BACKGROUND: The Russo-Chechen conflict can now be defined as a nine-year old struggle that has gone through two non-violent stages, between Chechnya’s declaration of independence in 1991 and December 1994, and between August 1996 and September 1999. The conflict has also gone through two violent phases, including the war of December 1994-August 1996 that ended in a Chechen victory, and the current war that has raged since September 1999. During these nine years, the main contentious issue has been the status of Chechnya and its relationship to the Russian Federation. The Russian Federal government has held a fairly simplistic view of the conflict as a fight against Islamic radicalism and terrorism. On the Chechen side, the conflict has until recently been defined as an ethnic or national issue. The Chechen state, established in 1991, legitimized itself in ‘western’ terms and based itself on the principles of national self-determination, human rights and democracy.

Chechnya was a thoroughly Muslim society when the war first began but President Dudayev refrained from Islamic rhetoric even during the war. The situation at present is different as the military effort is heavily cloaked in religious terms. The Chechen leadership has declared a ‘jihad’ or holy war, and fighters refer to themselves as ‘Mujahedin’, the same term used in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Before the latest war, Chechnya introduced sharia and proclaimed itself an Islamic State. The use of Islam for purposes of legitimization has increased dramatically since the return of warfare because the 1994-96 war led to a strengthening of Islam in Chechen society. Islam is increasingly attractive especially to fatalistic soldiers facing the extreme devastation of Chechnya and the death of close to 50,000 people.

The Council of Europe accepted Russia into its helm just as it was violating that organization’s most sacred tenets in Chechnya. When Russia attacked Chechnya in 1999 with tremendous brutality and indiscriminate use of force, Chechnya had little reason to adhere to ‘western’ principles of secularism and democracy. The Chechens found support in the Persian Gulf, primarily among private institutions or individuals that had benefited from oil dollars and who aim to promote radical forms of Islam globally. A similar phenomenon has been part of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement. Such aid is conditional on adherence to political Islam. Thus, Chechnya is under both internal and external pressures to increase the Islamic character of the state and its struggle.

IMPLICATIONS: From the Chechen perspective, the Chechnya War’s shift to an Islamically charged conflict has meant a secure flow of cash and foreign volunteers to support the war effort. Chechen sources claim that hundreds of volunteers have joined their forces to take part in the coming ‘Spring offensive’. Russian security services claim they have arrested 1,500 volunteers on their way to Chechnya across the Ukrainian border, and that 400 people have tried to enter Chechnya through Georgia. Both parties, however, have an interest in inflating these figures. The Chechens use inflated figures to point to their foreign support, and the Russians inflate them to further their painting of the conflict as a struggle against ‘global Islamic terrorism’.

The Chechens lack neither arms nor soldiers to fill the positions of deceased troops and the inflow of foreign volunteers boosts the morale of the Chechen forces. This foreign support plays an important role in the Chechen war effort and increases the chances of a repetition of the August 1996 victory for Chechnya. For Russia this is bad enough, but the consequences of a Chechen victory may extend much beyond Russia’s 1996 loss. An ethnically defined Chechen war like the one in 1994-96 entailed only a very limited support among other Muslim North Caucasian peoples. By contrast, a religiously defined conflict, as is increasingly the case, entails a significantly greater risk of contagion.

The risk of veritable rebellions in other Muslim areas of the Russian Federation remains low. However, as the Islamic revival in the Caucasus continues, it is likely that the North Caucasian population’s loyalty towards the Russian state will wither away further and Moscow’s control over the region will erode. There are indications that among the fighters in Chechnya, a few hundred members of other North Caucasian peoples are contributing to the Chechen war effort. And irrespective of the outcome of the war, most of these individuals will eventually return to their native regions and promote their views with unforeseen problems for the Kremlin.

CONCLUSIONS: Originally, Chechnya’s discourse in its conflict with Russia was clearly oriented towards a western audience and was intended to achieve recognition as a nation-state by western powers. But when Chechnya’s western orientation brought it close to nothing, the Chechens increased their use of Islam to legitimize their struggle. The 1994-96 war led to the strengthening of Islam in Chechen society and influenced the Chechen military effort to be cloaked in religious terms. The Chechens now call their war against Moscow a ‘jihad’ and fighters refer to themselves as ‘Mujahedin’. Chechnya has implemented sharia Islamic laws and proclaimed itself an Islamic State.

The Islamically colored picture of the Chechen conflict that Russian propaganda has been painting for the last decade has become a reality. Moscow’s inability to use any methods save brute force in dealing with the Chechen issue, including its refusal to commit resources to Chechnya’s reconstruction in the ‘inter-war era’ has amounted to pushing Chechnya into the arms of the global radical Islamic movement. In other words, Russia has contributed to the realization of its worst nightmare: the appearance and consolidation of Islamic radicalism on Russia’s very territory.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Svante E. Cornell is a lecturer in the departments of Peace and Conflict Research and East European Studies, Uppsala University, and the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press/S:t Martin's Press, 1999, as well as articles on Caucasian conflicts and geopolitics.

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