BACKGROUND: Most writing on international geopolitical rivalries in and around Central Asia focus on Russo-American competition. A growing literature also assesses Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish activities there. But there is also a visibly growing involvement of other major Asian states, not just in realizing a defense and security agenda, but also in the funding and development of major energy and infrastructure projects. This involvement, encompassing Japan, South Korea, and India as well as Pakistan, China, Iran, and Russia signifies a new trend towards the genuine internationalization of Central Asia’s foreign relations. Central Asian states have never neglected the purely Asian aspects of their foreign policy, and now Asian states are reciprocating.

From the beginnings of Central Asian statehood, governments there pursued security initiatives that mainly affected Asian governments. However, more recently both they and states like Russia and China have sought to involve Japan, South Korea, and India in major capital investment projects, largely relating to energy or to infrastructure investments like pipelines, and transport. Thus, China has solicited both Russian and South Korean assistance in its high priority investment program for Xinjiang. Russia, China and Japan are now trying to work out arrangements for financing pipelines and expediting delivery of Russian energy supplies in Siberia, from the Kovytinskoye oil and gas fields through Xinjiang and northern China to Japan. And Russia is developing transport projects tying it together with India and Iran. These projects obviously also involve Central Asian governments.

Japan, driven by its overall Eurasian initiative, very much stimulated by both security and energy needs, has substantially upgraded its Central Asian profile and investments, also meeting local interests in broadening the scope of foreign investment in Central Asia. South Korean efforts to penetrate Central Asian markets and enhance its investment have also been noticed there. India’s rising interest in Central Asia likewise owes much to its efforts to deny Pakistani influence there and to improve relations with Russia and China while curbing the incidence of Islamic insurgency at home and in Central Asia. Russia is attempting to link North and South Korean railroads to its system and create an "Iron Silk Road." And Russia is developing transport projects linking it with India and Iran. Those transport projects do not merely tie those states together with intervening Central Asian states. Rather, India is also poised to become a major investor in Sakhalin's oil projects and in new explorations in the Bay of Bengal.

IMPLICATIONS: East Asian and Central Asian states are also investigating major infrastructure and energy projects in East Asia. We now see rising East and South Asian interest in Central Asia and growing Central Asian interest in those states. This is not just a matter of gaining diplomatic or even military support against Pakistan and Afghanistan-based terrorists. The energy interests and overall investment needs of these states appear to coincide to a high degree. Russia, like the Central Asian states, desperately needs markets, pipelines, and investment capital for its energy holdings. Meanwhile Japan, South Korea, China, and India are also searching for reliable and affordable sources of oil and gas to meet their rising demand for energy without depending excessively on OPEC. And they have the capital and technical skills to invest in those alternative sources of energy.

This complimentarity of economic interests frequently reinforces the major East Asian governments’ security interest in the internal stability of Iran, China, Russia, and the South Asian states of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The mutual penetration of the Central, South, and East Asian governments in funding or developing collective energy projects reflects their growing appreciation for just how important stable diversified energy sources are. It also reflects the fact that the internal stability of these states can have a substantial impact on the internal security of China, Russia, and South Asia, and thus on their own vital or important national interests.

East Asian economic and security interests, as well as South Asian, appear to be very compatible with the interests of Central Asian governments. By broadening the sphere of their interaction with these East Asian governments, the Central Asian governments maximize their opportunities for broader access to capital markets and diversify their foreign exposure. But they importantly also minimize the risks of excessive dependence on any one provider of major security goods, be they economic or military in nature. And this, in itself, will greatly increase the security of Central Asia.

CONCLUSIONS: The pattern of deepening East Asian-Central Asian interactions reflects both the interest of the concerned parties as well as the deeper and broader process of globalization by which Central Asian states are ever more integrated, first with the East Asian economy and then with the global economy. While these processes are not risk-free and indeed make serious demands upon the internal policies of Central Asian governments, they do give them more resources or at least access to more resources with which to meet internal and economic challenges.

These interactions also make it harder for any one state to dominate the Central Asian region. They also make it easier to pool resources among multiple partners, which is more economically advantageous to the partners involved, and more likely an outcome where major projects are concerned. This form of globalization also facilitates the multilateral development of Asian security in general, as well as its sub-regional components such as Central Asian security. Such globalization offers some hope that at least some Central Asian states can surmount their present serious threats and turn the corner to begin truly sustained economic growth and political development.

AUTHRO BIO: Professor Stephen Blank teaches in the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College located in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the United States Army, the United States Defense Department, or the United States Government.

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