped to handle the developing health situation. The inclusion of the Southeast and Chinese trade is not only bringing more drugs through the region, but also increases the number of addicts through lower prices and increased accessibility. Human trafficking has also increased along the routes of trafficking, with a more organized prostitution and HIV as a result.

CONCLUSION: Central Asia has become the main drug trafficking route for the western and eastern European markets, transporting not only Afghan opiates but increasingly also becoming the route of choice for drugs from other parts of Asia. Local states were already at a loss handling the societal, economic and political fallout of the drug trade, and is by no means equipped to deal with yet further influxes of drugs. The Chinese and Southeast Asian route through Central Asia is accentuating the need to make Central Asia a major battlefield in the international cooperation against drugs. If there is true international support to combat drugs, large resources need to be directed towards the Central Asian region in order to mitigate the severe destabilizing effects of the drug trade on the economy, politics and not least society of the region.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Niklas Swanström is Associate Professor and Executive Director of the Silk Road Studies Program of Uppsala University, Sweden. http://www.silkroadstudies.org.