BACKGROUND: The Kursk disappeared on 12 August during a Northern Fleet training exercise. The last message sent by the Kursk was a request to proceed with a training torpedo launch. A week later in an announcement made on 19 August, the Dagestani Shura claimed that Dagestani martyrs had sunk the Kursk with a torpedo explosion. The Chechen guerrilla leader Khattab confirmed the sabotage in an interview. Such an action would be in character with Shamil Basayev’s previous operations. In November 1995, Basayev's agents committed the world's first incident of nuclear terrorism by leaving a 32 kilogram container of Cesium-137 in a Moscow park. Earlier in the year, Basayev seized over 1000 hostages in Budyennovsk. It is Basayev’s pattern that sensational gestures in view of the international press are worth more than a military victory in the mountains of Chechnya.

For Shamil Basayev, the sinking the Kursk could not be a more spectacular gesture of defiance against the Russian military, especially if men already on board offered him the opportunity. At the time of its sinking, three Dagestanis were in the sub's bow compartment. These included Chief Engineer Mahmed Gazhiyev, leading torpedoman Warrant Officer Abdulkadyr Eldarov, and Senior Lieutenant Arnold Borisov, Gadzhiyev's deputy. The naval operation in which the Kursk participated was the largest mounted in many years, and a prelude to a planned deployment to the Mediterranean this summer. Putin repeatedly expressed a determination to restore Russia’s global military presence, and, as its surface navy has dwindled, Russia’s submarine fleet has become increasingly prominent. The operation was as a showcase for Russian naval technology. Since the collapse of Communism, armaments along with oil have become the Russian Federation’s major source of hard currency.

Successful advanced weapons tests allow Russia to expand its market share of the international weapons trade. Some reports indicate that Gadzhiyev was to test an improved version of the VA-111 ("Shkval") torpedo, a high-speed cavitation rocket-propelled torpedo. The torpedo, in development since the 1980s, can achieve underwater speeds of nearly 200 m.p.h., and was designed as a "carrier-buster." Officials at the Dagdizel torpedo factory in Dagestan that produces the "Shkval" categorically deny testing this torpedo from the Kursk, stating that their two officials were overseeing tests of new accumulator batteries in standard torpedoes. The liquid-fueled improved "Shkval" was considered by submariners to be unsafe. The improved "Shkval" is launched using an hydrogen peroxide-kerosene mix, a highly inflammable combination. An early design of this torpedo for export had been displayed at an arms show in Abu Dhabi in 1985. Such a weapon would be a big seller in the international arms market, and there are reports that Iran was interested in acquiring the updated version.

IMPLICATIONS: The key to the Kursk explosion may well lie in the tortuous tangle of Chechen politics, and the bitter animosity between Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and Basayev. Maskhadov, Basayev and President Putin are fighting for control over the region’s richest asset: oil. While Dagestanis were greatly affected by what was happening to their west in Chechnya, the Chechen leadership was deeply divided as to how to cope with the Russian assaults. Maskhadov is a realist whereas Basayev is a Muslim radical who undercuts Maskhadov’s moderation at each opportunity. Maskhadov has openly blamed Basayev for the renewed conflict. When in April Maskhadov considered a de facto cease-fire with the Russians, Basayev threatened to kill Maskhadov's family if he proceeded. For Basayev, sinking the Kursk would likely enhance his own reputation while undercutting Maskhadov.

Crucial to understanding the Kursk explosion is the Dagdizel torpedo factory in Dagestan and its connection with Kursk Chief Engineer Mahmed Gazhiyev, a Dagestani who had worked with the Black Sea, Baltic, Pacific and Northern Fleets. According to Russian NTV, the twenty-year veteran was on the Kursk to test "the latest Dagdizel product." The engineers at the Dagdizel torpedo factory could not have been unaffected by the currents of violence, poverty, corruption and Islamization sweeping their republic. Kaspiisk, home of the Dagdizel plant, is a city of 80,000 that is located only eighteen kilometers southeast of the capital Mahachkala. Despite being a defense plant, Dagdizel was not immune from either political turbulence or criminal activity.

On 27 May ITAR-TASS reported that the FSB prevented the theft of 5,000 tons of nonferrous metals from the Dagdizel plant. The report noted, "the discovery of such a large amount of stolen products indicates that there is a ramified criminal network engaged in large scale theft." Security at the Dagdizel plant was drastically weak. However, for the Russian government to admit such a security lack would be to acknowledge that corruption had penetrated the supposedly secure military-industrial complex. The government is now concentrating on recovery of the bodies inside the Kursk, but this too is awash in controversy. While the government originally stated that it would raise the hull, Atomic Energy Minister Evgenii Adamov recently stated that there was no risk of radioactive contamination and so the hull need not be raised. The international picture is further clouded by the arrest of American Edmond Pope on suspicion of espionage. The Russian government charges that he was seeking designs of the improved version of the VA-111 ("Shkval") torpedo.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia depends heavily on Dagestan for its future prosperity. Dagestan contains 70% of Russia's Caspian coastline, a vital consideration for the division of Caspian territorial waters and their offshore petroleum deposits. Mahachkala has become Russia's southernmost ice-free port. The Russian presence intensified as the region's oil exports came onto the world market. In January 1999 Yeltsin issued a decree which established a military headquarters in Kaspiisk. Plans were developed for a base in Kaspiisk for coastal defense units and a flotilla of hovercrafts to reinforce the main Russian naval base at Astrakhan. These assets were all to protect Russian oil interests.

If Russia were to lose Dagestan, then it will not only lose any hope of an Azeri MEP pipeline to Novorossiisk but it will also see its claims to Caspian resources diminish by 70%. All sides have something to lose if it in fact comes out that the Kursk was destroyed by an act of Dagestani terrorism. Besides an immense financial loss, Putin’s government, elected on a platform of eradicating the Chechen "problem," could suffer an immense loss of face if Chechen claims proved valid. For Maskhadov, such an admission would be a tacit recognition that he has lost effective political control of his country. For the West, an acknowledgment that a single motivated individual could destroy a billion-dollar warship would likely lead to fears of copycat attacks. The recent attack on the USS Cole proves that such fears are not unfounded.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. John C. K. Daly received his Ph.D. in Russian Military and Middle Eastern studies from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London.

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