BACKGROUND: The instability of the Caspian-Asian region, matters profoundly to the west and to the U.S. for several reasons. First, its instability permits the operation and growth of terrorist movements that often have a global and specifically anti-American scope. Second, and related to this is the surge of illicit narcotics trade throughout the region that targets western societies and provides a major source of funding for these groupings. Third, the Caspian is a emerging oil producing region vital to unimpeded energy access. Finally, regional conflicts in this volatile area have the potential of developing into major power confrontations that cannot but affect the security of the U.S. and its allies. The record of U.S. policy towards the region in the 1990s shows a mixed picture. Washington has avoided major setbacks, but has not scored any major achievements either.

By virtue of its global standing as the sole remaining superpower, and by declaring the region an area of vital interests, the U.S. is a crucial component of the Caspian-Asian security calculus. However, Washington's policy displays no coherent strategy towards the region, and  policy seems to be mostly based on short-term, ad hoc decisions, thus being tactical rather than strategic in nature. In the Caucasus, Washington has helped prevent a return of Russian hegemony and sought to strengthen local states and resolve regional conflicts; but uncertainty regarding America's commitment to the region has allowed an extensive array of interpretations on the part of regional powers. Georgia and Azerbaijan have perceived an implied American commitment to their security, and voiced hopes of being accepted into NATO--thereby infuriating Moscow. Yet Washington remains undecided on how far it wishes to confront Russia in the region.

Further to the east, the U.S. has remained on the sidelines of the Afghanistan conflict during the entire 1990s, and has not been actively involved in the search for solutions there. In particular, the U.S. policy toward the Pakistan-backed Taliban movement's rise to power was vague: allegations of initial U.S. support for the Taliban contain strong circumstantial evidence. Washington's recent anti-Taliban shift is defined by a single issue: Osama Bin Laden, whereas a larger regional picture is absent. With regard to Pakistan, a long-time ally of the U.S., Washington's stance is ambiguous. There has been a tendency toward a rapprochement with India at Pakistan's expense; indeed, despite the fact that the Indian nuclear explosions of 1998 preceded and arguably set off the Pakistani ones, U.S. sanctions on South Asia have affected Pakistan disproportionately.

IMPLICATIONS: The lack of a clearly formulated U.S. policy grounded in a long-term strategy towards the Caspian-Asian region has contributed to the increasing instability of the region. Whereas the U.S. claims to engage this crucial region of the world, it does so in a less than predictable and coherent manner. Since the Fall 1999, the Caucasus has returned to a downward spiral with Russia’s renewed war in Chechnya, Armenia's instability after the 27 October murder of its prime minister and parliament speaker, and mounting tensions between the Georgian government and its Armenian minority in Javakheti--incidentally the locus of a Russian military base.

As Russia is flexing its muscles in the Caucasus and attempting to reassert its power over the South Caucasian states, Washington just like in the early 1990s seems to prioritize relations with the Kremlin, generating uncertainty and thereby instability. In Central Asia, the lack American engagement and U.S. deference to Moscow compelled the primary regional power, Uzbekistan, to forge new security relations with Beijing and Moscow. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has been converted into a center for subversive and terrorist activities in Eurasia and globally. Beyond the well-known fact of Osama Bin Laden's base in Afghanistan, Islamic dissidents plotting to overthrow secular Central Asian governments as well as Chechen and Kashmiri rebels are some of the guests of the Taliban.

Washington is unable to look beyond the Bin Laden issue and tackle Afghanistan in a broader perspective. The same is true in the case of Pakistan. With a looming economic crisis deepening existing ethnic and sectarian cleavages, the stability of the nuclear weapon-state Pakistan must be considered a clear priority issue. Yet, Washington seems unable to formulate a clear policy, and is perceived in Pakistan as increasingly tilting toward India, thereby fueling anti-American sentiments and strengthening the position of Islamic extremists. Moreover, Pakistan remains the only actor with influence over the unruly Taliban. With its sway in Islamabad declining, Washington also decreases its ability to influence developments in Afghanistan. A loss of influence over Pakistan would be heavily detrimental to America's larger geo-strategic interests.

CONCLUSION: Given the gravity of the security threats in the Caspian-Asian region, it is imperative for the U.S. to formulate a coherent, long-term strategic agenda defining its interests and ways of promoting them. Washington must recapture the initiative by re-engaging the region, formulating priorities, and acting on them. In this context, America’s long-standing alliance with Turkey should be seen as an example of a commitment that generated stability in the country in question as well as its neighborhood.

In such a regional scheme, the U.S. must publicize its commitment to key states like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan, all states seeking U.S. assistance and with pivotal roles in regional security. While engaging them, Washington would also be able to exert influence on democracy-building and accountable governance, thereby furthering the long-term stability of these key states and reducing the risk of their implosion or destabilization.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Svante E. Cornell is at the departments of Peace and Conflict Research and East European Studies, Uppsala University (Sweden), and the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press/St. Martin’s Press, 2000, as well as articles on conflicts and geopolitics in Eurasia.

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