BACKGROUND: The break-up of the Soviet Union seemed to open new opportunities for spreading Iranian influence in Central Asia. But Iran faced major obstacles in influencing the newly independent states in the region. One hurdle was Iran's limited knowledge of Central Asia. Another obstacle to understanding was the ideological differences between Iran and the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Iran’s religious association with the region was challenged by the sectarian, ethnic and nationalist identities of the emerging states that feared Islamic militancy and harbored a certain level of suspicion and distrust toward Iran.

Iran promoted Russia’s presence as a balance in Central Asia’s potentially chaotic environment and cooperated with Moscow. Their partnership was well demonstrated in Tajikistan when Iran and Russia worked together to mediate a settlement between the Moscow-backed government and the Iranian-influenced Islamic-led United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Iran refused to get involved in Chechnya although the Chechens’ armed struggle for independence from Russia had strong Islamic underpinnings. Iran’s partnership with Russia and Armenia was a strategic response to U.S. efforts to develop influence in the area through its ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. This polarized alignment of forces is central to the pipeline politics that pit the north-south axis against the east-west corridor.

It is geography and not history that offers incentives to the land-locked energy-rich Central Asia and the Caucasus to forge closer ties with Iran. Iran provides the most economic and the shortest export route for the region’s oil and gas to international markets. However, Iran’s geographic advantage is hindered by geopolitical realities. Driven by its revolutionary policy in the Middle East, Iran long ignored its potential role in the Caspian basin and blocked its emergence as a major player in oil and gas pipeline politics.

IMPLICATIONS: Fears of the spillover from armed conflicts in Afghanistan, the threat of religious and political extremism and growing drug trafficking are immediate security challenges in Central Asia. Iran shares the region's security concerns but it can hardly match Moscow’s security influence in Central Asia. Moscow opposes the U.S.-backed east-west pipeline route for the Caspian Sea basin but does not favor an Iranian route as an alternative. The Central Asian states still show interest in an Iranian route but not at Russia's expense. Moscow and Tehran both support the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan for security reasons, but Russia also exploits the Afghan situation in order to rebuild a sphere of influence in Central Asia.

Iran looks to the "common cultural heritage" that it shares with the Central Asian countries and hopes this common heritage will play a strong role in its future relations with the region. The Central Asian states are in the process of redefining their national identities but it is not likely that their common culture shared with Iran will be highlighted in these emerging identities. While the Central Asians rediscover their pre-Soviet cultural and historical roots, they will not ignore the legacy of their Russian-Soviet past that constitutes a bridge to European culture. It is these "European" ties that will lessen the significance of their "common cultural heritage" with Iran and strongly influence their future international relations.

Iran and Turkey have the potential to play a more influential role in the Caucasus and the United States is in a better position to counter Russian influence there. Ironically, it is in the Caucasus, not in Russian-influenced Central Asia, that Iran can play a more influential role. Iran can use its geographic advantage to influence the multi-lateral economic dealings in the region. Iran is expanding its oil swapping deals with Central Asian states and Azerbaijan. According to these arrangements, crude oil from the region is shipped to the refineries in northern Iran in exchange for proceeds from delivery of equal amounts of Iranian oil for export from Persian Gulf ports. A multiple pipeline approach that includes an Iranian route can prove to be a politically and economically desirable solution.

CONCLUSION: The road to Iran’s expanded business ties with the Caucasus passes through Washington. When Iran opens up to the world, the United States may consent to business dealings between the energy-rich Central Asian states and Iran. Such a development will serve the interests of all parties. Iran offers the shortest way to export Central Asian oil and natural gas to international markets. However, Iran can be a spoiler if its strategic interests are ignored.

Ongoing social and political changes in Iran and Central Asia should create new opportunities for bilateral and multilateral relations. In Iran, popular pressure on the Islamic regime to introduce social and political reforms should lead to improved relations with the West including the United States. Despite the recent conservative-led crackdown on the reformist movement in Iran, the country is likely to stay the course of reform. A reformed Islamic Republic can play a leading role in transporting the Caspian energy resources to international markets.

AUTHOR BIO: Ali A. Jalali is the director of the Voice of America-Farsi Service and formerly of the Dari and Pashto services. Trained as a professional military officer in the Royal Afghan army, he became a military planner for the Mujahedeen after the Soviet invasion. He has written a number of books on Afghanistan along with his recent book, The Other Side of the Mountain, a detailed account of military tactics used by militia style armies.

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