BACKGROUND: The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a windfall for the five Central Asian republics, that had previously shown little desire to strive for full independence. Unaccustomed to being on their own or making their own decisions, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan went through a period of euphoria, where anything seemed possible. But the subsequent economic collapse of the countries and open discrimination against ethnic Russians by the titular nationalities in the early 1990s quickly led to disillusionment and triggered a wave of migration. In Tajikistan, it led to civil war.

By the mid-1990s, the leaders of the five republics, who in the early days had flirted with democracy to varying degrees of intensity, recognized that political reforms were not foremost on the minds of the impoverished population and installed the political system that best suited their personalities. Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov developed a lavish cult of personality and was given the right to rule for life by parliament last December. He declared Turkmenistan a neutral state a few years ago and routinely ignores outside views. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev chose to follow the path of democracy to the letter, at one time earning him the reputation of being the "Thomas Jefferson of Central Asia." Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections in February, however, were seriously marred and have shown that Akayev’s stamina has waned significantly.

In the second half of the 1990s, international interest in the exploration and production of oil in the Caspian Sea region brought great attention to the oil-rich republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This, in turn, increased the assertiveness of their presidents as well as their desire to move out of Russia's shadow. The U.S. government's efforts to diminish Russia's historical influence over the area by supporting the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, an export oil pipeline that would run through the Caucasus to Turkey, met with approval. Both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan tried further to reduce their dependence on any one country for the transportation of their oil and gas by advocating the building of multiple pipelines, running in different directions - to the north, south, east, and west.

IMPLICATIONS: The endorsement of Vladimir Putin by Russian voters marks a new stage for the former Soviet Central Asian republics. The dynamics of the relationship between Russia and Central Asia first showed signs of change last summer following the incursion of Uzbek and Tajik guerrillas, veterans of the Tajikistan civil war, into the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz military was caught completely off guard, as was President Akayev who decided to call on Russia for help. Russia was happy to comply and sent technical assistance. Putin's hard-nosed approach to dealing with terrorism is what the Central Asian leaders believe they need to put a stop to the rise of militant Islam in the region. Kyrgyzstani officials are already anticipating another attack by Islamic guerrillas in the spring or early summer. Russia will certainly come to the help again as it is in its own best interest. But Russia will exact a price that will likely reduce the scope of independent decision making available to the Central Asian presidents.

Since Yeltsin's resignation three months ago and Putin's appointment as acting president of Russia, Kazakhstan has a strong sense of what lies in store from Putin’s Russia. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev enjoyed a close relationship with Yeltsin. The Kazakhstani leadership perceived its strong leverage because Russia's Baikonur Space Center is located on Kazakhstan's territory and the Russian government pays an annual fee for its use. When two proton rockets crashed over Kazakhstan last year, the Kazakhstani government temporarily prohibited all rocket launches and forced Russia to pay compensation. But Putin’s maneuverings at the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on January 25 changed this relationship. Putin, who was unanimously elected as CIS chairman, spent extra time meeting one-on-one with Karimov and the Kazakhstani media judged th summit as a major diplomatic failure for Nazarbayev.

In contrast, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov has been bolstered by the rise of Putin. Putin's approach to dealing with terrorism in Chechnya is mirrored by Karimov’s hardline approach to fighting militant Islam in Uzbekistan, although such militancy is mostly a product of the repressed political environment in Uzbekistan created by Karimov himself. An emboldened Karimov is likely to assert Uzbekistan’s border claims to territory in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, even if it has to do so unilaterally. Precisely around the time of the January summit, the border dispute between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan started. Uzbek border guards, supported by an armored personnel carrier, unilaterally demarcated a stretch of the border advancing several miles into Kazakhstan's territory. It is suspected that Russia might have supported this unprovoked incident aiming to cause instability in the Central Asian region and placing Putin in the role of savior.

CONCLUSIONS: The election of Vladimir Putin as Russia's president on March 26 has officially been welcomed, but privately has been dreaded by some Central Asian leaders and the non-Russian population of Central Asia. Russia under the ailing Boris Yeltsin lacked a coherent policy towards Central Asia, which allowed enough room for the five republics to develop and more or less implement their own domestic and foreign policies. Unfortunately for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the high estimates for potential hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea are now viewed as inflated. The Caspian has lost some of its luster and attractiveness for western investors, thereby leaving Central Asian countries little alternative but to fall into the wide open arms of a revitalized Russia

The reawakening of nationalism in Russia is of particular concern to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where a sizable number of ethnic Russians live. Slavic organizations in both countries, together with the Communist Party, have been so emboldened by Putin's drastic measures in Chechnya and his promise to revive the economy, they have demanded that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan join the Russia-Belarus Union. Although discrimination is no longer a factor, as it was right after independence, ethnic Russians long for improving their dire economic straits. Some dream that a union with Russia would help them better their lives. However, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz fear that such a union would signify re-colonization and would be a nightmare.

AUTHOR BIO: Birgit Brauer is a journalist based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, who writes for The Economist about Central Asia. She is also a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham in Great Britain.

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