Thursday, 03 October 2024

One Step Forward, Half a Step Back: The Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders

Published in Analytical Articles

By Farkhod Tolipov

On August 9-10, 2024, the Sixth Consultative Meeting of the Presidents of Central Asian states was held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. During this meeting, a number of strategically important documents were adopted, including the “Conception of Regional Cooperation until 2040.” Expectations were high regarding the potential for new initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration, and significant progress was indeed made. However, the pace of this process was perceived as excessively slow, with the participating presidents displaying a degree of caution. While the Conception is promising and forward-looking, it appears to lack the necessary conceptual strength to effectively guide regional cooperation.

Sixth Consultative Meeting of Heads of Central Asian States Takes Place in  Astana - The Times Of Central Asia

BACKGROUND: Regional integration in Central Asia was formally declared by the five independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, the integration process has progressed through several significant phases. However, throughout this period, these nations have contended with substantial geopolitical burdens. The admission of Russia to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) led to the merger of the CACO with the Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES), resulting in the dissolution of the CACO. This state of “frozen integration” persisted for nearly a decade until 2017, when the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoev, initiated a revitalization of the integration process by proposing the establishment of Consultative Meetings (CM) of the Central Asian presidents. CMs were held in Astana in March 2018; Tashkent in November 2019; Avaza, Turkmenistan in August 2021; Cholponata, Kyrgyzstan on July 20-21, 2022, and Dushanbe in September 2023. During each CM, the presidents adopted a Joint Statement – a declarative document that, while important, primarily serves to express their unity, fraternity, and common intentions. At the fourth CM, the presidents adopted the Treaty “On Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century.”  This treaty, while unique, effectively complemented a collection of existing strategically significant documents, such as the Treaty “On Eternal Friendship” signed in 1997, and the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Treaty “On Alliance Relationship” signed in December 2023. During the third CM, a Joint Statement was issued in which the presidents tasked their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs with developing the Treaty for presentation at the subsequent meeting. This task was successfully accomplished, illustrating a relatively new approach to regional decision-making: the leaders had begun to draft roadmaps and plan actions from one meeting to the next. When the presidents of Central Asia convene for their summits, Russian media consistently respond to these events by expressing geopolitical concerns regarding the “without-Russia” nature of these gatherings. While such reactions may appear ridiculous, baseless, and unfriendly, they reveal an underlying truth: Moscow is genuinely apprehensive about the potential loss of its neo-imperial influence in Central Asia, particularly in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The fourth CM itself and the treaty adopted during the meeting convened the impression of an inadequately slow progress of regional integration. Notably, the presidents of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have hitherto abstained from signing the Treaty “On Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation,” and the Treaty was not even mentioned during the sixth summit.  Yet while the Treaty appears to have been forgotten, the Conception-2040 was adopted, indicating a potential shift in focus away from previous agreements toward broader strategic visions for regional cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: The title of the Conception-2040 emphasizes cooperation rather than integration. Not only does the title overlook the notion of “integration,” but the text of the Conception itself does not mention this concept at all. This omission raises the question of whether, by 2040 – nearly half a century after gaining independence – Central Asian nations will still not be fully integrated. Moreover, by 2040, it is unlikely that the current presidents will still be in power, making it improbable that they would take political and moral responsibility for the implementation or non-implementation of the Conception. In contrast to previous CMs, this summit introduced several innovative ideas. The President of Uzbekistan proposed the establishment of a Free Trade Zone and a Common Market in Central Asia. The President of Kazakhstan suggested the re-establishment of Water-Energy and Transport Consortiums. One of the most significant ideas articulated during the summit was President Tokaev’s proposal to create a “defense and security architecture” in Central Asia and to develop a Catalog of Security Risks for the region. This proposal is indeed timely and, if realized, it would signify a genuine breakthrough in regional integration. However, three Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and two of them – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – are also members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Clearly, these two structures divert the Central Asian states from pursuing solely regional formats of integration. Consequently, the timely idea of establishing a regional security and defense architecture will inevitably conflict with the commitments of Central Asian states to CSTO and EAEU. Overall, the initiatives proposed during the sixth Consultative Meeting bear resemblance to the European functionalist approach to regional integration, wherein the unification process gradually extends from one sphere to another based on successful cooperation in each domain.  The recent summit fostered the impression of synchronized regional policies between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In March 2024, the leaders of these two states convened for an informal meeting in the Uzbek city of Khiva, during which they announced their intention to act in “tandem,” indicating a close and empathetic relationship. This mode of cooperation was preceded by the signing of the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Treaty “On Alliance Relationship” in December 2022. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on Alliance Relationships in April 2024. Additionally, Kazakhstan has similar alliance treaties with both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This trend reflects the overarching direction in regional affairs within Central Asia, which is driven by a historical imperative for integration. There is now a demand for the transformation of several bilateral alliances into a cohesive regional alliance in Central Asia. This process should, in theory, facilitate the rapid institutionalization of integration within a shorter timeframe than the proposed deadline of 2040. Furthermore, the idea of forming, strengthening, and developing a “regional identity” was officially articulated for the first time during the summit. This significant notion has gained considerable relevance and academic attention and is now recognized by the leaders of the five Central Asian countries. This discourse bears resemblance to the European identity narrative, which emerged in the context of deep political and social integration. However, while the European identity is a byproduct of robust integration among European nations, the impetus for stronger integration in Central Asia is largely rooted in the pre-existing regional identity shared by the nations of the region. Thus, the sixth Consultative Meeting left an ambiguous impression. On one hand, it showcased a relatively “new thinking,” as the presidents discussed regional identity and the establishment of a regional security architecture. On the other hand, after 33 years of independence, they appeared hesitant to engage in discussions about the prospects for full integration, even extending to the year 2040.

CONCLUSIONS: The question of whether to pursue consultation or integration has become a dilemma for the presidents of Central Asia. By designating their meetings as consultations from the outset, they appear to have alleviated themselves of greater responsibility for regional affairs. This tendency may stem from a prevailing perception – the memory of the failures of integration during the 1990s and early 2000s – that continues to shape their decision-making regarding regional development. Additionally, the geopolitical landscape, characterized by Russia’s divide-and-rule policy, can further impede the momentum of this process. It is important to recognize that the evolution of integration in Central Asia is likely to encounter friction, which is inevitable in any context of international relations. However, as long as the course of regional affairs is primarily dependent on the decisions of the presidents, the potential for aberrations in the integration process will remain significant and even risky. It is evident that the overall pace of the CMs is too slow, and the leaders are overly cautious. One contributing factor to this hesitance is the absence of a conceptual vision for the future. The leaders continue to avoid discussing integration, instead opting for rhetoric centered on cooperation, which obscures and undermines the genuine goals of regional development based on a shared regional identity. Another related issue is the elitist nature of the CMs, which remain a power-centric process. It is crucial for civil society and the expert community to be actively involved in this discourse. To paraphrase a classical maxim, we might argue that integration is too important and too serious an issue to be left solely in the hands of presidents.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Read 15282 times Last modified on Wednesday, 04 December 2024

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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