Wednesday, 26 March 2003

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS REVEAL SERIOUS FLAWS IN ARMENIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM

Published in Analytical Articles

By Claude Zullo (3/26/2003 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: During and since the recent presidential election, Armenian opposition forces held a string of mass demonstrations in Yerevan to protest voting irregularities and the election’s disputed outcome. The Armenian government was caught off guard by the size of these protests, which according to estimates peaked between 45,000 and 100,000 people. Since the first round of voting, the Kocharian government resorted to extreme measures to ensure success at the polls, including the detention of scores of opposition supporters for allegedly organizing and leading unauthorized demonstrations, public disorder, hooliganism, and disobeying police.
BACKGROUND: During and since the recent presidential election, Armenian opposition forces held a string of mass demonstrations in Yerevan to protest voting irregularities and the election’s disputed outcome. The Armenian government was caught off guard by the size of these protests, which according to estimates peaked between 45,000 and 100,000 people. Since the first round of voting, the Kocharian government resorted to extreme measures to ensure success at the polls, including the detention of scores of opposition supporters for allegedly organizing and leading unauthorized demonstrations, public disorder, hooliganism, and disobeying police. According to the OSCE’s Election Observation Mission, at least 200 individuals were detained as of March 6. Reports from various sources indicate that dozens more of suspected opposition supporters have been arrested or detained since the final round of the election. The common denominator among those arrested or detained seems to have been that either they or a family member was an opposition supporter or actively spoke out against the violations that occurred during the elections. There are a number of disturbing aspects about the government’s tactics. First, the arrests and detentions not only violated the spirit but also the letter of the law. Many were arrested under Article 180 of the Code of Administrative Violations, which prohibits organizing and leading unauthorized marches and demonstrations, but not participation in such events. A number of persons who participated in but were not involved in organizing the rallies were arrested under this pretext. Others, who were merely passing by the protests, were also detained for similar reasons. In other instances, individuals were asked by police to speak with the head of police without an arrest warrant and were subsequently detained and/or sentenced. Under Armenian law, if an individual agrees to accompany police in the absence of a warrant, that person must be released. Second, there seems to be overwhelming evidence that individuals were under surveillance. A number of individuals were arrested at their homes or stopped while driving and hauled off by police. In some instances, police detained the relatives of those being sought until the latter showed up at police headquarters. Third, fundamental legal procedures and standards fell by the wayside. Special Police and Interior Ministry units were deployed around the central courthouse. Many of the accused were not provided with legal representation or a copy of the court’s decision, which is necessary to lodge an appeal. Oftentimes, judges rendered decisions in absentia. One of the most highly publicized cases involves the detention of Artur Sakunts, head of the Vanadzor branch of the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly (HCA). On March 14, the Helsinki Assembly Vanadzor office was firebombed a day before a planned a protest over voting violations. Despite the incident, the protest went ahead as planned, only to have police disperse the gathering and take Sakunts into custody.

IMPLICATIONS: The government’s actions have had and will likely continue to have a number of ramifications. First, its actions appear to be backfiring. Arrests and detentions seem to be fueling continued opposition rallies. On March 21, thousands of Demirchian supporters marched past the main police building in Yerevan to demand the release of all detainees. Mass protests by the opposition and, as a consequence, arrests and detentions will likely continue and impact the May 2003 parliamentary elections. Second, as the American Bar Association’s CEELI program recently reported in its Judicial Reform Index for Armenia, the executive branch’s extensive involvement in the judicial appointment and disciplinary processes infringes on the independence of the judiciary. The judiciary’s involvement in closed-door trials is clear evidence of its lack of independence. This can only exacerbate the already low esteem in which judges are held and further undermine public confidence in the legal system. Third, the government’s sights may now be set on criminal defense advocates because of their efforts to defend detainees. Only days ago, the Council of Europe organized a conference on the regulation of the profession of lawyers and the provision of legal aid services in Armenia. One issue that the Ministry of Justice raised was the creation of an association, not just for independent lawyers, but one that would include prosecutors and judges. The question remains if such a broad association of legal professionals is created, to what extent it might come under the thumb of the Ministry of Justice. If such an association were created, it might not only provide a mechanism for controlling independent lawyers but may also serve as a means of retaining control over the judiciary once key constitutional amendments are passed. Finally, the government’s actions may adversely affect Armenia’s integration into in European institutional structures and relations with the West. The Council of Europe, which admitted Armenia two years ago based on the condition of further democratization, has already promised unspecified consequences. Moreover, sources indicate that Western donors could set tougher conditions for loans and grants to the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: Maintaining control over parliament is as critical for Kocharian as was getting reelected, which will likely force his government to continue some of the same tactics that now being employed. This may, in turn, force Western donors and European institutions to take tougher measures against the government, which may hurt the Kocharian government in the long run. If the West does not engage Armenia’s government now, it will be difficult to ensure that the upcoming parliamentary elections are free and fair. Moreover, attention needs to be paid to the constitutional referendum and follow-on activities as well. For example, the proposed amendment package would institute changes in the judicial appointment and disciplinary processes that can potentially enhance the independence of the judiciary. In addition, the amendments would also institute an ombudsman’s office to investigate human rights abuses. Once these amendments are passed, intense work will be needed in drafting the constitutional laws that flow from these amendments in order to clarify how those amendments are implemented. In addition, international organizations, foreign embassies, and rule-of-law implementers need to support the independence lawyers, particularly criminal law advocates, as they are the first line of defense against civil and human abuses of the state.

AUTHOR BIO: Claude Zullo is Associate Country Director for the Caucasus at the American Bar Association’s Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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