BACKGROUND: As one of the organizers of the 1991 Common National Congress of the Chechen people, Yusup Soslambekov read aloud and brought to a vote the resolution concerning Chechen independence.  The Chechen Congress chose Dzhokhar Dudaev to lead its executive committee and Soslambekov became one of his deputies.  This organization evolved into the post-Soviet Chechen government, in which Dudaev was president while Soslambekov served on various parliamentary committees. It is worth noting that the circles that initially pushed for Chechen independence were secular, intellectual, and moderate. In 1991 Soslambekov became a key figure in the Confederation of the Peoples of the North Caucasus (KNK) and in 1996 became president of the movement.  

In an interview with the author, Soslambekov explained that he sent Shamil Basaev and other Chechens to fight in Abkhazia against Georgia.  Those units played a key part in defeating the Georgian army. Soslambekov allowed that some KNK fighters may have been "used" by Russian security services while in Abkhazia.  However, he volunteered that the KNK became and remains deeply infiltrated by Russian security services, as are other social and political movements in the North Caucasus. Soslambekov never repudiated the KNK actions in Abkhazia, but on the contrary, continued to advocate active Russian support for the separatist movement in Abkhazia. Soslambekov became part of the anti-Dudaev opposition in 1993.  He did not play an important role during the first war although in 1997 he made an unsuccessful bid for the presidency.   He failed to find a position in the Maskhadov government.

In the summer of 1998, Soslambekov became Maskhadov's special representative charged with normalizing relations between Moscow and Grozny.  In this capacity he held meetings with the Russian Duma and Federation Council leaders, members of the government, and the presidential administration. The subject of negotiations was interstate relations which explicitly did not concern status for the Chechen side. The status question had already been decided, in favor of independence by the peace treaty of May 1997.  A draft agreement concerning technical questions such as customs and transport was produced. According to Soslambekov, two days after he delivered the draft treaty to both sides, Chechen field commanders Basaev and Salman Raduyev called a demonstration where they condemned the treaty and demand Soslambekov's resignation.  After this the latent competition between Maskhadov and Basaev became open and increasingly volatile.  All efforts to adopt a treaty ceased.

IMPLICATIONS: In May 2000, the "counter-terrorist operation" in Chechnya had clearly bogged down and protracted guerrilla warfare was in the offing.   The situation seemed ripe for political initiatives. These could take several forms: entering into negotiations with Maskhadov, as the legitimate president of Chechnya; summoning a new regional assembly; or appointing a viceroy to administer the territory in accordance with the metropolis's wishes. On May 26 Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) convened a roundtable to discuss such possibilities. In an atmosphere where each of the "Moscow Chechens" in attendance was vying to be Russia's pick for Chechnya's viceroy, Soslambekov was a resolute voice against the use of such "puppets."   Soslambekov argued vehemently that talks must be held with Maskhadov as the legitimate president of Chechnya and that the May 1997 peace treaty had established de-facto independence.

Soslamebekov disagreed with his central tenant that Maskhadov should have condemned Basaev's incursion into Dagestan last summer. According to Soslambekov "The Kremlin asking Maskhadov to condemn Basaev as aggression was pure provocation." In short, Soslambekov was expressing views that placed him firmly in Maskhadov's camp. Soslambekov wrote a peace proposal that called for negotiations with the Maskhadov government based on the constitutions of both countries and accompanied by a moratorium on military activities.  The first phase of the negotiations would concern setting up police and judicial institutions to cope with criminality, ensuring conditions for the return of refugees, and restoring goodwill among Chechens and Russians through legislation and the media.  A transition government of ambiguous composition and described in very general terms would manage these processes. 

Once the transitional government was created, the process of troop withdrawal from Chechnya Republic of Ichkeria would begin.  The final phase would regulate relations between Moscow and Dzhokhar, which would be based on the peace treaty concluded on May 12, 1997.  Then the process of disarming the population and rebuilding the republic could commence.  During the winter 1999/2000 Soslambekov repeatedly told media outlets that he wanted to serve as Maskhadov's representative for peace talks. In May, he stated that he was planning a trip to Chechnya and that he was being summoned there by Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov's representatives.  It is not certain whether he ever made the trip.

CONCLUSIONS: Soslambekov's peace process differed from the one put forward by Ilyas Akhmadov on June 5, 2000 in two important respects. Akhmadov does not envision a transition government and he repeatedly emphasizes the need for OSCE and other international participation.  Soslambekov's plan would result in a Chechnya governed by its own constitution, without Russian military presence, regulating its relations with Russia on the basis of the 1997 peace treaty.  It would be an independent state, but with a different government. On July 27, 2000 Soslambekov was shot in the head at close range while standing outside his Moscow apartment building. His death has many tragic dimensions for he met a violent end in the prime of his life.

The loss of Soslambekov is the loss of a capable politician who would have contributed to Chechnya's political development regardless of the outcome of the present war. It is also a loss to the historical record of the recollections of a person who could have told us a great deal more about the origins of Chechnya's quest for independence, it's government, and leading personalities. Soslambekov has bequeathed a monograph Chechnya (Nokhchich'o) A View from Inside, and numerous essays, articles, and interviews. Perhaps, it is a distortion to focus on the loss of one life when so many others have suffered and died in dehumanizing circumstances.  But it is the tragedy that forces us to focus on Soslambekov more than on other moderate Chechen leaders who have also perished recently. 

AUTHOR BIO: Miriam Lanskoy writes about the Caucasus region for the NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, a publication of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology andPolicy at Boston University. (www.bu.edu/iscip)

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